Timon of Athens and A Midsummer Night's Dream form a dramatic pair. A Midsummer Night's Dream portrays the founding and flourishing of classical Athens. The play presents, with comic distortion, Athens's legendary founder Theseus freeing love from the authority of fathers and establishing a city which celebrates the love of the beautiful and the triumph of art. Even the unerotic, literal-minded artisans think of themselves as artists and enact a stage-play about love.Footnote 1 Shakespeare's Athenian comedy vividly illustrates Pericles's famous description of the Athenians as “lovers of the beautiful with thrift, and lovers of wisdom without softness” (Thucydides, Peloponnesian War 2.40.1). They combine the love of beauty with moderation and the love of wisdom with courage.
Pericles cautioned the Athenians to restrain private greed. Athens's pursuit of boundless empire and glory, he warned, could corrupt the citizens and destroy Athenian brilliance. Glory, resting on acquisition, tends to engender greed (Thuc. 2.65.6–13). But following his death, the Athenians did just what Pericles had warned against. Timon shows the consequent decline and decay. The Athenians' love of the beautiful or the noble (to kalon) has been replaced by a voracious love of gold. Virtually everyone in Timon is chasing madly after money. Timon, the man most honored in Athens, is extolled—even revered—for his wealth and profligate giving.Footnote 2 “Plutus the god of gold / Is but his steward,” one admirer says (1.1.275–76). “O he's the very soul of bounty,” another exclaims (1.2.207), while still another praises him for possessing “The noblest mind… / That ever govern'd man” (1.1.279–80).Footnote 3 Post-Periclean Athenians esteem prodigality as the highest nobility.
Athens is no longer a community of citizens sharing a common heritage. Foreigners, we see, can now become Athenian citizens. Timon welcomes any Athenian to his banquet—“th'art an Athenian, therefore welcome” (1.2.35–36)—but the guests include Athenians with Roman names. Earlier, civic friendship was thought to hold the city together. Timon, however, emphasizes that he is tied to his guests by wholly private bonds. The city is no part of their ties or of their concerns. Only Alcibiades seems willing to act for the public good. But his soldiers are loyal to him rather than to Athens and fight for pay rather than for their city. Accordingly, soldiers are now indistinguishable from bandits. The senators, who are quick to banish the city's spirited heroes, cancel their exile of Alcibiades only when they fear for their own lives. Instead of caring for the common good, “the usuring Senate” (3.5.111) care above all to increase their individual wealth. Athens still has poets and painters, but they live off of Timon's bounty and look upon their art as merchandise to sell at the highest price: “Traffic's thy god” (1.1.238). Nearly all the Athenian nobles are sycophants and parasites, flattering Timon for his lavish gifts and abandoning him when his money runs out. Where A Midsummer Night's Dream concludes with the marriages of the two young couples and of Theseus and the Amazon queen, the sole women in Timon are Alcibiades's two whores, who will “do anything for gold” (4.3.152), and a masque of lascivious dancers, led by Cupid and dressed as Amazons, entertaining a party of carousing men.
Timon's “great banquet” (1.2.1 s.d.) is a bleak satire of Plato's Banquet (Symposium), in which Socrates, poets, and others, drinking through the night, deliver speeches in praise of Love (Eros). In Timon, Apemantus, a Cynic “Philosopher” (1.1.214), replaces Socrates. In contrast to Socrates, he speaks nothing but scorn for, and utters curses upon, the party, the host, and the other guests. Alcibiades, Socrates's notorious follower, attends both banquets. In Timon, he is an invited guest but says very little. In the Banquet, he is an uninvited crasher, who barges in shortly before the disastrous Sicilian expedition which he has promoted and delivers an encomium of Socrates. Where in the Banquet a flute-girl is dismissed from the party so the men can spend their time together in conversation, in Timon the showgirls' entertainment, which Cupid promises will be sensual, is eagerly received and highly complimented. Timon's description of its pleasures is the play's only mention of anything as “beautiful” (1.2.144).
