Inspired in part by the coincident bicentenary of Darwin's birth and the sesquicentennial of The Origin of Species in 2009, scholars have been hard at work these last ten years writing substantial histories of nineteenth-century natural history and geology. These histories include exceptional books by scholars trained primarily in literary studies: Cannon Schmitt's Darwin and the Memory of the Human (Reference Schmitt2009); Daniel Brown's The Poetry of Victorian Scientists (Reference Brown2013); and Gowan Dawson's Darwin, Literature and Victorian Respectability (Reference Dawson2007). With a few notable exceptions, however, the books I was invited to review here are written mostly by historians of science. And yet they are no less literary for that. All are marked by a tacit, pragmatic adoption of actor-network theory; by the extraordinary resources of the Darwin Correspondence Project and online databases of British periodicals; and often, too, by glossy illustrations. Further, nearly all of these histories share a methodological investment in what we call the history of the book, including all the economics of publishing (formats, sizes, fonts, prices, print runs, reviews, sales, generic conventions) and a political and heuristic stake in popularization and the general reading public. While Darwin (and Lyell, Herschel, Hooker, Huxley, and Spencer) remain at the center of the discussion, the empirically-minded history-of-the-book approach and investment in everyday readers reconstructs and legitimates a robust popular science that was engaged with, but not subordinate to, and often more liberal than the elite science of the X Club, the Royal Society, and other exclusive institutions. With the help of museums, lectures, tour guides, and other natural scientific literature, everyday readers produced their own knowledge of evolution, stratigraphy, speciation, animal emotion, and the sex life of plants.
Several scholars, particularly Jonathan Topham, have established the history of reading as the preeminent methodology for the history of science, but James Secord altogether reinvigorated the field in 2000 with the capacious and interesting Victorian Sensation, a comprehensive history of Victorian social and reading practices, scientific protocols, and “epistemological decorum” (to borrow a phrase from Steven Shapin) as they coalesce in the anonymous authorship, publication, and reception of Robert Chambers's Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation (1844). With a similar approach, balancing the material history of the book with a keen but restrained sense for literary nuance; marshalling a vast array of periodical reviews, illustrations, anecdotes, and textual interpretations with rather readable descriptions of the epistemological and social relevance of page and margin sizes, ink quality, and price, Secord takes up seven more exemplary scientific and metascientific books as the subjects of Visions of Science: Books and Readers at the Dawn of the Victorian Age (Reference Secord2014).
Secord's thesis is simple: “millenarian hopes in reading” and “self-education in science” evidence Victorians' gradual assumption of belief that cultivating a “reading public would be the basis for a reformed British polity” (14). Victorians promoted reading and science together as technologies of knowledge production and of moral and political improvement. In his first chapter, Secord recounts how the “dialogue format and visionary use of fact” in Consolations in Travel (1830), which turns up on Helen Graham's table in Anne Brontë's The Tenant of Wildfell Hall (1848), enabled Humphry Davy to speculate on wide-ranging philosophical questions that were becoming increasingly difficult to incorporate into scientific papers, which were already focusing on “specific discoveries in the laboratory, field, and museum” (26). He attends to how the ambiguous authorial presence and absence of Davy, by then a scientific celebrity, negotiated the competing epistemological demands of character (ethos) and objective distance (detachment) and to the way the dialogue formally reenacts the “scientific” processes of internal dialogue, debate, and discovery (43). Secord muses on the way Davy's travel trope enacts the scientific fantasy of empire, and, in the midst of tracing the fiery politics of the book's reception, suggests that the “delicate format and typeface” of the volume “carried some of the same sexual ambiguity that characterized Byron's poems. Was this a book for fops? For ladies? For Catholics?” (50–51). Provocative conjectural nuggets like this turn up in each equally wide-ranging chapter; each warrants a book of its own.
