Introduction
The Republic of North Macedonia (hereafter Macedonia) is a young state whose population has historically been characterized by ethnic, religious, and linguistic heterogeneity: next to the majority group of ethnic Macedonians, smaller groups coexist in the same territory, and among these, ethnic Albanians represent a sizeable portion.
Nevertheless, Macedonia is ranked among the so-called divided societies, meaning those ethnically diverse places “where ethnicity is a politically salient cleavage around which interests are organized for political purposes” (Reilly Reference Reilly2001, 4). The presence of ethnicity-based social cleavages sees the two major groups, ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians, living their social and political lives quite distantly, conveying “an impression of segregation and resentment” (Irwin Reference Irwin2010, 342).
From a political and institutional point of view, the two ethnic groups share power following the consociational model of democracy and the provisions suggested by the Ohrid Framework Agreement. However, the path toward consociationalism has not been easy, especially in the first decade after Macedonia’s independence, when the two groups’ relation was quite tense and eventually ended in a short conflict. Despite the implementation of ethnic power-sharing mechanisms, frustrations and dissatisfactions have remained on both sides, and social and political divisions have not disappeared.
While there has been increased discussion on Macedonia in recent years (see Bieber Reference Bieber2005; Daskalovski Reference Daskalovski2004; Kacarska Reference Kacarska2008; Koneska Reference Koneska2014), further research still needs to be done, particularly on the role of the collective identities of the two major groups and how these have influenced and are influencing political dynamics in post-independence Macedonia. This article is thus a contribution to the topic.
The argument discussed here introduces a useful and provocative concept: state sharing, which refers to the development of two parallel ethnic state systems enabled by the de facto binationalization of the state, following the Ohrid Framework Agreement and the political instrumentalization of preexisting ethnic cleavages. The topic is tackled by analyzing, from a historical and then institutional point of view, collective identities and the interethnic dynamics that led both major groups—ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians—to develop different understandings, plans, and behaviors toward the Macedonian state, and then to eventually find a compromise, generating a sort of stability.
The first part of the article analyzes the Macedonian and Albanian questions, describing the turbulent process of ethnic Macedonian nation- and state-building as well as the obstacles faced in acquiring recognition, both internal and external, before and after the fall of socialism. Considerable attention is also paid to the ethnic Albanian community, whose equal status alongside ethnic Macedonians within the new Macedonian state has not yet been achieved in spite of the last 15 years’ major improvements.
The second part of the article describes how ethnic diversity has been institutionally managed by two different systems, namely Socialist Yugoslavia (particularly from 1974 to 1990) and the independent Macedonian state, focusing attention on the constitutional and institutional changes introduced in 2001 by the post-conflict Ohrid Framework Agreement.
The article asserts that old divisions and group frustrations, transformed throughout the years and centered on a fundamental disagreement over the nature and ownership of the Republic of North Macedonia, have found partial peace after the official implementation of a consociational model of democracy—which ended the elevation of group cleavages as the pillars of the state. Institutionalized ethnic divisions have paradoxically been accepted by both main groups and have become essential to the state’s functioning and stability by enabling the groups’ representatives to soothe each of their respective groups’ frustrations—namely, a failed bid for exclusive state ownership on one side, and a failed bid for official co-ownership on the other.
This article therefore shows how, by accepting not only power sharing but also “state sharing,” the two main groups in Macedonia have tacitly agreed on a manageable state system that is ethnically divided but still able to avoid conflict and maintain stability.
Contextualizing the Theories
The Macedonian “political, social, cultural and psychological processes” (Brubaker Reference Brubaker2002, 167) of nation- and state-building have faced difficulties for a long time, barring a short interruption in the Yugoslav period where, for the first time in its history, Macedonia was recognized as a republic and ethnic Macedonians as a constituent nation. Ethnic Albanians, living first in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and then in independent Macedonia, have instead not been granted with the same status and political recognition in none of the two systems.
The destabilizing potential of already existing grievances and divisions between the two groups surfaced in the post-socialist reality, and through the use of a particular political idiom—that is, nationalism—those grievances and divisions, not only pertaining to the groups’ underlying ethnocultural differences but, above all, their political ones, have been rearticulated. Nations, indeed, are political claims (Brubaker Reference Brubaker2004) that see in the nation-state their ultimate realization, where the political and ethnocultural boundaries of the community coincide. The desired equation is, in fact, “one nation, one state” (Gellner Reference Gellner1983), but when more groups coexist—along with their differing cultures, languages, religions, wishes, and political aspirations—in one single state, the ethnic majority may try to prevail over the minorities and conflict may occur on various grounds. Thus, one identical issue may be raised by conflicting ethnonationalist points of view—namely, “that the identity and interests of a putative nation are not properly expressed or realized in political institutions, practices, or policies” (Brubaker Reference Brubaker1996, 79). It has been because of those claims pointing in different directions that violence between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians eventually occurred.
Institutional “diversity-sensitive” mechanisms present viable solutions to accommodate groups’ demands, particularly in plural and divided societies after ethnic conflicts, and those institutional changes and mechanisms characterize the envisaged solutions of peace and framework agreements. As happened not only in Macedonia, but also Bosnia Herzegovina and Kosovo, the institutional design adopted after violent ethnic conflicts has generally been the one based on ethnic power-sharing mechanisms, though it follows the consociational approach (Lijphart Reference Lijphart1977) rather than the centripetalist one (see Horowitz Reference Horowitz2014; Reilly Reference Reilly2001).
