The dynamic relationship between li 禮 (often translated as rites, rituals, and etiquette) and fa 法 (law) has long been a central theme in Chinese legal history.Footnote 1 The discourse began with the earliest recorded publication of penal law by Zichan 子產 in the Zheng 鄭 state in 536 BCE.Footnote 2 Over the subsequent three centuries, encompassing the late Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, intense debates emerged regarding the respective roles and functions of li and law in maintaining social order and governing the state. Some statesmen and thinkers advocated governance based on li, a normative system rooted in hierarchical distinctions. Others promoted governance through codified laws that were uniformly applied and rigorously enforced, aiming to shift authority from the hereditary aristocracy to a centralised bureaucratic state.Footnote 3
Since the 1970s, the excavation of Qin legal texts has provided new evidence that has significantly advanced scholarly understanding of the relationship between li and law. Contrary to the conventional view that Qin governance was exclusively guided by Legalist ideology, which rejected concepts associated with li, these texts reveal a legal system that incorporated elements of li, particularly in its differential treatment of individuals based on kinship and rank. This evidence suggests that the integration of li and law did not emerge only through ‘the Confucianisation of law’ during the Han period but was already present in the Qin legal system.Footnote 4 These findings necessitate a reassessment of the evolving relationship between li and law—how they initially came into conflict, were reconciled, and eventually integrated during the early transitions in Chinese history.Footnote 5
This study first explores the conflicts between li and law following the introduction of penal codes in the late Spring and Autumn period, with a focus on their underlying causes. It then examines the reconciliation of li and law during the Warring States period, particularly through Shang Yang’s 商鞅 legal reforms in the Qin state and Xunzi’s philosophical synthesis. Further, the study investigates the integration of li into Qin law and its functional role, as evidenced in excavated legal texts. The study demonstrates that the possibility of integrating li and law arises from their inherent compatibility, rooted in their shared characteristics as impersonal and authoritative rules, while their divergences and tensions were reconciled. In sum, this article attempts to illuminate how the tensions, reconciliation, and integration of li and law were shaped by institutional transformations and social changes in early China, shedding light on the motivations, objectives, and functions driving this integration, as well as its broader socio-political impact.
The controversy between li and law caused by the publication of law
To examine the evolving relationship between li and law, it is essential to briefly trace the evolution of the concept of li.Footnote 6 Originally rooted in ancient ritual ceremonies, li was influenced by the sacrificial culture of Yin 殷. By the Western Zhou period, li had evolved to encompass ritual proprieties and regulations, as well as social norms and behaviours predominantly observed by the aristocracy.Footnote 7 However, the abstract concept of li, representing a socio-political order with hierarchical distinctions, did not fully crystallise until the ‘Late Western Zhou Ritual Reform’ (mid tenth century BCE to around 850 BCE). This reform standardised the allocation of bronze vessels for ancestral sacrifices and burials according to aristocratic rank, determined by lineage kinship and seniority.Footnote 8 It formalised the connection between li and the reinforcement of social hierarchies, making li the embodiment of hierarchical socio-political order.
During the middle and late Spring and Autumn period, profound social and political changes prompted a redefinition of li. The decline of Zhou royal authority weakened political control over lords (zhuhou 諸侯), intensifying interstate conflict. Within states, powerful grandees (dafu 大夫) increasingly challenged the dominance of lords and exceeded their ritual privileges, while members of the lowest stratum of the ranked aristocracy (shi 士) seized key official positions, undermining their superiors’ authority.Footnote 9 These shifts led high-ranking statesmen to redefine li as a governance framework that emphasised hierarchy and social order, aiming to preserve the crumbling Zhou social hierarchy and counter the rising influence of the shi class. This redefinition resulted in a clearer distinction between li and yi 儀, with li focusing on governance and socio-political order, while yi referred to ritual ceremonies.Footnote 10 In this sense, li, originally tied to sacrificial rites, shed its ceremonial connotation and evolved into a socio-political principle that upheld social hierarchy—a meaning with roots in the late Western Zhou ritual reform.
In contrast, Confucius, emerging from the shi class, redefined li by embedding a moral core within it. He transformed li from a set of external norms into an ethical framework that integrated ritual with inner cultivation, self-restraint, and moral development. Thus, li became a process of internal refinement, enabling individuals to cultivate themselves through learning and practising it. By doing so, they came to embody the core virtue of ren 仁 (benevolence) and were transformed into junzi 君子 (superior men), thereby gaining recognition as legitimate members of the ruling elite through moral excellence and proper conduct.Footnote 11 This shift allowed individuals, particularly from the shi class, to challenge inherited privileges based on pedigree, ennobling themselves and pursuing social advancement. Consequently, Confucius’s reconfiguration of li undermined the hierarchical order it had traditionally sustained, while laying the ethical foundation for its enduring influence.Footnote 12
The wave of social change in the late Spring and Autumn period ushered in fresh ideas and innovations, prompting some statesmen to adopt novel governance strategies to address emerging challenges. Zichan, a prominent political figure of the time, epitomised this group. He served as the chief minister of the Zheng state from around 543 to 522 BCE and initiated a series of impactful political reforms.Footnote 13 In 536 BCE, Zichan became the first to order the inscription of the penal code (xingshu 刑書) on a bronze vessel for publication.Footnote 14 This move provoked strong opposition from Shuxiang 叔向, the minister of the Jin 晉 state, who feared it would further disrupt the social order, as reflected in his letter to Zichan:
始吾有虞於子, 今則已矣。昔先王議事以制, 不為刑辟, 懼民之有爭心也。猶不可禁禦, 是故閑之以義, 糾之以政, 行之以禮, 守之以信, 奉之以仁; 制為祿位, 以勸其從; 嚴斷刑罰, 以威其淫。懼其未也, 故誨之以忠, 聳之以行, 教之以務, 使之以和, 臨之以敬, 蒞之以彊, 斷之以剛; 猶求聖哲之上、明察之官、忠信之長、慈惠之師, 民於是乎可任使也, 而不生禍亂。民知有辟, 則不忌於上。並有爭心, 以徵於書, 而徼幸以成之, 弗可為矣。
夏有亂政, 而作禹刑; 商有亂政, 而作湯刑; 周有亂政, 而作九刑: 三辟之興, 皆叔世也。
今吾子相鄭國, 作封洫, 立謗政, 制參辟, 鑄刑書, 將以靖民, 不亦難乎? 《詩》曰: 「儀式刑文王之德, 日靖四方。」又曰: 「儀刑文王, 萬邦作孚。」如是, 何辟之有? 民知爭端矣, 將棄禮而徵於書, 錐刀之末, 將盡爭之。亂獄滋豐, 賄賂並行。終子之世, 鄭其敗乎? 肸聞之: 「國將亡, 必多制」, 其此之謂乎!Footnote 15
