The historical context
The Anglo-Ijebu conflict of 1892 is well represented in the historiography of the British conquest of Nigeria. The event forms part of the broader theme of late-nineteenth-century European imperialism underlain by economic considerations, and the attendant failure of African resistance leading to the establishment of colonial rule.Footnote 1 For all practical purposes, the conquest of the Ijebu in 1892 opened the way for the imposition of the Pax Britannica in Yorubaland.Footnote 2 This article examines the potential and significance of dramatizing the episode as another medium of contributing to the historiography on the subject.
The Ijebu, the African party to the conflict, are a Yoruba subgroup located astride Lagos and Ogun States in southwestern Nigeria. The Ijebu formed a kingdom, the town of Ijebu-Ode was the capital, and the king held the title of Awujale. The proximity of the Ijebu to the coast brought them into early contact with the Atlantic trade.Footnote 3 Thanks to the increasing commercial profile of Lagos from the closing decades of the eighteenth century, the Ijebu served principally as middlemen between the Europeans on the coast and the Yoruba hinterland.Footnote 4 However, this commercial pattern was threatened by the establishment of the British in Lagos in 1861, as they advanced the philosophy of free trade and unrestricted traffic. The Ijebu responded by instituting border markets. Traders coming from the interior, north of the Ijebu border (the Oyo-speaking Yoruba in particular) were barred from trading beyond the Iperu and Oru markets, while the Lagos trader to the south could only trade at the Ikorodu and Ejinrin markets on the lagoon.Footnote 5 The Ijebu, therefore, handled the exchange of goods from the interior and those from Lagos, and at their own price.
Two major routes ran through Ijebu from Lagos to the Yoruba hinterland. The westerly portion connected Lagos through Ikorodu and Sagamu (from 1872) to the interior, while the easterly section linked Lagos via the port town of Itoikin and Ijebu-Ode to the interior.Footnote 6 Since Ijebu routes formed the shortest link between Lagos and the Yoruba country up north, the British authorities in Lagos considered the Ijebu traffic and commercial restriction policy as an impediment to the colony’s economic growth.Footnote 7 Significantly, the Ijebu policy was also influenced by political considerations. The intention was to contain Ibadan military aggression by controlling the state’s access to firearms imports from Lagos, as the Lagos administration tended to consider the Ibadan threat claim to be exaggerated.Footnote 8
Other matters rankled in Lagos against the Ijebu. For what they considered political reasons, the Ijebu prohibited the agents of Christianity and Western civilization from operating in their territory. This is to be explained by the role played by the missionaries in the ejection of Kosoko from the Lagos throne in 1851, and the eventual takeover of the island kingdom in 1861 by the British. Two years later, in 1863, the new Lagos administration annexed Lekki and Orimedu (Palma), two Ijebu towns on the eastern seaboard. As a precautionary measure, therefore, the Ijebu strove to keep out all traces of European influence from their country; not only was Christian proselytism prohibited, but passage through their country was also often denied to missionaries and the officials of the Lagos government alike, travelling between Lagos and the interior.Footnote 9 Indeed, Ijebu-Ode, the capital town, was considered unsafe for strangers by their other Yoruba neighbours, among whom, according to T. O. Ogunkoya, “there was a common saying, Ijebu-Ode ajeji ko wo; bi ajeji ba wo laro, won a fi sebo lale (Ijebu-Ode, a town forbidden to foreigners: if a foreigner entered it in the morning, he was sure to be sacrificed in the evening).”Footnote 10 The peremptoriness of human sacrifice in the adage was a hyperbolic and figurative emphasis on the unwelcome presence of strangers in the Ijebu territory. The fear of losing their political sovereignty to protect their economic monopoly reached a fever pitch in the late 1880s. According to Samuel Johnson, “a report of what was called ‘The scramble for Africa,’ then going on reached them in one form or another, and they were but safe-guarding [sic] the national interests.”Footnote 11 All officials of the Lagos government and missionaries were suspects of espionage activity.