The consociational model of democracy theorized by Arendt Lijphart is, indeed, designed to involve and represent all the main societal segments of a plural divided society into the state’s institutions and power structures, guaranteeing all groups’ representation while ensuring the state’s political legitimacy and stability. However, when the most salient cleavage around which political identities are built is ethnicity, its institutionalization may “provide further incentives to emphasise these cleavages over others . . . and to build political alliances on the basis of those categories” (Wimmer Reference Wimmer2013, 13). Accordingly, one of the main critiques (O’Leary Reference O’Leary2005; Reilly Reference Reilly2006) of the model is that, due to its emphasis on groups rather than individuals, institutionalized ethnicity may deepen groups’ cleavages by strengthening the political relevance of ethnic collective identities and, eventually, power ends up more ethnically divided than shared. On the other side, consociationalism’s supporters see crystallized collective identities as a pre-existing feature of the context, asserting that “it is often more perverse to deny the existence and salience of ethnic identities . . . than it is to build upon them” (O’Leary Reference O’Leary2005, 19). In fact, institutionalized ethnicity might not represent a hindering problem if the political elite jointly works to promote loyalty and identification with the larger state in view of the achievement of democracy.
The crucial role played by ideology in building nations and states as well as shaping group identities and state institutions has to be added to this picture. Siniša Malešević (2013, 76) defines the process of ideology’s penetration in a society as “centrifugal ideologization”; he focuses the attention on the nation-state, whose political legitimacy rests on popular sovereignty while nationalism is conceptualized as the ideological glue able to hold “members and institutions of the nation-state together.”
As in the case of the nation-state, in plural contexts political legitimacy may be derived and provided by nationalism and nation-centric narratives. Multi-ethnic divided societies are, in fact, often characterized by ethnic politics, which is the alignment of social and political cleavages (Ramet Reference Ramet2006); in those cases, the “ethnic masses” tend to seek and find political representation in their co-ethnic political parties, whose ethnocentric standpoints eventually make political bargains and inter-group cooperation more difficult. Ethnic political leaders, hence, frequently rely on fears of being dominated or excluded from power structures by hegemonic ethnically different others living in the same state and “all remain related, however, to the principles of legitimacy—ethnic self-rule” (Wimmer Reference Wimmer2013, 29).
In Macedonia, therefore, the official implementation of power-sharing mechanisms was unequivocally meant to be a solution to preexisting exclusions and, although this was not explicitly stated, to satisfy some of the ethnic Albanians’ requests, which had been negated by the ethnic majority for a decade and erupted in a short conflict.
Therefore, especially in plural and divided societies, institutions and the shapes they assume matter consistently, not only in modeling group identity, but also and particularly in channeling groups’ grievances and interests, smothering hostilities by including and representing all of the major society’s segments, eventually decreasing the possibilities of conflict.
The Macedonian case thus may be considered a paradigmatic example of how institutional mechanisms, coupled with preexisting intergroup antagonisms and ethnic cleavages, have been accepted and their meanings re-negotiated to find viable solutions for guaranteeing internal stability and avoiding conflict.
Understanding Collective Identities and Frustrations
The Macedonian Question
Before entering Socialist Yugoslavia and gaining political recognition as a federal republic, Macedonia’s history was turbulent and, from an identity point of view, quite problematic.
“Who are the Macedonians?” (Poulton Reference Poulton2000) has, indeed, been a frequently asked question that still has considerable relevance in contemporary Macedonia. The question deals with the process of collective identity creation as well as state-building, and neither process has ended yet. The origins of the Macedonian question can be traced back to the pre-Yugoslav era, when the geographical area of Macedonia was the subject of conquests, partitions, and processes of cultural homogenization. The debate was essentially over the Slavic-speaking inhabitants’ identity—whether they were Bulgarians, Serbs, or Greeks (Roudometof Reference Roudometof2002). What Pettifer (Reference Pettifer1999a) instead calls the “new Macedonian question” refers to the post-1944 period, when the Socialist Republic of Macedonia was established and the Macedonian nation politically recognized. In both the old and new questions, state-led national narratives shaped the process of nation-building. Throughout its history, the Macedonian nation has faced many difficulties in both affirming itself and achieving international recognition.
The questions of what Macedonia is and who the Macedonians are is complicated from different points of view. As Hugh Poulton (Reference Poulton2000) explains, the Macedonian issue can be described in three possible ways: first, we can consider Macedonia as the geographic area currently divided among Greece, Bulgaria, and the Republic of Macedonia; second, we can identify Macedonians as citizens of the current Republic of Macedonia; finally, we can ethnically identify the Slav inhabitants of either geographic Macedonia or the Republic of Macedonia as Macedonians.
For centuries, the geographic area of Macedonia has been a crossroads of armies and populations that influence, with their religions, cultures, and traditions, the identity-building processes of the people living in that area. According to a conqueror, the population has gone through processes of homogenization and assimilation, so the phenomenon of shifting identification is often the result of forced identification pushed by the dominant group—as in, for instance, “Serbianization,” “Bulgarization,” and “Hellenization.”
Inhabited by the Slavs since late 6th century, Macedonia was then alternatively part of different empires and regional states until the 14th century, when it became part of the Ottoman Empire. Thanks to the Ottomans’ high level of tolerance and non-homogenizing policies, people could retain their own traditions and individual identities. Nevertheless, especially in the 18th century, when the rise of nationalisms in the West impacted the Sublime Porte, the way in which people were looking at themselves changed and the millet became progressively identified with the national group—the “prime focus of identity” (Poulton Reference Poulton2000, 36). But it was in the 19th century, after the Russo-Turkish war of 1877–1878 and “during the period of national awakening in Central and Eastern Europe” (Ramet Reference Ramet2005, 280), that a separate Macedonian national consciousness began to develop. After some initial local uprisings (Chepreganov, Reference Chepreganov2008, 166), it was in the beginning of the 20th century, when hostilities among the Ottoman Empire’s controlled peoples were exacerbated, that the first remarkable struggle for Macedonia’s independence occurred. In 1903, as a manifestation of that national awareness, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization appeared on the scene: it was a revolutionary organization founded in Thessaloniki in 1893 aimed at fighting Ottoman rule. The Ilinden Uprising, organized on August 2, 1903, represented the Macedonian struggle for freedom and independence and occupies a key place in current Macedonian national history. The uprising took place mainly in Western Macedonia and the insurgents established a republic in the city of Kruševo, under the provisional government of Nikola Karev. However, the premature attempt was destined to fail and, although they were in decline, the Ottomans defeated the revolutionaries (Rossos Reference Rossos2008).
