Animal rights and children's rights share a tangled history; though often associated in narratives about the supposed growth of kindness in the nineteenth century, they are also often opposed, generally through gestures towards the “irony” of animal-protection movements preceding child-protection movements by a significant span of years. Susan J. Pearson's superb historical analysis of the entwined development of anticruelty movements in nineteenth-century America deftly complicates these assumptions through its careful delineation of the shared philosophy of “sentimental liberalism” that allowed both forms of protection to gain the power and force they had in that period. Surveying an impressive range of texts, from children's literature to political science, from philosophy to animal training and parenting manuals, Pearson provides a dense history of the culture that allowed animals and children to be linked conceptually and politically in the public mind.
Pearson argues that the “anticruelty reformers made ‘cruelty’ into a social problem, stretched governmental powers, and expanded the state in a typically American way: through private associations” (4), a point which I considered with initial skepticism, given the significant overlap between the development of SPCCs and SPCAs in America and England, as well as in Canada and Europe. Nevertheless, she very convincingly links the protection movement in America to Gilded Age domestic ideology, considerations of cruelty, negotiations of rights, and developments in state power.
Her first chapter, “The Child Is an Animal” (quoting Mrs. Etta Wheeler's well-known words in the infamous Mary Ellen Wilson case) engagingly illuminates the historical ties between children and animals in American society, drawing upon illustrations and narratives spanning the nineteenth century. Pearson argues that transformations in the status of “pets,” brought about by the separation of home and work, led to a host of relations between animals and children that served to prop up nineteenth-century domestic ideology, such as the use of pets in the training of children into proper domesticity, and the importance of children and animals in delineating new models of “discipline through love” (46). Linking the development of proper affections and proper feeling to both child-rearing and the care of animals allowed for a shared discourse on concepts central to child protection, such as the nature of cruelty and the basis of rights.
Chapters 2 and 3 address cruelty and rights discourse, and it was in these chapters that I felt Pearson made the clearest argument for the uniquely American aspects of anticruelty work. Her analysis of cruelty, for example, places it within the context of a post-Revolutionary America that saw “the prohibition of official ‘cruelty’ [as] central to the establishment of a liberal political order” (63). But, as Pearson demonstrates, liberalism and anticruelty work did not necessarily mesh well together, because defenselessness was often in conflict with rights: “In most historical accounts … as in both liberal political theory and nineteenth-century historical tracts, the end of dependence marks the beginning of rights” (109). For anticruelty societies, suggesting that children and animals had rights while remaining dependants meant drawing upon the discourse of abolitionists, in which slaves were constructed as “paradigmatic dependent beings” whose rights lay within their ability to feel, whether pain and suffering or love and loss. Thus anticruelty workers developed “a vision of rights based on protection rather than liberty” (133).
Chapter 4, “The Dove Has Claws,” does important work in elucidating the gendered nature of anticruelty work. Focussing on the effects of the Civil War on national attitudes towards morality, Pearson argues that it “seemed to prove that people would not change unless forced to” (167). Within this new paradigm, protection societies linked charitable work with state force by combining police powers with a desire to prosecute wrongdoers in their fight to make cruelty socially unacceptable. This focus on the punishment of offenders also imbued protection work with a toughness that spoke to the increased masculinization of charity work at the end of the century, a means of making manly the sentimental, feeling, moral man, too closely aligned, according to domestic ideology, with the affective realm most clearly associated with women. Conversely, it also helped to transform the state, in which “the legitimacy of modern liberal governments slowly came to rest instead on the ability to relieve rather than inflict suffering and to rehabilitate rather than to wound” (183).
My one concern with Pearson's analysis is that the focus on children seemed somewhat secondary to her close attention to the rhetoric and politics of animal-rights organizations, though this can be explained, in part, by the historical precedence of animal rights and its importance in laying the groundwork for child protection. On the whole, Pearson's well-supported argument demonstrates clear lines of connection between animal and child protection without reducing the complexity of either, and succeeds in showing that despite the seeming separation of child and animal in the development of modern child welfare, the two remain discursively and ideologically linked in ways that speak to the legacy of Gilded Era anticruelty work.
