Democracy has been associated with human pathologies since its inception. Turbulence, irrationality, ignorance, crowd psychology, majority tyranny, and other moral failings of the masses are among the ailments identified by observers from Plato to Madison, Tocqueville, Lippmann, and Pareto. In Democracy Disfigured, Nadia Urbinati provides a keen examination of the healthy constitution of democracy and diagnoses three current distortions, which she terms the epistemic or unpolitical, the populist, and the plebiscitary. Drawing on historical and contemporary thinkers, she reveals ancient pathogens lurking within modern ills, from epistemocracy in quests for impartial, expert decision making, to demagogic populism in leaders who pursue unconstrained power in the name of “the people,” to plebiscitarianism in a mass media culture that promotes spectator-citizens. Urbinati argues that these problems are fed by rising social inequality, and they damage the vital organs of a healthy democracy. But while many studies of democracy are dispiritingly critical, this work urges us to invigorate democracy by tending to relations between the body politic and the procedures of representative governance.
The book unfolds from a conception of “diarchical and procedural” democracy. This builds on Urbinati’s (Reference Urbinati2006) work that champions representative over direct democracy and from theorists such as Aristotle, Hannah Arendt, Jürgen Habermas, and Bernard Manin. By diarchical, she defines democracy as an equilibrium of two fundamental components that should be coequal and mutually influential, yet distinct: public opinion emerging from citizen debate in a “free and open forum,” and the political institutions and processes tasked with representing popular will (pp. 2, 17).
By procedural, Urbinati means that democracy’s supreme goal is to ensure processes by which all citizens have “equal right and opportunity to participate” in “forming, criticizing, contesting, and changing collective decision”—not other outcomes (pp. 19, 28, 76–79). Seen from this perspective, the procedures associated with modern constitutional democracy (division of powers, bills of rights, voting, party competition, etc.) have an “unmatched capacity to protect and promote equal political liberty” (p. 19). The procedures are not self-maintaining, however—they require continuous protection against distortion.
Urbinati calls for a “demanding” proceduralism that moves beyond “defense of the rules of the game” and democratic process theories by insisting that protecting the formal political system is inadequate (pp. 20, 66; see, e.g., Bobbio Reference Bobbio and Griffin1987, Chap. 1, and Ely Reference Ely1980). The problem is that these approaches cannot prevent the “translation of socioeconomic inequalities into political power,” which violates citizens’ equal political liberty. Nor can they protect “circumstances of opinion formation;” equal opportunity for citizens from all walks of life to use political rights and exercise political influence; or “the perception citizens have of [the political system’s] effectiveness and value.” (Surprisingly, Urbinati does not diagnose the recurring problem of oligarchy operating in the translation of unequal resources into politics. The threat of rule of the wealthy few in their own interest is presumably a basic democratic disfigurement and “imbalance” contributing to other pathologies [see, e.g., Aristotle Politics III, 7.5, 1279b]).
By emphasizing concern for the “egalitarian conditions that a just work of democratic procedures requires,” Urbinati stretches the boundaries of proceduralism. She encourages governmental “strategies of control” for maintaining democratic institutions: reforming campaign finance law and adopting measures to reduce the influence of private money in politics, preventing media monopolies and diversifying media ownership, providing education to enable citizens’ informed participation, and adopting other strategies for implementing equal political rights, especially for the marginalized and disadvantaged (pp. 20–21, 52–69, 80).
Urbinati's core logic is that because “democratic government promises citizens the guarantee that all of them enjoy equal rights to both vote and voice,” this can “require law-makers to intervene in order to ensure that socioeconomic and cultural barriers are not so high as to jeopardize citizens’ equal opportunity to an equal political influence” (p. 79). She supports these prescriptions by framing them as antidistortion imperatives grounded in the Supreme Court’s constitutional interpretations and in arguments for fair use of political rights and communicative power (see, e.g., Rawls Reference Rawls1971, 225 and 2001, 149; see also Habermas Reference Habermas and Rehg1996, 409, 414–18, 442).
Urbinati first targets unpolitical mutations of democracy or epistemocracy. These involve attempts to counter and restrain partisan public opinion (doxa) through approaches for obtaining impartial, true, or expert decisions and outcomes (episteme). She argues that prescribing measures to create a “republic of reason” and expand mechanisms for expert, legal, or juristic judgments serves to damage democracy, not strengthen it (pp. 81–97; see, e.g., Pettit Reference Pettit2004; Rosanvallon Reference Rosanvallon and Goldhammer2008). To remove decisions from ordinary political debate and opinions—with its partisanship, passion, and all—fosters apathy and constricts democracy (pp. 106, 109, 118–21). Some deliberativist proposals, too, come under fire. Creating special citizen assemblies or deliberative fora, often with constrained agendas, does not necessarily yield the impartial outlooks sought, contributes to elitism, and devalues public opinion and conventional political institutions (pp. 112–15).