Although the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization did not succeed and the uprising failed, the 1903 events considerably strengthened the Macedonian national identity and have remained at the center of patriotic and national(ist) narratives. However, the partitioning of Macedonia happened during the Balkan Wars (1912–1913), when the geographical area was divided among three domains—called Aegean Macedonia under the Greeks, Pirin Macedonia under the Bulgarians, and Vardar Macedonian under the Serbs—and symbolized a deep wound for the Macedonian people. Though, as Chris Stefou (Reference Stefou2005, 354) emphasizes, it has been “well known” since 1912 “that a Macedonian nation with a Macedonian consciousness exist[s] and demonstrate[s] its desire for independence,” the existence of a separate Macedonian nation has constantly been denied, particularly by Greece and Bulgaria—which have historically considered the Macedonian people to be Slavophone Greeks (Poulton Reference Poulton2000; Rossos Reference Rossos2008; Roudometof Reference Roudometof2002) or Bulgarians, respectively, and Macedonia nothing more than a geographic area.
Later, when Vardar Macedonia was included in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, again the Macedonian nation was denied: Serbianization of the population took place and Macedonia was referred to as “South Serbia.” Therefore, some initially welcomed the Bulgarian occupation during the World War II. However, they once again quickly found themselves in a Bulgarization process. It was only in 1944, with the creation of Socialist Yugoslavia under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito, that Macedonia and the ethnic Macedonian people finally became politically recognized as separate and distinct.
On the symbolic day of August 2, 1944, also known as Second Ilinden, the first Anti-Fascist Assembly for the National Liberation of Macedonia proclaimed Macedonians as the constituent nation of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia—now a federal unit within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, together with the republics of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro.
Given the Macedonians’ identity circumstances—the fact that “many Macedonians have considered themselves Bulgarians before World War Two” (Ramet Reference Ramet2013, 1)—the Yugoslav authorities worked to promote and consolidate the Macedonian national identity, progressively eradicating pro-Bulgarian feelings. The Macedonian nation-building gained considerable strength and the Macedonian people became a dominant majority in what was “generally seen as the federal unit of Macedonians” (Koneska Reference Koneska2014, 61). However, the identity troubles of the Macedonian nation did not stop: the Macedonian language, although proclaimed “official,” was not recognized by Bulgaria, which considered it a Bulgarian dialect; the autocephalous Macedonian Orthodox Church, established with the help of Yugoslav authorities in 1967, was not recognized by the Serbian Orthodox Church; Greece denied Macedonian nationhood altogether.
Then, in the 1990s, in the context of Yugoslavia falling apart, growing insecurities and nationalism led to worsening domestic and external relations, even more so after Macedonia’s declaration of independence, which “set off a diplomatic, cultural, and international struggle over the recognition of the new state” (Roudometof Reference Roudometof2002, 29). The name “Republic of Macedonia” (Floudas Reference Floudas2002) and the Vergina SunFootnote 1 symbol used for the state’s official flag were fiercely opposed by Greece, since “the existence of Macedonia as a part of Greece has a fundamental place in the Greek political psyche” (Pettifer Reference Pettifer1999a, 18). Macedonia did change the flag’s design (in 1995) but not the state’s name, which until very recently remained “Republic of Macedonia” even though “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” was the provisional name introduced by the United Nations in 1993. In 2008, Greece blocked Macedonia’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Union (International Crisis Group 2009).Footnote 2
Bulgaria, for its part, recognized the country’s independence but appealed to the Bulgarians in Macedonia, “denying the whole concept of a Macedonian nation and stressing the Bulgarian nature of all Macedonians in Yugoslavia and Greece as well as Bulgaria” (Poulton Reference Poulton2000, 174). For both Greece and Bulgaria, in fact, the Macedonian nation was and remains Tito’s invention, a “state-sponsored ethnogenesis” (Roudometof Reference Roudometof2002, 41). Without arguing in favor or in opposition to the Greek and Bulgarian claims, I assert that it is true that the Macedonian nation’s recognition happened under Tito and he consistently helped the nation- and identity-building processes, favoring a transition from regional to national identity.
From a domestic point of view, the Macedonian nation faced another kind of contestation, which came from the sizeable portion of ethnic Albanians living in the republic. Macedonia’s internal ethnic composition has always been quite varied, with groups of Turks, Vlachs, Roma, Bošnjaks, Serbs, and others, and the ethnic Albanians were the largest group. What concerned the ethnic Macedonians, however, was the ethnic Albanians’ increasing numbers, growing both “due to their significantly higher birth rate in comparison with the other inhabitants of Macedonia” (Ortakovski Reference Ortakovski2001, 25) and because of migrations from Kosovo, especially after the 1970s.
In the light of preexisting identity frustrations and insecurities, when the circumstances allowed for it in 1991, ethnic Macedonians established the new state as a nation-state for and of the ethnic majority, denying ethnic Albanians (but not only them) previously enjoyed rights. The discrepancy between the newly born ethnic nation-state and its poulation’s heterogeneity in turn opened a dispute over the nature of the state itself—whether it is mono-, bi-, or multi-national—which also initiated a quarrel over the numbers themselves (Reuter Reference Reuter1999).Footnote 3 From an ethnic Macedonian perspective, their survival as people and a nation not only depended “on the continuing existence of their state” (Rossos Reference Rossos2013, 313), but also on their numerical majority.
The Albanian Question
The concerns of the ethnic Albanians in Macedonia, the roots of their discomfort, and the troubles they have faced are more about status—recognition in the political arena rather than recognition as a distinct national group. The so-called Albanian question started demonstrating its dangerous potential when Yugoslavia was falling apart and soon became a salient issue in the region (Bumci Reference Bumci2003).
