This is an interesting contribution to a very important debate, though ultimately, I find Lane Kenworthy’s thesis somewhat too static and conservative. In a nutshell, the conclusion of Would Democratic Socialism Be Better? is that we do not need to spend time thinking about new forms of democratic socialism. All we need to do according to the author is to follow the best-practice institutions of social-democratic capitalism, especially those of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, which have been very successful in the past and should serve as our guide for the future.

Kenworthy defines social democratic capitalism as a regime featuring “a capitalist economy, a democratic political system, good elementary and secondary schooling, a big welfare state, employment-conducive public services (childcare, job training and others) and moderate regulation of product and labor markets” (p. 2). The most interesting part of the book is when the author documents the successes of Europe’s social democratic societies in achieving higher welfare, life expectancy, and life satisfaction than all alternative existing systems, and in particular higher incomes for the lowest socio-economic groups than the US. This conclusion also applies to countries like Germany or France, but Kenworthy is particularly interested in the case of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, where the mobilization of public resources for social transfers and social investment has been particularly strong, especially in health and education, resulting in total tax revenues around 50% of national income, a public employment share around 30%, and substantially higher welfare and incomes for lower socio-economic groups than pretty much everywhere else (see, e.g., the figures on pp.3, 8, 42, etc.). The readers of Kenworthy will recognize the author’s characteristic sharp style throughout the exposition, as well as the richness and clarity of the comparative empirical material embodied in the extended set of figures.

In my opinion, the main limitation of Kenworthy’s book is that he tends to treat social-democratic societies (which he calls “social democratic capitalism”) as a quasi-finished product, almost as a static and frozen system. In my view, this approach is wrong-headed and has contributed to weakening the social-democratic agenda in recent decades. Social democracy is not a finished product—quite the contrary: it is still in the making. In particular, there exists a continuum of potential regimes and future trajectories that are yet to be explored between currently existing social democracy and various forms of democratic socialism. Here we come to the central issue: Kenworthy does not like the idea of a continuum between social democracy and democratic socialism. He is particularly upset at people like Bernie Sanders, who pretend to support democratic socialism and who in fact have in mind something closer to Nordic social democracy (p.14). He should also be upset at the many political movements who use the terms “social democracy” and “democratic socialism” in an interchangeable manner, like the “Parti socialiste Suisse” (the French name of the party), whose name is “Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz” in German, “Partito socialista svizzero” in Italian, and “Partida socialdemocrata da la Svizra” in Romansh: this is however the same party with the same platform.

Kenworthy would like to draw a sharp dividing line between social democracy and democratic socialism, but the problem is that his own definitions do not allow him to do so. He proposes the following definition for socialism: “let’s stipulate that socialism refers to an economy in which two-thirds or more of employment and output (GDP) is in firms that are owned by government, citizens or workers” (p.1). The difficulty is that Kenworthy never defines what it means to be owned by “citizens or workers” rather than by “capitalists.” Does this mean, for instance, that more than 50% of the company shares are owned by citizens or workers who individually own less than 1%, or does this require that 75% of the shares are owned by citizens or workers with nobody owning more than 10%, or should the definition also take into account the size of the company and the number of workers? Kenworthy never tells us. Depending on the exact thresholds and definitions, one might end up with the conclusion that democratic socialism is already in place in a number of countries.

When he discusses the limits of democratic socialism, Kenworthy has in mind for the most part the system of “coupon socialism” proposed by John Roemer in the 1990s (A Future for Socialism, 1994; Equal Shares: Making Market Socialism Work, 1996), whereby each young adult receives an equal endowment of the country’s company shares at age 18 but cannot trade them for cash (he or she can only trade them for other shares). Kenworthy also mentions very briefly the system of worker cooperatives advocated by Tom Malleson and others (After Occupy: Economic Democracy for the 21st Century, 2014). In both cases, the main argument of the book is that these systems have never been tried on a large scale, and therefore that it is relatively uncertain whether they would achieve better socioeconomic outcomes than currently existing social democratic institutions.

