This is an impressive book on many levels. The author Andrew March skillfully navigates between the seemingly disparate disciplines of modern Western political theory and medieval Islamic legal and political thought and puts them into conversation with one another—not a mean feat in itself. March then proceeds to show how important this conversation is for the construction of what might be termed in this context “a doctrine of liberal citizenship” for contemporary Muslims from within an Islamic legal-theological matrix. In the process he demonstrates enviable command of relevant sources in both Western languages and Arabic; the latter aptitude in particular establishes his qualifications for engaging in such an intense study of a timely but highly challenging and knotty issue.
The book is divided into three main sections: the first section deals with comparative political theory and ethics, focusing primarily on John Rawls's theory of political liberalism; the second section deals with arguments produced within the Islamic, primarily legal, tradition that may be deployed against political liberalism; and the final, possibly the most important, section deals with what the author terms “Islamic affirmations of liberal Citizenship.” In this last section, the author grapples inter alia with formidable matters, such as the loyalty of Muslim citizens to a non-Muslim state, expression of solidarity with non-Muslims on the part of Muslims, and their full recognition of non-Muslims as equal citizens.
March is at his most confident in the first section, which offers a carefully parsed and insightful reading of Rawl's views on the potential for creating an overlapping consensus among citizens of the liberal state who otherwise have different and potentially contradictory metaphysical commitments. Rawls specifically takes religious commitments into consideration in the creation of this overlapping consensus and his theory of liberal citizenship is based on eliciting “reasonable” and “reasoned” participation from a diverse citizenry who are not required to sacrifice such commitments. As such, his theory has been considered particularly relevant in the contemporary period in relation to Muslims (as it is to other faith communities). March clearly demonstrates how this Rawlsian perspective can prove to be a significant point of departure for developing an Islamic liberal theory of citizenship in the context of non-Muslim societies.
The author is on somewhat less firm ground when he proceeds next to engage Islamic sources and Muslim thinkers from the premodern and modern periods in order to determine the possibilities of formulating such a theory. Comprehensive and learned as this book is, there are two fundamental problems that I perceive in the author's premise and methodology as they pertain to the second and third sections of the book.
First, it is assumed by the author that the classical legal tradition defines “Islam”—this is in many ways the main conceit of the book. Thus March pays scant attention to theological and ethical works from the classical and medieval periods that were influential in their day (a number of which continue to be influential today) and pays disproportionate attention to legal treatises and politico-juridical works. This is not to deny that the works discussed by the author were influential in their time—they were—but to assume that they were all-defining of the variegated Islamic religious, intellectual, and ethical traditions is rather reductive and historically skewed. Classical juridical positions on particularly administrative matters and relations with non-Muslim authorities often evolved out of pragmatic engagements with the real world and reflect the Realpolitik of their times, rather than theological and doctrinal positions. Viewed from this vantage point, such legal opinions are therefore rightly seen as time-contingent and subject to change as socio-historical circumstances change. An expansive definition of the Islamic tradition that goes beyond its legal component also broadens the repertoire of ideational possibilities from which contemporary Muslims may plausibly and legitimately fashion appropriate responses to modern problems.
A second problem, ensuing from the first, is that modernist Muslims are sometimes then assumed by the author to be somewhat divorced from the classical Islamic tradition or dallying with newfangled notions when they espouse positions that are often at odds with those adopted by classical jurists from after the third century of Islam. It is also highly problematic that Rashid Rida, Syed Qutb, and Yusuf al-Qaradawi are made to be representatives of an assumed typical-ideal-authentic Islamic tradition which conveniently for the author coincides with the bulk of classical medieval Islamic legal interpretations. Muhammad ‘Abduh, a seminal and towering figure who triggered and shaped early Islamic modernism in the nineteenth century, is a marginal figure at best in this book. ‘Abduh's thought and voluminous writings, however, can only be ignored at one's peril in a project of this undertaking. Although Rida was a close disciple of ‘Abduh and started his career as a modernist, his views veered off in a different direction in his later years and he cannot be considered to be a faithful representative of the Abduhian school after that period.
In addition to ‘Abduh, recent and contemporary influential scholars of a liberal bent, such as Fazlur Rahman, Selim al-‘Awwa, Nurcolish Majid, Azizah al-Hibri, and Hasan Hanafi, for example, do not appear at all. Tariq Ramadan receives occasional but not in-depth attention. One does wonder why the writings of Rida, Qutb, and al-Qaradawi are considered to be more representative of a current prevailing consensus in Muslim-majority countries than their more liberal peers. While Rida as ‘Abduh's disciple is definitely worthy of attention, the remaining two raise eyebrows for the following reasons: Qutb was not even a credentialed scholar of religion and law and his strident writings circulate only in circumscribed, militant circles, while the more conventionally trained al-Qaradawi's popularity is due mainly to his media celebrity status, thanks to his frequent appearances on al-Jazeera cable television from his current perch in Doha, Qatar. Considering al-Qaradawi's writings to be reflective of prevalent thinking in a hugely diverse Muslim world is the equivalent of considering Rush Limbaugh's and Glenn Beck's extremist rhetoric today to be representative of predominant intellectual trends within American society, mainly on account of their mega-celebrity status.
