In this intriguing volume, we are introduced to a “new era” in which “new players and ideas, fresh policy tools, and a different context” herald the possibility that the needs of “distressed neighborhoods” might finally become addressed after decades of postwar neglect (p. 209). For editors Clarence N. Stone and Robert P. Stoker, the marginalization of neighborhood concerns resulted from the politics of the “redevelopment era” in which urban politics was dominated by the urban regime—comprised of business elites and downtown politicians—whose singular aim was to promote transformation of the urban core to stimulate growth, often at the expense of minorities and inner-city neighborhoods. By contrast, the new “postindustrial era” bears witness to a more fragmented polity in which the coherence of the developmental urban regime has broken down, where downtown growth no longer enjoys unparalleled priority, and where new actors (such as the “eds and meds,” the philanthropic sector, and neighborhood organizations) have the opportunity to demand greater attention to urban neighborhoods. Six case studies, all interesting and informative—of Baltimore, Chicago, Phoenix, Los Angeles, Denver, and Toronto—examine how the various efforts to effect neighborhood improvement in this new environment have fared (spoiler: not all that well).
At first glance, Stone and Stoker’s central argument posits a dramatic, epochal shift in urban political development. After all, the volume suggests that we are in a “new era” undergirded by a “new governing order” (p. 211). However, a closer read reveals a far more qualified view. The new political dynamic, we are informed, has not proved transformational; rather, change has been “limited and uneven” (p. 218). Whereas neighborhood concerns during the developmental era were largely ignored, today neighborhoods are “sometimes enlisted as coproducers in growth efforts” (p. 211); moreover, “the new era reveals the possibility of complementary (positive-sum) relationships between pursuing economic growth and addressing concerns in distressed neighborhoods” (p. 212; emphasis added). As such, though Stone, Stoker, and Martin Horak (who coauthors the final chapter) “make no present claim even of the glass of neighborhood improvement being as much as half full, [they] do see a metaphoric glass one-quarter full” (p. 230).
The chapter examining the contexts for neighborhood revitalization bears this reticence out: In not one of the cities studied was the poverty rate in 2010 lower than in 1989. Moreover, the case studies strain to find examples of major neighborhood improvement that did not involve displacement and other factors of gentrification, as the contributors are well aware. For instance, as Susan Clarke notes with respect to Denver, “neighborhood policy . . . is explicitly asset based and targets a limited number of neighborhoods and redevelopment potential” (p. 171). One method the city has adopted is “transit oriented development” (TOD). Yet, as Clarke insightfully points out, “[f]or neighborhoods, TOD is a two-edged sword: it can aid improvement but at the risk of substantial resident-displacing gentrification” (p. 176). In a similar vein, Horak and Aaron Alexander Moore’s engaging chapter on Toronto highlights a tendency evident throughout the cases: Structural conditions are such that “policymakers have been able to implement revitalization as planned only in instances where they have chosen to harness the forces of the real estate market in pursuit of physical reconstruction” (p. 206). As such, claims to a new era, propelled by a new order, sit uneasily with the qualifications offered within the theoretical chapters and the evidence presented in the empirical ones.
Another concern relates to case selection. While the case studies offer illuminating portraits of the travails of neighborhood policy and politics in a variety of cities, the editors do not lay out a clear logic behind their case selection. As such, it is not obvious what each of the cities is supposed to be a case of. Moreover, in the concluding chapter, major consideration is given to Seattle, “an exemplar” of successful neighborhood politics. Given Seattle’s exemplar status, one wonders why it was not selected as one of the case studies against which less “successful” attempts to pursue neighborhood policy might have been compared. Given that the volume is essentially a work in comparative urban politics, this is a missed opportunity for theory testing. In each of the cities we see variation, along a range of dimensions, in the degree to which greater neighborhood consideration results in neighborhood improvement. Such variation might have given rise to a more systematic account of what variables or casual mechanisms are at work in generating different outcomes. One interesting question, which others might take up in the future, would concern the circumstances under which cities can enhance economic and social neighborhood conditions without displacing the very residents who stand to benefit most from such improvements.
Additional questions emerge regarding Stone and Stoker’s periodization of urban political development. They argue that the new “postindustrial era” has replaced the “development era.” However, it is not at all clear when this transition occurred. At times, it seems that the 1980s are the key hinge point. However, this appears to be unsatisfactory since, for many cities, this decade was precisely the one in which transformation of the downtown core into a corporate center was solidified. Moreover, the slicing up of urban political development into fundamentally distinct “eras” seems to work better in theory than in practice. After all, in at least two regards, the new era looks strikingly like the old era. First, downtowns have continued to enjoy preeminence in terms of levels of investment, and second, market-led redevelopment continues to dominate, even if its locus now includes neighborhoods primed for gentrification.
As such, a more useful conceptualization might consider the possibility that there are, as there always have been, (at least) two urban orders at work: a use-value order, which seeks to improve neighborhood conditions for residents, and an exchange-value order whose aim is to promote whatever policies increase the market rate for urban land (see John R. Logan and Harvey L. Molotoch, Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place, 1987). What has changed, perhaps, is that those looking to enhance exchange value now see the neighborhoods, in addition to downtown, as a new frontier for capital accumulation, and see new partners in the growth coalition in the form of universities and hospitals (the “eds and meds”). In this view, philanthropic organizations, which now have the resources and capacity to become players in urban political development, may be enjoined to promote either tendency, depending on their goals (which we should not assume are necessarily progressive).
Looking to the future, Stone and Stoker remain “cautiously optimistic,” despite acknowledging that the new neighborhood politics has achieved relatively little hitherto. Yet we do not fully discover what, in their view, a robust neighborhood politics look like. As a result, it is unclear if there is a normative standard against which existing and future efforts ought to be judged. I expect that all of the authors would suggest that a successful neighborhood politics would deliver decent affordable housing, good schools, and well-funded amenities such as parks, libraries, and swimming pools. But what of jobs and city revenues? It seems unrealistic to imagine that a neighborhood would flourish if it experienced a high rate of unemployment or poverty, or received little investment. If so, this implies that what is needed for vital neighborhoods is not simply a neighborhood politics but a refashioned political economy in which ordinary working-class people can command a larger share of the proceeds of growth than under the old policies. As John Betancur, Karen Mossberger, and Yue Zhang point out regarding Chicago, “[r]esidents and community-based organizations are unable to address the structural inequalities that shape opportunities within poor communities. Such inequalities demand attention beyond the neighborhoods or local levels” (p. 105).
Regrettably, this essential component of neighborhood prosperity has been placed beyond the scope of Urban Neighborhoods in a New Era since it takes extant inequalities and the political economy as givens.