Among other things, Secord argues that that cheap format of John Herschel's Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy (1831), part of Dionysius Lardner's 133-volume Cabinet Cyclopaedia (1829–1846), made it far more likely to have been used as a conduct manual than the philosophical treatise on induction that posterity has typically deemed it to be. Thus Secord traces how nineteenth-century readers from laypeople and reviewers and newspaper journalists to Darwin variously appropriated “elegant extracts” of the Preliminary Discourse not as philosophical insight into inductive method but as exemplary articulations of the characterological import and effects of inductive thinking as an everyday attitude. Secord leaves much of the work of rereading the Preliminary Discourse as a conduct manual to us, but in recognizing the text as a physical book put to use by readers rather than conflating it with Herschel and his career, as philosophers and historians of science have typically done, he makes a compelling case for the historical validity and resonance of his methodology, and for a canny blend of the history of the book with literary analysis, over and above the history of ideas approaches still underwriting some histories and philosophies of science that haven't got the memo from Foucault. Secord considers the “position” of “most readers in the 1830s” (208), and in doing so affects a less conjectural, more empirical methodology than interpretation of the primary text itself. He is now the exemplary practitioner of this method, which has dominated the work in Victorian literature and science for the past ten years.
Secord also describes the reception of Charles Babbage's cantankerous Reflections on the Decline of Science in England (1830) as it manifests the emergence of “public accounting” as a standard for scientific evaluation and democratic mechanization (literally and figuratively) of scientific practice. Less originally, he details how Mary Somerville's On the Connexion of the Physical Sciences (1834), part of a “social network of [scientific] practice that depended only partly on print” (113), has a format that aspires to connect the fraught socioeconomic classes of a divisive nation just as it also presents mathematics as the method of connecting one science to, and thereby advancing, the next. He summarily rehashes how the style and format of Principles of Geology (1830–33), along with its tactical repudiation of Lamarck's transmutation, enabled Lyell to change the terms of geological debate – denying divine intervention, contesting the flood, and reaffirming the deep history of the earth – in the higher classes where power resided. Lyell, he explains, dissociates human history, with its narrative progress, from geological history, which is marked by facts stubbornly resistant to narrative trajectories.
Manifesting how the history of the book, as an interpretative method, tends to affect a kind of scientific ethos of its own, Secord explains William & Robert Chambers's “radically innovative pricing structures” as “experiments in cheap publishing” (193, 194) that translated George Combe's Constitution of Man (1828), the key text of phrenology, from obscurity to stunning popularity. Intimating how Combe's book invited readers to take it as a novel or read it without crediting its science, Secord suggests that the first lesson of phrenology might be “just because you saw someone reading a book did not mean that they accepted what it said” (199). Combe's book offered a science of tact, a science of feeling the surfaces of the world for the secrets they purportedly concealed. Secord refreshingly restores the serial, periodical format of the publication of Thomas Carlyle's Sartor Resartus (1833–34) to recognize it as a parodic, “ironic inversion” of the reflective scientific treatises whose visionary, reformative representation of science occupies the previous chapters (208–09), only then to explain how the publication of the articles together as a book transformed the work into a new genre, spiritual biography, which imagines alternatives to mechanistic science. Teufelsdröckh's book-filled attic study, a counter to the Royal Greenwich Observatory with its time ball, is “at once an intimate domestic interior and a scientific instrument,” “a spiritual observatory” (235). Ultimately, then, Secord tracks how reading was conceptualized as a scientific practice, a medium of scientific learning and work and becoming.
Secord's work is part of a widespread democratization of the history of nineteenth-century science beyond the monumental shadow of Darwin and beyond the subject of professionalization that dominated the field until, say, Adrian Desmond's remarkable Reference Desmond1989The Politics of Evolution, which studies morphology from the perspective of pre-Darwinian anatomy schools. Desmond might be said to have established the turn from canonical scientists to histories of popular science. In Wallace, Darwin, and the Origin of Species (2014), for instance, James T. Costa painstakingly compares and differentiates the work of Alfred Wallace in chronological relation to Darwin, so as to give Wallace his due credit. For another, in Evolution and the Victorians (Reference Conlin2014), which would make a useful textbook in seminars on Victorian natural history, Jonathan Conlin describes the discourse of evolution mediated through Kingsley, Spencer, Huxley, Wallace, and others.
