International criminal law has always exhibited a tension between power and law. The Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, Germany, is now generally regarded as a pivotal moment in this field. Yet it almost did not happen. Even in the closing moments of the war it was far from clear that the Allies would pursue legal avenues to punish the Nazi leadership. Winston Churchill favoured the summary execution of fifty or so leading members of the Nazi apparatus. Stalin approved, in a “semi-jocular” recommendation, of shooting 50,000 German general staff officers.Footnote 2 This exchange is commonly dismissed as an aberration today, but was a serious proposition at the time. Such an approach enjoyed the virtues of simplicity and candour. It would spare the Allies the tedious process of organizing the mechanisms and material necessary to present a watertight case, precluding legal rationalizations and dilatory tactics that the guilty might employ to delay their judgment. And, crucially, the victors would not be required to “disguise a punishment exacted by one sovereign upon another by appeal to the neutral instrument of the law”.Footnote 3
History has been kinder to the legacy of Nuremberg than to its counterpart, the International Military Tribunal (IMT) for the Far East. The very name conjures the Orientalism of which it was accused; Time magazine dismissed the Tokyo Trial as “a third-string road company of the Nurnberg show … The German production had a touch of Wagner—elaborate vaunting of guilt, protestations of heroic innocence. Tokyo’s had the flavor of Gilbert & Sullivan”.Footnote 4 As sober an international lawyer as Georg Schwarzenberger concluded that the “legal standards—or their absence—of the Tokyo Trial were such as to make lawyers wish to forget all about it at the earliest possible moment”.Footnote 5
For the most part that wish was fulfilled. The proceedings were not officially published for three decades and the trial is only occasionally discussed in the literature or in what is now a growing body of international criminal law. The Tokyo International Military Tribunal, by Neil Boister and Robert Cryer, of the Universities of Canterbury and Birmingham respectively, is a “reappraisal” of the Tokyo IMT and the cases it processed—not as an attempt to rehabilitate it but to take it seriously as a subject of study.
The book is structured around a brief history of the Asia-Pacific War and the legal basis for the trial, followed by chapters on specific controversial charges, notably those for crimes against peace and murder. The former, and the ancillary offence of conspiracy, were at best ill-defined; the latter not chargeable during wartime. Both remain problematic: the International Criminal Court technically allows prosecution for the crime of aggression, but implementation awaits agreement between the states parties after 2017; the crime of murder (other than as a means of committing war crimes or crimes against humanity) was rejected by the IMT and has not been prosecuted subsequently at international level.
The book closely examines every aspect of the trial. There is much to criticize. The indictment of the twenty-eight accused—a number fixed, it seems, by the number of seats that had been built in the dock—was marked “No. 1” but ended up being the first and last charges to be laid. Forty-five of the fifty-five counts were dismissed by the majority of the Tribunal because of a lack of jurisdiction, or because the charges were redundant, able to be merged, or obscurely stated. There were translation problems. Defence counsels were treated poorly. Objections to the legal foundations of the IMT were dismissed “for reasons to be given later” that were never given (p. 33). The judges were of questionable independence: the president, Sir William Flood Webb, had previously investigated allegations of war crimes by the Japanese for the Australian government; Judge Jaranilla from the Philippines had been a prisoner of war and forced to participate in the Bataan death march. For his part, the Indian Judge Radhabinod Pal announced upon arrival in Tokyo and prior to hearing any argument that he would dissent. Boister and Cryer conclude that the conduct of the trial “did not meet the most elementary standards of international law” (p. 114).
Yet the dominant critique of the Tokyo IMT is that it was an exercise of power rather than law. This was the sustained challenge by the dissentient Pal, who observed at one point that “only a lost war is a crime” (p. 121). Interestingly, it was also the basis on which Justice Douglas of the US Supreme Court—the only judge to engage with the issues—concurred that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the habeas motion brought as a last-ditch effort by the detainees: “As Justice Pal said, it did not … sit as a judicial tribunal. It was solely an instrument of political power. Insofar as American participation is concerned, there is no constitutional objection to that action” (p. 30).
One of the prosecutors suggested that the trial would come to be viewed as one of the three great trials in history, “placed after the trial of Jesus and with the Nuremberg trial” (p. 301). Instead, in the West at least, the tribunal is either ignored or treated as a cautionary tale of victors’ justice compromising the rule of law. (A limited exception is the Tokyo IMT’s rulings on command responsibility, relied on by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).) In addition to their own close analysis of the trial, one of the many contributions of the book is bringing to Anglophone readers the manner in which the Tokyo IMT continues nevertheless to resonate in Japan.
The authors suggest that contemporary lessons might be taken from greater attention to the problems of the Tokyo IMT. The dangers of prosecutorial overreach were seen again, for example, in the Milosevic trial before the ICTY. And, though the authors do not labour the point, there are similarities between the US approach to the Tokyo IMT and the contemporary “global war on terror”. As the United States now attempts to shut down the detention facility in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, and backs away from the dubious trials it had proposed to hold there, these are useful lessons to recall.
