David George Surdam's new book on Major League Baseball (MLB) during the Great Depression is a remarkable achievement because it is of interest to the scholar and the fan. Baseball fans that are interested in the economics of baseball will find this a readable tome. For example, Appendix 2, (pp. 309–13) Dramatis Personae, is a little gem. Scholars will recognize his meticulous research and his inquisitive mind. For example, Table 38 (p. 352) shows that New York had the lowest per capita attendance of any city during that period.
Surdam states the purpose of the book (pp. xiii–xiv) is to identify the actions of the MLB cartel, which possessed monopoly and monopsony powers, during a period of economic stress that included declining incomes for customers and general deflation. He organizes it into four easy-to-follow parts: four chapters on the financial side of the game, two on the game on the field, two on league rules, and four on innovation with a brief epilog.
A critical contribution of the book is to emphasize the importance of primary financial data and the lack of reliability of secondary financial data as reported in newspapers and elsewhere. He (pp. 12–21) gives examples of why secondary data is suspect and emphasizes the reliability of primary data such as the information in the Congressional Investigation of 1951 (Celler Report) or the records of the Yankees and Phillies. One notable example is the sale of Babe Ruth, where secondary sources have alleged that the Yankees made a $350,000 loan to Harry Frazee as part of the deal. Surdam's analysis does not stop him from making an exhaustive survey of secondary sources but does lead him to be skeptical of any secondary financial information. The unavoidable problem with primary sources is that they are incomplete. The Celler Report encompasses all teams but not all the details. The Yankees and the Phillies are a limited and odd data set with the Yankees being the most successful team during the Depression era as shown by winning five World Series while the Phillies might have nosed out the St. Louis Browns to be the most woeful team in MLB in that era. The Browns were clearly last in attracting fans.
We see Surdam's inquisitive economic mind at work in an excellent discussion of the financial intricacies of scheduling. One detail of interest is the arbitrage opportunity of the Browns and the Detroit Tigers with Sunday and holiday home games (pp. 179–82). He shows that both the Browns and the Tigers would be financially better off if those high-demand games are played in Detroit under the revenue-sharing rules in effect. Because the Browns have rights to those dates, they should sell them to the Tigers. The author shows that the American League restricted the number of holiday home dates that the Browns received late in the Great Depression.
Given the renewed interest in the Negro Leagues, some might criticize Surdam for not emphasizing them in the book. This is not a valid criticism because the book deals with the economics of the MLB cartel. The economic circumstances of the Negro Leagues are quite different from MLB cartel.
This excellent book still has imperfections. Three significant concerns will be discussed here: the conclusion, real net income, and profits after the war.
The concluding remark is, “Surviving the decade intact may have been the owners' biggest achievement.” This comment is representative of an epilog that is especially unsatisfying in light of the goals the author set out and the quality of his insight elsewhere. The author has done a great job in presenting the information in an unbiased manner and given us a few penetrating insights but the last chapter is an opportunity for him to weigh that information and sum it up for the reader. More of his opinion would be a useful addition.
The author is properly a stickler for adjusting nominal prices and salaries into real terms. Tables 3 through 23 reflect this important distinction. When done for items that are cash transactions like revenues and player salaries, these real adjustments are a critical part of understanding the economics of baseball in this era. Adjusting a number like net income or operating income, however, for inflation as in Tables 4 and 5 (pp. 318–19) is a problem. The problem is that either number is a computation of a variety of different types of dollars so it cannot be assigned to a single nominal year. For example, most teams had depreciable assets and liabilities. Yankee Stadium was paid for with (mostly) 1922 dollars. Its depreciation a decade later should be adjusted for that difference as part of the computation of real net income. Liabilities, during the deflationary period, would be repaid in more valuable dollars so the teams with liabilities should have purchasing power losses as part of net income. It would be challenging to find all the data to make the necessary adjustments to determine profits in constant dollars, but the author should recognize the problem.
The author says (p. 170), “After [World War II], while several American League teams had unprecedented attendance, three American League teams struggled to remain profitable.” The Celler Report that the author champions shows for the first three years after the war, 1946–1948, that all eight AL teams made a profit for that period and all the teams save the Red Sox made a profit every year and at least $445,000 total for those three years. It is a jarring note because the book is so well referenced elsewhere.
Wins, Losses, and Empty Seats is a book that should be eagerly read by fans and scholars alike. The writing, organization, and scholarship are all first class.
