David Domke and Kevin Coe have produced an impressive and potentially seminal piece of scholarship on religion and presidential rhetoric. According to Domke and Coe, the “God Strategy” is “a mixture of voice and agenda that has been primarily secularized, while … deliberately finding opportunities to ‘signal’ sympathies for religious conservatives’ views … At the heart of the God Strategy have been four signals:

1. 1. Acting as political priests by speaking the language of the faithful.

2. 2. Fusing God and country by linking America with divine will.

3. 3. Embracing important religious symbols, practices, and rituals.

4. 4. Engaging in morality politics by trumpeting bellwether issues” (pp. 18–19).

After detailing what they mean by the God Strategy, the authors move to empirical analyses of each of the four signals identified above. Chapter 2 focuses on how frequently and regularly presidents invoke both God and faith in their major national addresses. In an analysis that begins with the first term of Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) and ends two years into the second term of George W. Bush, Domke and Coe present several important findings. First, American presidents since FDR tend to invoke God quite a bit. Of the 12 presidents in the time period examined here, only three (John Kennedy, Richard Nixon, and Jimmy Carter) failed to invoke God in at least 50 percent of their major national addresses; all presidents except these three averaged at least one invocation per address. What is truly impressive, however, is the dramatic increase in both the percentage of addresses invoking God and the average number of invocations per address since the election of Ronald Reagan. Each of the last four presidents has invoked God in over 90 percent of their major addresses to the nation (Reagan was the highest at 96 percent), whereas the pre-Reagan highs (for FDR, Harry Truman, and Dwight Eisenhower) were in the range of 60 percent. Similar trends exist for the average number of mentions of God and the average number of invocations of faith per major presidential address. American presidents since 1980 are talking more about God and faith in their addresses to the nation. This is one of the enduring legacies of Ronald Reagan.

Reagan's influence is again apparent in Chapter 3 — where the authors examine how presidents since FDR have attempted to link God and nation in their rhetoric — and Chapter 4 — which focuses on presidents speaking at religious institutions or before explicitly religious audiences. Looking first at inaugural addresses only, Domke and Coe demonstrate that American presidents since Reagan have been much more likely to characterize the United States as a nation that is “set apart,” and also to discuss national renewal in some fashion. The authors also show that presidents since Reagan have spoken far more often at religious institutions or before religious audiences, issued more religious proclamations, and referenced Jesus Christ much more frequently in their Christmas messages.

It is the material contained in the first four chapters of this book that will likely have the largest impact on the study of American politics. The authors’ approach is unique. The thoroughness of their analyses is impressive, and their results substantive and new. Chapters 5 and 6 do not reach quite the same level of excellence. Chapter 5 looks at how political parties have engaged in morality politics by examining how they discuss some of the hot-button cultural issues in their platforms and other venues. Not surprisingly, the authors find that the Republicans discuss issues like abortion more frequently than do the Democrats, and also that they do so in a way that accords with religious conservatives’ stands on these issues. Chapter 6 discusses how the increasing use of the God Strategy has affected American politics and worries that it has been harmful to both politics and religion.

The latter claim is, of course, a normative judgment, and individual readers will make their own evaluations. But the way in which Domke and Coe portray the current use of religion in American politics as a unique form of strategic manipulation on the part of partisan elites is somewhat problematic for at least two reasons. First, it might not be all that unique. One wishes that Domke and Coe had delved into the Nineteenth Century as a point of comparison. Certainly religious conflict was highly prominent in the electoral politics of that era (especially the post-bellum period), and Abraham Lincoln's religious rhetoric likely resembled that of Reagan at least to some extent. Second, while the contemporary use of religion in politics undoubtedly is strategic, it is also reflects changes in American society. As the authors note, America is and always has been a highly religious society. But more Americans are irreligious today than ever before. This has made some of the vast majority of Americans for whom religion remains important a bit nervous. Thus, recent presidents may speak in more religious language to reassure America's religious majority that they value religion and are comfortable with it. In addition, the contentious issues of the culture wars are relatively new to the American political agenda. Therefore it could be that partisan elites address these issues more not solely for strategic reasons, but because the public demands that they do so.

These somewhat nit-picking points aside, The God Strategy is a high-quality piece of work. It is well written and accessible. Its findings will shape scholarship for years to come.