In the beginning I expected much from you, but now I no longer do so. Long ago, the former kings consulted about matters to decide them but did not make penal codes, for they feared that the people would become contentious. When they still could not manage the people, they fenced them in with righteousness, bound them with governance, employed them with li, maintained them with trustworthiness, and fostered them with benevolence. They determined the correct emoluments and ranks, to encourage their obedience, and meted out strict punishments and penalties, to overawe them in their excesses. Fearing that that still was not enough, they taught them loyalty, rewarded good conduct, instructed them in their duties, employed them harmoniously, supervised them with reverence, oversaw them with might, and judged them with rigour. Moreover, they sought superiors who were sage and principled, officials who were brilliant and discerning, elders who were loyal and trustworthy, and teachers who were kind and generous. With this, then, the people could be employed without disaster or disorder. When the people know that there is a code, they will not be in awe of their superiors. All together, they bicker, appeal to the texts, and seek to achieve their goals by trying their luck. They cannot be governed.
When there was disorder in the Xia government, they created the ‘Punishments of Yu’. When there was disorder in the Shang government, they created the ‘Punishments of Tang’. When there was disorder in the Zhou government, they composed the ‘Nine Punishments’. These three penal codes in each case arose in the dynasty’s final age.
Now as chief minister in the state of Zheng you have created fields and ditches, established an administration that is widely reviled, fixed the three statutes, and cast the penal code. Will it not be difficult to calm the people by such means? As it says in the Odes,
Take the virtue of King Wen as a guide, a model, a pattern;
Day by day calm the four quarters.
And as it says elsewhere,
Take as model King Wen,
And the 10,000 realms have trust.
In such an ideal case, why should there be any penal laws at all? When the people have learned how to contend over points of law, they will abandon li and appeal to what is written. Even at chisel’s tip and knife’s edge they will contend. A chaotic litigiousness will flourish and bribes will circulate everywhere. Will Zheng perhaps perish at the end of your generation? I have heard that ‘when a domain is about to fall, its regulations are sure to proliferate’. Perhaps this is what is meant?Footnote 16
In Shuxiang’s letter, he opposed Zichan’s publication of the penal code by invoking an idealised portrayal of antiquity, depicting a time when decisions were made by former kings with meticulous consideration. Their governance primarily relied on broad ritual norms of righteousness (yi 義), ritual behaviour, trustworthiness (xin 信), benevolence (ren 仁), loyalty (zhong 忠), and reverence (jing 敬), imposing moral constraints. Additionally, superiors, officials, elders, and teachers governed the people, with punishment serving only as a supplementary measure. This mechanism effectively deterred ‘a spirit of contention’ among the populace, which was crucial for maintaining governance and social order.Footnote 17 In contrast, Shuxiang viewed the introduction of penal codes as a sign of societal decay rather than a solution. He believed this could breed contentiousness and make the populace more prone to legal disputes, thereby eroding the authority of the aristocracy and exacerbating social disorder by fuelling widespread legal conflicts.Footnote 18
In response, Zichan deftly sidestepped engaging in arguments with Shuxiang and simply asserted his goal to ‘save his generation’ (jiu shi 救世), viewing the introduction of law as a remedy for the social turmoil in the small state of Zheng. Despite being portrayed as a legal pioneer in this section of the Zuozhuan, other passages frequently commend his strict adherence to traditional ritual propriety and his profound comprehension of li, as well as his efforts to broaden its application.Footnote 19 Zichan often engaged in discussions of li within the context of power dynamics, especially concerning interstate relations during times of crisis. His interpretation of li aligns with that of his contemporaries, distinguishing between its political essence and ceremonial aspect, and viewing li as essential for upholding social order, family ties, and effective governance.Footnote 20 Recognising that the varying depictions of Zichan in the Zuozhuan are influenced by the historical and political context, as well as by differing rhetorical arguments, allows for a more coherent view of his multifaceted portrayal. Wai-yee Li notes that Zichan’s accounts in the Zuozhuan epitomise pragmatism, showcasing his political reforms as a result of shrewd judgement balanced with compromise and negotiation. Despite being lauded for his understanding of li, Zichan occasionally displays impatience with rigid adherence to it, particularly when such rigidity appears impractical, irrelevant to crucial state affairs, or lapses into hypocrisy.Footnote 21 Zichan’s pragmatic approach probably led him to recognise that relying solely on li was inadequate for effective governance amid contemporary challenges. However, this does not imply a rejection or abandonment of the aristocratic hierarchy and social order associated with li through the publication of law. Even in Shuxiang’s letter, such a stance is not evident. Instead, Zichan’s reform seems to adapt a governance model rooted in li principles, incorporating additional legal elements to strengthen state power. The recently published Tsinghua Zichan manuscript further reveals his recognition of both li and law in governance.Footnote 22 Thus, Zichan emerges more as a rectifier rather than a radical reformer, demonstrating his strategy to govern through the dual mechanism of li and law.Footnote 23
After Zichan published the penal code, other states followed suit by inscribing their penal codes on bronze vessels or bamboo slips, marking the beginning of an era in China characterised by written laws. In 513 BCE, the ministers of the Jin state, Zhao Yang 趙鞅 and Xun Yin 荀寅, cast the penal code onto a cauldron. This action prompted strong criticism from Confucius and the scribe Cai Mo 蔡墨.Footnote 24 Confucius, in particular, expressed concern about the social consequences of casting the penal code onto a cauldron. He feared it would undermine the traditional social hierarchy based on li, blurring the distinction between the exalted and the lowly. His phrase ‘the people attend only to the cauldron’ (min zai ding yi 民在鼎矣) implies that the introduction of penal codes would shift governance from aristocratic rule to a form of ‘depersonalised and demystified legality’ accessible to the general populace.Footnote 25 Confucius was concerned about how the Jin state could preserve its long-standing hereditary social order and effectively govern its domain.