Science in the Marketplace (Reference Fyfe and Lightman2007), co-edited by Aileen Fyfe and Bernard V. Lightman, has twelve essays that examine the popularization of science from the perspectives of orality, print, and display. Science in the Marketplace considers science as a commodity marketed to consumers. Among many interesting essays in this volume, including a sharp account by Secord of the transition of science from necessary conversational cultural capital to off-putting shop-talk, are essays by Ann Shteir and Samuel Alberti. Shteir discusses how accounts of the mimosa in different discourses disclose the elimination of specific literary tropes from authoritative science writing and reify (in plants) assumptions about male authority and female chastity. Alberti recounts the “performative codes” (393) disciplining the affective experience of museums and science: visitors were encouraged to see from a polite distance rather than gawking, touching, or even smelling, but these less decorous forms of sensation nevertheless surface as sensational records of disgust, fear, empathy, and wonder in the museum. With Bennett Zon, Lightman has also more recently co-edited another anthology, Evolution and Victorian Culture (Reference Conlin2014), whose eleven essays summarize the negotiation of evolution in fiction, poetry, photography, early cinema, visual art, theater, dance, music, architecture, exhibition, and other popular culture.
Lightman's most prodigious contribution, however, is his compendious Victorian Popularizers of Science: Designing Nature for New Audiences (Reference Fyfe and Lightman2007), which summarizes the work of thirty British popularizers of science in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Turning from the “positivist diffusion model” of elite scientists lecturing to a passive audience, Lightman marshals “popular” to foreground questions of audience participation and appropriation, the “indigenous science” of non-practitioners (14). Following Secord's lead in Victorian Sensation, he ascribes substantial agency to the publishers who shaped Victorian science by imagining series, establishing audiences, cultivating authors, and prescribing the genres, tones, and conventions of legitimate science: John Murray, Whitwell Elwin, W. and R. Chambers, Charles Knight, John Churchill, Longman, Macmillan, Edward Stanford, Cassell, H. S. King, George Routledge, and the Religious Tract Society all appear here. Print runs, sales, editions, and prices likewise register for Lightman the impression of publications on readers, though he well respects how elusive the content of those impressions are.
After a historiographical introduction, Lightman offers a chapter on Anglican parson popularizers (Ebenezer Brewer, Charles Alexander Johns, Thomas William Webb, Francis Orpen Morris, George Henslow, William Houghton, and Charles Kingsley) who perpetuated the theology of nature. Another chapter explains how women writers (Phebe Lankester, Sarah Bowditch Lee, Mary Ward, Anne Pratt, Margaret Gatty, Rosina Zornlin, Mary Kirby, Mary Roberts, Elizabeth Twining, Lydia Becker, and Jane Loudon) deviated from the “maternal tradition,” in which women addressed younger women and children, in order to address their new audiences of middle-class, mixed-sex adults. Lightman also describes how the prolific John George Wood and John Henry Pepper capitalized on visual sensationalism in their theatrical lectures. Wood drew color pictures for his audiences as he lectured and staged accidents, knocking a flask over but catching it before it hit the ground; Pepper staged plays with optical illusions of ghosts at the Royal Polytechnic. But Lightman is most concerned with print. A chapter explains how David Page, Arabella Buckley, Edward Clodd, and Grant Allen adapted the conventions of evolutionary epic from Chambers, Darwin, and Spencer. Another fascinating chapter addresses the enormous role of periodicals through the example of Knowledge, founded and edited by Richard Proctor in 1881. This journal explicitly contested the elitist model of science institutionalized in Nature with a “vision of a ‘Republic of Science,’ which had animated many science periodicals and popular audiences prior to 1860” (300). T. H. Huxley and Robert Ball, who were both practicing scientists, likewise serve as counter-examples of popular science in yet another chapter.