Intergroup hostilities between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians became more pronounced in the 1990s, but were actually already visible by the 1980s, when a spillover effect from Kosovo also affected Macedonia. In line with the events taking place all over Yugoslavia in the late 1980s, nationalism entered in Macedonian political discourse, clashing with that of the Albanians.
The Kosovo Factor
According to the Yugoslav system, ethnic Albanians were recognized as a nationality (narodnost),Footnote 4 not a constituent nation (narod), since they had a homeland outside of the Socialist Federation. However, “the long years of isolation of Hoxhaist Albania and its poor relations with Titoist Yugoslavia had serious repercussions for the Macedonian Albanians” (Pettifer Reference Pettifer1999b, 137), which left them feeling rather marginalized within the Yugoslav system.
In the 1950s, a state-led campaign suppressed all nationalism, including Albanian nationalism; later the atmosphere became more relaxed. It was in 1968 that Kosovar Albanians started demanding more rights and autonomy for their desired Republic of Kosovo. Ethnic Albanians in Macedonia also protested in support of the Kosovo claims, but more protests that had less to do with Kosovo than with a general sense of dissatisfaction with their conditions in the broader Yugoslav system (Bumci Reference Bumci2003). Aligned with Milošević’s policy toward Albanians, the Yugoslav Macedonian authorities imprisoned and sentenced the Albanian nationalists—as they were defined—responding even more harshly than did the authorities in Kosovo.
Ethnic Albanians’ general conditions got slightly better in the 1970s, when the Yugoslav system gradually moved toward decentralization. In 1970, the University of Priština was established, offering higher education in the Albanian language, thus attracting Albanian students from all over Yugoslavia, and especially from Macedonia, and opening the possibility that they might improve their sociocultural conditions. It is worth highlighting that for the Albanian nation, the Albanian language has always been a central factor, since it gives them “the feeling of belonging to the same nation” (Babuna Reference Babuna2000, 67). Therefore, the recognition of collective rights concerning the use of their language was, and still is, strictly related to the ethnic Albanian community’s sociopolitical status in the broader society.
The constitutional changes rolled out in 1974, granted Kosovo the same rights of the federal republics without officially conferring it the status of republic on the one hand, while recognizing the nations and nationalities composing the Socialist Republic of Macedonia as constitutive of the republic on the other hand.Footnote 5 Therefore, the sociopolitical status of ethnic Albanians improved and “Albanian culture started being partially recognized by the authorities, which gave rise to the proliferation of scientific, literal, artistic, and media (print and broadcasting) production” (Iseni Reference Iseni2013, 178).
However, these improvements did not last very long. After Tito’s death in 1980, Albanian discontent became more pronounced and riots spread in Kosovo again in April 1981, marking the gravest threat posed to the interethnic equilibrium in Yugoslavia (Babuna Reference Babuna2000); once again, the Kosovo events provoked smaller-scale manifestations in Macedonia, where state authorities reacted by imprisoning the dissidents. The Yugoslav system was strongly against any kind of nationalism, and although they were aimed at increasing the rights of ethnic Albanians, the Kosovo riots were seen as a manifestation of Albanian nationalism and irredentism; hence, they had to be stopped and protesters punished. Meanwhile, Macedonian authorities saw the rise of Albanian nationalism as a great menace “not only to the territorial integrity of the republic but even to the very existence of the Macedonian nation” (Poulton Reference Poulton2000, 127). Afraid of the “spectre of expanding ‘ethnically pure’ Albanian areas akin to the situation developing in Kosovo” (128), Yugoslav Macedonian authorities adopted administrative measures, such as the law approved in 1985 stipulating that “classes with Albanian as the language of instruction could only be created if more than thirty Albanian pupils enrolled for the class and there were enough qualified teachers” (129). The consequence was the closure of classes with an insufficient number of Albanian pupils, compelling them to attend mixed classes in the Macedonian language. Issues related to use and status of the Albanian language would continue to inflame sociopolitical dynamics in independent Macedonia as a matter of state identity and ownership. Thus, despite the official policy of Bratstvo i Jedinstvo (brotherhood and unity), the Macedonian reality in the 1980s was clearly one of mistrust and separation which, when the circumstances allowed it, manifested themselves in a violent way.
Institutional Mechanisms and Ethnic Diversity
Macedonia in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1974–1990)
A better understanding of the collective frustrations and disagreements may be provided by a look at how ethnic diversity was institutionally managed since the Yugoslav system and how, in turn, institutional engineering has shaped sociopolitical dynamics between the two groups.
Yugoslavia was a multi-ethnic federation that, by using both ideological and institutional strategies, managed to accommodate ethnic diversity for decades. Nevertheless, the institutional changes rolled out in 1974, in trying to manage diversity and counterbalance nationalisms, increased the importance of the nations, which in turn paved the way for the exploitation of the ethnic issue by the ethnonationalisms of the 1990s (Brubaker Reference Brubaker1996). That happened because the federal structure was becoming weaker and power, instead of being shared among the federal units, was concentrated in the hands of the republics’ party elites: “it was behind the curtains of the SKJ [the League of Communists] that any outstanding problems between the ethnic groups were resolved, as the official stance of the Yugoslav leadership was that there were no ethnic problems in Yugoslavia” (Koneska Reference Koneska2014, 63). Therefore, adding to the ethnic nature of each federal unit, the elites who came into power in the 1990s lacked familiarity with any other political system but the Yugoslav Socialist one and demonstrated themselves to be unable to share power or go beyond the ethnonational paradigm. Hence, while inheriting some of the power-sharing features from the Yugoslav system, the new elites followed and applied the dominant ethnonationalist narrative of that time.