Ultimately, the Ijebu control of the highways was brought to an end. In May 1892, the British defeated and conquered their kingdom at a decisive battle which took place at the village of Imagbon, about fifteen kilometers southeast of the capital town of Ijebu-Ode.Footnote 12 The immediate events leading to the war may be dated to a year earlier in May 1891, when the Acting Governor of Lagos, G. C. Denton, visited the Ijebu king to negotiate arrangements by which the Ijebu may be persuaded to abandon their restrictive commercial policy. Reaching an understanding proved difficult. On his assumption of office as the substantive chief executive in September later in the year, Governor G. T. Carter, intent on establishing the Pax Britannica over the Yoruba hinterland of Lagos, adopted the policy of coercion.Footnote 13 His option resolved the Ijebu question through military conquest.
The nature and significance
The term historical drama is used broadly in this paper to encompass the diverse range of visualized representations on stage and screen. Generally speaking, dramatization is education, as education is dramatization. When we dramatize, we educate and help audiences remember and vividly recall what they have been taught. Dramatization has been a tool for education, entertainment, and learning since the beginning of time. Drama itself develops from the human instinct to imitate, reflect, and replicate experiences in the presence of others or audiences. The intention of dramatization in history, for example, is to recreate past events vividly, allowing the living to learn from them. Through the animation of historical facts, dramatists can jog the memory of present societies to be conscious of, and obviate, the errors of the past. “Historical drama,” writes Robert Cassler, “is an exciting means to educate and entertain at the same time. Seeing a drama take place before you and knowing that these conflicts really did happen is far more stimulating than a fiction which is entirely made up. Historical drama can reach more people and involve more people than practically any other tool.”Footnote 14 Sharing this view on the value of historical drama, Rasheedah Liman contends that “the dramatic arts and along with its performances in all their shades and nuances do not merely serve to entertain … they become useful media for the preservation of historical memory. The need to preserve history demands that the playwright deploy [sic] actual history itself as source material for dramaturgy.”Footnote 15
This article is an exposition of the significance of capturing the historical experiences of Nigerian societies through stage or screen adaptations foregrounded by primary and research-based (i.e., scholarly) sources to ensure accuracy, and thus highlighting the pedagogical value of historical dramatization as an educational tool and a means of generating knowledge.Footnote 16 This is, of course, in juxtaposition with the professional practice of sacrificing this pedagogical value for the entertainment or other peculiar requirements of such adaptations by the deliberate use of inaccuracies. Laco Halama and Zora Hudikova assert that “the disciplines that deal with the study of visual media (film, television, cultural studies) focus more on the ways and quality of its depiction than on assessing the degree of truth in a film about history.”Footnote 17 However, historical infelicities could leave a sour taste in the mouth, as exemplified in The House of Gaa (2024), which, through “dramatic license,” contains storylines that conflate the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Thus, as Linda Constanzo Cahir cautions, “for an adaptation to be considered successful, it should not deviate too much from the original literary work which it is adapted from and unless this is not the case, it is likely that the viewers label the adaptation as ‘unfaithful’ to the original work.”Footnote 18
From a historiographical perspective, the Yoruba region has been served by several published historical dramas as tools for reenlivening and preserving its history. Covering wars, epics, and folklores, a few examples that have enjoyed multiple stage performances include Ola Rotimi’s Kurunmi: An Historical Tragedy; Wale Ogunyemi’s Ijaye War, in the Nineteenth Century: A Historical Drama and Kiriji: An Historic Drama on Ekiti Parapo War in the Nineteenth Century; Femi Osofisan’s Women of Owu, and Lekan Balogun’s Alaafin Kanran. Footnote 19 Older and perhaps more celebrated have been the several historical epics of the acclaimed dramatist, Duro Ladipo (1931–78), especially his Oba Ko So and Moremi, adapted from folklore and early works on Yoruba history.Footnote 20
In dramatizing historical events, literary critics have emphasized the importance of the sources used and that the reenactment presented should be as faithful to the original event as possible. Thus, scholars have examined the intersection of the various genres of the traditional Yoruba oral sources like oriki (panegyrics), ifa (divination poetry), folksongs, etc., to foreground historical renditions of the precolonial context, in particular. Karin Barber’s I Could Speak Until Tomorrow: Oriki, Women and the Past in a Yoruba Town analyzes the way women performers use oriki (panegyrics) in dramatizing communal histories while linking present events within the community to ancestral events.Footnote 21 Still on traditional oral sources, Biodun Jeyifo’s The Yoruba Popular Travelling Theatre of Nigeria, in tracing the evolution of Yoruba mobile traveling theater from the precolonial to the postindependence period, explains how they staged historical narratives to negotiate collective memories and identities.Footnote 22 The basic point underlined by these studies is that there should be no wide disparities between the entertainment and educational functions of visualized history.
