In Act IV, Scene III of Shakespeare’s Troilus and Cressida, Troilus laments upon receiving a letter: “words, words, mere words, no matter from the heart: the effect doth operate another way.”Footnote 1 His point seems to be that words are meaningless, despite the force with which they are delivered, when they are divorced from substantive meaning. Oscar Wilde quipped in The Picture of Dorian Gray, “Mere words! Was there anything so real as words?”Footnote 2 inverting Shakespeare by declaring that, indeed, the truest substance is found in words alone. This tension between the poverty and the power of “mere words” animates Professor Burbidge’s work. In Ideas, Concepts, and Reality, the latest book from the professor emeritus of Trent University, Prof. Burbidge interrogates the divergence between subjective ideas and abstract concepts, borrowing Gottlob Frege’s theoretical framework to craft a nuanced account of abstract reasoning.
The main focus of Burbidge’s book is this: people use abstract concepts to make associations between sensible objects, to discriminate between one object or class of objects and another, to perceive one object and recollect its similarity to another, and so on. However, it must be asked, how are such concepts created? One option is that individuals create them inductively, through their own experiences. Another is that they already exist, perhaps in some Platonic world of forms, and that individuals merely connect with these ideas in the course of their thinking. There are problems with both accounts. For the former, Frege rightly pointed out that, if individuals were responsible for creating concepts, “a painter, a horseman, and a zoologist will probably connect different ideas with the name ‘Bucephalus’” (14), making any notion of truth concerning what ‘Bucephalus’ really is an impossibility. For the latter, it must be asked, where are these Platonic ideas? Are they objects? If not, how do we have access to them? And so on. Burbidge starts with this dilemma and develops a novel account of how individual notions develop into concepts, proceeding step-by-step from the initial problem in order to create his own unique solution.
The book is structured into two parts. In the first, “Ideas to Concepts,” Burbidge begins by articulating Frege’s distinction between a Vorstellung, or ‘idea,’ and a Begriff, a ‘concept.’ For Frege, the idea is an entirely subjective mental image, “often saturated with feeling,” and because the idea is based in the senses rather than in purely abstract thought, “ideas are demonstrably different in different people” (14). Frege dismisses the idea in favour of the concept, which is objective and has “an independent existence apart from any mind that happens to think [it]” (16). However, Frege makes an interesting claim, that the individual thinker “grasps” (15) the concept, and Burbidge jumps on this as proof of a latent psychologism in Frege’s thought, for even if the concept is objective, it seems that this act of grasping “is subjective, dependent on a particular person’s intellectual development” (17).
Burbidge builds on this in the second chapter, introducing the British empiricists Locke, Berkeley, and Hume to articulate what appears to be the polar opposite of Frege’s Platonism: concepts are built inductively, through the concatenation of many related ideas that then become “something general, divorced from the mind’s immediate encounter with the world” (26). Proceeding from these polar opposites, Burbidge gradually modifies Frege’s theory by introducing Hegel’s idea of the thesis, antithesis, then synthesis dialectic to describe how concepts initially begin as Fregeian ideas and then reach an intermediary stage called ‘thoughts,’ which have “tendrils that reach out upwards to their more general contexts, sideways to the alternatives that their differentiae exclude, and downwards to the species they include” (72). He ends the first half of the book with a discussion of Descartes’ four rules on thought by applying them to the ‘thought’ articulated above: a ‘thought’ undergoes a process of analysis and synthesis, where the thought is broken into its atomic pieces by the individual thinker and then brought together into a newly synthesized ‘thought,’ and finally becomes a comprehensive ‘concept’ through entering the social sphere, where it becomes homogenized through repeated use, reuse, and modification (keeping with Burbidge’s earlier insistence on Hegel’s dialectic). Having articulated a theory of how ideas apotheosize into concepts, in the second half of the book, “Tendrils of Thought,” Burbidge returns to Frege’s sharp distinction between subjective ideas and Platonic concepts. By massaging Frege’s ostensibly sharp dichotomy with his new theory, Burbidge is able to conclude at the beginning of the penultimate chapter, “Ideas to Concepts,” that “we do not need to place these two kinds of entities [ideas and concepts] in different realms, one in the human mind and the other in a Platonic heaven … [certain] thoughts are sufficiently objective and independent of our subjective interests that they cannot be distinguished from Frege’s concepts” (147).
Burbidge’s main focus seems to be crafting an account of how individuals abstract concepts from ideas in an analytic way, which is a focus-driven, sustained, and entirely alien method of cognition as compared to the way people typically think. However, regardless of the dissimilarity of rigorous analytic cognition to average cognition, it remains true that all forms of thinking derive from a biological basis. The main flaw in Burbidge’s account, then, is to ignore the many advances of modern neuroscience. While such an account as his might have legitimate merits, it is difficult to determine what they might be without scientific input. Is there any meaningful distinction between ideas, thoughts, and concepts neurologically, as Burbidge would have us believe? Does his Hegelian account of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis in the creation of subjective ideas map onto how cognition works at all? In turn, does this criticism have merit? It is impossible to say. He provides no answers to what are important questions, for without engaging with the potential biological implications, he creates merely a descriptive theory—it’s truth might be observed, but not verified. In this, he does both his work and his readers a disservice, for he has crafted a genuinely thought-provoking theory. Unfortunately, a philosopher should not theorize in a vacuum when better, and empirically testable, theories are readily available through perusing any journal indexer. In conclusion, though Burbidge provides an interesting and provocative theory, a dismissive reader may be apt to conclude that all of it is just “words, mere words.”