The 1974 constitution introduced power-sharing mechanisms, greater decentralization and representation mechanisms aimed at equally representing all groups at the federal level, eventually making the federation a “quasi consociation.” The republics, de facto sovereign nation-states, gained some independent political space within the federal system, transforming Yugoslavia into a sort of confederation where the constituent nations’ importance was constantly growing (Holliday Reference Holliday2005). As for Macedonia, the republic only had one constituent nation: ethnic Macedonians. However, the 1974 constitution defined the republic as “the national state of the ethnic Macedonian nation and the state of the Albanian and Turkish nationalities in it,” granting nations (the ethnic Macedonians) and nationalities (the ethnic Albanians and Turks) the same duties and rights—for example, the right to use and receive education in their mother languages, alphabets, and national symbols.
With the introduction of power-sharing mechanisms, Macedonian deputies had the opportunity to considerably influence Yugoslav politics, and the principle of equal representation also guaranteed that nationalities (such as the Albanians) were represented at the federal level who had been “completely absent until 1965 from the powerful executive committee of the Communist Party of Macedonia” (Iseni Reference Iseni2013, 177). At the republic’s level, however, the system was majoritarian and besides more inclusion and representation of the nationalities in the institutions, very few power-sharing arrangements were adopted. Moreover, concerned about the penetration of Albanian nationalism and irredentism, Macedonian authorities “adopted a more nationally assertive process of nation- and state-building that combined elements of both repression and assimilation” (Holliday Reference Holliday2005, 143).
The Macedonian Nation-State and Its Minorities (1991–2001)
Relations between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians did not improve and remained superficial, distant, and sometimes tense, even after the changes introduced in 1974. Particularly in the 1990s, the Macedonian political elite demonstrated very little knowledge or interest in sharing power and accommodating ethnonational issues. Accordingly, the Yugoslav heritage, besides some recycled institutional arrangements, also persisted in its dubious ability to tackle national issues. As in the Soviet space, the mechanisms and policies introduced by the regime were anything but antinational; by institutionalizing territorial nationhood and ethnic nationality as fundamental social categories, both the Soviet and the Yugoslav systems made themselves conducive to nationalism (Brubaker Reference Brubaker1996). Macedonian-Albanian relations worsened majorly, in fact, with state independence and its new constitutional asset increasing Albanians’ frustrations and thus their sympathies for the National Liberation Army, an armed ethnic Albanian group connected with the Kosovo Liberation Army.Footnote 6
In 1990, when Yugoslavia was exhaling its last breath, both nationalism and liberal democracy emerged in political discourse and it was in this ideological chaos that Macedonia opted for independence. The Socialist Republics of Slovenia and Croatia already were on their way toward independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; while the presidents of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, Alja Izetbegović and Kiro Gligorov respectively, concerned for their republics’ futures outside of the Socialist Federation, tried to preserve their states with a new confederal framework by proposing the so-called Platform for the Future of the Yugoslav Community—a plan that was overtaken by events.
In 1989, while Milošević was abolishing Kosovo’s autonomy, the Socialist Republic of Macedonia amended the 1974 constitution to declare Macedonia exclusively as “the national state of the Macedonian people,” omitting the phrase “and of the Albanian and Turkish people” that had been present in the 1974 version. The ethnic Macedonian majority downgraded ethnic Albanians (as well as Turks) to the status of minority, depriving them of many of the rights they had previously enjoyed. For example, at the time of independence, ethnic Albanians did not have a single institution of higher education in their own language and, in terms of students enrolled, they were underrepresented in both high school and university (Ramet Reference Ramet2005).
Fear and dissatisfaction, thus encouraged Macedonian and Albanian nationalisms to grow, and interethnic communication became more difficult. When the referendum for independence took place in September 1991, the Albanian community, almost unanimously, decided to boycott it, and ethnic Macedonians interpreted the boycott as a sign of disloyalty (Holliday Reference Holliday2005). In November 1991, Macedonia’s independence was proclaimed and a new constitution approved; the document, again, declared the Republic of Macedonia a nation-state, exacerbating Albanian discomfort and their desire for revision.
Although Macedonian nationalism was a relatively new phenomenon, the former socialist political elite saw independence “as the next stage in the historical development of the Macedonian nation toward full statehood” (Adamson and Jović Reference Adamson and Jović2004, 301). While keeping in mind that, throughout history, Macedonians have incessantly been contested as a nation—above all by neighboring Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece—it is plausible to say the Macedonians’ identity frustrations saw a partial decrease with the implementation of “constitutional nationalism,” namely “a constitutional and legal structure that privileges the members of one ethnically defined nation over other residents in a particular state” (Hayden Reference Hayden1992, 655).
The Macedonian elite tried to balance the ethnic nation-state narrative with the recognition of minorities, enunciating the importance of peaceful interethnic relations; however, the de facto marginalization of smaller groups was likely to increase tensions and hostile attitudes. Indeed, the state-building criteria used by the nascent post-Yugoslav state was, unsurprisingly, more ethnic than civic; “unsurprisingly” because Macedonia, although ethnically heterogeneous, was commonly seen as the state of ethnic Macedonians (Koneska Reference Koneska2014) and, furthermore, a civic understanding of the nations within the republic—meaning that a Macedonian civic nation inclusive of ethnic Macedonians, ethnic Albanians, and other groups—was never attempted nor promoted (Adamson and Jović Reference Adamson and Jović2004). Not only did this supranational identity not exist, but it objectively also could not be developed from scratch and in such a short time period, since the collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia happened very quickly.
Another factor to be considered is that the rise of ethnic nationalisms, in a context already dominated by the nation-state paradigm, could not drive anywhere else than toward ethnically defined nation-states. The political categories of nation, nationality, and ethnic group—which composed the Yugoslav collective identities hierarchy—had to be rearticulated in the new scenario and find new political meaning in the emerging socio-political environment. Thus, in line with what was happening all over dissolving Yugoslavia, the Macedonian former socialist political elite used ethnonational, rather than a civic, criteria to build the new state, and thus the idea of a nation-state for and of the ethic majority prevailed.
