Book reviews for The Journal of Pension Economics and Finance reflect reviewers' own views and in no way represent the views of the institution(s) with which they are affiliated.
This report is timely. We are experiencing a major crisis in housing credit markets with still unknown consequences for the global macroeconomy. Next to housing, old-age pensions contribute most to household saving. It is thus essential to think hard about the governance of all the capital accumulated to pay for private pensions. And these concerns will be even truer in the future: population aging will shift the balance from housing to pensions as a main driver of household saving. Moreover, most pension assets are collateralized by capital used in production, thus more directly relevant for economic growth than housing assets. A crisis in pension finance would have even more profound implications for macroeconomic development than the crisis in housing finance; much is at stake.
There are actually two giants in the retirement arena: insurance companies and pension funds. Together, these hold a quarter of equity and a tenth of all bonds in the OECD. The report by Boeri, Bovenberg, Coeuré and Roberts focuses only on pension funds, taking a macroeconomic perspective with attention to pensions' role in fostering innovation and growth as well as sharing risks efficiently within and between generations. The book is forcefully normative: it does not follow the usual two-handed approach of economists, instead taking a strong stance on a number of controversial issues. It divides the world outlook in two scenarios, good and bad. In the bad scenario, public pay-as-you-go pension systems crowd out private saving for retirement, risks are shed to banks and governments, and inflexible labor markets minimize human capital accumulation, hurting innovation and growth. The good scenario, in turn, has retirement savings diversified with private pensions dominating pension income for the well-to-do, and pay-as-you-go pensions limited to the low-income. This with flexible labor markets leads to innovation and growth.
After an introductory movement – a veritable allegro con brio, like the first bars of Beethoven's Fifth – this volume turns to three topics in more detail: financial literacy and the internal organization of pension funds; asset-liability management; and optimal risk-sharing between young and old. The report concludes with a broad reform agenda spanning education and health care, with labor market reform a constant theme. Central to the report is the authors' proposal to govern pensions by a two-tier structure. A supervisory board of trustees would represent participant interests, and a professional executive board would deal with the day-to-day business. Participants would be offered a limited choice of pension funds independent from their employers, and regulated to have harmonized accounting and funding standards. This, the authors contend, would minimize the bad effects of financial illiteracy and misselling on the one hand, and risk accumulation with the employer as insurer on the other hand.
This report is informative and offers food for further thought. It is also very well written – quite an achievement for such a dry and often technical subject. But the volume's main strength is also its weakness: with its distinctive view of pension reform, it offers little room for range of pension systems actually observed in Europe and elsewhere. And with pensions, the devil in the details that vary depending on the social network, how the labor and tax systems work, and more. These authors provide a distinctly “Dutch view” of how pension systems should work. As in the Dutch pension system, they argue that pay-as-you-go pensions should be confined to a flat base notional defined pension (NDC). Everything above that should be private, administered by pension managers. But I disagree with this prescription. First, flat pensions have important disincentive effects, discouraging labor supply, with their minimum income guarantee aspect. Second, the report happily ignores prior studies, some by the World Bank, on the purely political nature of NDC systems. For instance, in Italy, the NDC system has permitted the government to defer necessary cuts in the pay-as-you-go scheme until after the powerful baby boom generation of voters has retired. Moreover, there is a strange contradiction: NDC pensions are by nature not flat; instead, they are a vehicle for middle-class pensions. Third, I would suggest that pension funds need not be the sole provider of private pensions; instead, insurance companies can also offer similar products albeit in a different institutional setting.
Some of the report's assertions are not well supported. As an example, the claim of efficient and equal risk sharing (Section 4.2) relies on a model that assumes equal risk aversion. This crucial assumption is in direct contradiction to the report's postulate elsewhere that risk-averse older individuals should hold different portfolios than younger people who take more risk. When risk aversion is heterogeneous, capital market innovations can have profound distributional consequences and there will not be equal risk sharing; rather, the usual efficiency/equity tradeoff emerges. The volume also contends that pension funds are a spur to innovation and growth. While many hope that this is so, and we have tried hard to prove it in this journal, more evidence is badly needed to support such strong claims.
The book is also characterized by a strong paternalistic view of the world. An example is the authors' drive to limit liability-driven investment, in order to accommodate individuals' desires for pension guarantees. Of course if even young people value guarantees, this must reflect their risk preferences – perhaps because they have families, just bought a house, and face all kinds of job market uncertainty. Unless a better case can be made these people are misled or market failures drive them to this behavior in spite of their preferences, risk aversion per se must be accepted. Also missing is an international perspective. An important role of pension funds is to diversify capital markets efficiently across countries, thereby dampening the negative effects of population aging for the quickly aging countries. It surprised me that the authors did not discuss this point, given the report's sponsors and the authors' previous work.
Alas, pension researchers will not be unemployed after this report. There are still many controversial issues to be debated; more subtle theory to be written; and better evidence to be collected in order to make such distinctive claims with confidence as this report does. Given what is at stake, it is a worthy cause.