In place of praising Love, Timon delivers a panegyric on friendship which earlier, uncorrupt Greeks would hardly recognize. Greek poets, historians, and philosophers often discuss and extol friendship. Greek legends tell of pairs of devoted friends performing many heroic and political deeds. In perhaps the best-known treatment of friendship, Aristotle, who devotes major portions of both his Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics to the subject, says that no one would choose to live without friends, even if he had all other goods. A good life, he says, would be impossible without friendships. An end in itself, friendship is good beyond its usefulness and pleasure (Nicomachean Ethics 1155a5–6, 1156b8–24).Footnote 4
Timon's praise of friendship is prompted by a flatterer's expressed wish that Timon make some request of his beneficiaries so they can show their affection for him. Timon's boundless bounty prevents their reciprocity. Timon assures his “good friends,” as he calls them, that the gods will provide opportunities for them to help him: “how had you been my friends else?” he asks, with unwitting grim irony (1.2.86, 88). Explaining friendship's purpose, Timon declares, with an oath, “O you gods, think I, what need we have of any friends, if we should ne'er have need of ’em?” (1.2.92–94). Friends are needed for our neediness. We need friends so they can help us meet our pressing needs. “They were the most needless creatures living should we ne'er have use for ’em” (1.2.94–96). Unless we can use them, Timon says, friends “would most resemble sweet instruments hung up in cases that keeps their sounds to themselves” (1.2.96–98). Unused, they are useless and cannot perform their function. Timon, who is moved to tears of joy by these thoughts on friendship, turns Aristotle's understanding upside down. What Aristotle and virtually all classical writers see as the lowest form of friendship, Timon sees as the highest and the defining form. On his lips, utility replaces nobility; the high gives way to the low. Friendship at its best becomes a form of commercial transaction.
Philosophy is similarly degraded and debased. While others submerge themselves in wealth, luxury, and voluptuous pleasures, Apemantus pursues philosophy, but philosophy in a new sense of the term. He becomes a Cynic. Cynicism, which traces its roots to Socrates, was founded by Antisthenes, a friend and fanatical admirer of Socrates, whose ascetic life and superiority to worldly goods inspired him. “From Socrates he learned hardihood, emulating his insensibility, and thus inaugurated the Cynic way of life” (Diogenes Laertius 6.2). The best-known Cynic is Diogenes of Sinope. Introducing the outlandish manner of life that distinguishes Cynics, Diogenes lived in a tub, wore a tattered cloak with no undergarment, carried all his possessions in a sack, cared little about his grooming or cleanliness, wandered around, slept in the open on hard ground, ate whatever he could find, and outraged public decency in every respect. “He was accustomed to doing everything in public, even the works of Demeter and those of Aphrodite” (D. L. 6.69).
Diogenes, like most philosophers, distinguished between nature (physis) and convention (nomos). What exists by nature is good and should be followed. But, unlike other philosophers, Diogenes thoroughly radicalized the distinction. For him, as for them, living according to nature leads to happiness. But for him, living according to nature means renouncing all but the barest necessities—a lesson he learned by watching a mouse running around in the marketplace, unconcerned about superfluities and unafraid of dark places (D. L. 6.22). According to Diogenes, happiness consists in being free from misery: “A man is happy who is free from suffering and trouble” (Stobaeus, Discourses 4.108, 83). Happiness, for him, thus requires rejecting possessions, because if we have nothing, we have nothing to lose, and if we desire nothing, we cannot be disappointed. Poverty and apathy protect us against pain. Happiness therefore requires renouncing all conventions, for convention forces us to pursue more than mere necessities and makes us dependent on others and on things beyond our power to control. The twin renunciations, providing self-sufficiency through self-denial, permit each of us to be his own master.Footnote 5 Diogenes, combining the two renunciations with a characteristic, clever pun, boasted that he was proud to deface the currency (nomisma), that he was putting money and convention out of circulation (D. L. 6.1, 20, 56, 71).Footnote 6
Prefiguring Stoicism and Epicureanism, Diogenes regarded philosophy as a mode of life rather than as speculative inquiry. He despised theoretical speculation. “Plato's teaching,” he said, “is a waste of time” (D. L. 6.24). In his view, philosophy consists in action—in the freedom to speak one's mind to anyone, on anything, in any manner, at any time,Footnote 7 and to subvert conventional standards by committing shameless acts and impudent antics in public. Under Diogenes, Socratic moderation becomes strict abstinence, Socratic irony becomes unrestrained ridiculing and reviling, and Socratic disregard of common opinion becomes public indecency. Diogenes saw his philosophical purpose as pouring bitter scorn on his contemporaries for what he considered their foolish and illusory lives, while setting an example for others to imitate. Plato and others called him the Dog—hence the term “Cynic,” from kyōn or kynikos, the Greek word for dog or dog-like. But inverting conventional moral language, as he and other Cynics frequently did, Diogenes gladly adopted the derisive nickname as his own proud title. When Alexander the Great stood before him and announced, “I am Alexander the great king,” Diogenes disdainfully replied, “And I am Diogenes the dog” (D. L. 6.60). In everything he did, he resembled a dog. He was, Plato said, “A Socrates gone mad” (D. L. 6.54).