When ethnic Albanians called for a revision of the constitutional document, ethnic Macedonians saw their nation and nation-state contested from the inside while, on their side, ethnic Albanians saw their status downgraded and their rights taken back by the Macedonian state. Ethnic Albanians demanded equal status alongside the ethnic majority, representation in the state’s institutions and bodies, the right to speak their own mother language in the state’s institutions and parliament, as well as the right to receive higher education in Albanian language. In a few words, they wanted not to be considered as a minority or “second-class citizens,” a feeling still present in the current society.
While experiencing these deep feelings of subordination, ethnic Albanians in Macedonia began “to think in terms of autonomy” (Ramet Reference Ramet2002, 189). After boycotting the referendum on Macedonian independence, on January 11 and 12, 1992, 74 percent of the 92 percent of the ethnic Albanians eligible to vote did so in favor of the “territorial and cultural autonomy of Albanians in Macedonia” (Iseni Reference Iseni2013, 183), asking for independence in the Western parts of the country. Frustrated by the government’s answer, which maintained that autonomy would not serve Albanians’ interests but would “[cut] them off from the mainstream Macedonian public life” (Ramet Reference Ramet2002, 190), a group of Albanian nationalists declared the creation of a “Republic of Illyrida.” In the context of growing ethnonationalism, the wished-for republic represented a possible solution to the ongoing dispute and deep frustrations. The project, however, did not see any future, as the situation deteriorated immediately.
In December 1992, Macedonian authorities voted in the Law on Citizenship, which states that “individuals that have not lived legally and continuously in the Republic for 15 years do not have the right to acquire citizenship” (Koppa Reference Koppa2001, 44); the provision was clearly aimed against the Albanians who fled from Kosovo to Macedonia after the 1970s (Holliday Reference Holliday2005). Also, after Serbian authorities closed down the University of Priština, ethnic Albanians in Macedonia tried to create an Albanian university in the city of Mala Rečica, near Tetovo, but, again, the situation culminated in violence. Then, in 1997, an attempt to reopen the Faculty of Pedagogy for Albanians in the city of Skopje was violently rejected by ethnic Macedonian students, who chanted “Albanians to the gas chambers” and “Macedonia for Macedonians” (Neofotistos Reference Neofotistos2012). The ethnic Macedonian narrative of the topic was that “higher education was available to all citizens (including the Albanians), but it was the Albanians who failed to take advantage of the educational opportunities” (Roudometof Reference Roudometof2002, 177). On its side, Vladimir Ortakovski (Reference Ortakovski2001, 36) asserts that Albania proper
conditioned its relations with Macedonia on the advancement of the status of the Albanian minority, as well as on satisfaction of all its demands for tertiary education in Albanian and for representation in the institutions of the state. . . . After the 1997 riots in Albania and the collapse of Sali Berisha’s government . . . Tirana did not give up its support . . . but it determined that the minority rights of Albanians should be satisfied according to European standards and within the institutions of the system.
Nevertheless, interethnic relations worsened with the war in Kosovo in 1999, when “thousands Kosovars entered the small Republic, without being granted the right of permanent residence” (Koppa Reference Koppa2001, 43), further disrupting an already precarious equilibrium and directly impacting the internal stability of the country and its economy, which was already damaged due to both the collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the embargo Greece imposed in 1994 and lifted one year later.
Therefore, any tension at that time was interpreted along ethnic lines, and nationalism could not help but channel the groups’ discontent and fears, further polarizing interethnic relations, both domestic and nondomestic.
In the Name of the Nation: The 2001 Conflict
In the decade 1991–2001, Macedonia was officially declared and established as a parliamentary and liberal democracy in which citizens were supposed to be protected by a considerable number of human rights’ provisions; however, violations of human rights, particularly due to the lack of rule of law, have been frequent (Vankovska Reference Vankovksa2013). Moreover, since the very beginning, ethnonational political parties constituted the political arena and collective rights have generally prevailed over individual ones. As seen, ethnic Macedonians felt their identity, and their state, threatened once again by the ethnic Albanians’ claims and increasing number while, on their side, ethnic Albanians were dissatisfied with the constitutional document, also drafted by a commission of experts in which no Albanian was present (Vankovska Reference Vankovska2012). Many, indeed, saw the constitution as the trigger for the 2001 conflict, saying the conflict was a fight against the constitution and the system rather than the ethnic Macedonian people.
The long-term consequences of being considered lower status, first in Yugoslavia and then in independent Macedonia, shaped the form assumed by ethnic Albanians’ political mobilization. Moreover, the events happening in Kosovo since the 1980s, as well as Albanians’ increasing frustration at not being recognized as an equal group alongside the ethnic Macedonian majority in the independent state, are crucial factors to properly interpret the deterioration of interethnic communication and the conflict, since both deeply influenced internal stability.
The war in Kosovo had a direct impact on Macedonia, and the Kosovo Liberation Army “made its presence very clear in the small republic” (Koppa Reference Koppa2001, 39). In March 2001, tensions escalated first in the areas around the border with Kosovo, then in the city of Tetovo and the Kumanovo areas, while other cities with large Albanian populations (such as Gostivar, Struga, or Debar) remained outside the armed clashes. Eventually, however, the fights were widely supported by the majority of the ethnic Albanian population, and the rebels, organized in the National Liberation Army, looked like national heroes, “freedom fighters.”
Although at that time the Macedonian government was formed by a Macedonian-Albanian coalition, dialogue between the two parties proved to be difficult and nationalism grew. The conflict showed the incompatibility of the two groups’ respective ethnocentrisms and Macedonia seemed locked in a crisis where “neither ethnic Albanians nor Slav Macedonians had been converted to the belief in a ‘civic’ settlement that would strengthen democracy by improving minority conditions without weakening the integrity of the state” (Koppa Reference Koppa2001, 56).
After a few months of conflict, the four major political parties (two ethnic Macedonian, and two ethnic Albanian) signed the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) under the supervision of the European Union and Macedonia’s President Trajkovski, ending the violence. The National Liberation Army did not participate in the negotiations, but compromise between the two sides led to some constitutional changes, administrative decentralization, and more rights for the Albanian community.
