I

Irish-American concern about Northern Ireland revolved around the Troubles.Footnote ⁷ Violence was inflicted by both sides of the community in Northern Ireland and the inequalities often experienced by its Catholic population meant that the Troubles became a focus for Irish-Americans.Footnote ⁸ Initially, the American executive branch of government placed little pressure on the British government in relation to Northern Ireland and the Troubles. The administrations of Richard Nixon (1969–74) and Gerald Ford (1974–7) afforded the subject minimal attention and when the matter was raised in bilateral discussions with the U.K., the United States took a generally supportive attitude.Footnote ⁹ Reagan did not comment on the issue when he visited Ireland as Nixon’s emissary to Europe in 1972.Footnote ¹⁰ The Irish government did comment on Reagan, noting internally that ‘it would seem not unlikely that President Nixon is seeking to build up his stature as a possible candidate for the Vice-Presidency or for some other high office, such as that of Secretary of State’.Footnote ¹¹ However, the United States government’s position on Northern Ireland evolved as the 1970s progressed.

The support of some sympathetic Irish-Americans for the Irish Northern Aid Committee (NORAID) – a financier of I.R.A. activities – became a fixture in Irish-American and Anglo-American relations from the early 1970s onwards.Footnote ¹² In 1971 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (F.B.I.) announced that NORAID should register as a ‘foreign agent’.Footnote ¹³ Five years later, in a joint communiqué, Gerald Ford and Liam Cosgrave, the Irish Taoiseach (1973–7), asked Irish-Americans to end support for NORAID.Footnote ¹⁴ (The U.S. State Department and Justice Department continued to monitor NORAID and, despite its denials, in 1984, it again had to register as the agent of a ‘foreign principal’: essentially an agent of the I.R.A.Footnote ¹⁵ ) The Ford–Cosgrave communiqué coincided with a new political strategy to use Irish-American politicians to temper gunrunning and financial support for violence, while influencing the political process in Washington D.C., and ultimately Anglo–American relations, so as to secure a political settlement in Northern Ireland. Under the guidance of the civil rights leader John Hume (a founder of the Social and Democratic Labour Party in 1970, and leader of the party between 1979 and 2001), the ‘four horsemen’ – Speaker Thomas P. ‘Tip’ O’Neill (Democrat-Massachusetts), Senator Ted Kennedy (Democrat-Massachusetts), Governor Hugh Carey (Democrat-New York), and Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (Democrat-New York) – were the leading protagonists in this.Footnote ¹⁶ In an attempt to capture the Irish-American vote, Jimmy Carter discussed Northern Ireland during the 1976 presidential election and was critical of the British government.Footnote ¹⁷ Carter, as a presidential candidate, even walked down Fifth Avenue in New York city on St Patrick’s Day in 1976 wearing a lapel badge bearing the slogan ‘Get Britain out of Ireland’.Footnote ¹⁸ As president, Carter issued a statement in 1977 promising American investment in response to any power-sharing agreement.Footnote ¹⁹ This statement marked a departure from previous U.S. policy. A precedent for American intervention – or at least the possibility of action – had been established prior to Reagan arriving in the Oval Office.Footnote ²⁰

The 1970s also saw a division amongst Irish-American politicians on the Northern Irish conflict. Rep. Mario Biaggi (Democrat-New York) established the Ad-Hoc Congressional Committee for Irish Affairs (A.C.C.I.A.) in September 1977. Although the A.C.C.I.A. was a bipartisan group, leading Democrats, including O’Neill, did not participate given its ties with the Irish National Caucus (I.N.C.), which had republican sympathies.Footnote ²¹ The influence of congressional Irish-Americans became clear towards the end of the Carter administration. In June 1979, O’Neill publicly supported a ban on American arms sales to the Royal Ulster Constabulary (R.U.C.) after Biaggi promised to attach the amendment to the State Department’s annual appropriations bill during its passage through Congress. O’Neill hoped that the ban would prompt Thatcher to resolve the conflict. However, he also recognised that he could not campaign against Irish-American support for the I.R.A. while allowing the State Department to permit American arms to be sold to the R.U.C. In August 1979, O’Neill allowed Biaggi’s amendment to pass. This was an unwelcome development for the British government. However, the Carter administration accepted the ban: the president prioritised his domestic agenda and necessary working relationship with the speaker over the risk that the Thatcher government might be offended.Footnote ²² Carter refused to tackle Congress on the issue, despite a personal appeal from Thatcher when they met in December 1979.Footnote ²³

