Huang & Bargh (H&B) provide a compelling view regarding the “selfish” nature of goals. Two important questions are left unaddressed. First, how are behaviors prioritized such that they become goals in the first place? Second, how is competition between short-term and long-term goals reconciled? We propose that affect supports both processes. Affect is an omnipresent neuropsychological state generated via the integration of sensory information with interoceptive information; it is characterized by hedonicity and arousal (e.g., Barrett & Bliss-Moreau Reference Barrett and Bliss-Moreau2009; Barrett & Russell Reference Barrett and Russell1999; Russell Reference Russell2003). In this commentary, we first propose that affect “tags” behaviors such that they become organized into goals (i.e., goal formation). Second, we propose that affect “tags” existing goals, allowing for the resolution of goal competition (i.e., goal selection).

Affect is broadly involved in many psychological phenomena, including but not exclusive to, emotion (e.g., Barrett Reference Barrett2006; Russell Reference Russell2003), personality (e.g., Revelle Reference Revelle1995; Yik & Russell Reference Yik and Russell2001), stereotyping (e.g., Mackie & Hamilton Reference Mackie and Hamilton1993; Moreno & Bodenhausen Reference Moreno and Bodenhausen2001), and the formation of implicit associations (e.g., Payne et al. Reference Payne, Cheng, Govorun and Stewart2005; Reference Payne, McClernon and Dobbins2007). Affect guides behavior (e.g., Martin et al. Reference Martin, Ward, Achee and Wyer1993; Raghunathan & Pham Reference Raghunathan and Pham1999), directs deployment of cognitive resources (e.g., Gable & Harmon-Jones Reference Gable and Harmon-Jones2010; Wegener et al. Reference Wegener, Petty and Smith1995), and even influences the content of consciousness (e.g., Anderson et al. Reference Anderson, Siegel, Bliss-Moreau and Barrett2011b; Reference Anderson, Siegel and Barrett2011a). As such, affect is a prime candidate for being involved in goal formation and selection.

H&B acknowledge the possible role for affect in goal processes when they state, “a goal can become associated with positive affect; this ‘tagging’ signals goal desirability” (sect. 4.2.1, para. 5). In this and similar views (e.g., Aarts Reference Aarts2007), affect perpetuates goals, which presumably already exist. A complementary perspective addresses goal formation. In our view, affect becomes associated with particular behaviors, thus influencing the likelihood that those behaviors occur on future occasions. Goals form over repeated behavior-outcome sequences. For example, the repeated association between physical affection and its associated positive affective state leads to a goal to pursue social relationships that may include physical affection. Thus, affect plays a critical role in goal formation: when positive affect accompanies a behavior-outcome link, that link is prioritized for formation into a goal. Likewise, when a behavior results in negative affect, the likelihood of that behavior occurring in the future decreases (possibly subserving “avoidance” goal formation; Carver & Scheier Reference Carver and Scheier1990; Higgins Reference Higgins1997). The linking of affect with behaviors likely occurs via associative learning (Bliss-Moreau & Barrett Reference Bliss-Moreau and Barrett2009). These processes can occur either consciously or unconsciously and may become automatized according to the rules set forth by H&B. Our view does not require that goals become mentally represented in a formal sense, though this is likely the case in humans. In sum, we propose that behavior-outcome patterns become organized into goals because of affect.

Affect may also help prioritize goals when selection between different goals is necessary (in the “predecisional phase” of goal sequencing; Heckhausen & Gollwitzer Reference Heckhausen and Gollwitzer1987). Often, goals are pursued serially rather than in parallel, requiring that a particular goal be selected over another. Goal selection is particularly important when selecting between short-term goals (discussed in the target article) and long-term goals (not discussed in the target article). Pursuing the most desirable goal now (e.g., eating a delicious but not nutritious snack) may negatively impact future goals and states (e.g., losing weight). Thus, competition arises: Should one pursue short- or long-term goals in the given moment? Affect may aid in the resolution of this conflict by “tagging” goals for selection. For example, if a highly positive affective state is associated with a long-term goal, that long-term goal is more likely to be selected than a short-term goal tagged with less positive affect. Affect may also support favoring long-term gain (positive experiences conferred in the future; e.g., losing weight) in the face of short-term pain (negative experiences in the present; e.g., achy muscles after a hard workout) (Williams & DeSteno Reference Williams, DeSteno, Gruber and Moskowitz2014). Over time, this process likely becomes anticipatory in nature: goals that are anticipated to create more positive states are selected (Bagozzi & Pieters Reference Bagozzi and Pieters1998).

We are not alone in suggesting that affect and goals are related. Others have proposed that affect arises from and shapes goal-relevant processes (e.g., Aarts Reference Aarts2007; Carver & Scheier Reference Carver and Scheier1990; Schwarz & Bohner Reference Schwarz, Bohner, Gollwitzer and Bargh1996). Notably, our focus on the importance of affect's “tagging” role in goal formation and selection guides a number of testable hypotheses. For example, when our perspective is applied to understanding evolution, one could deduce that animals that have affect should also have goals. In this view, it is possible for organisms to have goals without sophisticated cognitive resources or the sorts of mental representations that humans have. Further, the differentiation of affect should track the differentiation of goals. Animals with affect alone (e.g., who feel pleasure) would have relatively more global goals (e.g., moving toward that which produces pleasure) than animals with highly differentiated affect (e.g., discrete emotions such as pride), who should have correspondingly differentiated goals (e.g., achieving personal success). In our view, the process of differentiation occurred across evolutionary history. Analysis of the affect-goal relationship across phylogeny should, therefore, reveal a progressive change from nondifferentiated affect supporting nondifferentiated goals to differentiated affect supporting differentiated goals.

Although cross-species evaluation of this process needs to be performed, it is notable that many theories of discrete emotion in humans utilize similar logic (e.g., Bagozzi & Pieters Reference Bagozzi and Pieters1998; Cosmides & Tooby Reference Cosmides, Tooby, Lewis and Haviland-Jones2000; Frijda Reference Frijda1986; Keltner & Gross Reference Keltner and Gross1999). Another testable hypothesis highlights the relatively flexible nature of goals, which is inherently the case as the result of the fluidity of the affect system. For example, it should be possible to shift goal formation and selection by manipulating an individual's affective state. Indeed, support for this idea has been found in humans (Aarts Reference Aarts2007; Schwarz & Bohner Reference Schwarz, Bohner, Gollwitzer and Bargh1996).

We hope that focusing on the role of affect in goal formation and selection should allow for greater understanding of the mechanisms that subserve goals in humans and nonhuman animals.