INTRODUCTION
As a device, a trust recognizes the dichotomy between legal and equitable rights. The principles that arise from this dichotomy have resulted in the area of law referred to as trust law. In Huebner v Aeronautical Industrial Engineering and Project Management Company Ltd (Huebner),Footnote 1 the Nigerian Supreme Court was faced with an appeal that centred on trust law principles. Although the appellant invoked the court's equitable jurisdiction, the Supreme Court turned down the appellant's plea, basing its decision on the provisions of the Land Use Act 1978 and the equitable maxim that he who comes to equity must come with clean hands. This article aims to show that the court erred in its decision, as the facts before the court clearly established the basis upon which a resulting trust would be implied.
UNPACKING THE RESULTING TRUST
Traditionally, there are two types of implied trust: constructive and resulting. Sukhninder Panesar writes that, “the fundamental distinction between resulting and constructive trusts lies in the fact that resulting trusts are implied by law whereas constructive trusts are imposed by law”.Footnote 2 This author agrees that resulting trusts are implied by law, because a resulting trust arises from a presumed intention when two unique circumstances occur. These circumstances were famously itemized by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in the House of Lords decision in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC (Westdeutsche),Footnote 3 where he held:
“Under existing law a resulting trust arises in two sets of circumstances:
(A) where A makes a voluntary payment to B or pays (wholly or in part) for the purchase of property which is vested either in B alone or in the joint names of A and B, there is a presumption that A did not intend to make a gift to B: the money or property is held on trust for A (if he is the sole provider of the money) or in the case of a joint purchase by A and B in shares proportionate to their contributions …
(B) Where A transfers property to B on express trusts, but the trusts declared do not exhaust the whole beneficial interest …
Both types of resulting trust are traditionally regarded as examples of trusts giving effect to the common intention of the parties. A resulting trust is not imposed by law against the intention of the trustee (as is a constructive trust) but gives effect to his presumed intention”.Footnote 4
This statement of the law remains the leading authority on when a resulting trust arises and was adopted by the Nigerian Supreme Court in Madu v Madu.Footnote 5 Suffice to say that the two circumstances that give rise to a resulting trust itemized in Westdeutsche find their origin in two maxims of equity.
The first circumstance (RT1 resulting trust) occurs when X pays for or contributes to the purchase of property that is then held jointly with or in the name of Y. The RT1 resulting trust gives effect to the maxim that “equity assumes bargains and not gifts”Footnote 6 and, as such, X who provided the funds did not intend to part with his beneficial interest. This presumption would remain unless Y can prove an outright gift, or that the relationship between X and Y raises the counter-presumption of advancement.Footnote 7
The second circumstance occurs when a trust fails or when the purpose of the trust has been fulfilled and surplus funds remain. In such situations, a resulting trust is implied because “equity abhors a vacuum”.Footnote 8 Such a resulting trust “has the effect of returning the beneficial ownership back to the person creating the trust”.Footnote 9
THE FACTS AND DECISION IN HUEBNER
In 1995, Mr Gerhard Huebner approached the High Court of Kaduna State to settle a dispute that had arisen between him and the Aeronautical Industrial Engineering Project Management Company Limited (AIEP). The dispute concerned a large parcel of land in Kajuru district in the Kachia local government area of Kaduna state (Kajuru land). Mr Huebner asked the court to declare that AIEP held the Kajuru land on a resulting trust for his benefit. The facts that resulted in this dispute were summarized in the lead judgment of Galinje JSC:
“Sometimes [sic] in 1975, the District Head of Kajuru District in Kachia Local Government Area of Kaduna State, acting on the instruction of the Emir of Zaria granted permission to the appellant to build a temporary weekend hospitality resort on a hilltop in Kajuru Village. The appellant initially built a temporary structure. Later he built a permanent structure which he name [sic] ‘The Kajuru Castle’. As a result of the desire to expand the business, the appellant sometimes [sic] in 1981 commenced negotiation through the agency of the District Head to purchase the land surrounding the said hill measuring 70 hectares. He was in the final stages of the negotiation, when in 1986 he was appointed the Managing Director of the respondent being a German, the appellant was adviced [sic] to buy the land in the respondent's name as it was unlawful for him to hold a legal estate in Kaduna State. The appellant heeded the advice and purchased the land in the name of the respondent. The receipt of which evidenced the purchase of the said land was issued in his name and the name of the respondent.