To understand the nature and social implications of publishing penal codes, as well as the ensuing debate over li and law during the late Spring and Autumn period, it is crucial to contextualise these events within the broader social transformations of the time. Li Feng argues that during Western Zhou, the state functioned as a ‘delegatory kin-ordered settlement state’, with political authority organised through kinship structures.Footnote 26 Individuals were governed by lineage control, and disputes were settled by lineage nobles who prioritised expediency over legal principles, rendering a written code unnecessary.Footnote 27 However, social changes of the late Spring and Autumn period led to the decline of lineages and the rise of smaller families.Footnote 28 This period also saw a weakening of social hierarchies and a shift away from kinship-based aristocratic governance.Footnote 29 Amidst these socio-political changes, statesmen like Zichan saw the publication of penal codes as crucial for strengthening their states. This approach incorporated administrative measures into a power structure dominated by a ministerial oligarchy, enabling legal control over the lower population.Footnote 30 Given their aristocratic backgrounds and the continued validation of established aristocratic hierarchies within contemporary beliefs and norms, these statesmen likely did not intend to challenge the existing social structure through their reforms. Nevertheless, their actions inevitably destabilised the traditional order, provoking opposition from proponents of governance through li. Li was central to upholding the Zhou kinship-based aristocratic hierarchy, whereas the introduction of penal codes allowed law to reinforce autocratic authority by punishing disobedient commoners and promoting individuals whose abilities surpassed their inherited status through service.Footnote 31 By reorganising the state around rewarded service, the law created inherent tensions with li, as it reshaped state power in a way that gradually replaced the nobility’s kinship-based system of ascriptive status—a system that li was specifically designed to preserve. Therefore, the debates over governance through li or law, triggered by the introduction of penal codes, were not merely about a choice between two administrative mechanisms. More importantly, as each approach was deeply connected to the social and political structure of the period, choosing one over the other would have a direct impact on how state authority was organised and exercised.
The reconciliation between li and law in Shang Yang’s legal reform
The Warring States period was a time of upheaval, characterised by escalating military conflicts and constant warfare between states, alongside profound social, technological, economic, and cultural advancements. During this era, society shifted from loosely organised aristocratic polities to centralised territorial states. Monarchs established centralised bureaucracies and implemented household registration, incorporating peasants into military, labour, and taxation obligations.Footnote 32 As a result, the Zhou aristocratic social structure and political order ultimately disintegrated. Beneath this collapse, however, lay the forces of transformation, which paved the way for the creation of a new social structure and the emergence of innovative political and legal institutions that would shape early imperial China.
Both domestic and external challenges compelled states to introduce a range of reforms aimed at reconstructing social frameworks. Notably, Shang Yang’s implementation of a merit-based ranking system through legal reforms in the Qin state was particularly impactful. A concise description of this system, outlining the methods of obtaining ranks and the corresponding benefits, can be found in ‘The biography of Lord Shang’ (‘Shangjun liezhuan’ 商君列傳) in the Records of the Grand Historian (Shiji 史記):
有軍功者, 各以率受上爵; ……宗室非有軍功論, 不得為屬籍。明尊卑爵秩等級各以差次, 名田宅臣妾衣服以家次。有功者顯榮, 無功者雖富無所芬華。Footnote 33
Those who had won military merit were to receive ranks in the nobility proportionate to their achievement. … Even members of the ruling family, if they had achieved no military merit, were not to be listed in the rosters of the nobility. Degrees of social superiority or inferiority, ranks in the nobility, and other marks of status were to be made clear in each case, and the extent of privately owned fields and houses, male and female servants, and articles of clothing were to be fixed for each family. Those who had won merit were to enjoy affluence and social position, but those who had won no merit, even if they were rich, were to be permitted no show of wealth.Footnote 34
Shang Yang devised a new hierarchical social structure by establishing a merit-based ranking system, in which individuals earned ranks and determined their status based on battlefield achievements, regardless of lineage or background. This reform redefined the social hierarchy, moving it away from one based on birthright and aristocratic pedigree to one centred on military service and state accomplishments. As a result, commoners were offered a pathway to ascend the social ladder.Footnote 35 This system allowed individuals to become detached from kinship ties and traditional aristocratic authority, yet their social status and destiny were increasingly subject to the control of monarchs through the rank system, as illustrated in the ‘Implementing laws’ (‘Cuo fa’ 錯法) of the Book of Lord Shang (Shangjunshu 商君書):
行賞而兵疆者, 爵祿之謂也。爵祿者, 兵之實也。是故人君之出爵祿也道明, 道明則國日疆, 道幽則國日削。故爵禄之所道, 存亡之機也。Footnote 36
‘Bestowing rewards and having the army strong’ refers to ranks and emoluments. Ranks and emoluments are the essence of the army. Hence, when the ruler bestows ranks and emoluments, the way [they are distributed] should be clear. When the way is clear, the state grows stronger daily; when the way is obscure, the state approaches dismemberment daily. Hence, directing [the people] with ranks and emoluments is the crux of surviving or perishing.Footnote 37
Through legal mechanisms, the Qin monarchs exercised exclusive authority over the merit-based rank system, which governed the allocation of social, economic, and legal privileges. This system became a powerful tool for directing and mobilising individuals into occupations deemed vital by the Qin state, particularly in agriculture and military service.Footnote 38 In turn, this contributed to the strengthening of Qin’s military power and political standing during the period of intense turmoil.