The Reagan administration therefore inherited a confident, successful but divided Irish-American lobby. Announced on St Patrick’s Day in 1981, the Friends of Ireland (F.O.I.) constituted another congressional group, but comprising of familiar protagonists such as Kennedy and O’Neill. Unlike Biaggi’s congressional committee, which relied on the grassroots support of the I.N.C., the F.O.I. enjoyed the support and credibility of congressional leadership. The F.O.I.’s condemnation of the I.R.A. and related activism meant that their moderation prompted criticism from some other Irish-Americans. Politicians such as O’Neill and Kennedy were therefore not simply electioneering in their concern for Northern Ireland: the positions that they assumed on the issue only infuriated hard-line Irish-Americans.Footnote ²⁴ To be successful in tempering republican support and controlling the Irish-American agenda, the ‘four horsemen’ (and F.O.I.) needed to demonstrate that they were influencing the Anglo–Irish process.

II

In contrast to the Democratic Party, the Republican Party’s 1980 platform did not include a reference to Northern Ireland.Footnote ²⁵ The Irish government was aware that Reagan’s G.O.P. was ‘obsessed’ with NATO and, in turn, prioritised Anglo–American relations.Footnote ²⁶ On 6 November 1980, President-elect Reagan commented on the suspension of arms-sales to the R.U.C. He emphasised both his Irish heritage and continuity with American foreign policy: ‘I would say with the name of Reagan the US cannot interfere or intervene but if there is any way we can be helpful we would be more than eager because I think it is a very tragic situation.’Footnote ²⁷

In February 1981, Thatcher became the first major world leader to visit the new president, in a clear indication that the White House believed her to be a leading ally.Footnote ²⁸ The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (F.C.O.) advised the prime minister ‘to give the President and his advisers an account of the realities of the Northern Ireland situation’.Footnote ²⁹ Although the Northern Ireland Office told Thatcher that the R.U.C. no longer required Ruger revolvers from the United States, the office advised that it remained politically ‘the best position … for the Americans to lift the ban’ so that she could ‘say that this has happened’.Footnote ³⁰ Regardless, it was expected that O’Neill would not agree and Reagan, like Carter, would not want to oppose the speaker on it.Footnote ³¹ Alexander Haig, the U.S. secretary of state (1981–2), advised Reagan: ‘Demonstrate publicly and privately that Thatcher is the major Western leader most attuned to your views on East–West and security issues.’Footnote ³² However, he warned that the prime minister could raise some issues that he should avoid discussing, for instance Northern Ireland. Haig noted: ‘Our policy has been to prevent Northern Ireland from disrupting our close cooperation with the UK and Ireland by adopting a policy of strict neutrality.’Footnote ³³ Northern Ireland was not a topic of discussion during Thatcher’s meetings either with members of the U.S. Senate or Reagan.Footnote ³⁴ Yet Reagan was sympathetic to Thatcher’s concerns about the R.U.C. He admitted to journalists the following month that he disagreed with the embargo of arms sales.Footnote ³⁵

Despite his sympathy for Thatcher on the R.U.C., Reagan maintained neutrality. Reagan’s first presidential St Patrick’s Day statement explained:

I add my personal prayers and the good offices of the United States to those Irish – and indeed to all world citizens – who wish fervently for peace and victory over those who sow fear and terror.Footnote ³⁶

The White House quickly clarified Reagan’s language – namely ‘good offices’ – in order to avoid any suggestion of an American intervention in Northern Ireland. Reagan’s interest extended to gifting the Irish embassy a jar of green jellybeans.Footnote ³⁷ Pressure on Reagan to act increased during the 1981 hunger strike. On 6 May 1981, the ‘four horsemen’ published a telegram that they had sent to Thatcher, criticising her ‘intransigence’.Footnote ³⁸ The ‘four horsemen’ came to believe that the president was sympathetic to their cause. In a meeting with Kennedy on 1 June 1981, Reagan indicated that he was open to intervening.Footnote ³⁹ The president remarked that ‘the situation over there really bothers me’ and he would ‘give it some serious thought’.Footnote ⁴⁰