Subsequently a Certificate of Occupancy dated 1st of January, 1997 was issued to the appellant by Kachia Local Government. This certificate was used in applying for a statutory certificate of occupancy from Kaduna State Government. The application was successful and a certificate of occupancy dated 6th March, 1999 was issued by Kaduna State Government. Both certificates were issued in the name of the respondent and were admitted at the trial court as exhibits A1 and A3 respectively …
From the evidence available at the trial court, it will appear that the appellant did acquire the disputed property with his personal money in the name of the respondent. This is so because the property in dispute was acquired between 1976 and 1985 before the appellant became the Managing Director of the respondent in 1986.”Footnote 10
On these facts, Mr Huebner's appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed in a judgment delivered on 7 April 2017. In dismissing his appeal, Galinje JSC held:
“Having come to the conclusion that the disputed property was acquired by the appellant, the question that agitates my mind is whether the appellant was qualified and had the capacity to hold legal estate in land in Nigeria. The law is settled that equity does not operate in vacuum. In answer to this question, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the appellant knew and had consistently maintained the fact that he as an alien cannot hold title to land by virtue of the relevant provisions of the Nigerian Law relating to landed property. Learned counsel further submitted that since the appellant is barred from holding legal title to land under the Land Use Act 1978, he could not hold any legal interest over the disputed property which is capable of being entrusted to the respondent. In aid learned counsel cited the case of Chief SO Ogunola & 6 Ors v Hoda Eiyekole & 9 Ors (1990) 4 NWLR (Pt 146) 632 at 647 paragraphs B–D … I entirely associate myself with the decision of my learned brothers in Ogunola & Ors v Eiyekole (supra) and hold that the appellant being an alien had no legal capacity to hold interest in land in Kajuru Local Government Area of Kaduna State. This being so and by virtue of the Latin legal maxim; Nemo dat quod non habet, the appellant cannot benefit from the property which he was incapable of owning”.Footnote 11
In Peter-Odili JSC's concurring judgment, the learned justice also commented:
“Then [remains] the nagging issue of whether [an] implied trust on the basis of equity crops up in favour of the appellant. In considering it, acts of the appellant come into question, firstly assuming he knew he was not qualified to own land in Northern Nigeria, he acted in going ahead to make the purchase wrongfully and illegally and therefore without clean hand [sic] which equity cannot encourage or assist. The flip side would be if he made payments with his funds not being aware that he could not have such ownership, then his action would be caught up by the principle that, ignorance of the law is not an excuse. Therefore either way, he lacked capacity to enter into the purchase transaction for land being a foreign national. It follows that whether in law or equity he lost out.”Footnote 12
This ended Mr Huebner's sojourn to vindicate his beneficial interest in the Kajuru land,Footnote 13 in the words of Peter-Odili JSC, “whether in law or equity he lost out”.
WAS THE COURT RIGHT?
Before considering this question, it is pertinent to reproduce the principal relief claimed by Mr Huebner: “[a] declaration that the defendant [AIEP] holds the legal estate in the land at Kajuru bought by the plaintiff [Mr Huebner] in its [AIEP's] name upon a resultant trust to the benefit of the plaintiff [Mr Huebner].”Footnote 14 From this relief, it is quite clear that Mr Huebner never invited the court to declare that he had legal title over the Kajuru land. All he implored the court to do was to declare that AIEP held the Kajuru land upon a “resultant trust” for his benefit. In this regard, there was no doubt that Mr Huebner had provided all of the funds for the purchase and development of the Kajuru land. Galinje JSC found as a fact that “the disputed property was acquired by the appellant” ie Mr Huebner. There was also no evidence that Mr Huebner intended to make a gift of the Kajuru land to AIEP, nor did the presumption of advancement arise on the facts.
Quite clearly, the facts of this case fit perfectly into the circumstance that would lead to the implication of an RT1 resulting trust under the principles articulated in Westdeutsche, ie that “A … pays (wholly or in part) for the purchase of property which is vested in B alone”.Footnote 15 Accordingly, equity will assume that Mr Huebner never intended to gift the Kajuru land to AIEP and infer that a resulting trust arose for the benefit of Mr Huebner with AIEP as trustee.
