This is the tenth volume in a valuable series of documents and it follows the earlier formats quite closely. The period covered from 1951 to 1957 is a significant one in European and world politics and it is interesting to see how the Irish state responded to the new world order orchestrated by the United States, the Cold War which was a consequence of this, and the end of empire that occurred during these years. Documentary series, such as this, provide an important insight into the development of policy and the political/diplomatic response to new challenges. It also allows the reader to assess the quality of decision making and how successful policy is in attaining the goals set for the diplomatic service.

Fianna Fáil returned to office as a minority government in 1951, but de Valera did not take the external affairs portfolio as he had done since 1932. Frank Aiken became minister for foreign affairs, a post he was to return to again in 1957 when de Valera formed his final government. A Fine Gael–Labour inter-party government replaced Fianna Fáil in 1954. John A. Costello became Taoiseach and Liam Cosgrave was appointed minister for external affairs. There are some differences in emphasis between the two governments, but in the main, continuity is the main characteristic of policy throughout these years. This consensus on policy reflects the continuing influence of de Valera on Irish foreign policy and the extent to which the certainties established during the 1930s continued to influence policy making in the 1950s.

Yet, it is questionable if continuity was the best policy to be adopted by Irish governments at this time. The world was changing rapidly when this volume opens and the pace of change accelerates over the next six years. Some changes did not affect Ireland directly, but many did. The drive for European integration increasingly threatened Ireland’s privileged position in the British market, especially when the United Kingdom actively promoted the idea of a European Free Trade Area. More radically, European integration challenged nationalist assumptions in respect of sovereignty, nationality and the economy. Furthermore, the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union was a new type of politics, one that Ireland found it difficult to respond to.

Aiken, Cosgrave and departmental officials grappled with many of these issues but were ill-equipped to do so. The departmental mind-set remained embedded in the inter-war period of absolute sovereignty and active promotion of neutrality. Moreover, anti-partition absorbed most of the energy of the department, perhaps crowding out the possibility of more innovative thinking about Ireland’s role in the world. Aiken’s policy on partition stressed the moral superiority of Ireland’s case, believed there was no basis for Britain continuing to ‘hold on’ to Northern Ireland and made no attempt to understand either the British case or that of unionism (see document nos 15, 18, 19 & 51). While Cosgrave was less aggressive than Aiken in promoting the anti-partitionist position, he and Costello maintained the traditional position during their period in office.

The most revealing documents here are those produced by Conor Cruise O’Brien. He is a key figure in the anti-partitionist campaign and actively promotes government policy under both governments. There is no question here (or indeed in his personal papers) that he did not subscribe to the traditional nationalist position. However, there was a subtle edge to his thinking. He visited Northern Ireland frequently and prepared reports on his meeting with nationalist figures there. Unlike Aiken and mainstream opinion, Cruise O’Brien recognised that Britain was not the main problem when seeking an end to partition. In August 1954 he argued that emphasising discrimination in Northern Ireland would influence the British government and have useful results in the campaign. He went on to argue that it was in the nationalist interest to undermine the united front presented by the unionist majority. He suggested that, ‘I cannot envisage any conceivable British government, at the behest of the United States or otherwise, handing over the Six Counties to us against the will of a solid Protestant majority in the area concerned. Therefore the main field on which we must always keep our eye is the Six Counties area itself’ (document no. 293, pp 386–88). This is a position that was to be taken up by the civil rights movement a decade later. Later in the same year, Cruise O’Brien addressed the issue of what would happen if the British did leave Northern Ireland, concluding in effect that unionism could maintain its position, politically, economically and militarily (document no. 317, pp 429–31).

In addition to partition, there are interesting discussions on neutrality, de-colonisation and the Cold War. Ireland’s takes up its seat at the United Nations in 1955 and this posed a series of new challenges for diplomats. Would Ireland join with the non-aligned such as India or would it identify more closely with the United States and the Christian west? Policy was often pragmatic and, on Algeria and Cyprus, rather conservative. The most telling documents are those concerned with the consequences of free trade in Europe and how that would impact on Ireland. By the time this volume ends, an inter-departmental committee had concluded that Ireland’s protectionist economy was untenable in the new world. What was not clear was how this challenge would be met.