The merit-based rank system of Qin reconstructed its social hierarchy and facilitated the management, organisation, and mobilisation of its population within a new social order. It is commonly believed that the Qin merit-based rank system dismantled and replaced the Zhou aristocratic rank system, rendering the two fundamentally different. Yet, a closer examination reveals that, despite substantial differences in social contexts and aims—which resulted in variations in how ranks were assigned and earned—both systems relied on li as a core mechanism for sustaining social hierarchical order. While the Qin system was revolutionary in reshaping personal identity and social status based on military merits, it, like the Zhou system, used li to structure social status within a hierarchical framework, with each rank conferring designated status, power, and benefits.Footnote 39 As Nishijima Sadao argues, the fusion of aristocratic ranks and li in Western Zhou was deeply entrenched in its socio-political system, where ranks were exclusively granted to the aristocracy based on kinship, with commoners excluded and governed primarily through punitive measures. In contrast, the Qin system innovated by awarding ranks based on military merit rather than birthright, incorporating commoners into a li-based social order that was once reserved for the aristocracy.Footnote 40 Although often seen as a break from its Zhou predecessor, the Qin rank system retained roots in the very tradition it sought to replace.Footnote 41 The reform reflects Qin’s ambition to dismantle the Zhou hereditary aristocracy, encourage greater social mobility, and strengthen state power. However, this did not mean abandoning the hierarchical principles of li; rather, the socio-political functions of li, emphasised by high-ranking statesmen in the late Spring and Autumn period, were adapted to include individuals from all social strata within the li-based hierarchy. As a result, it accommodated contemporary social change and established a new social structure.
The Qin merit-based rank system allowed li and law—two key governance tools—to move from tension towards reconciliation, coexisting within a unified framework aimed at achieving common goals: enhancing social mobility while consolidating power in the hands of the monarch within the hierarchical structure of an autocratic society. Amid this period of social transformation, Warring States thinkers largely rejected aristocratic, pedigree-based advancement in favour of a more flexible, merit-based system, although the nature of merit remained contested. Thinkers from the shi class primarily advocated ‘elevating the worthy (xian 賢)’, but its assessment—whether based on skill, morality, or both—often relied on eloquence or reputation, making it susceptible to manipulation. Their approach also conflicted with the autocratic system, as it placed the determination of ‘worthiness’ and the assignment of social status outside the monarch’s control. In contrast, fa-thinkersFootnote 42 criticised the shi for exploiting ‘worthiness’ for personal gain and advocated for a more functional meritocratic system with clear, uniform standards. Shang Yang’s rank system addressed these issues by reconfiguring the li-based social hierarchy through legal reforms, shifting the basis of social advancement from pedigree to merit based on military service and state accomplishments. This provided individuals with a clear, standardised avenue for social mobility.Footnote 43 As a result, the Qin legal system operationalised li to align private behaviour with public norms, ensuring that personal interests were fulfilled only in ways that met collective needs, thereby reinforcing Qin’s autocratic power and strengthening its military and political standing.Footnote 44 Moreover, by integrating li into Qin’s legal framework, the law became a mechanism for enforcing adherence to li and maintaining the li-based social order. Traditionally, li originated from sacrificial rituals and was embedded in Zhou’s aristocratic political system, where violations typically led to social disapproval and political disputes. Then, Confucius’s reinterpretation of li transformed it into an ethical framework, emphasising inward personal cultivation, moral consciousness, and alignment, rather than mere outward ritual conformity. In this context, adherence to li became internalised by individuals, eliminating the need for external enforcement. In contrast, the observance of law was externally enforced through state coercion, employing both incentives and penalties. Shang Yang’s merit-based rank system, by embedding li into the Qin legal framework, endowed li with legal authority, compelling compliance and securing enforcement with punitive measures. Thus, grounded in li and externally enforced by law, the system assigned status, resources, and privileges to ranked individuals in a hierarchical society while setting protections and boundaries for these allocations, with violations resulting in legal intervention and punishment.
Although Shang Yang incorporated the hierarchical principles inherent in li into Qin’s legal reforms, this mechanism is not explicitly discussed in the Shangjunshu.Footnote 45 Nonetheless, the text implicitly reveals his views on li. Notably, the term li appears 25 times across seven chapters of the book, with 13 references concentrated in chapter one, ‘Reforming laws’ (‘Geng fa’ 更法). This opening chapter features a significant court debate convened by Lord Xiao of Qin 秦孝公, where officials Shang Yang, Gan Long 甘龍, and Du Zhi 杜摯 present their arguments. Although Lord Xiao was inclined to initiate reforms to strengthen the state, he hesitated due to concerns about public opposition, prompting the debate. Shang Yang’s strong advocacy for reforming li and law is evident in the following passage:
公孫鞅曰: 「前世不同教, 何故之法? 帝王不相復, 何禮之循? 伏羲、神農教而不誅, 黃帝、堯、舜誅而不怒。及至文、武, 各當時而立法, 因事而制禮; 禮法以時而定, 制令各順其宜, 兵甲器備各便其用。臣故曰: 『治世不一道, 便國不必法古。』湯、武之王也, 不循古而興, 夏殷之滅也, 不易禮而亡。然則反古者未可必非, 循禮者未足多是也。君無疑矣。」Footnote 46
Gongsun Yang said: ‘Former generations did not adopt the same teaching: So which antiquity should one imitate? Thearchs and Monarchs did not repeat one another: So which li should one conform to? Fuxi and Shennong taught but did not punish; the Yellow Thearch, Yao, and Shun punished but did not implicate [the criminals’] families; and Kings Wen and Wu both established laws appropriate to the times and regulated li according to their undertakings. Li and laws are fixed according to the times; regulations and orders are all expedient; weapons, armour, utensils, and equipment, all are used according to their utility. Hence, I say: there is no single way to order the generation to benefit the state, one need not imitate antiquity. Tang and Wu rose to power without following antiquity and achieved prosperity, and for the downfall of Yin and Xia, they were destroyed due to failing to change li. Therefore, those who oppose antiquity do not necessarily deserve blame, and those who followed li do not merit much praise. My lord, do not hesitate!’Footnote 47
To address Lord Xiao’s concerns, Shang Yang argued that historical evidence underscores the necessity of continually adapting governance strategies, including both li and law, to meet evolving social circumstances and needs. He stressed that reforming li and law is crucial for the state’s survival and prosperity, warning that failure to adapt could result in its downfall. Ultimately, Shang Yang urged Lord Xiao to implement the reforms without hesitation.