Moving away from the scholarship of the Yoruba space, the other historiographical plane and the primary concern of this article is its focus on resistance to colonial conquest. First, popularizing the Anglo-Ijebu conflict in dramatized formats serves to reawaken consciousness, reinvigorate interest, and broaden popular knowledge of an epochal event in Ijebu history. Similar considerations underpinned the week-long celebrations, characterized by intense patriotic fervor, organized to mark the event’s centenary anniversary in May 1992.Footnote 23 Second, the Anglo-Ijebu conflict of 1892 marks a significant milestone in the establishment of the colonial presence in Nigeria. Remarkably, the Maxim machine gun, which was novel and crucial to British military success against Nigerian societies, was first deployed against the Ijebu.Footnote 24 This thus extends the idea of the dramatization of the conflict beyond regional significance.
The history of the events leading to the British conquest of Benin has, for example, been locally produced in a motion picture titled Invasion 1897, released in 2014. Published much earlier in 1974 and performed in several public presentations, Ola Rotimi’s Ovonramwen Nogbaisi is a stage drama on the fall of Benin.Footnote 25 Equally popular stage performances are Ahmed Yerima’s The Trials of Oba Ovonramwen, also on the fall of Benin and Attahiru, which features the collapse of the Sokoto Caliphate following the British onslaught.Footnote 26 The present article aims to draw attention to this underexplored genre of Nigerian history, namely, visualized memories of the resistance of Nigerian societies against European colonial conquest. Indeed, Obaro Ikime’s The Fall of Nigeria contains a tantalizing collection of episodes with prospects for stage and screen representations.Footnote 27
Common knowledge of the Anglo-Ijebu conflict outside intellectual circles is limited to awareness of the account in Johnson’s History. For those unfamiliar with this source, the event is generally associated with the establishment of British colonial rule. Paradoxically, the works of the first generation of local (Ijebu) historians of the colonial period contain scant information about the conflict. At their time, these authors had access to direct or first-hand witness accounts. Yet, their works are records of events and anthropological features of the precolonial and postconflict periods.Footnote 28 It is difficult to explain this shortcoming.Footnote 29 Perhaps it was a resultant apathy against an episode discredited by its failure.Footnote 30 The memory of significant local aspects of the conflict has thus become dim or lost over time.
The observable dearth of information in the published local histories is addressed in the section “The script data” of this paper, which presents a chronological narrative of the Anglo-Ijebu conflict in a drama script-like format. It draws on contemporary official documents from the National Archives in Ibadan, along with The Lagos Weekly Record, a weekly tabloid available in the same repository.Footnote 31 This body of archival material is supplemented by data from two seminal works, both of which also relied primarily on the same official documents held at the Ibadan archives, now deposited in the Public Record Office (now the National Archives) in London. The first is O. O. Ayantuga’s “Ijebu and Its Neighbours,” and the second is Robert Smith’s “Ijebu.”Footnote 32
The themes
To effectively dramatize, a dramatist must employ specific tools and follow a structured process of dramatization. In dramatizing the Anglo-Ijebu conflict efficiently, it behooves the dramatic writer or film scriptwriter to critically examine what to use and the choices or methods to follow. The elements of drama serve as tools for the dramatist in the quest for dramatization. They include theme, plot, characterization, language, setting, and spectacle. The theme is central to the plot of the script.
Depending on the quantum of data available to the scriptwriter, adaptations of the Anglo-Ijebu conflict may be established on varying themes. Broadly, three facets are discernible in the Anglo-Ijebu conflict, namely, the character and implementation of British colonial policy, the Christian missionary factor, and the nature of the Ijebu response. All three could be deployed as a single plot or as stand-alone presentations in various dramatized or documentary formats. All three, severally or collectively, led to the battle at Imagbon in May 1892.