As a result of this lopsided treatment, March is on occasion left reinventing the wheel. For example, the issue of the equal treatment of all citizens had already exercised the minds of earlier scholars. In the nineteenth century, ‘Abduh in his influential Qur'an commentary Tafsir al-manar had cogently and decisively argued in favor of such an egalitarian policy being implemented in the modern Muslim polity, irrespective of religion or gender or social status because, he asserted, the nonnegotiable objective of the religious law—to ensure justice—demands such equality in the modern period. Our early sources for Islam in fact point to a strong religious and gender-egalitarian orientation within the Muslim polity in the first and second centuries of its existence, just as later sources document a slow process of attrition of this egalitarianism as far more worldly concerns impinged upon the reading of the religious law. Rather than being mavericks, a critical, contextualized reading of Islam's own sources reveals that modernists like ‘Abduh and Fazlur Rahman are actually much closer to the élan and Geist of the early period of Islam and more credible in their interpretations of the Qur'an than many of the classical jurists, such as al-Shafi'i and al-Mawardi, for example, whose zeal for empire often colored their legal judgments. This misreading of the modernist enterprise leads March on occasion to devalue modernist interpretations as deviations from the earlier Islamic tradition. Thus he regards the modern, liberal understanding of the military jihad as primarily defensive in nature as a break with the legal tradition when this was the documented position of influential early eighth-century jurists such as Sufyan al-Thawri, Ibn Jurayj, Sa'id b. al-Musayyab, Ibn Shubruma, and others who adhered to the categorical Qur'anic proscription against initiating aggression (Qur'an 2:190). Historical examples such as these suggest that uncritically recuperating the classical legal tradition wholesale in the contemporary period may not be such a good idea and is very likely not feasible. Fazlur Rahman in fact had warned the Muslims of his time that if they were to move forward in their engagement with the modern world, they would have to leave much of the classical legal tradition behind them—what he tended to describe as “historical Islam,” that is to say, the Islamic tradition that was constructed in history primarily by the jurists—and advance towards “normative Islam” that can be rehabilitated from the Qur'an and early hadith and exegetical literature. Such an approach would allow for a much more flexible and nuanced approach to the Islamic legal and intellectual tradition. It is a warning that modernist and liberal Muslims, such as Khaled Abou el Fadl, Tariq Ramadan, Azizah al-Hibri, and Asma Barlas, to name just a very few—are heeding today and in the process are developing interpretations of fundamental Islamic principles that are intended to serve both their faith and the times they live in. March's attempts to illuminate congruities between classical Muslim legal interpretations and modern Western liberal construals of citizenship are often insightful and creative, but—given the premises of his hermeneutic enterprise—ultimately limited.
Attempting to reconcile faith and modern praxis is not merely a revisionist intellectual undertaking on the part of liberal Muslim scholars today. On a more empirical level, the desire to reconcile religious beliefs with modernity has been documented over and over again on the part of populations in Muslim-majority societies. Consistent polling in Muslim-majority societies shows that overwhelming majorities want democratic forms of government along with shari‘a, seeing no disjunction between the two; especially when it is understood that shari‘a is a many-splendored thing and can be understood in multiple ways—and yes, even in very liberal ways—by different groups of people. The recent so-called Arab Spring has spectacularly confirmed these demographic trends in recent times. Bringing these more potent indices of popular and intellectual trends into the discussion—perhaps in the next updated edition—will confer a greater aura of plausibility on the otherwise compelling narrative of this book.
Finally, an urgent question has to be asked: What will happen to the whole concept of “political liberalism” when in an increasing number of Western societies today there is a progressive attrition of civil rights and religious freedom for targeted minority groups under various pieces of illiberal legislation—such as Muslims in France and Holland subject to the burqa ban or in the United States under certain provisions of the Patriot Act? If those described as liberal democracies are ultimately willing to betray an overarching commitment to equal rights and the rule of law in the name of security or cultural “authenticity” or mere political convenience, what will be the fate of the liberal experiment itself and the overlapping consensus that was meant to sustain it? Unfortunately, given the times we live in, this is a question that will very likely be increasingly posed in the public sphere; the answers may not bode well for our collective future.