Lightman lastly addresses the fin-de-siècle work of Agnes Giberne, Eliza Brightwen, Henry Hutchinson, Alice Bodington, and Agnes Clerke. This “New Grub Street” of science literature constitutes a substantial body of scientific work outside of and often contradicting the now canonical scientists whom the popularizers often outsold (Lightman charts the numbers). This popular science welcomed women and some different classes of readers, whereas the “would-be professionalizers” – as Lightman carefully calls them – tended to exclude most. Competing for readers with fiction, it employed many familiar narrative strategies (anecdotes, anthropomorphism, defamiliarization of the commonplace, and synoptic overviews) and sustained religious cosmology well after Paley's Natural Theology (1802) had lost its relevance. Although it was the commercial product of professional writers, popular science adamantly resisted the professionalization of science; however inaccurate some of it might now be deemed to be, this writing – affordable, accessible, engaging – seems to be as democratic a form of knowledge as any other. Lightman's painstaking survey authorizes scholars to take up individual Victorian popularizers and their writings for sustained, more nuanced and critical analysis. If this writing rivaled novels, as Lightman shows it did, then its prose warrants some of the close literary analysis we afford novels. His scope prohibits indulgence in the degree of formal interpretation that natural historical writing promises to reward.
Ralph O'Connor's colossal The Earth on Show: Fossils and the Poetics of Popular Science, 1802–1856 (Reference O'Connor2007) calls for and delivers such interpretation as well as any interdisciplinary book does. O'Connor presents geology as the “paradigmatic science” (437) in the first half of the century. His first four chapters chronicle the emergence of the heyday of geological literature, which culminated in the 1840s and 50s with the incredibly prolific, self-taught Hugh Miller, whose artful prose influenced Carlyle, Tennyson, and Ruskin, among others (393). These chapters trace how Gideon Mantell engaged “the uninitiated general reader” of the 1830s (200) – a position O'Connor asks his readers to inhabit imaginatively – by affecting a confident showman tone, repeating a sensationalist “fact-or-fiction” trope (126), and capitalizing on lots of visual rhetoric. O'Connor details Robert Bakewell's articulation of curiosity and astonishment, and describes how William Buckland toed the establishment line by presenting geology as “both comfortingly traditional and attractively novel” (72). Examining the playful verse colleagues and students like Philip Duncan and William Conybeare wrote in response to Buckland's lectures and papers, which conjure the lives of “hyaenas” from fossilized poops and dinner bones he discovered in Kirkdale Cave, O'Connor catalogues the tropes underwriting geological literature “on both sides of the cosmological divide,” that is, literalism and geology of “the new school” (159–60). “Comparisons with romance, descriptions of huge monsters, folklore allusions, devotional rhapsodies, poetry quotations, vivid restorations of the past” comprise this “poetics of geology” (196).
O'Connor plays with participles, spots of time, perspective, all sorts of linguistic details, but his analysis of verse quotation is most productive. Buckland, like many others, “revivified” pterodactyls and other antediluvian creatures by “[dressing them] in Miltonic garb, dovetailing geohistory with sacred history” (161). Like many other geological authors, Lyell, whose hypothetical, sibilant, deliberately repetitive, and allusive “prose almost becomes poetry” (179), carefully cited Byron verse. In some cases, quotation “pulled Byron's visions of wrecked worlds out of their immediate polemical context, putting them to pious uses” (354); in other cases, his verse gives radical edge to what readers might otherwise take for granted. The middle chapters of The Earth on Show impressively, if long-windedly, correlate extratextual mediums of popularization like the panorama and diorama to the practice of verse citation. These mediums all necessitate “two distinct kinds of double vision.” On the one hand, their audiences oscillate along a scalar continuum stretching from minute details to sweeping, general pictures. On the other hand, their audiences concurrently oscillate between various ontological or experiential categories: “fact and affect,” “body's eye” and “mind's eye,” “prose and verse,” past and present (315–16). Verse quotations – of Virgil, Milton, Spenser, Wordsworth, Keats, Shelley, and others – therefore “encouraged a ‘mental diorama’” (316) insofar as their juxtaposition of prose and verse reproduced the twofold double vision of literal dioramas and panoramas.
