This is a book with a primary title that far overreaches its ambitions. Readers expecting a broad treatment of the Muslim Brotherhood would do well to pay closer attention to the subtitle. They will discover a more limited, but important, monograph focusing on the Muslim Brotherhood's second General Guide (al-murshid al-ʿāmm), Hasan al-Hudaybi (1951–73). Barbara Zollner accords al-Hudaybi an importance, she argues, he has long been denied, despite the significant role he played in rehabilitating the movement and steering it toward greater legitimacy during a period of “near defeat and destruction” (p. 2) that threatened its very existence.
Hasan al-Hudaybi succeeded the Muslim Brotherhood's charismatic martyred founder, Hasan al-Banna, in October 1951, after a divisive internal election. An outsider, certainly from the perspective of those who ran the movement's paramilitary units, al-Hudaybi sought to repair, even strengthen, ties with leaders of Egypt's dying parliamentary order. In his most controversial act, he paid a visit to the king, an event still recalled with bitterness by those who pursued more radical agendas. It remains unclear whether their real problem with al-Hudaybi was that he could never be al-Banna or that he kept at bay those who had usurped effective power from the founder and sought to redirect the movement to suit their militant leanings. A judge by profession and, in retrospect, a weak political leader, al-Hudaybi struggled to maintain amicable relations with the new Nasser regime and wound up alienating the officers; with few friends in his own camp he could not prevent his movement from playing into the hands of those out to declaw it or, ultimately, from self-imploding.
Zollner has carefully and critically read the numerous, often competing accounts (including my own) of the events that preceded the attempt on Nasser's life in October 1954, the act, staged or not, that precipitated the crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, including the execution of its key leaders and the imprisonment of many of its members. Al-Hudaybi was slated for execution, but his sentence was immediately commuted to life imprisonment. As the movement regrouped in the late 1950s and early 1960s, it was Sayyid Qutb who emerged as intellectual guide to those who sought to regenerate the Muslim Brotherhood's mission. Following Qutb's rearrest, trial, and execution for plotting to overthrow the Nasserist regime, his followers formed a faction within the movement later known as Organization 1965 that precipitated the second assault on the Muslim Brotherhood.
For all his efforts to counter the radicals, before and after 1954 and 1965, al-Hudaybi always appeared in the shadows, a well-meaning but rather ineffective figure dominated by others. Hardball politics was not his style, and at key moments he retreated from public view. I have suggested that he consented to the attempted murder of Nasser in 1954 (Nasser's Blessed Movement: Egypt's Free Officers and the July Revolution [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992], 181–83). Zollner relates how he acquiesced to Qutb's leadership of Organization 1965, apparently overwhelmed by the group's numbers. Following Qutb's reincarceration in 1966, al-Hudaybi did determine to reassert his authority over the movement and marginalize Qutb's followers. The radicals returned to prison unbowed, in stark distinction from 1954. Al-Hudaybi kept his distance and spoke out against them, circulating a series of letters that challenged basic tenets, or interpretations, of Qutb's incendiary texts. Then, in 1967, he charged a group of followers, “old line Brothers” (p. 47), and his son Maʾmun to compose a detailed broadside against the Qutbists. They worked in league with theologians from al-Azhar, which presupposes, Zollner notes, Nasser's approval of the venture.
The latter part of Zollner's book, over half the total number of pages, is a detailed analysis of Duʿat la Qudat (Preachers not Judges), al-Hudaybi's response to Qutb's Maʿalim fi al-Tariq (Milestones/Signposts). Completed in 1969, the work first appeared in 1977, a time of spiraling religious and intercommunal violence, four years before the assassination of Anwar al-Sadat. Zollner posits the work as a fundamental challenge to the radicals’ notion of takfīr, the judgment that a ruler or society has renounced Islam and that those who do not strive actively to implement an Islamic state have abandoned the Muslim community. It is not, Zollner makes clear, an original work, because its argumentation rests on classical legal scholarship. She traces its antecedents and contextualizes its key legal concepts. Where Duʿat la Qudat adopts a modernist thrust, particularly in minimizing the scope of absolute requirements of faith beyond ritual obligations, it hews closely to Islamic modernist ideology as expounded by Muhammad Abduh and Mahmud Shaltut. Zollner at times critiques the work for its “brevity” or “lack of definite verdicts and conclusive remarks” (p. 134). For all its urgency, it seems a cautious text.
In Duʿat la Qudat, al-Hudaybi (and his ghost writers) walk a razor's edge, upholding the Muslim Brotherhood's agenda of political-religious activism while putting forward “a moderate stance which calls for restrained confrontation” with the state (p. 135). Whatever his hand in the actual writing of the text, Zollner suggests al-Hudaybi deserves credit for taking a stand at the risk of eliciting charges of betrayal from the Qutbists. Hasan al-Banna's contested successor may remain overshadowed by Sayyid Qutb, the radicals’ ultimate heir, but his temperate “theological and juridical approach” to political activism, Zollner argues, lives on in nonviolent campaigns “to gradually change the state system(s) toward an Islamic order” (p. 146).
Zollner's book suggests the need for a fuller reappraisal of al-Hudaybi's leadership and character in addition to his intellectual and ideological contributions. This would include greater focus on the period between his release from prison after Sadat's May 1971 “Corrective Revolution” and al-Hudaybi's death in November 1973, when the Muslim Brotherhood was granted new opportunities to implement the conciliatory approach validated in his tract. A reconstituted movement emerged that would become the Islamist mainstream in Egypt. In this regard, Zollner's overarching title, read with a bit of caution, may be more apt than it initially seems.