An overview of the British policy may be described as one of failed diplomacy and inordinate military aggression. Johnson, for example, viewed as relatively pacifist and unrealistic, the British policy under Governor C. A. Molony (Carter’s immediate successor), which was urged on Acting Governor Denton.Footnote 33 Then the moment found the man. Governor Carter assumed office in September 1891, and early in the next year applied a Machiavellian tweak to the diplomatic option that presaged a military outcome. He insisted to his superior officers in the Colonial Office that the parley must be held in Lagos and not Ijebu this time. In December, he addressed two letters to the Awujale, issuing an ultimatum of thirty days for a delegation to be despatched to Lagos with an understanding to abolish “all tolls on the roads, which must be free and open to all persons using them for purposes of legitimate trade. The government, in return, will be prepared to consider the payment of a fixed sum per annum in compensation for the loss which you will sustain by the withdrawal of tolls.”Footnote 34 The delegation arrived in Lagos in mid-January 1892, just before the expiration of the ultimatum. Still, when it seemed clear that the delegation would frustrate his plans, he contrived a treaty agreement willy-nilly (see Appendix 2). A town meeting was convened on the arrival of the delegation at home, and as the Awujale later disclosed, “the people came back from the … meeting and said that they would not accept the Treaty.”Footnote 35 In this way, Carter applied a diplomatic option that could only lead to armed conflict. A casus belli was necessary to sway his dithering principals at the Colonial Office, who opposed a policy of coercion.
By his imperious mien, Governor Carter of Lagos represents the classic example of the “man on the spot” in imperial discourse.Footnote 36 His provocative demeanor influenced the trend of events leading to the conflict. On the eve of the armed conflict, he confronted the reluctance of his principals with the assurance that the impasse afforded an opportunity to establish British control over Ijebu.Footnote 37 Which, in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, he forced down their throats.Footnote 38 As A. B. Aderibigbe notes of the dilemma of the home officials, “once caught in the empiric web of expansion woven by his local agent, any dissentient Minister was committed to upholding that agent in the public.”Footnote 39 In an era of competing and heightened European imperialism in Africa, there was certainly less tolerance of African sovereignty.Footnote 40
Yet, as some of the neighbors of the Ijebu considered them burdensome and insufferable, Carter was an Ijebu nemesis – British intervention was a welcome development. Johnson described vignettes of the humiliation the Ibadan bore to sustain the diplomatic friendship of the Ijebu right down to the eve of the British conquest.Footnote 41 The Ibadan factor was crucial as the road to Imagbon began when, in February 1892, the Ijebu accused a mixed party of Ibadan and Lagos carriers of acts of impunity on Ijebu soil. It was “without doubt,” writes the Lagos Weekly Record, “the primal incident which led up to the war with Ijebu.”Footnote 42 Thus, heeding Carter’s surreptitious call, the Ibadan contributed a hundred auxiliaries to the expeditionary force that conquered the Ijebu in May.Footnote 43
The second discernible facet of the conflict was the Christian missionary involvement. The failure of Christian missionary activity in Ijebu was a fallout of the British aggression on the Ijebu seaboard following the eviction, under the pressure of the missionaries, of Kosoko to Epe in the early 1850s. For the Ijebu, missionaries were harbingers of conquest. E. A. Ayandele argues that the British desire to introduce Western civilization into Ijebu through Christian conversion was central to the Anglo-Ijebu conflict. He thus contends that the conflict was a “Missionary War” as the missionaries facilitated the denouement.Footnote 44 At the end of January 1892, the Lagos government palmed off an economic time bomb to the Ijebu, which was detonated in February by the indiscretion of the Christian clergy.Footnote 45 The provocative act of preaching on the streets of Ijebu-Ode by Revd. Tugwell, encouraged by the treaty agreement imposed by the Lagos administration, directly led to the armed confrontation at Imagbon.