Apemantus, “a churlish philosopher”Footnote 8 who is repeatedly called a dog and whose name means “free from misery,” takes Diogenes as his exemplar. When Timon and his companions see Apemantus approaching, Timon says, “Look who comes here: will you be chid?” And a companion answers, “He'll spare none” (1.1.178–79). Like Diogenes, Apemantus regards reproving others as his special privilege and seldom refrains from speaking his mind freely. He constantly scolds those around him, mixing his surly rebukes with ridicule and unwelcome wordplay. As soon as Timon greets him politely (“Good morrow to thee, gentle Apemantus”), Apemantus, in his first words, returns Timon's greeting with an unlooked for, unwanted meaning: “Till I be gentle, stay thou for thy good morrow, / When thou art Timon's dog, and these knaves honest” (1.1.181–82). Apemantus will not greet Timon until Apemantus is a gentleman, Timon a Cynic, and the others truthful men, which of course, he means, will never be. Apemantus's taunting trope—an aggressive form of an asteismos—is by far his favorite rhetorical figure. Exhibiting at once his quick wit and deep disdain, it catches a certain word which it then hurls back at the speaker (either directly, by close synonym, or by contradiction, often as a one-liner) with an unexpected twist in meaning (Quintilian, Institutes 6.3.17). Apemantus seldom exchanges words with anyone without using it. The only time he praises another is when the Fool uses the trope to answer a mocking servant, and Apemantus lauds him for answering like Apemantus: “That answer might have become Apemantus” (2.2.122). The figure, which Diogenes also favored, perfectly suits Apemantus's purpose. While lending itself to stock Cynic antitheses, which it skillfully inverts (poverty/wealth, true/false, friend/flatterer, foolish/wise, beast/man, and so on),Footnote 9 it chides and intimidates his interlocutor, displays his own sly intelligence, rejects the other speaker's basic premise while forcing significant incongruities on him, and lays claim to his own moral superiority by underscoring his uncompromisingly contrary character and way of life.
The trope's scathing counterblow, while generally emblematic of Cynic counterculture, crystallizes Apemantus's equivocal relation to other people. Apemantus prides himself on his scorn for others:
Tim. Thou art proud, Apemantus.
Apem. Of nothing so much as that I am not like Timon.
(1.1.189–90)One might expect someone who considers others worthless to have as little as possible to do with them. Even if he does not retire into the mountains like Heraclitus, such a person might withdraw into a private garden with like-minded friends like Epicurus (D. L. 9.3, 10.10). But Apemantus actively engages others. He chooses to attend Timon's banquet. Explicitly refusing his welcome, he tells Timon that he has come not to be welcome, but “to have thee thrust me out of doors” (1.2.25). Because Apemantus, always boorish and berating, neither desires nor is fit for company, Timon sits him at a table by himself. Apemantus, however, does not stay “silent,” as Timon wishes (1.2.37), but delivers a vituperative series of insults, curses, and criticisms of what he has “come to observe” (1.2.34). His long litany sharply contrasts himself and his way of life to those around him. Like his typical trope, it tells everyone that “he's opposite to humanity” (1.1.272).