In the first chapter, li is used in an abstract sense, viewed as a socio-political mechanism for governance, similar to law. This sets the tone for the book, emphasising the need to reform both li and law to enhance state power, leading readers to expect that following chapters would build on these themes. However, while later chapters discuss Shang Yang’s legal reforms, they notably contain no discussion on li reform. This omission may stem from the fact that Shang Yang’s reforms of li were already embedded within his legal reforms, particularly through the merit-based rank system, rendering a separate discussion unnecessary. Despite this, it is striking that the legal reform sections do not even reference li in its abstract sense or acknowledge its incorporation into the legal framework. Throughout the book, except in the first chapter, li is used in its concrete sense, referring to ritual behaviours and etiquette, with the exception of the ambiguous term ‘the law/regulations of li’ (li zhi fa 禮之法). These occurrences of li are mostly associated with Confucianism, which Shang Yang explicitly criticised and despised.Footnote 48 As Yuri Pines argues, it is likely that Shang Yang deliberately avoided using the multifaceted term li in discussions of legal reforms to prevent associating it with its ritualistic aspects, which were dominated by Confucian followers, who were experts in Zhou rites.Footnote 49 His nuanced use of li reflects a complex attitude: while he sought to reform li and apply its hierarchical principle, he also wished to discard it as a symbol of ritual propriety. This ambiguity in Shang Yang’s treatment of li has obscured its role in his legal reforms, leading to the misconception that he rejected li as a whole. However, his opposition was directed solely at its ritualistic aspects, not its socio-political functions.
The synthesis of li and law by Xunzi
During the Warring States period, the reconciliation and integration of li and law were also driven by the development of philosophical thoughts. Xunzi 荀子, one of the most prominent pre-imperial philosophers and a major influence on later imperial political culture, played a particularly crucial role in this process. Xunzi’s theory of li synthesises the ideas of earlier statesmen and thinkers, reconciling the two previously distinct aspects of li: its function as a socio-political instrument reinforcing hierarchical order and its role as an ethical imperative guiding proper behaviour.Footnote 50 However, unlike other Confucians, he further emphasises the value and function of law. In his view, while law is complementary to li, it occupies an indispensable role in the effective governance of the state.
First, Xunzi’s distinctive perspectives on the origin and functions of li stand out among pre-Qin scholars, as depicted in chapter nine, ‘A discussion on rites’ (‘Li lun’ 禮論) of the Xunzi:
禮起於何也? 曰: 人生而有欲, 欲而不得, 則不能無求; 求而無度量分界, 則不能不爭; 爭則亂, 亂則窮。先王惡其亂也, 故制禮義以分之, 以養人之欲, 給人之求, 使欲必不窮乎物, 物必不屈於欲, 兩者相持而長, 是禮之所起也。Footnote 51
How did li arise? I say that men are born with desires which, if not satisfied, cannot but lead men to seek to satisfy them. If in seeking to satisfy their desires men observe no measure and apportion things without limits, then it would be impossible for them not to contend. Such contention leads to disorder. Disorder leads to poverty. The Ancient Kings abhorred such disorder; so they established li and righteousness in order to divide [men], to nurture the desires of men, and to provide what men seek. This ensures that desires should not overextend for goods and goods would not be exhausted by desires. In this way the two of them, desires and goods, sustained each other over the course of time: this is the origin of li.Footnote 52
Xunzi explains li by analysing the inevitable conflict between humanity’s inborn desires and the limited availability of resources. He argues that the unrestrained pursuit of these desires often leads to contention (zheng 争) and social disorder (luan 亂), which makes regulation necessary. To address this, Xunzi traces the origin and functions of li to its role in demarcating social divisions (fen 分), which help to restrain human desires and allocate resources, thereby resolving contentions and preventing social disorder. Consequently, li serves as the foundational principle for constructing social hierarchies and regulating social order. Within this structured framework, an ideal social mechanism functions through clearly defined social divisions established by li, ensuring that individuals are assigned appropriate roles, fulfil their corresponding duties, and receive a proper allocation of resources.Footnote 53
This reconceptualisation of li thus raises a critical question: what principle, according to Xunzi, underlies the foundation of social divisions? Notably, Xunzi situates li within its moral dimension, an aspect that was emphasised and endorsed by Confucius and his followers. He argues that individuals’ social position should be determined by their adherence to li and righteousness:
雖王公士大夫之子孫, 不能屬於禮義, 則歸之庶人。雖庶人之子孫也, 積文學, 正身行, 能屬於禮義, 則歸之卿相士大夫。Footnote 54
Although they be the descendants of kings, lords, shi, or grandees, if they are incapable of devotedly observing the requirements of li and righteousness, they should be relegated to the position of commoners. Although they be the descendants of commoners, if they accumulate culture and study, rectify their character and conduct, and are capable of devotedly observing the requirements of li and righteousness, they should be brought to the ranks of prime ministers, shi, or grandees.Footnote 55
Xunzi challenges the notion that social hierarchy is fixed or hereditary, arguing instead that individuals—whether descendants of kings, lords, nobles, or commoners—can rise or fall in status based on their commitment to li and righteousness, which he presents as the foundations of both social divisions and social mobility.Footnote 56 In Xunzi’s framework, li is not merely a set of moralised ritual behaviours, as earlier Confucians proposed, but also serves as a crucial tool for defining social divisions. Xunzi therefore imbues li’s moral dimension with tangible socio-political significance, effectively integrating its ethical and socio-political functions. His approach to social stratification mirrors Shang Yang’s Qin merit-based rank system in rejecting hereditary status and emphasising individual achievement. However, Xunzi differs in that he links status to adherence to li and ethical cultivation rather than military accomplishment.