The third discernible facet in the Anglo-Ijebu conflict was the nature of the Ijebu response. In contrast to the experiences of several Nigerian societies, the people, rather than the royalty, were at the center of the narrative of resistance against British conquest. For example, the plots in the Benin and Sokoto historical dramas mentioned above are built around tragic royal heroes, who ended up as victims of British imperialism – Ovonramwen lost his crown, while Attahiru lost his life. In Ijebu, the plot assumed a broad-based dimension, as the king’s role, advising caution, was overshadowed by pressure from an emergent military and mercantile class that commanded popular support. This development can be traced to November 1879, when a military garrison was dispatched to the frontier market town of Oru to defend the Ijebu border following the commencement of the Ekitiparapo War in 1878. The garrison was under the command of Onafowokan, the Balogun (leading war chieftain).Footnote 46 In December 1882, the garrison spearheaded a rebellion that led to the eviction of Awujale Fidipote (d. 1885) from the throne for refusing to relax the economic restrictions imposed on Ibadan. They held the reins of government until the appointment of a new king, Tunwase, in February 1886.Footnote 47 Rapidly becoming the nucleus of an emergent mercantile class and a pressure group styled Onisowo Pampa (merchants’ guild), they determined the state’s economic policy. Oru was established as the primary market center on the northern border.Footnote 48
Control of the market fell to the young military chieftains headed by Kuku, who received the command of the garrison under the subordinate military title of Seriki following the retirement home of their aging commander, Onafowokan, in February 1888.Footnote 49 However, Kuku’s increasing commercial profile afterwards aroused the antagonistic envy of his comrades. They consequently clamored for his recall from Oru, hoping to undermine his commercial power base.Footnote 50 Matters reached a head at the end of August 1890 when, as Carter was informed later, Kuku “was ordered to return [to Ijebu-Ode] but refused. He was then forcibly turned out of Oru, and took refuge in Ibadan.”Footnote 51 Kuku’s adversaries forced his extradition back home in June 1891, and fearing for his safety, he sought refuge in Ijebu-Ife, some sixteen kilometers east of the capital.Footnote 52
These military and commercial dynamics centered in Oru marked the genesis of the popular resistance movement, which took on the British in 1892 with the Onisowo Pampa as the fountainhead. The thriving commerce at Oru necessitated a nonnegotiable monopoly, that is, the control of all trade between the coast and interior must remain in the hands of the Ijebu.Footnote 53 This rejection of transit trade across Ijebu territory was the crux of the resistance. With Balogun Onafowokan in retirement and Seriki Kuku declared persona non grata, Akala, another soldier-merchant, emerged as one of the principal figures who led the resistance and died on the battlefield.Footnote 54 Prominent war survivors included Odejayi, Sarumi, Odunuga, and Sote, all of whom became eminent personalities of the postconflict era.Footnote 55
In contrast with his Benin and Sokoto counterparts in the published historical dramas, the Ijebu king, Tunwase, was misconceived by his subjects as a saboteur of the national cause.Footnote 56 He incurred the wrath of his people for advising a conciliatory approach towards the Lagos administration. In addition, he was not averse to Christian evangelism and Western education in his domain, making overtures to the Catholic missionaries of the Society of African Missions from early on in his reign.Footnote 57 Thus, he was exposed to charges of sabotage for permitting the arrival in July 1889 of a (Nigerian) Anglican Christian missionary, George A. Roberts, to preach Christianity in Ijebu-Ode and its environs as well as commence educational instruction in the palace. At a time when anybody connected with Lagos was suspected of espionage, the missionary’s arrival was inauspicious. “An ugly rumour began to spread,” writes the missionary, “that I was the representative of the British Government here under the Awujale, for the latter has received £1,000 from them for this arrangement.”Footnote 58 Roberts was subjected to much derision and animosity, and, feeling increasingly insecure, secretly abandoned his duty post in March 1890.Footnote 59 This lack of trust in the Awujale’s genuine intentions contributed to the failure of Denton’s negotiations when he came calling in May 1891. The extent to which the Awujale’s authority subsequently became vitiated was demonstrated enough when he was sidelined in the selection process of the delegation sent to negotiate the treaty with the Lagos government in January 1892. “The people met at the Ogboni’s [Osugbo],” he lamented, “and selected the deputation to go to Lagos, and sent to inform me of it.”Footnote 60 In the event, half of those selected were the Onisowo Pampa, not constitutionally entitled to be on the delegation.