This contrast between Reagan’s personal views and his administration’s foreign policy was reflected in the divisions between the president’s foreign policy advisers. The British government believed that the administration’s decision-making process was ‘incoherent’ as Haig was ‘actively distrusted’ by Reagan and his ‘closest White House advisers’.Footnote ⁴¹ Richard Allen’s (the national security adviser, 1981–2) role was ‘uncertain except that he can be relied upon to oppose Haig’, and Meese (counsellor to the president, 1981–5) was influential ‘across the whole board of policy’ but was ‘not a master of the foreign scene’. Reagan was viewed as poorly informed about the nuances of foreign policy.Footnote ⁴² This problematic approach to foreign policy suggested that the ‘four horsemen’ had a potential opening to secure Reagan’s commitment to intervention. However, American interests, combined with the frailties of the Thatcher government, ensured that the White House would not undermine Thatcher. In a scathing assessment of their British allies in July 1981, Allen informed Reagan that Britain was subject to ‘troubling political, social and economic drift’, with Thatcher having ‘lost her grip on the political rudder’.Footnote ⁴³ The administration was concerned that a Labour government ‘could prove harmful to our security interests even if reduced to a splinter group’. Allen told Reagan: ‘With no British leader seeming to have a clear idea of where or how to go, some political turbulence is likely, with adverse effect on the country’s reliability as a U.S. ally.’Footnote ⁴⁴

In a letter written on 14 July 1981, Garret FitzGerald, the Taoiseach (1981–2, 1982–9), asked Reagan to help prevent the death of hunger striker Kieran Doherty (who had been elected to Dáil Éireann on 11 June 1981). FitzGerald wrote: ‘I beg you to use your enormous influence with the British Prime Minister within the next 24 hours … to avert his death so preventing the very dangerous consequences which would inevitably follow’.Footnote ⁴⁵ According to the Irish record, Seán Donlon (Irish ambassador to the United States, 1978–81) stressed to Michael Deaver (the White House deputy chief of staff, 1981–5) ‘the need for an early response’.Footnote ⁴⁶ According to Deaver, the president had already asked Allen to consider the situation and, given media interest, he would respond ‘as soon as possible’. Deaver was concerned that the British government was being blackmailed. Donlon reported that Allen was also not ‘very sympathetic’ because Ireland was not a member of NATO and held a ‘somewhat primitive view about how to deal with the IRA’. Whereas Reagan was sympathetic to Kennedy’s case for American involvement, White House staff were unenthusiastic. Clearly uncertain in light of his advisers’ stance, Reagan candidly told Donlon that he did not think that ‘this is one for me’. Instead, the president told Donlon that he viewed the Troubles as ‘a war between two rival religious factions’ and, subsequently, ‘wondered why the heads of the churches could not give a more positive lead’. Reagan also assigned blame to communists who were ‘obviously involved as they had been, for example, on US campuses during the Vietnam era’. Donlon did not believe that his explanation of the history of paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland ‘succeeded in doing much more than confusing the president’. Nonetheless, the ambassador informed the Irish government that the president was overall ‘well informed and anxious to help in any way he could’.Footnote ⁴⁷ Ultimately, Reagan refused to intervene in the hunger strike. In a reply to FitzGerald on 23 July, he wrote: ‘I appreciate the depth of concern which prompted your letter and want you to know how sorrowfully I, along with millions of other Americans, view this tragic conflict.’Footnote ⁴⁸ He added that American intervention was not possible, although ‘U.S. policy and my own personal feelings as expressed in my St. Patrick’s Day statement are well known to the British Government’.Footnote ⁴⁹ The White House told the British embassy that Reagan’s letter was ‘masterfully non-committal’.Footnote ⁵⁰ The president’s neutrality represented a prioritising of Anglo–American relations. Indeed, Reagan and Thatcher only briefly discussed the hunger strike at the Ottawa economic summit in July 1981, with the president reassuring the prime minister that he would not interfere.Footnote ⁵¹

Uncertainty over Reagan’s views on Northern Ireland abounded, particularly due to the comments of William P. Clark Jr (deputy secretary of state, 1981–2; national security adviser 1982–3; secretary of the interior, 1983–7), who was a long-term associate of Reagan and considered himself to be an Irish-American.Footnote ⁵² In August 1981, Clark told Donlon that the State Department opposed Reagan intervening because Northern Ireland was viewed as a British domestic issue, while unnamed ‘astute political advisers’ to the president argued that it was a ‘no-win situation’.Footnote ⁵³ Despite the opposition of many in the administration, Clark assured the Irish ambassador that the president ‘felt deeply’ about Northern Ireland and was willing to play a constructive role, which would also satisfy Irish-Americans in Congress and the country. Donlon believed that ‘any message delivered by Clark accurately represents the president’s position’.Footnote ⁵⁴ Hume was equally convinced of Reagan’s intentions: ‘he was very committed to … doing anything that he could to support what happened in Ireland … he strongly supported anything that Tip O’Neill and Ted Kennedy decided about Ireland because there they were united … in their Irish roots’.Footnote ⁵⁵ Therefore, Reagan’s enthusiasm to act on Northern Ireland was tempered by internal debates in his administration about the issue and wider foreign policy concerns, such as Anglo–American relations. This even extended to an address at the Irish Historical Society in New York in November 1981. Clark told Irish embassy officials that the speech originally included ‘a helpful’ paragraph on Northern Ireland, which had been agreed by both Ambassador Donlon and the British, but Meese intervened.Footnote ⁵⁶ Subsequently, Reagan’s remarks were autobiographical and light-hearted, making only one reference to Northern Ireland:

The Reagan administration’s neutrality was called into question by a faux pas made by Clark in December 1981. During a visit to Ireland in December 1981, Clark publicly declared in an interview on Raidió Teilifís Éireann (R.T.É.) that the American people wanted to see a unified Ireland. Furious British officials were relieved that the State Department speedily clarified that this remark was not indicative of a change in administration policy.Footnote ⁵⁸ Nonetheless, officials at the British embassy in Washington, D.C. informed their colleagues in London that Clark’s remarks were ‘not something which he let slip in the heat of the moment but an idea which [he] had been determined to get across in public at some point during his visit to Dublin’.Footnote ⁵⁹ Another point of concern to the British was a letter from Reagan, which Clark handed to the Taoiseach (which the Irish shared with the British as Clark was not as forthcoming). After stressing his interest in Northern Ireland, reaffirming his neutrality, and emphasising his St Patrick’s Day statement, Reagan wrote:

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office asked the British embassy to raise with the State Department the line, ‘reconciliation between the two Irish political traditions’.Footnote ⁶¹ The British government believed that it ‘implies an all-Ireland solution to Northern Ireland’s problems’ and was suggestive of a ‘veiled reference to Irish unity’.Footnote ⁶² The British embassy confirmed that the State Department will ‘try … to ensure that the phrase is not used again’. In a conversation with Nicholas Henderson (the British ambassador to the United States, 1979–82), Clark quickly clarified his position on reunification and apologised for warning the British government about Reagan’s letter to FitzGerald.Footnote ⁶³ Clark continued to be a concern for British officials working on Northern Ireland. After he was appointed national security advisor, the British Embassy briefed the F.C.O.: ‘Clark is one of Reagan’s oldest and closest associates … and, in his time at the State Department, he has continued to have the ear of the president.’Footnote ⁶⁴ They further warned that there was ‘no doubt that Clark will be one of the inner circle at the White House’ and ‘the one subject which seems to have aroused his personal interest has been Northern Ireland’. Nevertheless, there was hope that this would change: ‘As one NSC staffer put it to us, with luck, Clark will now be too busy to devote much time to that issue.’Footnote ⁶⁵ By 1982, it was clear to the Irish government that Reagan was concerned about Northern Ireland and that Clark wanted him to intervene, while the State Department and White House advisers, such as Allen and Meese, opposed Clark for foreign policy reasons and the political consequences of a ‘no-win situation’.Footnote ⁶⁶

Reagan clearly followed the advice from Meese, Allen and the State Department. During a meeting with Charles Haughey, the Taoiseach, in March 1982, the president was interested in Northern Ireland but ultimately non-committal.Footnote ⁶⁷ Haughey argued that the ‘ultimate solution to the problem lay in Irish unity and the final withdrawal of the British from Ireland’. In reply, Reagan wondered whether the people in Northern Ireland agreed. He suggested that ‘the majority of the Irish people must yearn for peace but are terrified by the extremists on both sides’ and ‘then sought some information on the persons who would be providing entertainment at the lunch’.Footnote ⁶⁸ By June 1982, Clark’s impact on policy towards Northern Ireland was reduced. Commander Dennis Blair, a member of the National Security Council, briefed British officials that although Clark’s interest in Northern Ireland ‘was strong as ever’, it was clear that Reagan ‘saw the political dangers of involving himself in Irish politics, and would keep right out of it’.Footnote ⁶⁹ Unsurprisingly then, Reagan and Thatcher did not discuss Northern Ireland during his visit to the U.K. in June 1982, instead focusing on the Middle East, the Falklands War, and the forthcoming NATO summit (later that month).Footnote ⁷⁰

III

Irish-American leaders viewed the New Ireland Forum (N.I.F.) in 1983–4 as a means to agree a solution on Northern Ireland. Constitutional nationalist parties (Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, the S.D.L.P. and Labour) participated, the main unionist parties refused on the basis that it was a biased process, and Sinn Féin was excluded due to its connections with the I.R.A.Footnote ⁷¹ Reagan’s cautious interest in developments was evident in his telephone conversation with FitzGerald (again the Taoiseach) on St Patrick’s Day in 1983.Footnote ⁷² Reagan stated:

In reply, FitzGerald explained that the N.I.F. had been established as part of the ‘efforts to reconcile the two traditions in Ireland’. The Taoiseach asked for Reagan’s support for the N.I.F., but Reagan quickly sought to end the conversation: ‘Well, we shall retain our good relationship and shall cooperate with you … I think something is happening with our connection. You’ve begun to fade’. There was not a problem with FitzGerald’s connection.Footnote ⁷⁴ Despite Reagan’s interest, he followed the advice of the majority of his White House staff and avoided any serious involvement. In contrast, the U.S. Congress passed a resolution in support of the N.I.F. and a united Ireland on St Patrick’s Day in 1983.Footnote ⁷⁵ Northern Ireland was not raised when Thatcher met Reagan at the White House on 29 September 1983.Footnote ⁷⁶ Despite congressional concern, the Reagan administration still refused to intervene in the Anglo–Irish process, prioritising its relationship with Thatcher. In the subsequent month, Reagan even rejected Kennedy’s appeal for an American peace envoy.Footnote ⁷⁷

FitzGerald visited the White House on St Patrick’s Day in 1984.Footnote ⁷⁸ The Taoiseach began his conversation with Reagan by discussing Northern Ireland and the N.I.F., saying that he ‘hoped for a constructive outcome’. Preferring not to engage with the N.I.F., Reagan remarked: ‘what was happening there was all, ostensibly, happening in the name of God, but it was the same God’. He inquired whether ‘a majority of the people there could get together’ or if this was prevented as ‘each side was simply being intimidated by its own radical groups’? This was now a recurring observation from the president.Footnote ⁷⁹ FitzGerald also met George Bush, telling the vice-president that ‘he would like to describe the work of the Forum’.Footnote ⁸⁰ Bush turned the conversation, however, to the American supply of arms for the I.R.A. When FitzGerald again tried to discuss the N.I.F., Bush again changed the topic of conversation, this time focusing on Ireland’s forthcoming presidency of the European Economic Community.Footnote ⁸¹ When meeting with George Shultz, the U.S. secretary of state (1982–9) side-stepped the N.I.F. by sympathising with the British view of trying to avoid anything that could worsen the situation: ‘a good physicians rule – avoid anything which might make the patient worse’.Footnote ⁸² The Reagan administration simply refused to engage with the specifics of the Anglo–Irish process. This was echoed in Reagan’s diary entry about this meeting with FitzGerald: ‘He’s a fine man. I think we gave him some different insights in Central Am. He’s very brave & outspoken about the terrorism in N. Ireland. We held a St. Patrick’s Day lunch which was great fun.’Footnote ⁸³

Reagan’s visit to Ireland and the United Kingdom in 1984 provided some outstanding footage for his re-election campaign later that year. He was also filmed meeting other world leaders at the G7 economic summit in London and participating in the celebrations for the fortieth anniversary of D-Day on Normandy’s beaches.Footnote ⁸⁴ Reagan returned to his ancestral home of Ballyporeen, County Tipperary, claiming to represent forty million Irish-Americans (or, as translated by one journalist, forty million voters).Footnote ⁸⁵ In a speech to a joint session of the Irish parliament, Reagan outlined American foreign policy, his plans for economic prosperity, and his approach to the cold war.Footnote ⁸⁶ On Northern Ireland, he stressed his opposition to violence: ‘there is no place for the crude, cowardly violence of terrorism … end the violence … end it completely … end it now’. Reagan did speak optimistically about the Anglo–Irish process, observing that there was ‘legitimate cause for hope’ and praising the ‘constructive’ N.I.F.Footnote ⁸⁷ The N.I.F. had concluded in May 1984, proposing a series of options: a fully reunited Irish state; a federal state of Ireland and Northern Ireland; a Northern Ireland under shared authority of Britain and Ireland.

