In this work Seosamh Ó Longaigh addresses a pivotal period in the development of the Irish Republic. The transition of the Irish Free State from dominion of the British empire to autonomous and functional nation was both a monumental event and fascinating study in state formation. Ó Longaigh has the unenviable task of writing a legal history. Here he must work to satisfy both historian and legal scholars, a difficult task he accomplishes beautifully. This book is a masterful symmetry of historical narrative and legal study. Ó Longaigh writes an account of the history of Irish emergency law and, crucially, writes a case history of legal precedents and acts of government of the period. This book can easily inhabit the library of a historian of Ireland and one of an attorney that practices on Irish criminal law or even international civil rights theory. Ó Longaigh articulates his thesis most directly when he writes, “Doubtless, the nature of legislation altered radically between 1922 and 1948, moving from a system similar to martial law that legalized execution and internment of persons captured in arms against the state in 1922 to a statutory, almost parallel legal system in 1931, and eventually to a well-defined supplement to the state's legal and judicial machinery that operated under the constitution” (277).
Ó Longaigh makes excellent use of both primary and secondary sources. He is keen on referencing periodicals and memoirs of major figures of the period. The papers of Éamon de Valera, Richard Mulcahy, Hugh Kennedy, Ernest Blythe, Desmond Fitzgerald, Sean McEntee, and others inform the work. He also relies on earlier work regarding emergency law in Ireland written by Colm Campbell, especially his Emergency Law in Ireland, 1918–1925 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). In many ways Ó Longaigh picks up where Campbell leaves off chronologically, and thus he helps to fill a noticeable gap in the literature. The emphasis on the papers of Cahir Davitt is most helpful. In terms of archival research, Ó Longaigh relies on the National Archives and the Military Archives in Dublin, made available by the National Archives Acts, 1987 to 1993. From these rich and varied sources Ó Longaigh informs the reader about the struggle of the post–Civil War governments to both contain the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and craft the necessary legislation to address the long history of paramilitarism in Ireland.
The book is broken into six manageable and practical sections. Ó Longaigh begins with the Irish Civil War and the immediate aftermath, dated 1922–27. This is the most compelling and legally significant portion of the work. The fateful transition from the Collins government to the hardliner approach of the new chairman of the provisional government, William Cosgrave, and minister for defense, Richard Mulcahy, frames the beginning of Ó Longaigh's narrative. In this early period the author identifies two major issues. The first is the nature of the legal authority of the Provisional Government and its powers under either existing British law or the legal actions, such as internment, devised by executive acts, rather than legislation. The second issue is organization of a special judiciary and the staffing of legal professionals to administer the acts of the state, vis-à-vis the IRA irregulars and common criminals.
With the assassination of Minister of Justice Kevin O’Higgins and the unprecedented powers delegated to the Garda Síochána by the Public Safety Act of 1927, Ó Longaigh describes a new chapter in Irish emergency law history. With the entry of Fianna Fáil to the Dáil Éireann and the increasing escalation of IRA and Free State security conflict, Ó Longaigh frames the next section as the IRA resurgence, 1927–32. Here the author chronicles the significant problems the Free State authorities had in protecting juries and obtaining evidence from witnesses against IRA crimes. Tensions between the Garda and the courts, as well as the frequent use of the Treasonable Offenses Act of 1925, are also discussed.
In chapter 4 of the book, Ó Longaigh deals with the rise of Fianna Fáil and the retention and expansion of emergency powers. From 1932 to 1937, the De Valera government used the emergency powers to tackle the Blueshirt movement of Eoin O’Duffy and also to rein in the more radical republican elements of the IRA. This renegotiation of political power in the Free State is discussed in the next chapter, which is focused on the 1937 constitution. Ó Longaigh argues that the Treason Act, a measure designed to cover serious emergency law violations, became a site of serious tension. However, the new constitution redefined treason and allowed lesser crimes to be dealt with under the Offenses Against the State Act.
The examination of emergency law ends with the “emergency” period of 1939–48. With Éire neutrality during the Second World War, the increase in need for continued emergency powers was apparent. The combined fragile nature of this neutrality as well as the continuing IRA/Garda violence led to a harsh application of the existing laws, despite some movement in the Oireachtas to dismantle some emergency powers. Ó Longaigh argues that the state was fortunate in limiting domestic threats against it and admirable in its resolute applications of necessary laws, including the maintenance of neutrality throughout the war. Here Ó Longaigh is measured and convincing.
The focus of this work, emergency law and internment, particularly resonates with the early twenty-first-century American war on terrorism. Despite the obvious similarities with the domestic American political events that were contemporary to the publishing of the book, Ó Longaigh makes no attempt to link the two. To his credit, Ó Longaigh lets this work remain within the parameters of both Irish law specifically and emergency law more generally. In addition, Ó Longaigh remains explicitly ambiguous as to his position on the moral or ethical dimensions of civil rights, as these are understood in the context of international treaties and protocols that form the corpus of international human rights law drafted after this period.
The author comments on the observation of J. Bowyer-Bell indicating the Irish public's tolerance for “gross invasions of civil liberties.” Ó Longaigh reasons: “Does this mean that the modern Irish state is any less a democracy? The answer is, invariably, ‘no.’” Ó Longaigh concludes, “But what of a state that faces well-organized, militarily strong, undefeatable opponents? Questions about the justification of using extraordinary measures become far more complicated. Simply, what should a state do when faced with a violent uprising that has a good chance of overthrowing the government? When is repression simply defense of sovereignty, democracy and the constitution, and when does it become oppression and tyranny or simply the use of extraordinary measures by one political faction within a state attempting to control and suppress another faction? Fortunately for the modern Irish state, these were questions it did not have to confront” (289).