But so too did generic hybridity: geological writing, as O'Connor shows, dallied on a generic continuum blending natural-theological and paleontological treatises, anatomical monographs, travel guides, topography, heroic autobiography, sacred history, epic and lyric poetry. The verse quotations thus “drew attention to geology's strange status, poised uneasily yet enticingly between fact and fiction” (347). O'Connor masters this poise himself: if some passages and charts of genres and prices might tire a reader less enamored with geological print culture, The Earth on Show rewards attention with light-hearted tidbits, including a witty observation on book history based upon a (duly facsimiled) spider squashed on a page of Thomas Milner's 1846 Gallery of Nature (234–35).
Given how convincingly O'Connor documents geological writing as popular literature, I think we might take his description of this “epistemological brinkmanship” (347) and run with it as an heuristic to describe not only the generic work of a lot of nineteenth-century literary conventions but also much of the work happening here and now at the intersection of literary studies and the history of science. As O'Connor observes, in Organic Remains of a Former World (1804–11), James Parkinson portrayed fossils as historical objects “fraught with entertainment” (53–54). Geological history appeals to literary scholars not just because it “rested,” as Parkinson says, “on a thick and fertile substratum of folklore” and Biblical heritage (53); not just because it deemed the Earth a palimpsest of human, cultural, animal, and divine history; but because it employed what O'Connor calls “compilatory practices”: multimedia, allusions, spectacular imagery, generic hybridity, codes of decorum, travel writing, conjecture, sweeping cosmological and often apocalyptic narratives and the recalcitrant detail of thick description. I would add here that Parkinson's locution, “fraught with entertainment,” seems an apt characterization of the epistemological brinkmanship of modern academic scholarship in these hybrid domains. This work keeps one foot on the epistemologically-safe, utilitarian high-ground of natural history while the other flits in pleasing, comfortably-conjectural literary waters. The works under review here prefer their entertainment fraught with natural scientific creditability and their natural science fraught with literary value (readability, humanism, textual sophistication). The dual imperative of this generic continuum and its conventions of double vision again mediates scholarly publishing and practice.
Geology is a hot topic. Martin Rudwick, perhaps its foremost historian, has produced Worlds Before Adam (Reference Rudwick2008), a monumental sequel to his equally authoritative Bursting the Limits of Time (2005). Adelene Buckland's Novel Science (Reference Buckland2013), however, foregrounds the relation of geology and fiction. It justly rebuts the old saw that early nineteenth-century geology offered “an authoritative plot pattern on which to hang a fiction,” a plot pattern of gradualist and therefore “realist” change, and underscores instead how geologists actually legitimated forms of “plot breakdown.” Interrupting or disavowing a narrative coherence secured “narrative authenticity” (26–27). Attentive to its own colorful, recalcitrant details – like Charles Lapworth's petrified sandwiches (89) and the drinking games that followed meetings of the Geological Society of London and were inspired by Walter Scott's Guy Mannering (1815) – Novel Science registers literature as a mode of scientific practice because literature inflected the experience of geological work and the style of geological writing. The layered strata of the geological map is the foremost technology here linking fiction and geology. Through interpretations of novels by Walter Scott, Emily Brontë, Charles Kingsley, and George Eliot, Novel Science identifies William Buckland's “stratigraphic imagination” at work, analogous in ways to O'Connor's “mental diorama.” Generic hybridity recurs here, too, in the form of landscape sketches juxtaposed with stratigraphic maps or personal travel narratives juxtaposed with geological data and observations. Together, the books under review imply that generic hybridity was a paradigmatic vehicle of nineteenth-century knowledge production, that it was a formal index of novel, moral, and valuable truth. And, as I have already hinted, their own interdisciplinary indulgence in book history, literary analysis, and science history, coupled with their indulgent use of charts and pictures, also implies that generic hybridity retains or has retained this epistemological clout. If Novel Science does not exactly change how we read fictions like Wuthering Heights, like O'Connor's work, the connections it draws between novels and geological practice enticingly gesture at the epistemology of fiction, the tropes that made it resonate as knowledge.
