Using a domestic political economy framework, Nathan Munier provides a rich analysis of how and why five African states have complied since its inception in 2003 with the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KP) for reducing and ultimately eliminating the trade in “conflict” diamonds. More importantly, he also offers a detailed theoretical framework of regime compliance that can be applied beyond the diamond sector. Munier’s goal is to explain both why states may go “above and beyond” a minimal level of cooperation and spend their scarce resources to enhance the viability of the KP itself and why some states may be able to attract more assistance in their efforts than others. What Munier does exceptionally well is give the reader ample evidence to support a domestic political economy framework as a necessary piece of the puzzle that explains why the KP, as a self-regulating regime with little real enforcement or punishment power, has persisted over time and what factors explain the waxing and waning of state compliance over time. One of the major contributions of this research beyond the focus on a specific regime is its nuanced approach to understanding negotiated international outcomes. Munier demonstrates that state preferences manifested at the international level are not unitary state-level decisions but, in fact, result from a complex and often contentious domestic decision-making process. Finally, Munier is concerned with the implications of global regimes like the KP on democratic development in states that are most heavily burdened by compliance, but the book does not fully answer this question.

Whereas previous research has focused on the origins of the KP, its limitations in controlling the black-market trade in diamonds, or the capacity of the framework to use agenda setting and moral suasion to induce states and private actors to comply, Munier returns our attention to self-interest to explain why some states have complied with the KP more than others. He argues that the KP is more about reinforcing already existing “modes of exchange” than it is about changing them to create a more just supply chain or new norms of behavior among actors within extractive industries. Munier’s basic argument is that private actors, most notably De Beers, saw the writing on the wall regarding both negative publicity and looming changes to its market share with the rise of concern over “conflict diamonds” and used the KP framework to reinforce their own positionality within the industry by influencing the regulatory decisions made by governments. In turn, government compliance is explained by three factors: the level of dependence on private corporations like De Beers, political geography, and the governing party’s policy preferences, which are always dependent on domestic political exigencies.

Munier uses a most-similar comparative case study design examining Angola, the Central African Republic, Namibia, Sierra Leone, and Zimbabwe. His theoretical framework demonstrates both within-case and across-case variance in compliance. In these five states, as well as in other diamond-producing nations in Africa, diamond extraction provides a key mechanism for obtaining foreign exchange. As Munier demonstrates, most of these states have a dependency on private corporations, most especially De Beers: the variance in this dependency largely explains variance in the level of compliance with the KP. As he states, “The ability to constrain state behavior in the future is likely to make economic actors interested in influencing international agreements. This can be a way for economic actors to consolidate gains and make sure that they will have a certain level of predictability of government policy in the future” (p. 49). The other two domestic political economy factors that augment the explanation of compliance variance are, as mentioned, the government’s policy preferences and political geography. Munier’s attention to these two factors is an important addition to the literature on the KP, which has largely focused on compliance as a question of norm failure and regime design.

Viewing compliance as inherently a political decision illuminates the challenge of global governance over extractive industries and validates the importance of understanding power differentials between NGOs and private corporate actors, as well as the governments that are dependent on them. Munier’s nuanced assessment of the internal politics of African regimes clarifies the extent of influence that a corporation like De Beers can have on policymaking, and his analysis of political geography—in terms of type (alluvial or primary), the spatial characteristics of diamond deposits in each state, and the capacity to police state borders—is very convincing in elucidating why diamond smuggling has continued long after the KP was adopted. If anything, Munier underplays the role of political geography in decoding the continued illicit trade in diamonds and, by extension, many other valuable extractive resources. Weak governments often have very limited reach beyond the main population centers and thus over large areas of their territory. If diamond deposits or other easily traded and highly valued goods happen to exist in areas that the government finds difficult to control, their illicit trade is guaranteed to continue, given the lack of opportunities for people in these areas and those goods’ value within international markets.

Although the intention of the KP has always been to keep diamonds obtained through violence out of the supply chain, its design is so narrow as to effectively make it more of a public relations tool for the diamond industry than an effective tool to stop diamond smuggling. Munier develops a robust theoretical framework squarely focused on the economic interests of public and private actors that also takes seriously the domestic political machinations that result in policy outcomes and the limitations placed on governments by geography. This research adds a valuable layer of analysis to understanding the KP’s effectiveness and provides valuable lessons for NGOs and policymakers who may be hoping to design similar regimes to govern other extractive industries. Ultimately, Munier reminds us that we cannot forget the basics: individual interests, incentives and, most especially, power differentials. Although significant previous research has focused on changing norms, corporate social responsibility, or diamond companies as “socializing agents” that can advance protections of human rights, Munier is most convincing in his arguments that economic self-interest is still the main explanatory factor for compliance. He concludes, “The focus on states as the major actor in creating and responding to an international agreement is outdated, as private economic actors continue to gain a level of influence that can rival, if not replace that of states, especially those that are resource dependent” (p. 163). The final chapter begins the conversation about how increased corporate power on the international stage might influence the capacity of states to grow democratically, but Munier does not fully answer his own questions on this front. Perhaps he is leaving those questions for his next book.