Macedonia after the OFA
The OFA, signed in August 2001, is a rather simple document containing provisions and guidelines for the introduction of power sharing. It stresses the need for constitutional changes to ameliorate interethnic relations and bring the country toward democracy. The OFA meets some of the Albanians’ demands, which probably also spread the wrong message that violence is a viable solution to obtaining political visibility and results (Marolov Reference Marolov2013). However, while trying to address the ethnic Albanians’ claims, the OFA explicitly avoids federalism and territorial partitions in order to avoid a Bosnia-style solution; it, indeed, declares that “there are no territorial solutions to ethnic issues.” In practice, however, areas of strong political influence are present, since ethnic Albanians live mostly in the Western areas of the republic and ethnic Macedonians in the rest of the country.
The OFA has tried to promote a civic understanding of Macedonia, creating the opportunity to build a new state identity focused on citizenship rather than ethnicity. The amended Preamble of the Constitution, a major cause of discord, addresses “the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, the Macedonian people, as well as citizens living within its borders who are part of the Albanian people, the Turkish people, the Vlach people, the Serbian people, the Roma people, the Bosniak people, and others.” Considering the institutional changes prescribed by the OFA, this follow Lijphart’s (Reference Lijphart1977) recommendations for building a consociation—namely, grand coalition, proportional representation, veto rights, and segmental autonomy.
The creation of a grand coalition was, however, nothing new for the republic: since 1991, an unwritten rule was followed to include both ethnic Macedonian and Albanian parties in the coalition government. The provision reenvisioned by the OFA, however, had the effect of stressing the binational rather than multinational character of the state, prevalently and primarily addressing the ethnic Albanian community rather than all the citizenry, and not providing enough mechanisms for smaller groups’ rights protections. In this way, it led to the de facto binationalization of Macedonia (Bieber Reference Bieber2005) without equalizing the status of ethnic Albanians with that of ethic Macedonians.
Among the OFA’s provisions directly aimed at obliging some of the Albanians’ requests, and directly connected to their sociopolitical status within the state, is that pertaining to “education and use of languages” and proportional, equitable representation in the societal segments in the state bodies. Education remains segregated (Barbieri, Vrgova, and Bliznakovski Reference Barbieri, Vrgova and Bliznakovski2013), with primary and secondary schools ethnically divided and pupils either going to different (ethnic) schools or the same schools but in different shifts or on different floors. University education, initially provided only in Macedonian language, was also guaranteed in Albanian language with the opening of South Eastern Europe University in Tetovo in 2004. Concerning language, Macedonian remains the official language in the state but a compromise is that “any other language spoken by at least 20 percent of the population is also an official language, as set forth herein” (OFA 6.5). However, Albanian does remain unofficial at the state level and, for instance, “plenary sessions of the Parliament cannot be conducted in the Albanian language . . . Albanian ministers in the Government cannot speak or write in Albanian language, Albanian language is not used at all at the state Presidency; the Albanian language cannot be used in the army and the police” (Shasivari and Zejneli Reference Shasivari and Zejneli2013, 601).
Finally, the societal segments’ representation in all the state’s bodies and institutions was paramount and directly aimed to counterbalance the disproportional presence—or marginalization and exclusion—of minority groups. Ethnic quotas are indeed an often-used tool to manage diversity and guarantee minorities’ representation and participation while preventing tensions that may arise between majority and minority groups. Practically speaking, however, equitable, proportional representation has been translated into institutionalized ethnicity and the way in which the principle has often been put in practice has some negative consequences: to mention just one, consider the country’s poor economic performances and high levels of unemployment; the public sector has become the major “employer,” which negatively impacts not only the state budget and quality of services offered but also foments a system of ethnic-clientelism based on the self-interested mobilization of ethnic identity. In order to further protect the smaller groups, the OFA also introduced a double majority principle (the so-called Badinter principle) for laws that directly affect culture, use of language, education, personal documentation, and use of symbols (Marolov Reference Marolov2013). Although not explicit, this double majority is connected to the defined “vital national interests” and thus functions as a veto—another consociationalism requirement.
Lastly, following Arendt Lijphart’s model, segmental autonomy is guaranteed by a progressive decentralization and increase of municipalities’ autonomies. Nevertheless, when the Law on Territorial Organization of the Local Self-Government was enacted in 2002, and the number of municipalities reduced in 2004, ethnic Macedonians largely opposed the provisions while ethnic Albanians saw them as key to ensuring their self-governance (Bieber Reference Bieber2005). Therefore, although the OFA introduced mechanisms and provisions aimed at increasing all groups’ participation and representation in the state, it basically helped the ethnic Albanian community achieve greater political consideration, responding to some of their previous demands and collective frustrations.
Old grievances, cleavages, and ethnocentrism widely persist. The de facto binational character assumed by the Republic of North Macedonia remains only informally acknowledged, and ethnic Macedonians seem ready to share power but not really official ownership of what remains understood as their state. However, the institutionalization of group antipathies and cleavages has been tacitly welcomed by both groups’ political representatives, who see it as a way to maintain internal stability via power- and state sharing, though without official co-ownership of the state.
Conclusion: State Ownership and State Sharing
Today, Macedonia remains a divided country, where political parties, the education system, media, cafes, music, municipalities, and neighborhoods remain ethnically divided, and where social contacts between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians continue to be quite superficial. Democratic tradition and institutions are still weak and not consolidated, while institutional and political mechanisms are largely exploited by a corrupt political elite. Accordingly, instead of going beyond ethnicity and ethnic collectivities, as encouraged by the OFA, ethnic-based sociopolitical cleavages have been institutionally legitimized and exploited by ethnic representatives, welcoming and accepting a manageable divided system to avoid conflict and maintain stability.