Reagan was briefed about the N.I.F.’s potential importance. Robert ‘Bud’ McFarlane (national security advisor, 1983–5) noted that it called for the British ‘to cooperate in facilitating movement toward Irish unity’, so advised the president ‘to avoid direct involvement, while reaffirming our support for all efforts – by both the Irish and British – to find a peaceful and constitutional solution’.Footnote ⁸⁸ Shultz warned Reagan that Fitzgerald would likely ask him to use his ‘good offices with Mrs. Thatcher’ in support of the N.I.F. proposals.Footnote ⁸⁹ The Taoiseach wanted to convince Reagan of the virtues of the N.I.F. In a speech at Dublin Castle during the dinner held in Reagan’s honour on 3 June 1984, FitzGerald argued that the N.I.F.’s conclusions were ‘courageous, realistic, compassionate’.Footnote ⁹⁰ As Reagan’s advisers anticipated, the N.I.F. was the leading topic of conversation during the meeting with the Taoiseach on 4 June.Footnote ⁹¹ FitzGerald ‘hoped that the President would have a few words with her of encouragement and support … on the Forum report’. In reply, Reagan suggested that an indicator of Thatcher’s approach lay in the Falklands War: ‘What did the people themselves want?’Footnote ⁹² In advance of his meeting with Thatcher, Reagan was advised by Shultz to maintain neutrality:

Shultz’s brief was indicative of administration and State Department interest in the progress of the Anglo–Irish process.

In October 1984, the Anglo–Irish process was challenged by the I.R.A.’s attempt on Thatcher’s life at the Grand Hotel in Brighton during the Conservative Party conference.Footnote ⁹⁴ The bombing, followed by Thatcher’s rejection of the N.I.F.’s conclusions at the Anglo–Irish summit in November 1984 meant that the prospects for the Anglo–Irish process were bleak.Footnote ⁹⁵ Subsequently, the Irish government and Irish-Americans decided to ‘play the Reagan card’ and exploit the Anglo–American ‘special relationship’ in order to change Thatcher’s approach. There was an opening for this at the White House. Kennedy recalled that as Reagan entered his second term, the administration’s approach to Northern Ireland was evolving and discussion about substantial issues related to the Troubles and Anglo–Irish process were permitted.Footnote ⁹⁶ Indeed, Reagan’s second term saw Meese leave the White House for the position of attorney general (1985–8) and the departure of Deaver in May 1985.

Thatcher’s opposition to the N.I.F. was greeted by outrage amongst congressional Irish-Americans. O’Neill wrote to the president, arguing that Thatcher endangered ‘the best hope for a peaceful, lawful and constitutional resolution to the tragedy of Northern Ireland’.Footnote ⁹⁷ O’Neill asked that Reagan urge Thatcher to renew Anglo–Irish discussions and recognise the N.I.F.’s ‘significant support in Congress and among Irish-Americans interested in bringing peace to the beautiful land of their forebears’.Footnote ⁹⁸ O’Neill also wrote to Reagan as a member of the F.O.I.Footnote ⁹⁹ The A.C.C.I.A. wrote to Reagan, asking him to discuss Northern Ireland with Thatcher when she visited Reagan in December 1984. Biaggi argued: ‘We are cognizant of the need for the United States not to be in the position of advocating or imposing a particular solution’, but urged Reagan to practice ‘some quiet diplomacy … in the just pursuit of peace and justice in Northern Ireland’.Footnote ¹⁰⁰

IV

The Reagan administration would alter its neutral position towards the Anglo–Irish process. Shultz briefed Reagan to discuss Northern Ireland with Thatcher during their meeting at Camp David in December 1984. He suggested that Reagan should encourage the prime minister to make progress at the next Anglo–Irish summit, so as to prevent ‘a radicalization of Irish-American opinion which would endanger our current bipartisan policy toward Northern Ireland’.Footnote ¹⁰¹ But Reagan failed to raise the issue; instead Thatcher did, in an acknowledgement of Irish-American interest. The American record reads: ‘Mrs Thatcher said she wished to address the situation in Northern Ireland. Despite reports to the contrary, she and Garret FitzGerald were on good terms and we are working toward making progress on this difficult question.’Footnote ¹⁰² Reagan then expressed Congress’s uneasiness: ‘The President said making progress is important, and observed that there is great Congressional interest in this matter. Indeed, Tip O’Neill has sent him a personal letter, asking him to appeal to Mrs. Thatcher to be reasonable and forthcoming.’Footnote ¹⁰³ Subsequently, Reagan wrote to the speaker, exaggerating his comments to the prime minister:

The belief that Reagan had leaned on Thatcher was a popular one.Footnote ¹⁰⁵ For instance, in his memoir, FitzGerald wrote that Reagan expressed his concern to Thatcher, which was ‘somewhat to the surprise’ of his advisers and the State Department. FitzGerald believed that the president’s intervention ‘must have been a factor contributing to the more positive approach the British adopted’.Footnote ¹⁰⁶ However, it was Shultz, aware of the tension with – and within – Congress on the issue, who had encouraged Reagan to raise the issue. O’Neill’s opposition to violence needed the shelter of political cover from Reagan’s influence with Thatcher. Moreover, Reagan took this as an opportunity to display his political nous, successfully negotiating the need to placate O’Neill and other Irish-Americans, while also not distracting from his meeting with Thatcher. He allowed Thatcher to raise the issue, and then essentially pointed out the existence of O’Neill’s letter and his appeal. Therefore, Reagan was not criticising Thatcher – instead he simply passed on the message from O’Neill. He cooperated with the speaker, but did not risk an unneeded quarrel with the British prime minister. Reagan and Thatcher prioritised a wide-range of policy issues, including arms control, the economy, the Middle East, terrorism and the Soviet Union. Significantly, the meeting included Thatcher’s account of her meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev early that year at Chequers (while he was emerging as a credible candidate to become the Soviet Union’s general secretary). The prime minister told Reagan that ‘he was an unusual Russian in that he was much less constrained, more charming, open to discussion and debate’.Footnote ¹⁰⁷

Thatcher returned to the United States in February 1985. She addressed a joint session of Congress, using her remarks to criticise NORAID and reassure Congress that the Anglo–Irish process was progressing.Footnote ¹⁰⁸ Before meeting Thatcher in the White House, Reagan was advised to stress: ‘Our policy on Northern Ireland has not changed. Despite urgings by some US politicians that we get directly involved, we have no intention of injecting ourselves into this complex and emotional issue.’Footnote ¹⁰⁹ Although a record of this meeting is unavailable, according to FitzGerald’s memoir, Reagan assured the Irish ambassador that he had again raised Northern Ireland with Thatcher and ‘believe[d] that the Prime Minister really wanted to do something about the problem’.Footnote ¹¹⁰ There would indeed be significant progress. The Anglo–Irish Agreement (A.I.A.) was signed on 15 November 1985, with the result that the Irish government would be consulted over Northern Ireland’s affairs.Footnote ¹¹¹

The British and Irish governments sought the assistance of leading Irish-Americans at this stage in the Anglo–Irish process, in particular Reagan and O’Neill. McFarlane advised Reagan about ‘emissaries who came on a private mission’ on behalf of Thatcher and FitzGerald, asking ‘that the president and speaker would endorse the AIA and reiterate their condemnation for violence and terrorism in a joined public appearance’.Footnote ¹¹² The national security advisor passed on the British and Irish view that a joint statement from ‘America’s two most prominent Irishmen’ could ‘send a signal of hope and moderation to the people of troubled Ireland’. The British and Irish governments also expressed a hope for ‘tangible, financial support to assist with the economic and social development of those areas that have suffered from the instability’. Therefore, Reagan’s statement would ‘lay the groundwork for possible future U.S. funding’. The importance of domestic politics was clear in the White House’s considerations. McFarlane explained: ‘The Speaker is impressed that you are willing, on the eve of your trip to Geneva, to address the Irish question personally in public.’ (Reagan was scheduled to meet Gorbachev, now the Soviet general secretary.) The Reagan administration was serious in its response to the A.I.A. Reagan and O’Neill met to discuss ‘bipartisan, public support’ and ‘to lay the groundwork for possible future U.S. funding in support of the rebuilding of Northern Ireland’. The administration’s commitment was also underlined by the attendance of key dignitaries at that meeting: Bush, Shultz, Donald T. Regan (White House chief of staff, 1985–7), McFarlane, M. B. Oglesby, Jr. (head of Legislative Affairs), Ros Ridgway (assistant secretary of state), Ronald K. Sable (N.S.C.), Peter R. Sommer (N.S.C.), Kirk O’Donnell (O’Neill’s senior aide), Sir Oliver Wright, the British ambassador to the United States (1982–6), and the Irish ambassador to the United States, Pádraig MacKernan (1985–91).Footnote ¹¹³ Reagan’s statement praised the A.I.A. as an initiative: ‘which pledges to both communities in Northern Ireland respect for their rights and traditions within a society free from violence and intimidation’.Footnote ¹¹⁴ The president diarised: ‘At 9 A.M. Wash. Time P.M.s Thatcher & FitzGerald (Ireland) signed an agreement on bringing peace to Northern Ireland. Tip O’Neill came down & we were photographed together endorsing their action & making statements of support.’Footnote ¹¹⁵ Reagan recognised the A.I.A.’s importance as part of a process of bringing peace to Northern Ireland.