We might wonder why he does this. Apemantus quite willingly forsakes the possessions, positions, and pleasures of the world. At Timon's banquet, for instance, he “scorn[s] … meat” and prefers to drink “honest water” (1.2.38, 59). As a matter of course, he takes food “where [his] stomach finds meat, or rather where [he] eat[s] it” (4.3.296). The Cynic virtues of enduring poverty, physical hardships, contempt, insults, and other deprivations and indignities are not hard for him. But while readily renouncing comforts and pleasures, he seems to need the people he renounces to recognize his renunciation of them and their proud way of life. Paradoxically, in spite of—or perhaps precisely because of—his despising their opinion, he seeks their opinion that he despises their opinion. His pride prevails.
Apemantus's conspicuous contempt for the pride of others conceals his own pride in contemning their pride. Diogenes once walked on Plato's beautiful carpet with muddy feet and said, “I trample upon the pride of Plato.” And Plato replied, “Yes, Diogenes, with another kind of pride” (D. L. 6.26). Pride has no fixed object. It can attach itself to penury as well as to opulence, to severe deprivation as well as to lavish plentitude. Thus Apemantus's constant theatricality. His pride secretly seeks recognition, and so he is always flaunting his stark difference. “O that men's ears should be / To counsel deaf, but not to flattery,” he bemoans (1.2.250–51). Without his constant chiding, he tells Timon, “thou wouldst sin the faster” (1.2.241–42). But, as we saw, his response to Timon's opening greeting strongly suggests that he does not expect or perhaps even want to be heeded. If he courts listeners, it is not to change them.Footnote 10 Diogenes once begged alms of a statue. When asked why he did so, he answered, “To get practice in being refused.” At another time, he tried to enter a theater just when everyone else was leaving. Asked why he was doing this, he replied, “This is what I practice doing all my life” (D. L. 6.49, 64). Apemantus, like Diogenes, needs continual refusal or rejection to confirm to himself and others the opposition between himself and them. Both men show, in spite of themselves, that what Cynicism boasts of as self-sufficiency is, at bottom, simply contrariety. The Cynic world is a world of double negatives.
Cynicism seems directly contrary to the Athenians in every respect. The Athenians are marked by greed, luxury, and flattery; Cynicism by poverty, austerity, and truth telling. Athenians are soft, Cynics are hard. Yet, Shakespeare suggests that their patent contrast may not be the final word. During the time that Timon is off-stage learning that he is bankrupt, Apemantus and the Fool wrangle with three servants of Timon's usurious creditors. Their exchange is the play's only jocular passage and is often dismissed as an inexplicable interpolation. But while not advancing the plot in any ordinary sense, the episode, set off from the main drama, brings out a common feature underlying Cynicism and the Athenians, one that goes to the heart of Timon.
The servants have come to demand Timon's immediate payment of the enormous sums he owes their masters. Their leader is Caphis, whose name is ominously the Greek word for an animal's gulping. When Caphis sees Apemantus and the Fool approach, he proposes that the servants “ha’ some sport with ’em” (2.2.52). One of the others, however, wishes to avoid confronting Apemantus (“he'll abuse us” [2.2.53]). Rather than deal with Apemantus, he challenges the Fool: “How dost, fool?” (2.2.55). But, despite the servant's wish, Apemantus, with a rapid series of asteismoi, makes fools of all the servants.
The initial back-and-forth leads quickly to a discussion of the connection between usury and prostitution. Apemantus describes the servants as “usurers' men, bawds between gold and want” (2.2.64). Their masters are procurers who provide gold to men willing to pay for it. The servants, evidently hoping to humiliate the Fool, ask him, “How does your mistress?” (2.2.71). She too procures; as we soon learn, she is a whore. “She's e'en setting on water to scald such chickens as you are,” the Fool responds. His mistress, he warns, infects men with venereal disease, causing them burning pains, and she gulls them of their money, just as chickens are scalded in boiling water to remove their feathers.Footnote 11 “Would we could see you in Corinth,” he adds, inviting the men to visit his mistress in Greece's city known for prostitution (2.2.72–73).