The Supreme Court disagreed. From the excerpts of the decision of the court quoted above, in reaching its decision, the court reasoned that: the Land Use Act forbade Mr Huebner from acquiring land in Nigeria; a trust could not have arisen in favour of Mr Huebner under the principle of nemo dat quod non habet; and Mr Huebner was aware of his incapacity and as such was unable to activate an equitable resulting trust because his hands were unclean. With respect, in the context of established equitable principles, this author disagrees with the Supreme Court's decision.
The Land Use Act forbade Mr Huebner from acquiring land in Nigeria
The Nigerian Supreme Court's decision in Ogunola v Eiyekole determined that “a non-Nigerian cannot apply for a statutory or customary right of occupancy”Footnote 16 and as such cannot acquire legal title to land in Nigeria. It was based on this decision that Galinje JSC endorsed the submission that Mr Huebner “could not hold any legal interest over the disputed property”. However, in Huebner, it was AIEP that had legal title to the land in dispute. Mr Huebner affirmed AIEP's legal title, and asked the court to declare that AIEP held that legal title on trust for his benefit. In delineating the unique character of a trust as a legal device, Clarke and Kohler explain that:
“… there were interests ‘developed by equity to mitigate the harshness of rigid common law rules and to satisfy a commercial need which the common law left unfulfilled’. The most obvious example is the one that arose out of equity's creation of the institution of the trust, which split entitlement to benefit from a thing from management and control of it. This was done by requiring the legal owner of a thing to use it not for his own benefit but for the benefit of someone else. The proprietary interest of the beneficiary is equitable, and there is no legal counterpart”.Footnote 17
Thus, while AIEP remained the legal owner of the Kajuru land and thus had management and control of it, Mr Huebner was asking the court to recognize that AIEP was required to manage the Kajuru land for his benefit. Mr Huebner's beneficial interest existed in equity, separate and independent from AIEP's legal title, which was conferred by the Land Use Act. It is submitted that the resulting trust that arose in favour of Mr Huebner operated outside the strict provisions of the Land Use Act.
The recognition of equitable interests in land outside the strict provision of statute is not a new concept in Nigerian law,Footnote 18 as the distinction between equitable interest and legal estate has taken root.Footnote 19 Nigerian courts, acting within their equitable jurisdiction, have found a way to give effect to the parties’ intention outside the formal requirements of statute by imposing a trust relationship and finding that an equitable interest arises where necessary. Justification for this approach is found in the maxim that “equity will not allow a statute to be used as an instrument of fraud”,Footnote 20 as espoused in the seminal case of Rochefoucauld v Boustead.Footnote 21 Nigerian jurisprudence recognizes the importance of this maxim and, in Chieke v Olusoga (Chieke),Footnote 22 the Supreme Court held:
“The plaintiff is trying to hide under the provision of Section 5(2) of the Law Reform (Contracts) Law of Lagos State because PW3 (his agent) did not sign Exhibit ‘M’. I think this is an attempt to make the law an instrument of fraud. This court will not allow the plaintiff [sic] make fraudulent use of this legislation and take advantage of his own fraud. The courts have always interfered against a party who attempts to make the Statute of Fraud, 1677 and similar legislations an instrument of fraud”.Footnote 23
In Huebner, it is submitted that the Supreme Court allowed AIEP to set up the Land Use Act as an instrument of fraud in depriving Mr Huebner of his beneficial interest in the Kajuru land. The facts are clear. Between 1976 and 1985, Mr Huebner used his own funds to buy and develop extensively the Kajuru land, displaying an unequivocal intention to make the land an enduring investment. The only reason why AIEP's name was on the certificates of occupancy was because Mr Huebner was informed in 1986 (ten years after he started the purchase and development of the Kajuru land) that, as a foreigner, he could not own land in Nigeria. However, when Mr Huebner asserted his equitable interest in the Kajuru land, AIEP hid behind the provisions of the Land Use Act and asserted that Mr Huebner had absolutely no interest in the Kajuru land. As in Chieke, the court was called upon to activate its equitable jurisdiction and refuse shelter to a party that attempted to use legislation as a technical basis to deny the existence of an equitable right. However, the Supreme Court “endorsed” AIEP's unconscionable position and held that “whether in law or equity [Mr Huebner] lost out”.
