Who has the authority to direct the education of children? And, more precisely, how should we resolve conflicts between parents and the state, especially when they clash over value-laden curriculum such as sex education? Generally speaking, Rawlsian thinkers, such as Stephen Macedo and Amy Gutmann, side with the state in these conflicts because they regard the cultivation of liberal virtues, including tolerance and mutual respect, as essential to good citizenship and the maintenance of democratic institutions.
Against these thinkers, Melissa Moschella defends parental authority in her new book, To Whom Do Children Belong. She does so, first, by arguing that the strength of our personal obligations to others depends on the closeness of our relationship to them. Parent-child relationships are especially close, even compared to other familial relationships, because of the unique biological relationship. As Moschella notes, “the parent-child relationship is based not only on a shared genetic heritage, but on a relationship of biological causality” (37). That same closeness also leaves parents “uniquely suited” to attend to their children's development needs (47)—a fact that further supports broad parental authority. This is partly because genetic similarities with their offspring sensitize parents to their children's particular strengths and weaknesses. That same natural closeness offers children an insight into their identity, which is partly why so many adopted children seek out their biological parents. As Moschella explains, “biological parents stand in a permanent, unique and intimate relationship to their children as the cause of those children's existence and identity” (41). For these reasons, Moschella concludes that parental authority is “natural and original, primary to the state's authority over children and in no way derived from it” (23). Children belong to their parents.
Moschella concedes that the state has an interest in providing some minimal form of civic education for its citizens, just not the kind Rawlsians say we should mandate. This is partly because she does not think that the maintenance of good citizenship or democratic institutions depends on a universal Rawlsian education. Thus, contrary to Rawlsians, Moschella says that children do not need an education that cultivates an appreciation of the reasonableness of other citizens by exposing them to different conceptions of the good life. Nor do they need one that encourages the articulation of a political agenda that is independent of a comprehensive philosophical or religious framework.
Why? Just look around. If liberal education were a prerequisite for the development of decent, tolerant citizens, then people like Mother Teresa would be grave threats to democracy. Yet, Moschella observes, Teresa had “great compassion and respect for those who held other beliefs… yet she did not think that those other beliefs were just as reasonable as her own” (94). In fact, mandatory Rawlsian education, Moschella surmises, would actually undermine the development of future Mother Teresas. Even if we consider those ordinary orthodox Christians who are not destined to become saints, no evidence suggests that they are unusually bad citizens despite being deprived of a Rawlsian education. Christian activists usually make secular arguments, accessible to all. American history points to the same conclusion. Rights have been protected and gradually expanded even though civic education is a relatively new development. In fact, Moschella reminds us that education was not even compulsory for most of our history.
The Rawlsian case rests on the unsubstantiated assumption, popular in educated circles, that dogmatic convictions gravely undermine citizens’ ability to treat others with civility and respect. What Rawlsians ignore, Moschella concludes, is “the possibility that one can deny that others’ beliefs are worthy of respect, without denying that the persons who hold those beliefs are worthy of respect” (95). This is, in part, because traditional religious educations tend to cultivate moral virtues often neglected by Rawlsians even though they are perhaps more important to the cultivation of good citizens. They include virtues such as charity, honesty, courage, and self-mastery.
Yet in this age of partisan polarization, it is reasonable to ask what will foster badly needed liberal virtues, especially the ability to comprehend and engage those with different philosophical and religious beliefs. And, in particular, what institutions will cultivate those virtues? As Moschella's book suggests, perhaps K–12 education should not be the primary institution for cultivating those political virtues. Primary and secondary schools should maintain our nation's distinct moral communities by respecting and expanding parental rights.
If that is right, perhaps universities are better suited to cultivate liberal political virtues, especially since they prepare elites to lead our nation's many political institutions. Yet Rawlsians have rarely asked how well our universities cultivate a respect for the reasonableness of opposing viewpoints. Had they done so, they might be troubled by the lack of diversity of ideas among the American professoriate, especially in the social sciences and humanities. They might also be troubled by the fact that elite students are rarely exposed to conservative thinkers, especially those on the religious and cultural right. And they might also be troubled by the chilly climate on many campuses, one that discourages the expression of conservative and sometimes moderate perspectives. If Rawlsians want to improve the political virtues of Americans, why not target their reformist energies not at the occasional fundamentalist who wants to opt out of a sex-education class, but at the university—the institution whose very raison d’être is to provide a liberal education?
Whatever one thinks of this critique of higher education, To Whom Do Children Belong is a careful, balanced, and sharp work. It would pair well with Amy Guttmann's Democratic Education in education courses. It should also challenge Rawlsians to rethink and better defend their case for mandatory liberal education.