After confirming that the servants work for usurers, the Fool, with a pun, likens usurers and prostitutes. “I think no usurer but has a fool to his servant; my mistress is one, and I am her fool.” As a prostitute, his mistress is a usurer: she regularly uses and is used sexually by men.Footnote 12 The difference between the two trades, the Fool continues, is that “when men come to borrow of your masters, they approach sadly, and go away merry; but they enter my master's house merrily, and go away sadly” (2.2.101–5).Footnote 13 The former enter poor but leave with money; the latter enter cheerful but leave concerned about having acquired a disease or having been cheated out of their money. The Fool's contrast, heightened by its chiasmus, sets the groups' two courses in opposition—one from sad to happy, the other from happy to sad. But the opposition is apparently meant as a riddle (“The reason of this?” [2.2.105–6]). The present dramatic setting—the usurers' servants' presence and the news which Timon is hearing—belies the opposition. Just as the riddle's two groups both get what they come for, both may pay dearly for it. Usurious debt and venereal disease seem metaphors for each other. Greed and lust—and their deleterious effects—go together.
As the wordplay on “use” points up, Apemantus and the Fool link prostitution and usury on utilitarian grounds. Aristotle links them as well, but for him the important connection is their illiberality, not their cost. Aristotle says that illiberality or meanness, the vice opposite to that of prodigality, consists in two contrary extremes: a deficiency in giving and an excess in taking. Those who exceed in taking “take from any source and take all they can.” Aristotle's examples are people who practice degrading trades, such as “brothel-keepers and … usurers” and others who have “a sordid love of gain” (Nic. Eth. 1121b30–22a2). Their link is their base covetousness. Notwithstanding Apemantus's repeated denunciations of Athenian life, he and Cynicism share with Timon and the Athenians an indifference to the noble or the beautiful. Where Timon and the Athenians see nothing higher than utility, Apemantus and Cynicism repudiate the noble and the beautiful in the name of nature. For the former, wealth is the highest good; for the latter, the freedom of living on mere necessities, speaking one's mind unrestrainedly and acting shamelessly is the only good. Despite their obvious opposition, for both, the low alone is real; nothing is ennobled or ennobling. The two appear as fundamental contraries only when their common premise is overlooked or taken for granted.
When Timon is unable to pay the vast debts he incurred to support his prodigiality, his creditors offer no relief and those he calls his “friends” refuse to help. Out of money, he is out of friends—or of those pretending to be his friends.Footnote 14 “Feast-won, fast-lost” (2.2.175). Timon not only foolishly mistook his flatterers for his friends, as Apemantus and his own steward warned. He also mistakenly presumed that generous giving by itself is “a bond in men” (1.1.147) and elicits gratitude, no matter the circumstances. “Canst thou the conscience lack / To think I shall lack friends?” he confidently assures his doubting steward. “Ne'er speak or think / That Timon's fortunes ’mong his friends can sink” (2.2.179–80, 234–35). Despite believing that the best friendships are based on calculated self-interest, Timon is surprised and outraged when he discovers his former beneficiaries' ingratitude. He expected that they would repay his largess with good will and love. He took at face value their professions of love and their avowed wish to return his giving: “Might we but have that happiness, my lord, that you would once use our hearts, whereby we might express some part of our zeals, we should think ourselves for ever perfect” (1.2.82–85). Vanity, grounded in self-flattery and abetted by good fortune and the flattery of others, has blinded Timon both to his feigned friends' deception and to the implications of his own commercial view of friendship.
We see for ourselves, however, that fear and hope, not past favors, spur gratitude—or the appearance of gratitude—among Athenians. “Fear / … wipe[s] out [the senators'] ingratitude” when Alcibiades in revolt arrives with an army to destroy Athens after the senators banish him, their former benefactor (5.4.15–17). And hoping to taste again his “open bounty,” the Poet professes to be unable to find words to describe “the monstrous … ingratitude” that Timon has suffered at the hands of “thankless natures” (5.1.57, 58, 64). Convinced that Timon has gold which he will give them, the Poet and Painter go to him in the woods believing that by “tender[ing their] loves to him” they are “very likely to load [their] purposes with what they travail for” (5.1.13–15). Contrary to Timon's expectations but not to his utilitarian principles, gratitude, particularly among the greedy, looks to the future and depends on a calculation of future gain or loss rather than on grace or graciousness for past favors. Prospect, not performance, produces what passes for gratitude in Athens. As Timon comes bitterly to learn, even the gods—“You great benefactors”—should keep something in reserve “lest your deities be despis'd” (3.6.71). With nothing to give, Timon has nothing to receive. “Men shut their doors against a setting sun” (1.2.141).
