The title of Antonios Tzanakopoulos's monograph Disobeying the Security Council: Countermeasures against Wrongful Sanctions is to the point and misleading at the same time. That the disobedience of states in response to wrongful sanctions should be qualified as countermeasures is the book's central – and most original as well as provocative – argument, thus making for a fitting title. Yet, the book is much more than just a discussion of how states’ disobedience should be viewed, in that it covers a wide array of issues relating to the responsibility of international organizations (IOs). In this sense, the title of the author's DPhil thesis (‘Responsibility of the United Nations for Wrongful Security Council Non-Forcible Measures’), on the basis of which the book developed, more precisely describes the true purview of this impressive work. After all, Disobeying the Security Council is nothing less than an in-depth and comprehensive study of the responsibility of the United Nations for wrongful sanctions – a topic that is, without doubt, of great importance. An introduction clarifying this would have helped the reader, who, on the basis of the book's title, might wonder why the question of disobedience is addressed only in the last quarter of the book. Once the broad scope of the study is realized, however, it follows logically that its structure traces, after a concise discussion of responsibility as a form of accountability (Chapter 1), the classical elements of the law on international responsibility, namely the engagement of responsibility (Part I), the determination of responsibility (Part II), and the consequences of responsibility (Part III).
The first chapter in Part I approaches the ‘thorn[y]’ (p. 17) issue of attribution of conduct to the United Nations at some length. The author notes that the conduct proper of the Security Council is almost entirely limited to the promulgation of ‘normative acts’, which are themselves attributable to the Security Council and thus the United Nations, even if ultra vires (pp. 20–33). The more complex question is how far the acts of member states can be attributed to the Security Council – a question that draws its relevance from the fact that most acts of the Security Council require implementation by member states in order to become operational. Basing himself on an incisive analysis of the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (DARIO), the author argues in favour of going beyond the commission's work and recognizing the notion of ‘effective normative control’ as a ground for attribution under what is now Article 7 (pp. 34–45). According to him, when a state is obliged to adopt certain conduct by a binding decision of an IO without any margin of appreciation (see p. 40), the conduct should be directly attributed to the IO, notwithstanding the fact that it may also be concurrently attributable to the state. He maintains that recognition of ‘normative control’ only as a basis for ‘derivative responsibility’ under Article 15 DARIO is insufficient and that ‘a more coherent interpretation would allow for direct attribution’ (p. 50). While the presented arguments are sound, the discussion is more of theoretical than practical relevance, since the end result – namely that exercising ‘effective normative control’ can engage the IO's responsibility – does not depend on whether we speak of direct or derivative responsibility. As a matter of fact, the entire discussion on attribution of member states’ conduct may be somewhat obiter, but we will come to that later. For now, we move to the question of obligations of the Security Council, which the author discusses in the next chapter.
The author surveys the obligations incumbent on the Security Council under both the UN Charter and general international law. As regards the former, he concludes that the Security Council is duty-bound to determine the existence of a threat to peace under Article 39 of the charter before imposing sanctions, to act proportionately, and to respect the division of powers under the charter (pp. 57–69). The analysis becomes more provocative when it turns to general international law, where the author – after affirming that the council is directly bound by jus cogens (pp. 70–72) – argues that the Security Council would seem to be generally bound by customary international law because the charter does not enshrine the Security Council's right to depart from it (pp. 72–3). However, he further contemplates (and appears to endorse) that the will of the member states to give the Security Council the power to abrogate jus dispositivum could be presumed, in which case one would have to look for an explicit ‘intention to depart’ in a particular resolution under Chapter VII (p. 73). If one accepts this presumption, however, it is not obvious why a resolution that clearly conflicts with general jus dispositivum cannot be taken to express an implicit intention to derogate from this body of law. After all, if the power to depart can exist on the basis of a presumption, why can the use of that power not be presumed in the same way? Following the author's line of argument, the council could forgo a breach of an obligation deriving from jus dispositivum by simply declaring its intention to abrogate the relevant rule. If this is correct, why would the council not use this readily available ‘get-out-of-jail-free’ card whenever there is doubt as to the compliance of a particular resolution with general law? It might have been valuable to explore whether the intention to abrogate could be seen as implicit in a resolution that is contrary to general dispositive law and whether such an implicit intention could be sufficient to abrogate the dispositive law.
