This book, an English version of the Hebrew original, focuses on disclosing a mine of information on the secret American–Israeli discussions on the Israeli nuclear project at Dimona. As such, the English version is true to the book's title and should be acknowledged as an important contribution, not only to the growing research on Israel's nuclear history that was missing from conventional histories for decades but also as a key to understanding the connection between American domestic and foreign policies in regard to Israel. The central thesis of the book is that Israel was able to procure and develop its nuclear “option” between 1957 and the Six Day War ten years later despite both public and secret efforts by American administrations at the time to stop nuclear proliferation worldwide, particularly in regard to Israel's nuclear option. The thesis itself requires some criticism but is worth being studied next to a deeper discussion of domestic Israeli, Soviet, Egyptian, Syrian, and Palestinian dimensions and reactions to the Dimona project, which may have transformed this book into a major contribution to the study of the origins of the Six Day War and its ramifications until today.
The main merit of the book is the large and detailed discussion of many heretofore closed primary diplomatic sources, mainly American but also British, French, and Canadian ones. The author's discussion of them is largely chronological, focusing on the American–Israeli exchange over Dimona, though he occasionally moves back and forth between dates and events. His scholarship is sound and accurate but somewhat limited in depth and scope due to missing newly opened former Soviet sources, a better discussion of American–Egyptian relations, and the related primary sources on Israel's own domestic affairs. Thus, the book would have benefited from additional research and expansion as suggested below.
Although the author outlines—albeit sporadically throughout the book—the main motivation for David Ben-Gurion's early quest for a nuclear solution to Israel's security dilemmas since its birth in terms of ongoing Arab hostility and in the strategic imbalance between the Jewish island and the Arab ocean into which it was born, the Holocaust and its lessons are hardly mentioned. For Ben-Gurion, the Jews of Europe and of British Palestine were caught between a Nazi hammer and the Allied anvils and reacted in a way that typified other democracies' (and Stalin's) behavior during a major war. Hence, Ben-Gurion pursued a double-track foreign and security policy: acquiring foreign support, possibly also binding security guarantees, and at the same time acquiring an independent deterrent—including medium-range nuclear missiles—while maintaining the partition of Palestine. American refusal to support Israel beyond a very limited and informal fashion at the time, and Washington's intervention in Israel's domestic politics against Ben-Gurion's nuclear policy and person led to somewhat ironic results that the author is unable, or unwilling, to discern.
In my view, by making the Dimona project illegitimate in terms of its own antiproliferation campaign, the United States succeeded in removing Ben-Gurion and installing Levi Eshkol—his successor—who was much more cunning and clever in pursuing the Dimona project vis-à-vis Washington. However, Eshkol's coalition comprised conventional strategists and ideologues, ending the partition of western Palestine, which in due course would launch the preventive, conventional war of 1967, and occupying the West Bank (and East Jerusalem) in order not to rely on the nuclear option and not to maintain Ben-Gurion's credo in favor of partition. By making Dimona illegitimate, and by investing much effort in preventing the deployment of French-made MD 660 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) to Israel scheduled for late 1967 or early 1968, Washington seemed to have forged common interest with an alarmed President Nasser of Egypt, and the alarmed Palestinian exiles—who feared that no Arab state would risk a war with a nuclear Israel for them. However, the United States allowed the Soviet Union to push Nasser, or Nasser to push Moscow, toward the 1967 crisis before the Israeli nuclear deterrent, IRBMs included, was ready. Moreover, had Eshkol made some concessions to the Americans in regard to Dimona and the missile deployment, Washington would have left him alone during the height of the 1967 crisis and thus contributed to his downfall and to the emergence of a national emergency coalition that pushed for war and finally occupied the West Bank—an anathema to Ben-Gurion.
This sad irony was hardly known to Israelis at the time, nor even today, but it does not emerge in its full connotations—in terms of the partial American responsibility for the Six Day War and its “conventional” results, 1973, and continued occupation and settlements efforts—until very recently, from Zaki Shalom's limited but (in parts) meticulous research.