Abandoned by his “mouth friends” (3.6.84), Timon shuns all human beings and withdraws to the woods to live in solitude. In A Midsummer Night's Dream, the young lovers flee to the woods to escape a father's tyrannical rule and marry the people they love. In Timon, Timon flees to the words to indulge his hatred of Athens and all mankind: “I am Misanthropos and hate mankind” (4.3.54). Timon's indiscriminate beneficence turns into his indiscriminate malevolence. Wishing harm to all, Timon calls for the moral and physical ruin of Athens and everyone and everything in it. All that is virtuous or good—honesty, loyalty, piety, laws, health, and much more—should “decline to [their] confounding contraries” (4.1.20).
Apemantus, indignant, follows Timon into the woods because, as he reproaches him, “thou dost affect my manners, and dost use them.” “Do not assume my likeness,” he sternly orders (4.3.201, 220). Apemantus does not consider Timon a Cynic. He thinks that he is just “putting on the cunning of a carper” (4.3.211). Timon's new manner of life—living in a cave, eating roots that he digs up, drinking only cold water, and dispensing with all comforts—is simply an affectation. When Timon admits, with a misanthropic insult, that he does imitate Apemantus (“‘Tis … because thou dost not keep a dog / Whom I would imitate” [4.3.202–3]),Footnote 15 Apemantus explains why he rejects his change: “This is in thee a nature but infected, / A poor unmanly melancholy sprung / From change of future” (4.3.204–6). Timon's nature has not been transformed, but merely tinged or tainted against his own wishes. His Cynic-like conduct lacks a proper Cynic motive. Rather than his nature causing him to choose poverty, his poverty has caused him to assume the appearance of a Cynic nature. His fortune, not his nature, has been altered.
Although it reduces philosophy to action, Cynicism, like Stoicism and Epicureanism, radically internalizes virtue. Deeming virtue an invincible fortress against the vicissitudes of Fortune, it renders virtue an attitude of the mind, but requires that that attitude stem from an unforced will. Since mind or will is, in its judgment, the only real thing belonging to man, virtue consists in, and must be motivated by, will. “No one can force me to deal with [Fortune's effects] other than as I will,” Diogenes maintained (Epictetus, Discourses 3.24.67–69). The embrace of poverty—the escape to bare nature in the woods—is not enough. While poverty is a condition for happiness, the poverty must be voluntary and not imposed by external circumstances. “If thou didst put this sour cold habit on / To castigate thy pride ’twere well; but thou / Dost it enforcedly,” Apemantus lectures Timon. The wretchedness must be “willing misery” (4.3.241–44). If Timon's fortunes were reversed, Ademantus charges, Timon would revert to his profligacy: “Hadst thou wealth again. / Rascals should have't” (4.3.219–20). For Timon, penury is a great loss; for a Cynic, a great gain. A Cynic must freely choose and be “content” with a life “worse than the worst” (4.3.249).
Timon, turning the tables, accuses Apemantus of being a Cynic by chance and not by choice. Instead of being independent of the influence of Fortune, Apemantus is “a slave, whom Fortune's tender arm / With favor never clasp'd, but bred a dog” (4.3.252–53). Fortune made Apemantus what he is. Rather than his having voluntarily chosen his Cynic life, Apemantus's disreputable birth and upbringing forced that life on him: “Thy father (that poor rag) / … who in spite put stuff / To some she-beggar and compounded thee / Poor rogue hereditary” (4.3.273–76). Apemantus's adherence to Cynicism is nothing more than the result of his unfortunate family inheritance. Like father, like son: the one a “poor rag,” the other a “poor rogue.” “If thou hadst not been born the worst of men,” Timon declares, “thou hadst been a knave and flatterer” (4.3.277–78). Only his low origin prevented Apemantus from being exactly the sort of man he claims to despise.
