A collection of essays by twenty-one authors, this book examines the diplomacy and decision making of the “key global actors” and the “key regional actors” leading up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, explaining their aims, expectations, and policies country by country. It next assesses the “context and the consequences” for Iraq, Islamic militancy, oil, and the global economy; the role of the United Nations; and finally, the role of international law and ethics. The last section treats the “theoretical implications” for theories of international relations. It is obvious that no single author, or even two or three, could deal with this wide range of topics in a single volume at such an early date, 2006. Thus, a group effort was imperative.
A most welcome investigation, it is the first of its kind to deal with the Iraq War in both its global context and the context of its belligerents. The chapters in the first two parts are crisp, packed with facts about leaders' considerations, decisions, public opinion, and consequences. Thus they provide readers with an unusually broad range of events, insights into leaders' intentions, and a review of the early outcomes of the invasion. Moreover, it is not only a study of how a couple of countries decide to go to war and the results, but it is also a study of the role of international organizations and most all other countries either directly affected or involved.
How well will this volume stand up over time? Already by late 2007, several of the judgments on war aims and diplomatic objectives look shaky, some clearly off the mark. Then again, the view today could change as the war continues. The best “global actor” chapters concern the United States, Britain, France, Germany, the East European countries treated collectively, and Japan. The chapter on Russia is the weakest, showing no awareness that Russian military advisers and intelligence units were active in Iraq during the invasion and that Moscow's aims were hardly benign. The judgments reached in 2005 in the “regional actor” chapters on Israel, Iran, and the Palestinians look less convincing in 2007. The assertion that the invasion of Iraq improved Israel's security was questionable in 2003, and it looks farther off the mark after Israel's war in Lebanon and Iran's growing regional influence. The same can be said about hope for progress in the “peace process” in Israel. Iran's ambiguous assessments of what the U.S. invasion of Iraq would mean for its interest are cogently described, but the author of this chapter shows little appreciation for the large gains in influence that the war has already reaped for Iran, gains Iran's leaders were recognizing once U.S. plans for elections in Iraq were clear in 2004, for example, that the new government would be dominated by a Shiʿi majority favorably disposed to Teheran.
The chapter on oil exaggerates the role of oil in U.S. strategic calculations. Most U.S. policymakers do not really understand the oil issue, and often analysts who make oil a central factor fail to recognize that one does not have to own an oil-producing state in order to buy its oil. In fact, Iran would gladly sell its oil to U.S. companies if the U.S. government did not forbid it. In a similar vein, the U.S. occupation authority's handling of the Iraqi oil industry has not been its dominant concern by any means. The oil issue is largely a red herring except for one fact, ignored in this chapter: Saudi Arabia's large standby production capacity. It is so great that the Saudi government can rapidly flood the oil market, affecting the price far more than any other oil-producing state. Indeed, this reality has been a major factor in the U.S. policy of striving for cooperative relations with Saudi Arabia. Moreover, Saudi Arabia has assuaged U.S. concerns by surging production more than once to limit the influence of OPEC in pushing up oil prices.
The last two chapters, assessing the theoretical implications of the book's findings, will be of interest to the proponents of the various competing international-relations schools of thought. For strategists and policymakers, as well as students seeking a more textured appreciation of war and diplomacy, the value is less. It is unfortunate that too often “realists,” “constructivists,” and “liberal institutionalists” behave as if they are religious cults, insisting that their theory is the only right and true path to understanding world politics. In reality, each offers important insights that more intellectually mature students will accept eclectically without joining one or another school. It is fortunate that the editors are a bit more evenhanded, although Hinnebusch is stoutly hostile to so-called “hegemonic stability theory” (HST). For the uninitiated, HST simply asserts that the international order is stable when there is a single unchallenged hegemon keeping order. It is not without its utility.
For example, hegemonic Rome and several Chinese dynasties kept the peace for long periods, much longer than Europe ever enjoyed before U.S. hegemony there. In fact, “realism,” the school that houses critics of HST, was largely developed on Europe's parochial experience since the Treaty of Westphalia, where there never was a state capable of hegemony. Moreover, HST can be seen as a variant of “realism.” Thus we sometimes find “realists” attacking a product of their own theory more globally understood.
Perhaps the most powerful impression this volume leaves with the reader is that the war in Iraq has shaken the very foundations of the present international order. It is ironic that the United States seems bent on destroying the very international system it worked decades to construct. This conclusion, of course, flies in the face of all three international-relations-theory schools—realism, liberal institutionalism, and constructivism.
These last chapters also correct some of the judgments in the country essays, in particular the implication that there was a “right way” to conduct the invasion that would have been successful. After reading all the accounts of the various countries and the brief history of Iraq, one will find it difficult to believe this “right way” hypothesis. Yet most of the debate in the United States since the invasion is based on the assumption that there was such a way, that is, “if we had only done x, y, or z, we would have won.” If the chapter on how the United States decided to go to war had focused more sharply on U.S. war aims, this issue would have arisen much earlier in the book. Even before the war, it was clear to a few observers in the United States that the war would serve primarily the interests of al-Qaʿida and Iran. How, then, could the war be fought correctly?
Finally, many of the book's weaknesses are excusable because it was written before the war ended. Another book can be written when it has ended, but now we very much need this one. It will enrich university courses treating the war, as well as more general courses on war and diplomacy.
