Tamir Moustafa's elegant book examines one of the most intriguing episodes in contemporary Egyptian politics: the gradual rise and abrupt retreat of the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC). The story follows a neat dramatic arc: the SCC is established in 1979 as a confidence-building measure by President Anwar Sadat to lure and assure foreign investors that their assets will be safe. However, the institution takes on a life of its own as its sitting activist judges issue market-friendly rulings that dismantle Nasser-era controls on the economy while also handing down rights-friendly decisions that restructure political life, most dramatically the landmark 2000 ruling requiring full judicial supervision of elections, a first in Egyptian history. This “golden era” of court activism promotes societal “constitutional consciousness”; human-rights groups, opposition parties, the legal profession, and the independent press form a “judicial support network” that increasingly petitions the SCC, pressures the executive to abide by its rulings, and defends the court when it comes under attack from the regime.
However, the judicial support network is ultimately too fragmented to stave off regime reprisals against the SCC. In 2001, President Hosni Mubarak decisively ends the decades-long SCC norm of chief-justice self-selection, initiating an aggressive court-packing plan that places regime insiders as SCC chief justices. Two years later, to deflect domestic and international criticism, Mubarak appoints the first woman judge to the court, attorney Tahani al-Gebali. The executive-controlled parliament issues a restrictive new associations law to cripple human-rights groups, thus sundering a key node in the judicial support network. To add insult to injury, the tamed SCC is then deployed by the regime against newly vocal reformist judges and civil society. Concluding his four rich empirical chapters of this story, Moustafa rues, “The SCC was transformed from the most promising avenue for political reform to a weapon in the hands of the regime to constrain the regular judiciary and sideline political opponents” (p. 218).
Carefully sourced, meticulously organized, and engagingly written, The Struggle for Constitutional Power is as gripping as political science gets. It skillfully synthesizes deep knowledge of the Egyptian case, theories on institutions in authoritarian regimes, and the law-and-society literature on legal mobilization. Chapter 2 is an original analysis of the politics of courts in authoritarian regimes, where we learn that courts ameliorate four common “pathologies” of authoritarianism: they provide credible commitments to investors, enable the regime to maintain unity and discipline within the bureaucracy, provide an alternate institution to implement unpopular policies, and help create regime legitimacy (p. 41). Empirical Chapters 3 through 6 are crammed with rich details and illuminating sources, including the author's revealing interviews with SCC justices and human-rights activists, and citation of fascinating and little known but consequential SCC rulings.
Chapter 3 focuses on Sadat's establishment of the SCC as one of a bundle of measures to rebuild the economy; Chapters 4 and 5 trace the unintended consequences of Sadat's actions, describing the rise of constitutional power and the development of the judicial support network around the SCC; and Chapter 6 details the executive's taming of the SCC beginning in 1998 and on into 2005. Extrapolating from the Egyptian case, the book's last chapter concludes with cautionary notes addressed to scholars and policymakers who prescribe rule-of-law institutions as the panacea for economic underdevelopment and lack of democracy. Moustafa argues that without the crucial prior condition of a balance of power between the state and social groups, judiciaries cannot on their own foster economic development and democracy.
Of particular interest to SCC watchers will be Moustafa's interview with former chief justice Fathi Nagib, appointed by President Mubarak in 2001 to rein in the court. In remarkably candid terms, the late Nagib tells the author that his predecessors “were issuing rulings that were bombs in order to win the support of the opposition parties. . ., This needed to be corrected. Now the President [Mubarak] can be assured that the Court will make rulings that are in the interest of the country yet still maintain its independence” (p. 201). The author's exposition here would have benefited from an interview with Nagib's predecessor, Muhammad Wali al-Din Galal, under whose tenure (1998–2001) the SCC issued two of its landmark rulings: the July 2000 decision requiring full judicial supervision of elections and the June 2000 ruling “striking down the most important piece of legislation governing associational life in decades” (p. 187).
Readers of The Struggle for Constitutional Power will draw from the book three important general lessons for analyzing authoritarian politics anywhere: intrastate dynamics matter, both among the three branches of government and among different agencies within one branch; state-society interaction matters, no matter how fragmented societal groups may be; and law matters, not simply as a tool of domination but also as an arena of struggle among political actors. Moustafa demonstrates that even in the most super-presidential regimes, presidents must work hard to ceaselessly manage and tame autonomy-minded judiciaries and potentially troublesome legislatures. Moreover, government branches are rarely unitary blocs: judiciaries may be fragmented and sprawling structures, providing openings for both power-hungry presidents and their civil-society opponents to secure toeholds, and executives comprise both peak-level mandarins and street-level bureaucrats, making intra-executive management a formidable task.
The same internal differentiation characterizes the second aspect of authoritarian politics, state–society contention. Whereas conventional accounts of politics in authoritarian regimes stress only one part of the story—how incumbent elites devise and manipulate institutions to bolster their power and weaken their challengers—Moustafa's account foregrounds the dialectic between power-preserving incumbents and their adversaries, patiently tracing the unintended consequences of incumbent strategies. The book's title fittingly leads with the word “struggle,” and the introduction argues, “Courts inevitably serve as dual-use institutions, simultaneously consolidating the functions of the authoritarian state while paradoxically opening new avenues for activists to challenge regime policy” (p. 10). The story of the SCC illustrates both the possibilities and the limits of institutional change in authoritarian regimes. The law-and-society literature has long recognized that law can be both a tool of domination and a lexicon of resistance. Moustafa's study merges the two insights, but it does more. It shows that law is not only a tool of politics but also the actual setting of political conflict. He writes, “A lively arena of contention emerges in what we typically imagine to be the least likely environment for the judicialization of politics—the authoritarian state” (p. 56).
Although he renders a rich portrait of politics in authoritarian regimes, what Moustafa does less well is consider alternative explanations for the SCC's genesis. His theory hinges on the claim that Sadat created the SCC to send a signal of “credible commitment” to both foreign investors and asset-holding Egyptians, that is, commitment “that their assets would be safe from state seizure or adverse legislation on entering the Egyptian market” (p. 4). Yet it can be argued that Sadat's rapprochement with the United States and signing of the peace treaty with Israel in March 1979 (a few months before the establishment of the SCC) were far more powerful signals to domestic and foreign capitalists wishing to do business in Egypt.
A widely accepted alternative explanation of the SCC's genesis locates it in Egypt's perennial executive–judicial conflict rather than a presidential political-economy logic of attracting foreign investment. This explanation begins with Gamal Abdel Nasser's 1969 decree-law establishing the SCC's predecessor, the Supreme Court. This court was designed to control a refractory judiciary that was vigorously resisting Nasserist political incorporation and on the verge of issuing rulings against regime interests. Sadat assumed power in 1970 and constitutionalized the Supreme Court in the new 1971 constitution, the document that served as the centerpiece of his de-Nasserization policies. However, Sadat delayed the enabling legislation for eight years as he and his legal advisers pondered how to produce an SCC law that would appear to liberate the court yet effectively maintain executive control over the institution. After energetic mobilization by lawyers and judges in 1978 against the regime's attempts to pass legislation ensuring a pliant SCC, the SCC law was finally passed in 1979 as a compromise between the president's prerogatives and legal specialists' demands.