A trust could not have arisen in favour of Mr Huebner under the principle of nemo dat quod non habet
In its judgment, the Supreme Court declined to uphold Mr Huebner's beneficial interest, holding that, as a foreigner who was legally disabled from owning land in Nigeria, the maxim nemo dat quod non habet meant that he could not “benefit from the property which he was incapable of owning.”Footnote 24 This maxim simply means that a person cannot give that which he does not have.Footnote 25 It is a rule of law that mandates that a legally cognizable alienation of property can only be effected by a person who has some proprietary interest in the property. The rule also stipulates that the capacity to alienate depends entirely on the nature of the proprietary right that a person possesses over that property.Footnote 26 Accordingly, the Supreme Court by its holding determined that an equitable interest could not arise in favour of Mr Huebner because: he was incapable of owning the Kajuru land; and he could not benefit from land that he was incapable of owning. It is submitted that, in arriving at this decision, the court did not appreciate the essence of a resulting trust.
In Huebner, the Supreme Court held that “an implied trust is founded upon the unexpressed intention of the settlor and same is raised and created by implication of law from the surrounding circumstances of the case. It does not require agreement between the settlor and the trustee”.Footnote 27 This explanation of implied trusts is directly applicable to a resulting trust, which arises when either of the circumstances articulated in Westdeutsche occurs. A resulting trust is wholly implied by operation of law and as such “does not require [an] agreement between the settlor and the trustee”.Footnote 28 With a resulting trust, equity looks at the facts of the case and, when they meet the criteria laid down in Westdeutsche, the law implies a trust relationship irrespective of the consent or willingness of the trustee. There is no requirement in law that a beneficiary under a resulting trust should have ownership rights over the trust property before a resulting trust is implied in their favour. In fact, in an RT1 resulting trust (where the trust property is not jointly owned), the beneficiary would never “own” the trust property; he or she would simply have contributed to its purchase.Footnote 29
In this regard, Mr Huebner never asserted that he created an express trust by giving the Kajuru land to AIEP. What he maintained was that the Kajuru land was bought in AIEP's name with funds that he provided. It is submitted that, considering the established facts in the light of Westdeutsche, Mr Huebner's claim to an equitable interest under a resulting trust was well-founded. The legal maxim nemo dat quod non habet was inapplicable because equity would not require that legal title first reside in Mr Huebner. The resulting trust was not settled by Mr Huebner, it was created by operation of law.
On the second limb, it is also not a requirement of equity that Mr Huebner be capable of owning the Kajuru land before a trust in respect of the land is implied in his favour. It is submitted that Mr Huebner's acquisition of an equitable interest under a resulting trust was unaffected by his inability to own the Kajuru land as a result of the provisions of the Land Use Act.
A perfect illustration of this point is a trust of land for the benefit of an infant. Usually, in Nigerian law, an infant is incapable of holding legal estate in landed property (ie owning land).Footnote 30 However, a conveyance of land to an infant automatically results in a statutory trust implied by operation of law. This point was neatly articulated by Prof Smith, SAN who writes: “[w]here a right of occupancy is transferred or devised to an infant either alone or jointly with other persons, the instrument operates as a declaration that the legal estate is vested in the grantor upon trust to convey same to trustee for sale [sic] for the benefit of the infant or infants”.Footnote 31
Thus, although an infant is statutorily disabled from holding legal estate in land, a trust is statutorily implied for the benefit of the infant, conferring on him or her a right to benefit from the land. The infant's legal inability to own the land does not impact or destroy his or her equitable right to benefit from the land.
In essence, the Supreme Court's application of the maxim nemo dat quod non habet was misplaced in view of the principles that regulate the creation and incidences of a resulting trust. There is no equitable requirement that Mr Huebner either own or be capable of owning the Kajuru land before a resulting trust could arise in his favour.
Mr Huebner was aware of his incapacity and as such was unable to activate an equitable resulting trust because his hands were unclean
In Peter-Odili JSC's concurring judgment, speaking on the “conduct” of Mr Huebner, his lordship held: “firstly assuming he knew he was not qualified to own land in Northern Nigeria, he acted in going ahead to make the purchase wrongfully and illegally and therefore without clean hand [sic] which equity cannot encourage or assist”.Footnote 32 This holding of the court requires detailed consideration. The first point to be made is that, on the established facts, characterizing Mr Huebner's conduct as “without clean hands” comes across as unfair. Mr Huebner commenced his investment in the Kajuru land in 1975 by building a temporary resort. Between 1976 and 1985 he proceeded to purchase the Kajuru land. It was only after his purchase that he was informed that, as an alien, he could not own land in Nigeria. It is pertinent to state that the Land Use Act (which is the source of the illegality) did not come into existence until 1978, three years after he commenced his purchase.