Timon asks Apemantus, “Why shouldst thou hate men? / They never flatter'd thee. What hast thou given?” (4.3.271–72). Timon assumes that we should hate only those who have personally harmed or offended us, not people because they are of a certain sort. We ought to hate those who have flattered or been ungrateful to us, but not flatterers and ingrates as such. Like his instrumental notion of friendship, Timon's view of hatred is limited to immediate self-regard. It lacks any disinterested element and is excited only by what affects ourselves. If Apemantus hates anyone, Timon admonishes him, it should be his father for giving him such a terrible life.
Apemantus does not answer Timon's question. Instead, just as Timon charged that Apemantus's harsh character was shaped by the extreme circumstances of his birth, Apemantus charges that Timon, never having known middling circumstances (“The middle of humanity thou never knewest, but the extremity at both ends” [4.3.301–2]), has never been moderate. And if Apemantus has been despised for his low birth, Timon, Apemantus stresses, has been despised at both ends. “When thou wast in thy gilt and thy perfume, they mock'd thee for too much curiosity; in thy rags thou knowest none, but art despis'd for the contrary” (4.3.302–5). When rich, Timon was mocked for his fastidiousness and his love of novelty. Now, impoverished, he is despised for the contrary of what he had been mocked for.
Apemantus's reproach is remarkable. It is an Aristotelian criticism out of the mouth of a Cynic. Although he has always deliberately lived at the extreme, Apemantus chides Timon for failing to find the virtuous mean between opposite extremes. Not abstinence or even asceticism, but moderation, is his new standard. Apemantus also gives great moral weight and urges deference to the opinions of others. Although he has always mocked and been mocked by such opinions, he blames Timon for incurring and then neglecting to heed the disparaging opinions of others. We might wonder whether Apemantus's present circumstance has caused him to attenuate his adherence to Cynicism—whether he is a Cynic in the city, where he can set himself in singular opposition to the greed, luxury, flattery, and falseness of corrupt Athens, but not with Timon in the woods, where he must find some other way to distinguish himself from his new-found imitator. Apemantus is still “a carper,” but his fault finding is now only partly that of a Cynic and limited, moreover, to the question of Timon's motive.Footnote 16 Captiousness evidently runs deeper in Apemantus than Cynicism. His Cynicism, one might suspect, as Timon in fact suggests, seems to reflect nothing so much as his attempt to set himself apart from and above the world around him, which he hates.
Apemantus never disputes that he “hate[s] men.” On the contrary, here and elsewhere, he says that he hates men and would be glad to destroy them if he could. And, in his final words, he calls upon Timon to “abhor” certain men whom they see approaching (1.1.228–29, 4.3.324, 400). Notwithstanding his own emphasis on the importance of a Cynic's proper attitude, Apemantus confounds the fundamental attitudes of a Cynic and a misanthrope. Neither looks with forbearance on human failing. But a Cynic is radically detached from human concerns and looks at them with ridicule and disdain, while a misanthrope takes human affairs seriously and regards them as harmful and evil. The former scorns as worthless what the latter takes most to heart. A Cynic laughs at what a misanthrope loathes. The one is derisive at what he observes and believes that men are incapable of doing either good or evil. The other is made melancholic at what he sees and thinks that men are dangerous and depraved.Footnote 17 As Timon seems to recognize, Apemantus proves to be largely a misanthrope cynically parading as a Cynic.
As A Midsummer Night's Dream compresses the time between Theseus's founding and Athens's Periclean peak, Timon compresses the time between the events following that peak and its domination by Rome. As we have seen, the play depicts Athens's faded splendor—the decayed remnants of its former brilliance. “The only things left to [the Greeks] were learning and eloquence” (Plutarch, Cicero 4.5). But even they are withered and wasted. We hear mordant wordplay, but hardly a hint of noble eloquence. And philosophy is no longer an inquiry into the nature of things, oriented toward the noble and the good,Footnote 18 but a fixed attitude of mind, ostensibly oriented away from, but actually reflecting, Athens's corruption and decay. As Shakespeare shows in Timon, a thoughtful Athenian might already have said, “Fair Greece! Sad relic of departed worth!” (Lord Byron, Childe Harold's Pilgrimage, 2.73).