While she incisively criticizes the aristocratic tilt of “democratic Platonism,” Urbinati posits an overly rigid dichotomy between procedural and epistemic goals and risks oversimplifying the contrasting positions. It is possible to combine concern for procedures with concern for the substance or quality of outcomes (see, e.g. Beitz Reference Beitz1989; Brettschneider Reference Brettschneider2007; Dahl Reference Dahl1989; Rawls Reference Rawls1971). (Indeed, even her exemplary epistemist, David Estlund, endorses “epistemic proceduralism” [Estlund Reference Estlund2007, 66, 99, 102, 108]). There are also approaches to deliberation that are less prone to Urbinati’s criticisms (see, e.g., Chambers Reference Chambers2009; Fung Reference Fung2006; Kadlec and Friedman Reference Kadlec and Friedman2007). Moreover, Urbinati’s own version of proceduralism overlaps with substantive concerns: Her emphasis on the egalitarian conditions of fair procedures and the public forum, her condemnations of polarization, radicalization, and manipulation of public opinion, and her rejection of mass acclamation and passive spectatorship as substitutions for individual judgment all implicate values beyond procedures themselves.
A related false dichotomy may be seen in Urbinati’s problematic division between doxa (common opinion) and episteme (true or justifiable belief). Instead of reinforcing Plato’s antagonistic either/or framework, she might offer more nuanced conceptions of political judgment and its relation to general public opinion, perhaps by drawing more extensively on Aristotle (one of her touchstones). He suggests that wise political judgment can emerge from human experience and discussion among ordinary citizens with multiple perspectives. And Aristotle treats doxa as a type of logic or argument (logos) that is based on conviction, that can be erroneous or true, and that can be influenced through “passion” and sentiments of anger or sympathy, as well as through persuasion and deliberation (see, e.g. Aristotle Politics, III.11,1281–82; De Anima III.3,428a19–24, 434a8–9; On Rhetoric I.1,1357a2, II.1,1377b20–24; Nichomachean Ethics VI.8.1142a14–1142a31; see also Beiner Reference Beiner1983). Indeed, presumably Urbinati views education as a precondition for equal political liberty partly because she believes it supports informed judgment and can render public opinion less prone to manipulation.
Populism undergoes scrutiny next. Drawing on Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, and others, Urbinati characterizes disfiguring populism as a “radical contestation of parliamentary politics” that seeks to damage or shatter constitutional democracy to create “centralization of power, weakening of checks and balances, strengthening of the executive, disregard of political opposition” and transform elections into a mass plebiscite empowering an unrestrained leader. She clarifies that her definition does not implicate all popular movements and that some benign forms of populism involve “reclaiming politics on the part of ordinary people against an elected elite that concentrates power” (pp. 129, 131). Thus, this disfigurement warrants a more precise term, such as demagogic or anticonstitutional populism.
Urbinati is most perturbed by aggrandized leadership in the name of “the people” that operates by polarizing public opinion, manipulating class division, condemning pluralism, and devaluing or overriding democratic procedures and institutions (pp. 131–39, 153). Her prime suspects are right-wing European leaders such as Bonaparte, Mussolini, and Silvio Berlusconi (p. 149). She exempts some popular movements from her critique, such as the First Awakening and People’s Party in the United States, because she views them as efforts for more popular government within the “ideological and institutional frame of a republic” (pp. 149, 146).
This view that populism should be evaluated with respect to republican commitments makes Urbinati critical of Ernesto Laclau’s (Reference Laclau2005) undifferentiated theory of populism as ideological struggles (a treatment traversing the political spectrum from leftist revolutionaries to reactionary movements). She faults what she sees as Laclau’s acceptance of leaders’ reliance on polarization, hegemonic politics, and instrumental uses of democratic procedures; his portrayal of people as a homogenous collective; and his Weberian conception of democracy as mass antagonism to governing institutions (pp. 153–80). Thus, while populism is sometimes perceived as more genuinely democratic because it appeals to “the people,” Urbinati believes that demagogic populism thwarts the healthy balance of public opinion and institutions.
Plebicitarianism is the author’s last concern. This is exemplified in the Roman model of a popular assembly possessing a direct yes/no vote on major decisions, such as changes in leadership or constitutional amendments. Focusing on the way that plebiscitarianism overlaps with demagogic populism, Urbinati criticizes the leadership patterns enabled by new information and media technologies. We should not discard older constitutional fears of an “unbound executive” by assuming that modern media allow public opinion and elites to prevent tyranny (p. 200, pace Posner and Vermeule Reference Posner and Vermeule2011). Nor should we believe that technology can create a fully transparent “leader democracy” where citizens gain greater control and agency by keeping leaders “under the eye” of the people and the “tribunal of opinion” (pp. 200–207, pace Green Reference Green2010). Urbinati instead diagnoses civic passivity: turning “the people” into “a mass spectator of political elites” and the public sphere into a theater where citizens exercise only “ocular judgment” and can only “check rather than make decisions” (pp. 171, 214–16; see also Manin Reference Manin1997). She fears elite manipulation and damage to democratic institutions through the displacement of less dramatic civic practices of free speech, discussion, individual judgment, and voting (pp. 182–85, 190–94, 226). Unfortunately, Urbinati does not analyze other modern formulations of plebiscitarianism, such as rising popular referenda and initiatives in the U.S. and Europe (see, e.g., Matsusaka Reference Matsusaka2004).
By joining these astute critiques of contemporary political hazards to a powerful account of the procedures needed to promote equal political liberty, Democracy Disfigured offers a deeply learned meditation on democratic theory and practice. Urbinati has crafted an ode to the deep value of democratic processes of debate, decision, and revision, and a profound call to better honor and protect these values.
