Although much has been written about the politics of the Islamist movements in Egypt and elsewhere, precious little has been said about what sort of economics these groups promote and would pursue if they came to power. Thus the publication of Bjørn Utvik's book is most welcome to anyone interested in political Islam. The book's title accurately describes its contents while its subtitle suggests the tenor of its findings. As the country of origin for the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt provides an excellent case study, and Utvik—who teaches Middle East studies at the University of Oslo—provides a synthesis of a large set of writings by Egyptian Islamists on their economic analyses and policies.
The book begins with clearly written, informed chapters on Islamic movements, the recent evolution of the Egyptian economy, and the early 20th-century predecessors of the movement. However, the author's central contribution is his summary of Islamist writings on economics. For this, several choices had to be made, which could inevitably be contentious. The time period covered is 1984 to 1990, when President Mubarak's government allowed a political opening with its attendant public debates of these issues. It is obvious that the selection of criteria used to identify an Islamist was important, and the book's focus is placed on two groups partnered in the Islamic Alliance: the Muslim Brothers and the Labor Party. Furthermore, the author relies on three main sources for his information: works by noted authors, such as ʿAdil Husayn and Yusuf Kamal; programmatic documents about economics, prepared by the Muslim Brothers and the Labor Party; and a large set of newspaper and magazine articles published in media controlled by those groups, as well as speeches made by Islamist members of parliament. Whatever quibbles one might have about the time period or selection of authors, this study promises to represent an important sector of informed Islamist opinion.
Economists often situate government economic policies within a spectrum, defined at one end by a position in favor of free markets and nonintervention, as might be associated with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (WB/IMF), and defined at the other end of the spectrum by significant government interventions. Incidentally, the latter years of the Nasser regime are often used to illustrate the interventionist end of that spectrum.
Chapter 4 presents Utvik's findings on the policies of Islamist economics in Egypt, organized around three main themes: economic development, justice, and independence. The author frequently affirms Islamists' desire for development as opposed to a nostalgic look backward in time. The particular stances on specific issues such as wage and price controls, land reform, and government ownership of the means of production tilt a bit more toward those of the WB/IMF than toward those of Nasser. Economists in any country are seldom in complete agreement, and in the case at hand there are differences between the Muslim Brothers and the Labor Party. These reflect the former's clashes with Nasser; authors within the latter, by contrast, tend to criticize the perceived failures of Sadat's liberalization policy (infitāḥ) and its continuation under Mubarak. Nevertheless, Utvik's sources affirm the benefits of private ownership. Land reform is downplayed, and there is even a begrudging recognition of the benefits of privatization of public sector enterprises.
Moving beyond specific policy issues, Utvik describes Egyptian Islamists as seeing themselves as the vanguard of a moral revolution, insisting that justice is a prerequisite for social peace. The link between justice and economics requires not only the removal of corruption but also the guarantee of minimal levels of wealth for all. This leads to disagreements on issues of subsidies and taxes (including zakat), reflecting a conflict between the goal of justice and a reluctant acceptance of the WB/IMF position on the inefficiency of government interventions. Utvik also reports a widespread condemnation of budget deficits and inflationary finance.
The third thread in Egyptian Islamic thinking concerns economic independence. Egypt's negative experience with debt in the 1880s is still remembered and cited, particularly with respect to the recent stabilization programs pushed by the IMF, which are widely rejected as surrender of autonomy. This nationalism certainly leads Islamists in a direction different from the stand on the micro issues mentioned previously. An intriguing position is support for the development model of South Korea based on its success in achieving economic independence. This example illustrates the variety of influences from outside Islam's sacred writings. It might be added that there is little mention of influences from Iran or—more recently—Turkey.
Utvik reports that although Egyptian Islamists generally support the ban on interest (ribā), they are critical of their country's negative experience with Islamic investment companies, which purportedly followed Islamic practice on interest while making un-Islamic speculative investments. Finally, Utvik addresses the question, “What is special about the Islamic solution?” The various sources Utvik has used affirm the existence of a road to a true Islamic economy consisting of faith plus modernization.