The Reagan administration’s willingness to support the A.I.A. can be explained through the cynicism of politicking: it was a positive development for which the president could hope to claim some credit with O’Neill and Irish-Americans. Crucially, it also represented an opportunity to strengthen broader administration objectives. Without Meese and Deaver objecting to Reagan’s association with the Irish question, the president sought to connect the aid programme to other Reaganite policies. Kennedy recalled that Reagan initially proposed $50 million over five years, although reflecting the free-market spirit of the 1980s, ‘most of it was all incentive for the private sector to come in’.Footnote ¹¹⁶ A more ambitious bargain quickly emerged. Congress had frustrated the administration in their efforts to support the Nicaraguan Contras. They were an obsession for Reagan, who even described them as ‘the moral equal of our Founding Fathers’.Footnote ¹¹⁷ Not everyone shared Reagan’s sentiments, including O’Neill and the majority in Congress, which resulted in a ban on U.S. government financial support for the Contras in their struggle against the Marxist Sandinista regime in 1984. The resulting 1985–7 Iran–Contra affair, in which the Reagan administration illegally financed the Contras, was such a serious scandal that it threatened Reagan’s presidency.Footnote ¹¹⁸ Thus, Kennedy recalled that when he and O’Neill approached Donald T. Regan about the direct aid, he ‘indicated he was prepared to get us the money if we were prepared to call off the dogs on the [Edward Patrick] Boland Amendment, which was to end the war with the Contras, in Nicaragua. It was sort of a quid pro quo, and we weren’t going to have that’.Footnote ¹¹⁹ The political process of securing the aid even led to a candid discussion between FitzGerald and O’Neill. Frustrated by the White House, the speaker asked the Taoiseach whether he had persuaded the president to support financially the A.I.A.: ‘Cut the bullshit … Is President Reagan going to go for the larger money or isn’t he?’ Much to O’Neill’s irritation, FitzGerald accurately replied: ‘This is a matter that’s going to have to be solved here in this country.’Footnote ¹²⁰ Despite the politicking, American aid to Northern Ireland was secured and it proved O’Neill’s final political victory before his retirement in 1987. The House of Representatives unanimously voted in March 1986 to grant Northern Ireland a five-year $250 million aid package.Footnote ¹²¹

V

Recalling his 1984 trip to Ireland in his memoir, Reagan wrote exclusively about his visit to Country Tipperary.Footnote ¹²² He did not include any reference to the New Ireland Forum, the 1985 Anglo–Irish Agreement, the Anglo–Irish process, or any discussion with any Taoiseach he met during his presidency. Yet Reagan was certainly an actor in the Anglo–Irish process, albeit a reluctant one influenced by competing priorities in foreign policy and domestic politics. Further research about the United States and Northern Ireland during the Reagan epoch is therefore warranted. Reagan’s advisers were divided, with most demonstrating a nuanced understanding of U.S. interests. For them, taking account of British sensitivities was their top priority: the Anglo–American relationship, especially its security aspects, was simply not worth jeopardising by involving the administration in the Anglo–Irish process. A clear effort to downplay the issue was therefore a cornerstone of Reagan’s advisers’ approach to Northern Ireland. For the president, it appears that he ultimately saw an intervention as a means of furthering good relations with O’Neill. Moreover, his support for the Anglo–Irish Agreement fulfilled a crucial and publicly stated criteria: he was asked to become involved.

Reagan abandoned his administration’s policy of neutrality and discussed the Anglo–Irish process with Thatcher in 1984 and a year later he endorsed the Anglo–Irish Agreement. This was not due to his concern about the Troubles. Instead, Reagan’s domestic political concerns triumphed over strategic factors. Thus, the president ultimately claimed to O’Neill to have raised the issue with Thatcher in 1984. Reagan’s position, therefore, regarding the Northern Ireland conflict was similar to that of his predecessor, Carter, who seemingly spoke out about Northern Ireland as a means to a political end with his Democratic supporters and allies. Nonetheless, regardless of his motivations, Reagan did intervene more directly than any of his predecessors in the Anglo–Irish process and established a trend of ever-increasing U.S. involvement in Northern Ireland. By simply discussing the issue with Thatcher, Reagan could claim to have encouraged her to act positively in negotiations with FitzGerald, and the British and Irish governments sought his endorsement of the A.I.A. Moreover, even by raising the subject, the president involved the United States to a greater degree. Thus, Reagan’s level of involvement constitutes an embryonic internationalisation of the Northern Ireland conflict in 1985, which foreshadowed the beginning of greater intervention by the American government in the 1990s.