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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 February 2004
This book examines the views of David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first prime minister and defense minister, regarding Israel and Arab–Israeli relations from 1948 to 1956. It constitutes a recent addition to the growing body of literature on Israel, its foreign policy, and the Arab–Israeli conflict during the first years of statehood. Shalom treats the period between the first two Arab–Israeli wars in thematic rather than chronological fashion, but the title of the book is somewhat misleading. Ben-Gurion is at the center of this work, but the author devotes much attention to the views of his chief political rival, Moshe Sharett, who was prime minister from the end of 1953 to late 1955 and foreign minister from 1948 until June 1956, when Ben-Gurion forced him to resign.
Shalom's principal method is that of frequent quotations followed by a few paragraphs of analysis. The text includes more than 300 direct quotations, and many of them are quite lengthy. Yet in some sections, such as that dealing with Israel's policy of retaliation (pp. 122–31), Ben-Gurion is quoted only briefly, while the views of Sharett, Chief-of-Staff Moshe Dayan, and Pinchas Lavon (defense minister under Sharett) seem to hold sway. Moreover, Shalom's treatment of events of this six-year period is somewhat eclectic. Thus, he writes about Israel's December 1955 retaliatory raid against Syria but nowhere mentions the February 1955 Gaza raid against Egypt that marked Ben-Gurion's return as defense minister to Sharett's government. Yet that operation marked a historical turning point on the way to the 1956 war.
The issues to which Shalom devotes most of his attention are the borders that resulted from the 1948–49 confrontation, the armistice agreements that regulated the territorial status quo, and Ben-Gurion's approach to both the prospects for and possible ramifications of peace treaties with the Arab states. The author emphasizes that while Ben-Gurion held complex views of his country's salient concerns, pragmatism was his lodestar when dealing with those issues. Nevertheless, the focus is on Ben-Gurion's worldview rather than the policies that he pursued. In other words, this book is primarily about what Ben-Gurion said (or wrote), and not what he did.
Ben-Gurion was pessimistic regarding the chances of peace with the “Arab world,” because both the norms of Arab society and the character of its leadership militated against accommodation with the Jewish state. He rejected the premise of Yitzhak Tabenkin, the Israeli socialist leader, who viewed the exploited classes in the Arab countries as potential allies in making peace. In Ben-Gurion's eyes, Arab mobilization in the war of 1948 was sufficient proof that all social strata in the Arab states were united in their desire to drive Israel into the sea. In a speech in January 1951, Ben-Gurion acknowledged that the possibility of an accord existed. But he insisted that were this to come about, it would be a “cold peace,” and not reconciliation.
According to Ben-Gurion, a great gulf separated Israel from the Arab states; “we live in the twentieth century, they in the fifteenth” (p. 20). But Shalom deals only briefly with Ben-Gurion's views regarding the political, social, and ideological nature of Arab society. He analyzes in greater depth the Israeli leader's writings and speeches on refugees, borders, territory, and the day-to-day challenges with which Israel dealt as it attempted, from the end of the first Arab–Israeli war until the Suez–Sinai confrontation of 1956, to maintain security at a “tolerable” level in the face of increasing violence on its borders. The author quotes Ben-Gurion's candid appraisal of the Palestinian plight. In 1952, he told his party (Mapai) that “between six and eight hundred thousand refugees fester on the borders, whose fields, homes, and villages have been expropriated…. [I]t amazes me that there are so few cases of infiltration, shooting and killing” (p. 12). Yet, by mid-1953, the situation on the borders had deteriorated sharply. Ben-Gurion expressed deep concern about the readiness of Israeli society to face another round of armed conflict with the Arab states, which he assumed would learn from past mistakes on the military plane. He acknowledged that Israel maintained a military advantage over its adversaries but noted the extraordinary burden that the flood of Jewish immigrants, including hundreds of thousands of refugees from the Arab countries, placed on the new state.
Ben-Gurion's view of the boundaries of the Jewish state was complex. He considered the Jewish right to the Land of Israel the ultimate moral consideration, proclaiming, “nothing can override that” (p. 12). Yet, he rejected any rigid concept of “historical borders” that would prevent an Israeli government from working toward peace through territorial compromise. Borders, he said, were “dynamic parameters dependent on changing circumstances.” This dynamism could facilitate a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem and thus the Arab–Israeli conflict, so long as it was not forced on Israel by the Great Powers and provided it could be accomplished vis-à-vis “authentic” Arab leaders who were themselves not dependent on colonial powers (p. 32). Thus, Ben-Gurion considered Jordan an “artificial” entity created and supported by Britain. He placed a far higher premium on the stability that would come of a peace agreement with Egypt.
A brief note regarding the author's sources is warranted. The bibliography is rather limited when one considers the growing volume of literature on Israel and the Arab–Israeli conflict during the period covered in this book. At the same time, as the Oxford historian Avi Shlaim points out in the Foreword, Shalom has conducted extensive archival research and documents his work with great care. For that reason, it is surprising that he does not list the archives among the resources on which he has drawn. These include the Israel State Archives as well as those of the Israel Defense Forces, the Israeli Labor Party, the Knesset, the Ben-Gurion Heritage Institute, and others.
Shalom's book is not a history of the years 1948–56, and he is careful to point out that that is not his purpose. Nevertheless, his work will be useful to both beginning and advanced scholars who seek a source that makes accessible the thoughts, speeches, and writings of Ben-Gurion, Sharett, and other Israeli leaders on major issues that marked that period.