Buffeted by his people and sharply upbraided by the commander of the British expeditionary force for his inability to keep his subjects in check, the Awujale’s role in the conflict was one of a hapless pacifist who unsuccessfully strove to protect his kingdom from a foreboding calamity. It is instructive of the king’s disposition that the age group formed after the conflict was named Obase, the king is vindicated of his pacifist appeals.Footnote 61
Alongside the three themes discussed above, several additional key elements can be highlighted to enrich the dramatization process. One such element is the nature or extent of female involvement in the conflict. In nineteenth-century Yoruba warfare, women often played a significant role in prolonged conflicts, providing sundry logistic support in battle theaters.Footnote 62 It is recounted that women went to the Imagbon War armed with ropes, eager at the prospect of capturing Europeans to extract valuable metals believed to be inside their bodies.Footnote 63 The encounter was expected to be primarily against European military personnel. Therefore, participation in the battle offered high promises of material gains. However, the primary motivation was the patriotic desire to defend their state against foreign military aggression, very much akin to the response of the Egba women who rapidly mobilized to support their menfolk when Abeokuta was attacked in 1851 by an army from Dahomey, which included many Amazons. S. O. Biobaku asserts that “the Egba owed their victory to the zeal of their women, who attended the wounded and kept the front-line supplied with food and water.”Footnote 64 Although the armed confrontation with the British-led expeditionary force was too brief and complete for a thorough evaluation of women’s involvement in the episode, attention to female participation is necessary to preclude an oversight of this feature in dramatized representations of the episode, lest the male gender constitute the sole element in the Ijebu camp.
A second element was the use of mystical or metaphysical forces.Footnote 65 Among the Yoruba, the Ijebu were famed for their faith in the power and use of imprecation. The Ijebu, according to a contemporary remark, possess “a blind and obdurate belief in superstition and jujuism.”Footnote 66 They thus hoped to use supernatural forces against the expeditionary force. Johnson writes:
They had offered in sacrifice a man and a woman, goats, fowls and pigeons at Ito Iki [from where it was believed the enemy would approach], and charms of imprecation for which they were famous were uttered over the creek that the vessels may founder and the expedition might end in failure.Footnote 67
River Yemoji, on the edge of Imagbon, was similarly ritualized as “it was reported that they had offered a human sacrifice to the goddess of the river, to enlist her aid against the invaders.”Footnote 68
Carter disparaged the Ijebu for relying “more upon the power of their ‘Fetish’ than upon force of arms.”Footnote 69 According to him, “it was doubtless their firm faith in the power of this ‘fetish’ which enabled them to resist the British force for so long.”Footnote 70 The British ace was the deployment of incendiary artillery, which “turned fresh wet foliage into ashes” and dissolved the confidence of the Ijebu in the elemental forces as they fled from the battle scene.Footnote 71 The experience was sufficiently shattering to discourage further hopes of extending the struggle to a new battlefield.Footnote 72
The third element towards enriching dramatization is the aspect of songs. Over time, the Yoruba have been remarkable for their spontaneous composition of ditties for various events. Such songs not only could offer historical material but are significant reflections of the mood of the moment, espousing a people’s cause against a common foe. Disappointingly, songs relating to the Imagbon War are hardly recalled nowadays. However, fitting improvisations are permissible in a Yoruba stage or screen performance context.Footnote 73 For example, one might imagine a song emphasizing the oft-repeated contention of the Ijebu against British incursion that God “had separated them from each other, assigning to the white man the sea and to the black man the solid earth.”Footnote 74 Such an improvisation represents, to use R. A. Rosenstone’s terminology, a “true invention” as opposed to the “false invention” of a factitious storyline.Footnote 75
The setting and site locations are among the other key components of the plot for the dramatization. The site locations of the Anglo-Ijebu conflict still exist.Footnote 76 The principal ones include Lagos, Ijebu-Ode, Oru, Itoikin, Epe, Poka, Naforija, Odo Lagaye, Mojoda, and Imagbon. A setting is expected to reflect the ambience of a preindustrial society in the nineteenth century. This is to prevent historical anachronisms.