Literary studies and the history of science converge most strongly in the successful genre of the intellectual biography that demonstrates a particular set of epistemological, ideological, institutional and other practices, conventions, and transformations through the life of an exemplary person, object, or book. Jim Endersby's Imperial Nature (Reference Endersby2008), for example, traces how Joseph Hooker transmuted the gentlemanly ideals and epistemology of civility espoused from the early-modern period through the early nineteenth century into “modern scientific codes of conduct” (5). In opposition to the usual “avalanche of isms” (326), Endersby organizes his book around practices – travelling, gardening, collecting, drawing, labeling, drying, corresponding and distributing, seeing, classifying, settling, publishing, charting, associating, and governing – as each relates to the dynamics of the “philosophical” as a code of manners and manner of thought. To be philosophical, rather than professional or merely disinterested or gentlemanly, meant emphasizing the “broad” over the specific, “the general character of a country's vegetation” rather than “the individual species of which it was composed” (244); being “cautious” and even “deliberately equivocating” (326) rather than being decisive and thereby divisive. As Endersby writes, “Hooker's work. . . remakes nature in empire's image” (314). Not only did it manage the distance between his position as institutional center managing a periphery of collectors and specimens, but it also created Kew gardens in the image of an empire whose governance was complex and uneven.
Refusing to conflate the history of science with “professionalization,” Endersby observes how Hooker and his peers eschewed “professionalism” on behalf of the “moral overtones of terms like ‘professed,’ ‘cultivator,’ and ‘votary’” (24). These terms evoked disinterestedness and bypassed the division of amateur and professional, which ostracized colonial and provincial plant and fossil collectors upon whose work metropolitan experts relied. Playing up the “philosophical” bent of the botanist, Hooker implied that the metropolitan scientist's generalization of the work of these local collectors established the “inductive credentials” (15) of botany, and as Jonathan Smith's Fact and Feeling (Reference Smith1994) and Mary Poovey's A History of the Modern Fact (Reference Poovey1998) have shown, the Baconian idiom of induction was a constitutive feature of knowledge in nineteenth-century Britain. Coupled with the geographical distribution of plants, Hooker's imperiousness, and the financial opportunities of empire, this inductive relationship between metropolitan expert and local collector constitutes the “imperial nature” of Endersby's title. Hooker insisted that understanding the laws governing the “botanical empire” would “raise botany from the merely descriptive” (17) to a respected science because it inscribed abstraction into it.
