Ledbetter's work coincides with the fiftieth anniversary of Eisenhower's last speech as President – his farewell address of 17 January 1961. Eisenhower was not, according to Ledbetter, a “great orator,” but his address earned a “permanent place in the public memory” (1–2). Its fame has tended to rest on a simple sentence: “In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military–industrial complex.” Ledbetter argues that it is a mistake “to speak of the military–industrial complex in the past tense.” This is the nub of the book's argument. “The terms of Eisenhower's troubling critique,” Ledbetter continues, “have been used for decades to analyze the tension between democracy and military strength, and … today we still need to debate the concept of the military–industrial complex's ‘unwarranted influence’ on the most fundamental function of the American state” (14).
Ledbetter traces the intellectual and historical origins of the idea of the military–industrial complex, highlighting the various critiques that have been made about the insidious aspects of the rise of the munitions industry from the beginning of the twentieth century. Such arguments include the Merchants of Death thesis advanced by H. C. Engelbrecht and Harold Lasswell's Garrison State theory. As Ledbetter shows, Eisenhower's later invocation of the military–industrial complex struck a chord with widespread ideas about the interplay between business, power and the military that had previously been espoused by pacifists and opponents of war and academics concerned with the concentration of power and the forms it was taking in twentieth-century advanced industrial societies.
Subsequent chapters of Ledbetter's work take us from Eisenhower's early military career to his tumultuous second term in office and the drafting of his farewell address. Ledbetter's incisive account shows how early career experiences influenced Eisenhower's thinking on the necessary separation between national security and military spending on the one hand, and liberty – particularly economic liberty – on the other. His analysis of Eisenhower's presidential years provides intriguing material on the President's correspondence with Norman Cousins, editor of the Saturday Review and a leading antinuclear activist. Throughout the 1950s, the two men maintained a serious and respectful, if occasionally contentious, correspondence. Eisenhower's doubts about the efficacy of nuclear weapons as a cost-effective method of achieving security were often prompted, as Ledbetter shows, by his correspondence with Cousins. This period witnessed increased challenges to the administration over its handling of national security policy. Sputnik afforded unprecedented opportunity for savage political attack on Eisenhower, whose reputation and popularity had hitherto been untarnished. The political fallout of this episode is well documented by the extensive literature on the Soviet space and technological achievements of August and October 1957, but Ledbetter provides an interesting analysis of the growing interdependence between the military and private industry, in particular the latter's advertising of military aviation goods. “To flip through these publications in the late 1950s was,” Ledbetter argues, “to peer into an otherwise hidden America, where prosperity and security seemed to orbit solely around a single and vast industry” (94).
The remainder of the book's chapters focus on the influence of Eisenhower's speech on American political life after 1961. As Ledbetter notes, his reference to the military–industrial complex reinforced existing attitudes concerning its malign effects. It also provoked broader interpretations about the implications of the military build-up that Eisenhower and his speechwriters could not have imagined. Critics of the military–industrial complex spoke of its capacity to infringe upon civil liberties, undermine academic freedom and distort national social and political priorities. Moreover, Ledbetter's examination of the role of the military in encouraging the expansion of the military–industrial complex during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations raises important questions about the nature of the state–private network and the ability of the executive to control militarism.
In his final analysis, the author shows how contemporary conflicts, including the war in Iraq, have given rise to a renewed interest in the concept of the military–industrial complex. Ledbetter alludes to the well-known but questionable activities of the US government that resonate with the arguments of early critics of war and militarism. Such activities include, for example, the role of Vice President Dick Cheney and Halliburton, the controversial detention centre at Guantánamo Bay, and the torture revealed at the Abu Ghraib prison. Yet, with a broader outlook in mind, Ledbetter provides some thought-provoking material on the pattern of military spending and the structural changes that have taken place in the American economy over the last four decades, which may leave some readers questioning whether the very term “military–industrial complex” is now outdated. But he also leaves some questions unanswered, namely, if the military–industrial complex is such a bad influence, why has America failed to restrain it? And what have been the effects of wasteful military spending on social and welfare needs? This is an area that Ledbetter does not seek to address.
Nevertheless, Unwarranted Influence is a well-researched, thought-provoking and very well-written account of the evolution of the military–industrial complex, whose influence has extended beyond the Cold War.