The author advances a different argument: he explains that Article 41 sanctions evince a ‘functional analogy’ to countermeasures, in that they always respond to a prior breach of international law by the sanction's target state (pp. 76–9). Employing a Kelsenite analysis, he argues that the condition of a sanction under Chapter VII is that a state's conduct poses a threat to the peace and that one can in fact deduce from this the existence of a primary rule that prohibits posing such a threat. If a state breaches this rule, the Chapter VII sanction functions analogously to a countermeasure. This approach allows the author to maintain that sanctions breaching jus dispositivum, in the absence of a clear intention to abrogate these rules in either the charter or the resolution itself, will nonetheless be lawful. He further argues that the functional analogy confirms that, unless an intention to abrogate is made clear, general law continues to apply – after all, we would otherwise not need the justifying qualification as a countermeasure (see p. 79). It further allows the sanctions to be judged against the substantive criteria applying to countermeasures, particularly as regards those parts of jus dispositivum that cannot be displaced by countermeasures (pp. 79–83). While these advantages may have some appeal and the argument is internally coherent, conceptual difficulties persist. First of all, not all Article 41 sanctions are directed against states; some prominent examples rather target individuals. Following the author's logic, one would have to conclude that there exists a primary rule under international law prohibiting individuals from posing a threat to the peace, which is a proposition difficult to sustain. Second, there exists a problem with regard to the submission that it could be presumed that the Security Council has the power to abrogate dispositive law: the author's argument in this regard in essence maintains that the Security Council is bound by jus dispositivum unless it decides to liberate itself from these obligations, but might then justify the voluntarily (and unnecessarily) committed breach of international law as a countermeasure. Again, if one accepts the proposition that the Security Council has the power to liberate itself from all obligations of jus dispositivum (including those it would have to respect in taking a countermeasure), the reasoning seems unnecessarily convoluted, given that no explanation was provided for why an intention to depart cannot be implied or why the Security Council would voluntarily limit its own power in such a way. In this regard, some doubts thus persist. However, what matters for the rest of the study is the unobjectionable conclusion that the Security Council is subject to some obligations and can thus engage the United Nations’ international responsibility by not acting in accordance with what is required. Who is to determine such a breach is discussed in Part II of the book.
The first chapter in Part II deals with the judicial determination of a breach (pp. 87–111). The author explores the possibilities of judicial determination at both the international and the national levels in order to examine whether there is such a thing as judicial review of SC decisions. He reaches the forceful conclusion that there is not, and that we have to look elsewhere for a determination of responsibility. The following chapter accordingly deals with the determination by states, arguing that states hold the power to auto-determine whether the Security Council has breached its obligations under international law. The conclusions drawn from the process of auto-determination are naturally not binding and the state, when relying thereon, acts at its own risk (pp. 116–17). However, this power, which can be exercised by both political and judicial domestic organs (pp. 123–9), is not unfettered. The author scrutinizes the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice to distil a strong ‘presumption of legality’ that can only be overcome in the most manifest cases of breach of obligation (pp. 120–2). Irrespective of some minor issues – for example, one searches in vain for a discussion of immunities in the section dealing with the determination of an IO's breach of international law by domestic courts – this chapter is thoroughly convincing. Apart from its important contribution to the overall argument, it more generally constitutes a skilful exposition of the basic structure of the decentralized international legal system, testifying to the author's mastery in this field.
Part III opens with a chapter on the content of international responsibility, discussing issues such as reparation, cessation, etc. in a clear and straightforward manner. It is after finishing this chapter that the reader finally arrives at the name-giving highlight of the book, namely the implementation of responsibility through self-enforcement (i.e., countermeasures). After a short excursion on whether the concept of ‘civil disobedience’ is useful to qualify disobedient behaviour by states (pp. 158–63), the author contends that disobedience can indeed be qualified as a countermeasure against a wrongful sanction and embarks on a discussion of the various elements of countermeasures, namely the illegality of the action being justified as a countermeasure, the illegality of the act to which the countermeasure responds, and finally the competence to take countermeasures.
The first contentious issue is thus whether disobedience is actually, per se, illegal under the charter. On the basis of two arguments, he submits that it is. First, the author argues that Article 25 of the charter does not grant member states a licence to disobey illegal resolutions. In reviewing the various interpretations of the phrase ‘in accordance with the present Charter’, his understanding appears to be that ‘only those decisions of the Council which are vested with binding force under other provisions of the Charter are to be accepted and carried out by M[ember] S[tates]’ (p. 165).Footnote 1 However, while his criticism of other interpretations is forcefully presented, this reading is not compelling either. In the end, it boils down to saying that member states are only bound by binding decisions, which, as Rosalyn Higgins remarked in 1972, is ‘more circular than helpful’.Footnote 2 One certainly cannot blame the author for being unable to solve the riddle that is Article 25 and, faced with this dilemma, one may indeed conclude that the author's approach of not relying on some expansive interpretation thereof is well justified (see also p. 177). Second, the author argues that illegality does not necessarily result in invalidity and that, next to the rebuttable presumption of legality that is attached to the United Nations’ acts, there also exists a ‘virtually irrebuttable’ (p. 170, emphasis in original) presumption of validity (pp. 166–77). The combination of these two points would appear to indicate that, while a state has the power to auto-determine that a resolution is illegal, it cannot auto-determine that a resolution is invalid and thus void of legal effect. In the final conclusion, it is therefore argued that even illegal normative acts bind states and that disobedience is therefore always illegal (pp. 176–7). This illegality could then only be cured by way of justification, in this case by qualifying the disobedience as a countermeasure. One may or may not agree with this conclusion, but the analysis leading up to it is powerful.