Robert J. Richards's The Tragic Sense of Life (Reference Richards2008) similarly employs an intellectual biography of Ernst Haeckel, Darwin's German champion, to study the material developments of a concept, in this case morphology. At home in German and English, immersed in Romantic and modern as well as Victorian scientific and philosophical work, moving and sophisticated in its argument, beautifully illustrated and written, exhaustively researched and footnoted, complete with appendices on the history of morphology and an essay on the “The Moral Grammar of Narratives in the History of Biology,” The Tragic Sense of Life sets an exceptionally high bar for what interdisciplinary work can be. It is stunning. Growing out of Richards's earlier The Romantic Conception of Life (2004), the book defends Haeckel from a host of influential scholarly dismissals – not to mention “an electronic auto-da-fé” on “thousands” of creationist websites (7) – that variously characterize him as a derivative or anti-Darwinist, a plagiarist, even a proto-Nazi. Richards describes Haeckel instead as the foremost disseminator of Darwinian theories, popularly and to influential thinkers like Freud. Richards's earlier work on Darwin demonstrated how many of the earliest proponents of Darwinian theory embraced “nonmaterialistic metaphysics” and theological beliefs (Richards Reference Richards1987, 331–408). Haeckel, Richards in the later work contends, is largely responsible for the popular reception of Darwinian theory as “materialistic and a-theistic, if not atheistic” (15), even as Haeckel too found “in nature the beauty and solace lost in human love” (108). Richards ascribes Haeckel's vehement turn against dualism and orthodoxy and his wholehearted embrace of a materialist and a-theistic Darwinism to the sudden, crushing death of his first wife Anna Sethe, thinking of whom he wondrously described and lovingly named several species of medusa (jellyfish). For Richards, Anna's 1864 death inflected the monistic metaphysics of Haeckel's magisterial Generelle Morphologie (1866): “For Haeckel,” he writes, “love fled and hid her face among sea creatures” (111).
Haeckel's monistic metaphysics was realized from readings of Goethe and as “balm to a terrible loss” (167), but “it perfectly mirrored” the personal convictions of “Darwin, Huxley, Spencer, Baldwin, Mach, and Helmholtz” in the latter half of the nineteenth century (128). Like George Levine, then, Richards convincingly argues for a more optimistic reading of Haeckel (and through him Darwin) by which life is not so much reduced to mechanism and material as mechanism and material are vitalized. Richards's stunning, original reading of the Generelle Morphologie and its reception in dialogue with Darwin's work is the centerpiece of The Tragic Sense of Life. In addition to a detailed catalogue of Haeckel's interpretations of, departures from, and innovations to Darwin's writing, it convincingly suggests that metaphysical monism underwrites modern scientific thought, even as it “allowed Haeckel,” who coined ecology in 1866, “to believe that a once-living soul might be brought back into the beating heart of nature, since the conservation laws indicated that neither force nor matter could be destroyed. Anna would not die forever” (128).
Gillian Beer's Darwin's Plots (1983, 2000, Reference Beer2009) remains the signature book on Darwin as a writer and on how to historicize transgeneric discursive features – idioms, plots, metaphors – without submitting to reductive historical determinism. A new third edition includes an additional essay on “Darwin and the Consciousness of Others,” which plumbs the ways Darwin's 1830s Notebooks and major late works, The Descent of Man (1871) and Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872), work around the problematic human agency implicit in language – a problem Darwin explicitly recognizes in The Descent and that Beer examines at length in the original chapters of Darwin's Plots – by attending to the forms that “awareness” and “intent” might assume in other organisms. Darwin explores intent in different organisms most thoroughly via the “vertiginous freedom” (247) of his experiments, which subordinated skepticism to the possibilities of unpredictable insights and the empathy of “anecdote,” which “acknowledges the interpretative role of the observer, seeking to enter other forms of consciousness by the imperfect means of his own attentiveness” (254).
George Levine has also added to his contributions on Darwin, Darwin and the Novelists (Reference Levine1988) and Darwin Loves You (2008), with Darwin the Writer (Reference Levine2011), which recasts Darwin's prose as comedy that affirms feeling engagement with the world rather than disenchanted alienation from it. Rebuffing the habit of “knowing” Darwin without reading him, Levine highlights the “intensity” of his writing, how it wraps “huge claims” in “understated prose” (8). Abstractions of Darwin's ideas, such as Daniel Dennett's description of natural selection as an “algorithm,” miss their “affective freight” (17) and “creative tensions” (9). Disenchantment thus accrues to such abstractions, not to Darwin's writing itself, which is as exuberant about life as it is insistent about competition and death. Darwin is comic, for Levine, in his juxtaposition of high and low: the grand theory, by which development by natural selection displaces intelligent design, rubs shoulders with quotidian matters – experimental tablespoons of pond muck in a tea cup (21), “playing the piano for worms” (214), observations on seedlings, beeswax, and birdshit (14). Levine instantiates this comedy in a pervasive rhetorical pattern, or “double movement,” whereby Darwin's prose segues from expressions of awe or shock at an initially “overwhelming or adamant fact,” which appears to be belie his theory, through a matter-of-fact explanation that recasts the apparent anomaly as superior evidence of his theory. Darwin thus renders the ostensibly counterintuitive observation sublime in a different way: wondrously, the counterintuitive turns out always to be intuitive.
