This Cambridge Companion provides a comprehensive analysis of the most important themes of Heidegger’s major work. The 17 essays in this collection offer a concise introduction for undergraduate students and an important contribution to the field. Current debates amongst specialists are addressed, such as provocative interpretations of Heidegger’s conception of understanding, sense and meaning, and the centrality of the question of being. Key essays explore these issues taking into account the analysis of temporality in the second division of Being and Time, a practice that reflects the contemporary focus on this important book. Also showcasing the volume’s contemporary tone is the authors’ common use of different translations for key Heideggerian terms. This approach to Heidegger’s idiosyncratic language is further indicative of an attempt to break through the unproductive habit of relying on Heidegger’s own manner of expression to explain or describe ambiguous passages.
The first essay by Mark A. Wrathall and Max Murphey succeeds in presenting a succinct and in-depth summary of the whole book in one introductory chapter, reminding the reader that Being and Time was, in Heidegger’s own estimation, left incomplete and still unclear regarding the central ‘ontological problematic,’ namely, the meaning of being. The second essay in turn offers a historical context of the work; Alfred Denker delves into the circumstances surrounding the writing of Being and Time and portrays it as rather the product of Heidegger’s confrontation with various, distinct philosophical researches that would later come under one theme, which will become the central thesis of Being and Time, i.e., the formulation that time is the transcendental horizon of the question of the meaning of being.
In their own manner, several authors suggest that to fully grasp the import of Heidegger’s existential analytic, an understanding of the criticality of the meaning of being in the project is required. Two essays stand out in this regard. Taylor Carman’s “The Question of Being” explains that, while Being and Time does not answer its opening question regarding the meaning of being, it nevertheless gives an account of the hermeneutic conditions that render this question intelligible. Carman explains that after Being and Time Heidegger comes to emphasize the phenomenological import of his first major work, focusing on the question of being as an experience rather than as an interrogation that needs to be answered. In the last essay of the volume, Thomas Sheenan focuses on Heidegger’s later concern with meaning rather than the concept of being. Sheehan demonstrates that meaning as opposed to being was already the most fundamental notion for Heidegger in Being and Time, and accordingly attempts to incentivize a shift in the field by underscoring the meaning-process in Heidegger’s phenomenological project and further indicating the centrality of the human being for any investigation of existence.
In the same vein, subsequent essays concentrate on topics that have been left undeveloped or are the subject of conflicting interpretations. An example of the latter is Iain Thomson’s essay, in which he offers a deep analysis of the factors that contribute to and perpetuate the controversy in the literature over the meaning of ‘death’ in Heidegger’s work. Heidegger’s pragmatic-existential account of language is investigated by Barbara Fultner, while Wayne Martin focuses on the logical form that sustains Heidegger’s use of modal claims. Matthew Ratcliffe gives a provocative interpretation and critical discussion of Heidegger’s novel notion of ‘mood,’ and Joseph K. Schear provides an analysis of the obscure chapter in Being and Time on temporality and historicality.
Many essays present Heidegger’s arguments in Being and Time in juxtaposition to Descartes’ subject/object dualism and its epistemological and metaphysical implications. Heidegger’s criticism of the Cartesian subject as an isolated mind severed from the world is employed by authors as the foil to the explication of and elaboration on difficult concepts in Being and Time. David R. Cerbone argues that Heidegger’s sense of bodily forms of proximity as circumspective coping stands at odds with his explication of proximity in terms of (cognitive) attention, such that the derivative nature of a secondary sense of metric space is fraught with inconsistencies, to the point that notions of ‘nearness’ and ‘farness’ in Being and Time would require some residual Cartesianism in order to make sense as spatial notions. In “Being-with-Others,” Hubert L. Dreyfus appeals to the neurophysiological concept of mirror neurons to argue that the type of imitation that these make possible provides a physiological basis for the shared character of our activities and shared intelligibility of the world in general, an account that is outlined to support Heidegger’s criticism against the mistaken ontology of human beings as self-sufficient, isolated Cartesian subjects. Denis McManus explicates that for Heidegger scepticism is an expected outcome when one adopts the Cartesian thinking subject as the basis for knowing, since the ontological foundation of such a subject cannot makes sense of the intentionality of belief and its ability to represent or misrepresent states of affairs.
The Kantian tradition is also central to various essays and provides the context for the development of the discussions. Heidegger’s views on freedom are revised by Béatrice Han-Pile, who explains that Dasein’s ability to choose to be free, unlike Kant’s and Sartre’s appeals to an act of willing, involves the openness to a call of conscience that summons Dasein to be responsible for itself as much as the constraints of facticity and finitude allow. Heidegger’s engagement with Kant and Neo-Kantianism is the topic of Peter E. Gordon’s essay, in which he analyzes the extent to which Heidegger’s depiction of the relation between Dasein’s understanding of being and its ontological foundation endorses some form of inverted idealism. Stephan Käufer provides a detailed analysis of section 65 in Being and Time, a point in the book in which the phenomenological analysis of Division I develops into a transcendental argument that parallels Kant’s transcendental reduction and schematism.
The influential work of three Heidegger experts—Carman, Dreyfus, and William Blattner—has a strong presence in the theoretical background against which discussions and questions are developed in several chapters, something that might present some difficulty to beginning readers of Heidegger. However, this does not necessarily demand an exhaustive acquaintance with their previous contributions as major arguments are sufficiently summarized. In conclusion this companion volume provides a comprehensive analysis of the key themes in Being and Time and familiarizes readers with the new directions in Heidegger studies.