With these facts, are Mr Huebner hands really unclean? In Dering v Earl of Winchelsea (Dering), the court held that, “if this can be founded on any principle, it must be that a man must come into a court of equity with clean hands, but when this is said it does not refer to a general depravity; it must be an immediate and necessary relation to the equity sued for; it must be depravity in a legal as well as a moral sense”.Footnote 33
On the strength of Dering, it is submitted that the uncleanness that would irk the court of equity to refuse a remedy “must be depravity in a legal as well as a moral sense”. In Huebner, while a legal wrong can be asserted, it would be a stretch to argue that Mr Huebner acted immorally. He invested in the Kajuru land for over ten years before he became aware of his disability.
Secondly, while equity demands that he who seeks equitable remedies must come with clean hands, it is also a recognized maxim that equity does not demand that its suitors shall have led blameless lives. This maxim was explained in Loughran v Loughran (Loughran),Footnote 34 a decision of the United States Supreme Court that held:
“By the long line of cases following Connolly v Union Sewer Pipes Co, 184 US 540, it is settled that illegality constitutes no defense when merely collateral to the cause of action sued on. A ‘person does not become an outlaw and lose all rights by doing an illegal act.’ National Bank & Loan Co v Petrie, 189 US 423, 425. Courts grant relief against present wrongs and to enforce an existing right, although the property involved was acquired by some past illegal act. Brooks v Martin, 2 Wall 70, 79, 80; Planters’ Bank v Union Bank, 16 Wall 483, 499, 500 … Equity does not demand that its suitors shall have led blameless lives.”Footnote 35
In Seed Vest Microfinance Bank Plc v Ogunsina (Seed Vest),Footnote 36 the maxim explained in Loughran was adopted by the Nigerian Court of Appeal, where Denton-West JCA stated:
“It is often stated that one who comes into equity must come with clean hands … I am not saying that a ‘bad person’ cannot obtain the aid of equity, no, equity does not demand that its suitors shall have led blameless lives. All I am saying is that if there is a nexus between the applicant's wrongful act and the rights he wishes to enforce, then the defence of unclean hands may apply.”Footnote 37
The decisions in Loughran and Seed Vest buttress the principle established in Dering to the effect that there must be a direct connection between the illegal conduct raised and the equitable remedy claimed.Footnote 38 If the illegal conduct constitutes the cause of action or an element of the cause of action, then equity would reject he who comes with unclean hands.Footnote 39 However, if the illegal conduct is not an element of the cause of action, then, as in Dering, Loughran and Seed Vest, equity would not demand that he who seeks equity be without blemish.Footnote 40
Returning to Huebner, Mr Huebner's cause of action was entirely centred on an RT1 resulting trust under the principle laid down in Westdeutsche: that he purchased the Kajuru land in the name of AIEP. The court held that Mr Huebner's illegal conduct was that “he knew he was not qualified to own land in Northern Nigeria … [and went] ahead to make the purchase wrongfully and illegally”.Footnote 41 However, Mr Huebner's knowledge of his incapacity to own land in Northern Nigeria did not change the reality that he purchased land in the name of AIEP, which did not assert that the Kajuru land was a gift.