While the argument has some strengths, it also has two obvious limitations. First, the same argument could certainly have been made against the social democratic agenda a century ago—and it was indeed made again and again by lots of people. For example, in 1910 almost nobody within the political, economic, and academic elites of the time would have accepted the idea that a large welfare state involving the socialization of half of national income would be a viable and successful system. Yet in the following century it was experimented with and implemented, thanks to social struggles and political mobilization. Not only was it successful, but it came together with the largest rise of socioeconomic prosperity ever observed.

Next, Kenworthy tends to ignore that while the “coupon socialism” idea and the cooperatives agenda have a lot of merit, these are not the only ideas on the table. Indeed public discussions on various forms of democratic or participatory socialism have been plentiful in recent years. For example, Julia Cagé proposed various institutional forms in order to limit the power of large shareholders and increase that of journalists in media organizations—a solution that could also apply to other sectors (Saving the Media: Capitalism, Crowdfunding and Democracy, 2016). Isabelle Ferreras, Dominique Méda, and Julie Battilana have promoted the idea of “economic bicameralism,” with a worker chamber serving as an effective counter-power to the shareholder chamber (Democratize Work: The Case for Reorganizing the Economy, 2022). Joe Guinan and Martin O’Neill have explored new versions of Meidner’s investment funds for workers, including new forms of local and communal investment funds (“Socialising Capital: Looking Back on the Meidner Plan,” International Journal of Public Policy, 2019; Joe Guinan and Martin O’Neill, The Case for Community Wealth Building, 2020).

In my own version of “participatory socialism, I propose to extend the most ambitious version of “co-determination” or “co-management” schemes (50% of employees-elected directors in company boards) to all firms, irrespective of size, together with a cap on the maximal fraction of voting rights that a single shareholder can have (say, no more than 5% in a company with more than 100 employees). In case there is no other shareholder, then the remaining directors’ seats are allocated to employees (see A Brief History of Equality, 2022, figure 18, p.118). I also emphasize that one the most important limitations of the social-democratic institutions that were put in place during the twentieth century is that they were not able to reduce substantially the inequality of asset ownership and economic power. The bottom 50% wealth share remains below 5% in all social-democratic countries, while the top 10% share is typically around 50%–60% or more. The concentration of inheritance is about the same, which means that bottom 50% children face limited opportunities as compared to top 10% children. I argue that a substantial redistribution of inheritance, with a meaningful minimum inheritance for all at age 25 (say, at least 60% of mean adult wealth; see op.cit., figure 30 p.160), could substantially raise bargaining power and life opportunities and contribute to a more vibrant society. One should also add that twentieth-century social democracy was too much centered on a small number of nation-states in the North: it now needs to take a much more global perspective and push for major reforms of the international tax system (arguably the only way to confront the challenge of climate reparation). Of course this will not happen in one day; it will take enormous social struggles and political mobilizations, just like the rise of social democracy during the twentieth century.

I suspect that Lane Kenworthy (who recognizes the merits of codetermination and worker power and the political and economic problems associated to extreme wealth concentration) might well agree with some of these proposals, or at least about some versions of these proposals. But depending on where we stop, depending on the exact parameters that we collectively choose, will we still be in social-democratic capitalism or will we enter the realm of democratic socialism? It seems to me that asking the question in this way is not very productive: we should rather focus on the substance and the content of the proposals. Obviously we should take into account the fact that some people (including Kenworthy) do not feel at ease with the word “socialism” and prefer the word “social democracy.” I do not share this hesitation, but I respect it. All the institutions that I have just described could be referred to as “social democracy for the 21st century” rather than “democratic socialism” or “participatory socialism,” and I would have no problem eliminating the word “socialism” or inventing a new word if this could facilitate the adoption of these institutions. Irrespective of what we call them, however, it is important to stress that social democracy and democratic socialism are not finished products or frozen objects: they are yet to be invented, they are an on-going process. Social struggles will play a critical role in the future in order to deliver political change, but so will democratic deliberation, books, and ideas. Rather than freezing the discussion into a linguistic debate, it is high time that we focus on the content and set ambitious socioeconomic and political targets for the twenty-first century, just like social democrats and democratic socialists did more than a century ago, with great success.