In Spin Dictators, Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman lay out a blueprint for understanding the modern dictatorship: In short, autocrats today look disturbingly similar to democrats. Classic tyrants who dressed in military uniforms and ruled by fear, such as Adolf Hitler or Josef Stalin, have largely become a relic of the twentieth century. The “new and improved” dictator of the twenty-first century (such as Vladimir Putin or Recep Tayyip Erdoğan) wears suits, skillfully adopts a veneer of democracy, and focuses “more on shaping public opinion than on violent repression” (pp. 11–12).

According to Guriev and Treisman, spin dictators rely on five strategies to win over everyday citizens. First, they meticulously manage their approval ratings and are often quite popular. “When the facts are good, they take credit for them; when bad, they have the media obscure them when possible and provide excuses when not” (p. 15). Second, they weaponize institutions to consolidate their power (i.e., constitutional changes, court packing, and gerrymandering). Third, like a wolf in sheep’s clothing, they pretend to be democratic, “[embracing] the vogue for freedom” (p. 17). Fourth, they open up their countries to the world, often inviting foreign investment and joining international institutions. Fifth, and most importantly—spin dictators avoid violent repression, keeping this option in their back pocket only as a measure of last resort.

Spin Dictators does a marvelous job at providing a much-needed upgrade to our perceptions of modern-day dictatorships. Regimes, such as North Korea, that remain closed off and rely primarily on repression, have become outliers in the world of autocracies today. Fear has (largely) been traded for spin, and autocrats such as Putin, Hugo Chávez, or Lee Kuan Yew, are often genuinely popular due to their media savvy and ability to project an image of competence. Limited censorship and coercion are reserved only for regime opponents that possess a real threat and are often carried out under the guise of legal proceedings. Putin, for instance, frequently uses defamation lawsuits to silence journalists. Of course, we should not forget that he also resorts to poisoning his perceived enemies at home or abroad, or having them shot on Moscow bridges.

Nevertheless, a huge contribution of this book is that it highlights the fact that modern dictators have become extremely skilled at co-opting the language and institutions of democracy. The lines between regime type have become incredibly blurred. Guriev and Treisman explain how the end of the Cold War brought about the rise of a liberal international order: Foreign aid was withheld from regimes with blatant human rights violations and the old model of dictatorship was ostracized on the global stage. To survive the post–Cold War era, autocratic leaders adapted by trading in coercion for institutions and information manipulation.

However, this shift is dangerous for two reasons. First, as the book highlights, the emphasis on persuasion and approval ratings often results in more durable dictatorships, simply because many autocratic leaders have large support bases and are genuinely popular with everyday people. Second, adopting the language and institutions of democracy provides dictators with legitimacy. Most modern autocratic governments hold and win multiparty elections. It is critically important that everyone, including scholars and policy makers, understand what the new model of dictatorship really looks like, and that modern autocracies may be highly durable.

This book also introduces some big remaining questions that scholars of autocratic regimes should continue to tackle. Spin Dictators is written largely from the perspective of the autocratic leader: The book’s analysis focuses on the choices and actions of the regime. What does the story look like from the perspective of everyday people living under this new breed of dictatorship? Are they persuaded, and do they believe the spin, or are they effectively cowed into submission by the threat of repression and thus afraid to speak their minds, preferring instead to mouth support? Do spin dictators remain in power because they have successfully convinced their citizens that the regime is managing the state well, or is it because these leaders have successfully weakened and neutralized potential opposition forces?

Another remaining question is the future of spin. In the conclusion of the book, Guriev and Treisman speculate that the future of autocracies will depend on whether modernization and globalization continue. The familiar story is that as citizens become wealthier and more educated, they may agitate for political reform. However, recent research shows that a college degree does not necessarily result in a desire to oust the dictator. A recent book by Bryn Rosenfeld (The Autocratic Middle Class, 2020) demonstrates that college-educated professionals—teachers, doctors, and white-collar workers—will often not support democratization or regime change, especially when their employment is tied to the state.

In fact, scholars should rethink, more generally, the assumption that everyday people always want democratization, or that citizens inherently value democracy over dictatorship. The real story seems to be much murkier. In a recent study, Matthew Graham and Milan Svolik (“Democracy in America? Partisanship, Polarization, and the Robustness of Support for Democracy in the United States,” American Political Science Review, 114[2], 2020) find that voters are willing to trade off democratic principles for partisan interests—even in the United States. In fact, as Thomas Pepinsky aptly notes: “Life in authoritarian states is mostly boring and tolerable” (Vox, January 9, 2017)—and this is even more true as autocracies generally cease to rely on repression and coercion.

Spin Dictators focuses on how autocratic leaders neutralize threats from below and maintain support from the masses. Because the vast majority of autocracies now hold multiparty elections, maintaining support from everyday people has become an important dimension of regime stability. However, challenges from within the regime remain a huge threat to leader survival. In 2021, leaders were ousted from power through military coups in Mali, Guinea, Sudan, and Myanmar. Coups were also attempted in several other countries, such as Nigeria. Autocrats continue to face a persistent threat from their own regime elites and military officials. Modern-day dictators, therefore, can stay in power only if they successfully manage the intricate dance of neutralizing threats from above and below.