In Xunzi’s view, the ethical function of li primarily operates through its educational and nurturing role (yang 養), fostering personal character by promoting self-cultivation and moral development. Through this process of internalisation, li curbs desires and channels self-interested behaviour towards moderation, reducing competition impulses.Footnote 57 However, since mastery of li requires engagement with its texts and the performance of associated rituals—both of which demanded a high level of literacy—the learning of li and its attendant moral and educational influence are largely confined to the upper social strata.Footnote 58 For the common people, who lack the capacity for ritual education and moral self-cultivation, the transformative power of li is ineffective. To regulate their behaviour, Xunzi advocates the use of law as a necessary tool for external regulation and social control:
由士以上則必以禮樂節之, 眾庶百姓則必以法數制之。Footnote 59
From the position of the shi up to the supreme position, all must be moderated through li and music. The ordinary masses, the Hundred Clans, must be controlled by law and methods.Footnote 60
Unlike other Confucians, Xunzi emphasises the necessity of law and punishment as essential tools for social control and governance—ideas typically associated with the fa-thinkers. While this stance may be partly influenced by his observation of the social changes resulting from Shang Yang’s legal reforms in Qin,Footnote 61 it more deeply reflects Xunzi’s philosophical understanding of human nature and the limitations of li in moralising the general populace. He advocates the use of law not only because he believes that human nature (xing 性) is inherently evil (e 惡) in its original state but, more importantly, because of his scepticism regarding most people’s ability to shape their nature (wei 偽) through li.Footnote 62 Accordingly, the petty men (xiaoren 小人), who lack the potential for moral transformation, must be restrained through external mechanisms like law and punishment. In contrast, the superior men, who are capable of achieving moral excellence through self-cultivation, should be guided by the internalised principle of li.Footnote 63 In Xunzi’s framework, li and law address fundamentally different groups, yet together they are synthesised as complementary mechanisms that maintain social order and enable effective governance. However, as a Confucian thinker, Xunzi assigns a subordinate role to law, viewing it as a supplement to educational and moral instruction provided by li and insisting that law be formulated in accordance with li.Footnote 64 He de-emphasises the role of law, upholding the ‘exaltation of ritual’ (zhong li 重禮) as the defining characteristic of a true king (wang 王) while associating the ‘emphasis on law’ (zhong fa 重法) with the coercive tactics of hegemonic rulers (ba 霸).Footnote 65 Xunzi acknowledges that, although law and punishment may be effective in the short term, they are ultimately inadequate for ensuring sustainable governance. This limitation is reflected in his scepticism towards the long-term viability of the Qin state’s authoritarian model. For Xunzi, the moral force of li is more enduring and efficacious than coercive legal mechanisms, reflecting his belief in the pre-eminence of morality over the manipulation of political instruments like law.Footnote 66
The integration of li in Qin law
The following section examines the integration of li in Qin law, as revealed in recently discovered Qin legal texts, with a focus on its role in social organisation and governance. These texts indicate that Qin’s social structure was primarily shaped by Shang Yang’s merit-based rank system, introduced during his legal reforms, but underwent further adjustments and developments over time. Initially, the system consisted of 17 meritorious ranks, which were later expanded to 20. This system facilitated the transition from a kinship-based Qin society to one centred on residence, shifting the criteria for social identity from pedigree to individual achievement.Footnote 67
Unlike the previous adherence to li without external enforcement, its integration into Qin law ensured the legal protection of the li-based social order. The hierarchical social system, composed of 20 meritorious ranks, was formalised in law. Rank, recorded in household registration,Footnote 68 became a fundamental marker of social identity, with each rank assigned specific social and economic privileges, all regulated and enforced through law. Primarily, land for homesteads and agricultural fields—the most important resource for individuals—was allocated based on whether individuals held a rank and the degree of that rank, as stipulated in the ‘Statutes on households’ (‘Hu lü’ 戶律), which established a system of imperial land grants.Footnote 69 In addition, various statutes granted social and economic privileges based on rank, including clothing allowances, food provisions, burial arrangements, and exemptions from labour services and taxes.Footnote 70 Under the law, ranks were generally inherited from father to son, but typically at one or two ranks lower than the father’s, with steeper reductions for higher ranks. The top two rank holders, the nineteenth (guanneihou 關內侯) and twentieth (chehou 徹侯), were exceptions, allowing their ranks to be fully inherited by heirs.Footnote 71 This downgraded inheritance of Qin ranks promoted greater social mobility compared to the fully hereditary aristocracy of Zhou, while still preserving a small, influential super-elite class.Footnote 72 Moreover, although Qin provided opportunities for upward mobility, it limited commoners’ advancement to the fifth rank,Footnote 73 revealing that, despite its reforms, Qin society was far from egalitarian.