Levine reiterates how “double movement” inheres in paradox and irony (24). Darwin's “ultimate paradox” (149) is that human consciousness evolved in adaptation to an otherwise “meaningless world” (144). For Darwin, meaning and beauty – pace Samuel Butler, George Bernard Shaw, and others – depend upon the conscious mind that supplants divine creation in scientific discourse: “blunders discovered” in the natural world become the “key to nature's real design” because “the mind tracing those blunders, working the analogies, distinguishing the homologies, writing the histories, is the designer” (218). This is not all so bad in Darwin's rendering. Levine attunes readers to Darwin's good-humored love of “the strange awkwardness of so much life” (218), a comic affect often in tension with the merciless world he purports to observe. Levine links Vivian's paradoxes in Oscar Wilde's “The Decay of Lying” and Virginia Woolf's inward turns from the ordinary, such as “the mark on the wall,” to Darwin's comic double vision. But most refreshingly and I hope most influentially, he eschews overt Darwinian themes and images in Thomas Hardy's novels on behalf of style. He calls The Woodlanders (1886–87) the most Darwinian of all Hardy's works because of its “generic chaos” (193), because it “enacts in startling juxtapositions comic grotesqueries, pastoral ideals, and low comedy” (197). Upholding a “Darwinian scheme of plasticity as against conventionality,” Hardy knew well that the violation of conventions, however amoral, made life possible (208).
Levine also ascribes an affective surplus to Darwin's double movement, and his recurrent turns to “affect” and to vision bespeak, not only the resonant scholarship on vision by Jonathan Crary, Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, Jonathan Smith, and Chris Otter, but also the convergence of affect and performance theory with science studies. This convergence is most pronounced in Tiffany Watt Smith's On Flinching (2014), which extends vision to the whole body. On Flinching describes flinches and winces, “both an embarrassing liability and a visceral pleasure,” as “part and parcel of the [later nineteenth-century's] restless technological advances and mass entertainment culture” (4). Where eighteenth-century writers identified the flinch as a symptom of moral fiber or a gesture of sympathy, Smith claims Victorians conceptualized the flinch as a performative technology of seeing as well as a subject of physiological studies of perception. Darwin's recoil from a puff adder, Henry Head's winces at pin pricks, Monkey F's surgically-created inability to be startled by David Ferrier's pistol fire: these flinches had a double valence as physiological symptom of the unmediated body and the effect of elaborate staging, and so they evidence for Smith the theatricality of Victorian objectivity. Smith's fascinating work will no doubt inspire redoubled attention to the flinches of Victorian literature as well as to the embodied experience of Victorian scientific work.
These books under review all testify to the voracious publishing market for the history of science, but in their conjunction of book history with formalism and generic analysis, they also make abundantly clear the historiographical and epistemological contributions of literary studies to interdisciplinary work. These books recognize that the sciences they describe relied on writing, not merely as a secondary medium of transmission and promotion, but as a productive technology. Natural history and geology were, among other things, writing. Generic conventions and literary tropes produced knowledge and validated fossils, plant specimens, characters, and strata as knowledge. These books therefore affirm the value of book history and formal literary analysis as historical epistemology, as analysis of what counted as knowledge in specific cultures, including our own. They also suggest that such analysis is most revelatory when it subordinates themes and images to the nitty-gritty of diction, syntax, trope, genre, and other matters of style.