The historical and institutional analysis provided in this article has shown the deeply rooted nature of the political and social antagonism between the two largest groups in Macedonia. From a historical point of view, the difficulties faced by ethnic Macedonians in their process of nation- and state-building have clearly displayed a double character: political and psychological. Politically speaking, by declaring the independent state as their own (ethnic) nation-state in 1989 and again in 1991, the Macedonian political elite acted both in line with the dominant nationalist paradigm and in accordance with Yugoslav heritage, marked by its lack of civic understanding of the nations composing the federal units. Psychologically, after being contested for long time, first from the outside and then also from the inside, the creation of a Macedonian nation-state answered the need to be internationally recognized as a distinct titular nation in its own sovereign national state. State ownership aimed to strength the Macedonian identity, and ethnic Macedonians’ status as the dominant group had to be not only understood in ethnic rather than civic terms, but also confirmed by their hegemonic presence in all spheres of sociopolitical life, as reflected in the administrative, political, cultural, and religious spheres. Ethnic Albanians, equally frustrated at being declassed to a minority in the democracy, expressed their concerns by protesting and then by means of violence. Ethnic political parties, whose ethnocentric and nationalist rhetoric aim to satisfy the interests of the ethnic collectivities they represent, nowadays express concerns and fears on both sides. From an institutional point of view, the Yugoslav quasi-consociationalism, although it provided the political elites with some of the tools needed to manage ethnic diversity, demonstrated its weaknesses and superficial character as more a façade at federal level than a consolidated practice at the republic level (Koneska Reference Koneska2014).
After the conflict happened in 2001, the OFA promoted a civic understanding of the state, trying to go beyond ethnic collectivism to ensuring groups’ representation through the implementation of power-sharing mechanisms. However, partly due to already existing divisions, real cooperation among groups has resulted in a de facto binationalization of the state, where the Albanian community has been unofficially “elevated to a status that makes them quasi-constituent” (Bieber Reference Bieber2005, 115). The outcome has been the development of two parallel ethnic systems, where ethnic political parties and their ethnic masses are strongly connected amongst themselves but separated from each other.
Consequently, effective implementation of the OFA’s provisions remains partial and incomplete; political compromise and dialogue is difficult and political parties’ bargains are often not transparent. Populism, ethnocentrism, and widespread corruption and (ethnic) clientelism are worsening an already critical situation, further slowing down the democratization process. Also, according to Bashkim Iseni (Reference Iseni2013, 189), “the lack of economic perspective is breeding ground for nationalism in Macedonia. Nationalists articulate the social contradictions in ethnic terms. This is how the recurring populism feeds in Macedonia.” Inter-ethnic relations, at both the political and social levels, remain overshadowed by mistrust and mutual suspicion and, as Biljana Vankovska (Reference Vankovksa2013, 94) argues, “the major systematic weaknesses, nevertheless, have always been disrespect for ‘the rule of the game’ and replacement of the rule of law with rule of men (party leaders). Lex has always been interpreted in accordance to the current political liking of the Rex.”
To conclude, it is thus not wrong to say the main issue plaguing the country is fundamental disagreement over the state’s ownership—however articulated in terms of state identity—whether multi-, mono-, or binational. The deep nature of this disagreement lies, indeed, in collective identities’ frustrations connected to the status they occupy and wish to occupy within the state – practically speaking, a failed exclusive state ownership on one side, and a failed official co-ownership on the other. The main cleavage between the two communities, hence, is about state ownership, while ethnicity only serves to channel and frame political disagreements and divergent interests.
Trying to satisfy their historical dream of full statehood, ethnic Macedonians claimed the exclusive ownership of their state, built on contestation rather than consensus. Meanwhile, ethnic Albanians, seeing their recently little-improved status fiercely downgraded to that of minority, asked for status elevation as co-constituency, where state co-ownership meant political recognition and representation.
Hence, mistrust between the two communities, ideologically overshadowed during Yugoslavia, became clear in the 1990s; since then, following the institutional changes rolled out in 2001, it has found a sort of equilibrium and political legitimacy with a consociational system, where representatives of two collective identities share power and state’s institutions alike. This makes it clear not only that nations are essentially political claims articulated by the specific political idiom that is nationalism (Brubaker Reference Brubaker2004), but also that institutions’ shapes are paramount in managing diversity and negotiating power among groups (Wimmer Reference Wimmer2013).
The constitutional changes and the implementation of the consociational model partly soothed both groups’ frustrations. What is often considered a negative outcome of the consociational model, namely, institutionalized ethnicity, has eventually begun to function as a proxy of the division of the state—state sharing—and, thanks to the perpetuation of the divide and its political exploitation by ethnic elites, groups’ are at relative ease and inter-ethnic conflict has been avoided since 2001.
Both groups thus benefit from the perpetuation and institutionalization of group cleavages and it seems that Macedonia does not really have incentive to depoliticize or deinstitutionalize ethnicity, since its institutionalization and pragmatic exploitation has enabled the sharing of the state, making the country functional. Nevertheless, the rhetoric according to which ethnic Macedonians are the dominant group in their own state persists and ethnic Albanians are treated as co-constituent only unofficially and for pragmatic reasons.
The arguments so far offered have found further confirmation in the latest political developments in Macedonia: the president of the Republic has recently given the mandate to the Social Democratic Union’s leader to form a new government, even though he initially firmly refused because, as the President stated, he couldn’t entrust the mandate to people or political parties “who advocate or have in their political program a platform for destroying the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the Republic of Macedonia.”Footnote 7 The platform in question was the so-called Tirana Platform, adopted in January 2017 by the ethnic Albanian parties in Macedonia, whose adoption was facilitated by the prime minister of Albania, Edi Rama. The platform articulated a set of demands from the Albanian community—considered nonnegotiable in the future government—and, among these, “better legal arrangements for the use of the Albanian language in the state.” Therefore, the fact that a new government open to the ethnic Albanians’ demands has been formed may possibly mark the end of state sharing without official co-ownership of the state. But only time will tell.