Excavated legal texts reveal that a notable feature of Qin rank was its capacity to mitigate or redeem punishments.Footnote 74 This seems to contradict the statement in chapter 17, ‘Rewards and punishments’ (‘Shang xing’ 賞刑) of the Shangjunshu, which states, ‘What is called unifying punishments means imposing punishments without regard for one’s status’ (Suo wei yi xing zhe, xing wu deng ji 所謂壹刑者, 刑無等級).Footnote 75 This assertion, along with the Shiji narrative of the Qin crown prince’s violation—resulting in the mutilation of his tutor Gongzi Qian 公子虔 and the tattooing of his teacher Gongsun Jia 公孫賈Footnote 76—has contributed to the widely held belief that Qin law applied uniform punishment to all offenders, regardless of status. However, evidence from excavated Qin legal texts suggests that the Shangjunshu assertion more likely means that the sentence, as prescribed by law, should remain consistent regardless of rank. Nevertheless, rank holders could still receive preferential treatment in the enforcement of punishment. The fact that the crown prince violated the law yet was not personally punished also reveals that Qin law did not apply punishment equally to all, regardless of status. The mechanism within the Qin rank system that allowed for the mitigation of punishments, particularly exemptions from mutilation, merits further examination:
有為故秦人出, 削籍, 上造以上為鬼薪, 公士以下刑為城旦。Footnote 77
In cases where people assist the old Qin population in leaving [the country], their [population] register shall be removed; holders of the second rank and above shall be made gatherers of fuel for the spirits, and holders of the first rank and below shall be mutilated and made wall-builders.
According to this and other statutes,Footnote 78 holders of the second rank (shangzao 上造) and above in Qin were exempt from mutilation punishments. In this statute, even the reduction in labour penalties, being made as gatherers of fuel for the spirits (guixin 鬼薪), was a result of mitigating the associated mutilation punishment. In contrast to the varying social and economic benefits tied to different meritorious ranks, the exemption from mutilation was uniformly granted to all individuals holding the second rank and above. This connection between Qin meritorious ranks and exemption from mutilation recalls the renowned saying, ‘Li does not extend down to commoners; punishment does not extend up to grandees’ (Li buxia shuren, xing bushang dafu 禮不下庶人, 刑不上大夫) from the Book of Rites (Liji 禮記).Footnote 79 The subsequent phrase, ‘mutilated persons shall not be at the ruler’s side’ (xingren buzai junce 刑人不在君側) clearly refers to persons who suffered mutilations, supporting Shūzū Shiga’s view that the ‘xing’ 刑 in the saying denotes corporal punishments.Footnote 80 Moreover, ‘dafu’ 大夫 in the saying does not necessarily refer solely to grandees but more broadly to ranked individuals.Footnote 81 Although historical records show no evidence of actual exemptions from mutilation for rank holders in Zhou,Footnote 82 this likely reflects an idealised view of the opposition between li and mutilation punishments, suggesting that the li-based social order inherently rejected such punishments.Footnote 83 Tomiya Itaru suggests that, during the development of the 20-rank meritorious system, Qin was likely influenced by this theoretical view on li and mutilations, and applied it accordingly. This aim was to shield rank holders from enduring lifelong stigma and social exclusion resulting from mutilation.Footnote 84
In addition to establishing a social hierarchy with meritorious ranks that conferred corresponding privileges, li also played a crucial role in shaping family order in Qin. Recognising the importance of family stability for governance, the integration of li into Qin law provided legal protection for li-based hierarchical family structures, thereby ensuring that family order served as the foundation of social order.Footnote 85 As a result, the law recognised intra-family distinctions based on gender, seniority, and degree of kinship, with penalties for crimes within families varying according to the relative status of the offender and the victim. For instance, homicide or injury committed by a child against a parent, a junior against a senior, or a wife against her husband resulted in harsher punishments.Footnote 86 Qin law further granted the head of a family and his wife the authority to discipline household members for misdeeds, with local authorities intervening only in cases involving killing or mutilation.Footnote 87 Moreover, Qin law mandated family-related values, particularly filial piety—a virtue typically associated with Confucian thought—as a means of reinforcing li-based family hierarchy and stability. In this regard, the observance of filial piety was implemented in a manner specific to fa-thinkers, relying on codified rewards and punishments rather than moral instruction and ritual observance.Footnote 88 Individuals were legally rewarded for exhibiting filial devotion towards their parents, loyalty and reverence (zhong jing 忠敬) towards elder siblings, and care and affection (ci ai 慈愛) towards younger siblings.Footnote 89 Conversely, unfilial conduct was met with severe penalties.Footnote 90 Furthermore, fathers were obliged to report disobedient children for execution, with failure to do so resulting in punitive consequences.Footnote 91
Thus, as in Zhou, the application of li in Qin extended to both familial and social realms, delineating distinctions between superiors and inferiors. However, Qin introduced significant adaptations, particularly in the construction of socio-political structure. A defining feature of the Zhou system was the extension of kinship structures into the political sphere, where aristocrats’ dominance and seniority within lineages conferred political authority, with political status established through kinship ties embedded in lineage hierarchy and segmentation.Footnote 92 By contrast, although Qin’s family and social structures were shaped by the hierarchical principles of li, they followed different organisation logics and did not align with each other. Family hierarchies remained based on kinship and seniority, whereas social hierarchies were determined by personal merit and military achievements, making it even common for a son to outrank his father.Footnote 93 Despite this potential for merit-based advancement, in reality individuals had limited control over their status, as the integration of li into Qin’s legal framework centralised authority in the ruler, reinforcing a top-down, autocratic order that dominated both social and economic life. Thus, Qin’s autocratic system comprised two interrelated spheres: a centralised state under a single absolute ruler and a kinship-based realm of individual households, each led by the paterfamilias.Footnote 94 This dual structure reflects the ideal of a well-ordered society envisioned in the li-based socio-political theory of the period, which emphasised hierarchical family structures and centralised state authority, with individuals expected to fulfil prescribed roles to sustain social stability.Footnote 95 However, as Qin progressively consolidated power and reinforced autocratic rule during the Warring States period, and especially following the unification of China, it increasingly extended its control into the domestic sphere, directly intervening in household affairs. When family order, rooted in sex, seniority, and kinship, came into conflict with state interests, the state asserted its authority, legally subordinating familial obligations to governance demands, even at the potential risk of disrupting family harmony.Footnote 96
Conclusions
This article demonstrates that, during the transformative periods of early China, the relationship between li and law shifted from initial tension to gradual reconciliation, ultimately resulting in the integration of li into the Qin legal framework. Understanding the rationale behind this integration requires examining the inherent characteristics of li and law, which not only laid the foundation for their convergence but also shaped the way in which their potential conflicts were managed and resolved. Consequently, the governance mechanism, composed of li and law, was redefined in both content and scope to address internal institutional disintegration and significant social changes.