Thus, the illegal reason for the purchase in the name of AIEP was not an immediate and necessary element in establishing Mr Huebner's equitable interest: it was “merely collateral to the cause of action sued on”.Footnote 42 A compelling precedent for this approach is the decision of the House of Lords in Tinsley v Milligan (Tinsley).Footnote 43 In that case, the plaintiff and defendant were involved in fraudulently obtaining benefits from the Department of Social Security (DSS). To perpetuate their fraud, both parties bought a property in the plaintiff's name alone, thus allowing the defendant to make false claims upon the DSS as regards her means. On these facts, Lord Browne-Wilkinson reasoned:
“In particular it is said that equity will not aid the respondent to assert, establish or enforce an equitable, as opposed to a legal, proprietary interest since she was a party to the fraud on the Department of Social Security. The house was put in the name of the appellant alone (instead of joint names) to facilitate the fraud. Therefore, it is said, the respondent does not come to equity with clean hands: consequently, equity will not aid her … In the present case, the respondent claims under a resulting or implied trust … The creation of such an equitable interest does not depend upon a contractual obligation but a common intention acted upon by the parties to their detriment. …
The presumption of a resulting trust is, in my view, crucial in considering the authorities. On that presumption (and to the contrary presumption of advancement) hinges the answer to the crucial question: does a plaintiff claiming under a resulting trust have to rely on the underlying illegality? Where the presumption of resulting trust applies, the plaintiff does not have to rely on the illegality. If he proves that the property is vested in the defendant alone but that the plaintiff provided part of the purchase money, or voluntarily transferred the property to the defendant, the plaintiff establishes his claim under a resulting trust unless either the contrary presumption of advancement displaces the presumption of resulting trust or the defendant leads evidence to rebut the presumption of resulting trust. Therefore, in a case where the presumption of advancement does not apply, a plaintiff can establish his equitable interest in the property without relying in any way on the underlying illegal transaction. In this case the respondent as defendant simply pleaded the common intention that the property should belong to both of them and that she contributed to the purchase price: she claimed that in consequence the property belonged to them equally … Therefore the respondent was not forced to rely on the illegality to prove her equitable interest …
In my judgment the time has come to decide clearly that the rule is the same whether a plaintiff founds himself on a legal or equitable title: he is entitled to recover if he is not forced to plead or rely on the illegality, even if it emerges that the title on which he relied was acquired in the course of carrying out an illegal transaction. As applied in the present case, that principle operates as follows. The respondent established a resulting trust by showing that she had contributed to the purchase price of the house and that there was a common understanding between her and the appellant that they owned the house equally. She had no need to allege or prove why the house was conveyed into the name of the appellant alone, since that fact was irrelevant to her claim: it was enough to show that the house was vested in the appellant alone.”Footnote 44
The principle borne out of Tinsley is that, with a resulting trust, Y only needs to prove that he contributed to the purchase of a property. If the reason why the property is in the name of X alone raises an illegality, it does not affect the viability of the equitable interest because it is irrelevant to the assertion of Y's beneficial right.
Juxtaposing Tinsley and Huebner, the issue of illegality was present in both: the perpetuation of fraud in Tinsley; and the avoidance of the strict requirements of the Land Use Act in Huebner. However, in both cases, the underlying illegality was irrelevant, as all that was necessary to assert and maintain the beneficial interest was that money had been contributed to the purchase of the property, not by way of gift or advancement.Footnote 45 Thus, Mr Huebner's claim for a beneficial interest under a resulting trust should have succeeded.
Finally, it is pertinent to state that both Mr Huebner and AIEP were before the court in its equitable jurisdiction. Thus, the duty to approach the court with clean heads was as much AIEP's as it was Mr Huebner's. It is a fundamental maxim of equity that equity acts in personam, ie equity “is designed to prevent a specified individual from acting unconscionably”.Footnote 46 Thus, “in the law of trusts, equity binds the conscience of a legal owner, who holds property impressed with a trust, to perform the trust”.Footnote 47 It is accordingly submitted that equity will not allow a trustee to use a statutory provision to set up the defence of illegality and by so doing: defeat the trust; escape from his or her fiduciary duty; deny a beneficiary an equitable interest; or acquire the trust property for personal use, as played out in Huebner.
Although an alien cannot own land in Nigeria, the Land Use Act does not prescribe any penalty for an alien's acquisition of an interest in land. However, AIEP obtained a forfeiture order in respect of Mr Huebner's equitable interest through the back door. In local parlance, AIEP reaped where it did not sow. In equity, AIEP acquired an unjust enrichment that demanded a remedy.Footnote 48
This author is left with no doubt that the Kajuru land was “impressed with a trust”Footnote 49 and AIEP's unconscionable position should have given the court cause to reflect. At the very least, the court was bound to provide a remedy by imposing a constructive trust to reverse the unjust enrichment that AIEP has apparently acquired.Footnote 50
CONCLUSION
The law pertaining to trusts is still in its nascent stage of development in Nigerian jurisprudence. Not many disputes reach the courts raising issues of trust law and the number of legal practitioners specialized in the field of trust law is indeed small. However, the law must grow. Nigerian courts must strive to give life to the ideal of equity as a tool to prevent unconscionable conduct. With the greatest respect and deference to the learned justices of the Supreme Court, the court got it wrong in Huebner. It is hoped that the court is presented with another opportunity to set the law upon its proper path.
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
None