The next requirement discussed is that the illegal act constituting the countermeasure must be taken in response to a previous illegal act. It is in this context that questions of attribution resurface. Earlier on in the book, the author argued that normative acts, through which the Security Council acts, can either be unlawful in and of themselves, depending on the primary rule, or lead to unlawful implementing acts (see pp. 48–50). It was discussed at some length under what conditions the implementing act can be attributed to the Security Council, or at least trigger its responsibility in a derivative manner. The relevance of this discussion is called into question to some degree in this last chapter. For one, there is reason to believe that all sanctions ordering conduct that is in breach of an obligation imposed on the Security Council may be, per se, unlawful. In this context, Article 17 DARIO may be more useful than the author thinks:Footnote 3 not only does it establish a primary rule prohibiting the authorization or recommendation of conduct that is in violation of the organization's obligations (see p. 50), but it also forbids the imposition of an obligation to act in a way that would be illegal for the IO itself, regardless of whether any implementing act actually follows. In effect, the author himself at times appears to subscribe to the view that all such resolutions are unlawful.Footnote 4 Provided this is accepted, it is of no importance for the present study whether implementing acts can be attributed. If, on the other hand, it is maintained that, in some cases, it is really only the implementing act that is unlawful, then it has to be asked how far a refusal to implement (i.e., disobeying the command to implement) can itself be a countermeasure, as there is not (yet) an unlawful act to which the disobedience would react. These questions might have deserved some further contemplation.
The last major section discusses to whom the obligation to abide by SC decisions is owed and who has standing to invoke the United Nations’ responsibility for wrongful decisions in order to take countermeasures. As regards the former, the author argues that the obligation under Article 25 is owed to the United Nations as such, which, in consequence, means that it is susceptible to being breached in response to an unlawful act by the organization (pp. 177–9). With respect to the latter, it is argued that the Security Council's obligations under the charter – according to the author, the duty to find a threat to the peace, to act proportionately, and to respect the institutional division of powers – should be qualified as being of such a character as to allow all member states to take countermeasures in case the obligations are breached (pp. 179–85). As regards other rules of international law, the crucial question is whether states that are not individually injured can take countermeasures against the Security Council if a resolution breaches an obligation erga omnes (pp. 198–200). In light of his overall argument, it is not surprising that the author is in favour of accepting such a power. However, considering the centrality of this matter, particularly in view of the fact that the most prominent cases of disobedience have dealt with alleged violations of human rights owed erga omnes, one might have expected a somewhat more elaborate explanation of why the author comes to this conclusion.
Overall, the theoretical argument on countermeasures is well constructed. A powerful point of criticism, however, relates to the fact that the author cannot point to a single instance in which an actor actually justified disobedience as a countermeasure.Footnote 5 While he remarks that states are often reluctant to openly admit that they are taking countermeasures (p. 188), the absolute absence of any statements to this effect does somewhat undermine his claim to describe things as they ‘actually do look’, not as they should look.Footnote 6 While he convincingly demonstrates that the Organization of African Unity's actions against the Libya sanctions carry all the trademarks of countermeasures, save for an admission that these were countermeasures, the Organization of the Islamic Conference's rejection of the Bosnian arms embargo was clearly based on the fact that the relevant sanction was perceived as not binding due to its illegality (cf. p. 126). In effect, while the author's argument may thus provide a convincing ‘interpretation of state practice’Footnote 7 in some cases, it may be less persuasive in others. One may thus be tempted to conclude that practice, as is so often the case, escapes attempts to be explained by one single theory.
In conclusion, the author deserves much praise for his work. While the book is well written and structured, the sheer density of argument, the wealth of research, and the depth of thought make it a very rewarding yet equally challenging read. It is nothing less than a tour de force through the law of responsibility of international organizations, carried out with great intellectual rigour. Whereas one can, as I have at points done, disagree with certain conclusions and arguments, the integrity of the overall argument is beyond reproach.
Disobeying the Security Council constitutes a valuable contribution to the discussion about the accountability of the Security Council. With regard to unlawful sanctions, it demonstrates that the ‘invalidity approach’ has its flaws, and seeks to find another answer. Using a responsibility paradigm certainly adds to the debate and allows for novel insights. What is more, basing himself firmly on ‘classic’ public international-law arguments, the author avoids the many vexed questions that arise under constitutionalist approaches and demonstrates that the latter are by no means the only perspectives that can claim legitimacy in today's scholarship on the United Nations. With its rich contribution, Disobeying the Security Council can certainly be recommended to any international-law academic.