The potential of integrating li and law rested fundamentally on their shared characteristics as impersonal and authoritative rules that regulated socio-political life beyond specific circumstances. The Gongyang Commentary (Gongyang zhuan 公羊傳) envisioned an early unified state governed by ritual and administrative rules operating independently of situational contingencies, describing li as ‘King Wen’s regulations and measures’ (Wenwang zhi fadu 文王之法度).Footnote 97 This conception parallels the fa-thinkers’ view of legal mechanisms as the foundation of political order.Footnote 98 In this context, li, particularly when considered apart from the moral dimensions later introduced by Confucius, was closely aligned with law, as the fa-thinker Shen Dao 慎到 observes: ‘Laws, institutions, rituals, and documents are how norms are set up publicly’ (Fa zhi li ji, suo yi li gong yi ye 法制禮籍, 所以立公義也).Footnote 99 Due to their impersonal nature, li and law functioned in similar ways as mechanisms for regulating socio-political order, deriving their authority from formalised rules rather than the ruler’s personal virtue or abilities, which ensured stability independent of the ruler’s individual capacities.Footnote 100 Moreover, both li and law served to consolidate the ruler’s authority by establishing coherent, formalised norms. Ritual rules governed almost every aspect of a nobleman’s conduct according to rank, thereby sustaining the socio-political hierarchy headed by the Zhou king and reinforcing his authority.Footnote 101 Likewise, law reinforced monarchical power by providing explicit, impersonal rules that structured the bureaucracy and regulated the behaviour of subjects. These intrinsic similarities in the attributes and functions of li and law inherently provided the foundation for their integration into a unified political system.
Despite these similarities, li and law differed markedly in both scope and enforcement, which created potential conflicts that had to be reconciled for their integration. Unlike law, which applied universally to all members of society, li was primarily directed towards the aristocracy, serving to define and signify their social status. This distinction in scope likewise influenced their respective enforcement mechanisms. Li comprised binding norms that the aristocracy was expected to internalise, relying on adherence to moral and social values rather than external state coercion.Footnote 102 Confucius valued li precisely for this non-coercive nature, as noblemen, by internalising ritual norms, were able to govern their conduct through moral cultivation and self-discipline, rather than through externally imposed authority. In contrast, law, which applied universally, was enforced externally, with explicit penalties for non-compliance.
Given their differing scopes and enforcement mechanisms, strategies were devised to integrate li and law. For Xunzi, the distinct social groups—namely the ‘superior men’ and the ‘petty men’—distinguished by their capacity for ritual education and moral cultivation, required different governance approaches and could not be treated uniformly. Accordingly, Xunzi synthesised li and law without altering their respective domains: li governed the morally cultivated elite, while law regulated the common people. In contrast, the Qin reformer, Shang Yang, transformed the Zhou hierarchical order by establishing a rank system based on military merit rather than heredity. This shift extended a li-based hierarchy, previously reserved for the aristocracy, to commoners, thus broadening the scope of li’s application. Moreover, integrating li into Qin’s legal framework fundamentally altered its enforcement mechanism. Li evolved from a set of internalised moral and behavioural norms into externally imposed rules, thereby acquiring a ‘lawlike’ authority. Consequently, compliance with li was ensured through legal enforcement, with punishment for violations of li-based rules.Footnote 103 This integration of li into Qin’s legal system created a unified governance mechanism, where both li and law operated synergistically, with their scope and enforcement fully aligned.
Overall, the transition from conflict to reconciliation, culminating in the integration of li into Qin law, allowed these two statecraft approaches to function as complementary and essential components of governance. Although early China underwent profound socio-political and cultural transformations, the Zhou legacy of li persisted. Qin not only inherited Zhou’s ceremonial rituals but,Footnote 104 more decisively, adapted and integrated the socio-political functions of li into its legal framework, thus constructing social and familial structures. This integrated governance model, rooted in li and law, survived subsequent dynastic transitions and, over more than two millennia, continued to shape Chinese law and society, endowing li with enduring significance.Footnote 105 As Kwang-chih Chang suggests, Chinese civilisation exhibits a pattern of continuity, in contrast to the Western trajectory characterised by rupture. He argues that while the West developed new frameworks for social order, departing significantly from its ancient foundations, Chinese civilisation remains unique in its continuity, with many of its beliefs and rituals perpetuated and integrated into the core fabric of the state.Footnote 106 This integration of li into the legal framework fundamentally shaped Chinese law, giving it distinct characteristics that set it apart from other legal systems. Beyond its conventional roles in regulating behaviour, preventing crime, and enforcing punishment, law also served as a tool for structuring social hierarchies and distributing status, resources, wealth, respect, honour, and privileges. Rulers thus employed both li and law as complementary instruments to organise, mobilise, and control the populace, effectively harnessing mechanisms of reward and punishment. This fusion of li and law cultivated a politico-legal system that extended beyond the regulation of behaviours, embedding itself within the core social values and political structures of traditional Chinese society.
Acknowledgements
I am deeply grateful to Yuri Pines, Chun Fung Tong, and Thies Staack for their insightful comments and generous suggestions. I also wish to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their careful reading and constructive feedback, which have greatly improved this article.
Conflicts of interest
None.