In terms of characterization, considerable flexibility is expected, depending on the feasible size of the cast. On the Lagos side, the principal characters are Acting Governor Denton and Governor Carter. The identification of the nationality of the Lagos cast requires close attention. Many of the characters mentioned in the text with English names were local citizens.Footnote 77 On the Ijebu side, the focus is on Awujale Tunwase, supported by officials (sitting in state) identified by their titles. Some of these officials could be assigned specific roles in the plot where their names are available. For example, the Olisa (the most senior chief) at the time of the conquest was Aboki (d. 1902). The Ogbeni Oja (next to the Olisa) was Afesomu (d. 1906). Then there are the military chieftains and prime movers of the events, notably Onafowokan, Kuku, and Akala. To these characters may be added other known and prominent survivors of the conflict, such as Odejayi, Sarumi, Odunuga, and Sote.
Ijebu Sites.
Script adaptation can also be expressed in a variety of dramatic forms, including stage plays, movies, television series, documentaries, and feature films. The media forms are contingent upon several factors, such as finances, means, time, themes, and objectives. For example, the cost of producing a stage play will always be less than that of producing a documentary, feature film, or television series. The time scale is also shorter for stage production. The character and nature of what to dramatize or not is open to the dramatist, film scriptwriter, TV scriptwriter, or playwright. The script adaptation may, for example, be determined by objectives and themes as illustrated above.
The script data
The working data for the dramatization of the Anglo-Ijebu conflict is provided in this section. It is a script-like chronological narrative arranged in dated entries. It is for script creation and adaptation in varying media forms mentioned above. Each entry is captioned with its source and the specific date of the event described. The entries are narratives of events in Lagos and Ijebu, excluding those at the London end. However, this is an optional consideration imposed here by space constraints. It could therefore be expanded to accommodate a wide range of adaptations, incorporating the responses and attitudes of policy makers at the Colonial Office.
In breaking down the text from the sources into dated entries, minor structural adjustments and elisions have been made to retain thought continuity and chronological sequence. Where necessary, annotations are provided for further elaboration, new insights, and reinterpretations of the subject. The annotations are significant as they enable the dramatization of the narrative to be rendered in its correct historical perspective. Modern town spellings are applied (e.g., Ijebu-Ode for Jebu Ode, Itoikin for Ito-Iki of the original text) for easy identification. There are two appendices at the end of the article. Appendix 1 is a short outline of Ijebu state organs to serve the dual purpose of a glossary and an additional source for the construction of local character designation. Appendix 2 is the Anglo-Ijebu Agreement, which was the casus belli for the British military expedition against Ijebu.
A. C. Molony, who assumed office as the Governor of the Lagos Colony in 1886, proceeded on terminal leave at the end of 1890. In his absence, the Colonial Secretary, G. C. Denton, held the helm of affairs as Acting Governor. The text begins with an attempt by Denton to overcome the resoluteness of the Ijebu by diplomatic means as recommended by the departed governor.
Denton [Wednesday, 11 February 1891]Footnote 78
I informed the Awujale by messengers whom he sent to salute me on my assumption of office of the government that if agreeable to him it would afford me much pleasure to pay a visit to Ijebu-Ode with a view to discussing with him personally matters of mutual interest to Ijebu-Ode and Lagos.Footnote 79
Denton [Wednesday, 11 March 1891]Footnote 80
I receive a reply that the Awujale was well pleased with my message, and I should hear later on from him on the subject when the customs attendant on the funeral of his brother are over. By the messengers who brought this communication, I asked the Awujale to be good enough to let me know the probable date of the termination of the funeral customs, also when I might expect to receive a definite answer to the message proposing my message to him.
Denton [Wednesday, 1 April 1891]Footnote 81
Messengers again came to me, and I was informed that when the festivities were over, the king would be very glad that I should come to Ijebu-Ode. I requested him to let me know, if possible, within twenty-one days, the exact date on which he would receive me.Footnote 82
Denton [Friday, 17 April 1891]Footnote 83
I received a very cordial message from the Awujale inviting me to come to Ijebu-Ode when I liked.
Denton [Monday, 20 April 1891]Footnote 84
In answer, the messenger was requested to convey to the Awujale that I propose to leave Lagos on 6 May and hope to arrive Ijebu-Ode on 7 May. I added that I should be accompanied by some of the officers of the government and by a bodyguard.
Denton [Monday, 4 May 1891]Footnote 85
I sent the carriers required for the expedition with a baggage guard to Itoikin.Footnote 86
The Lagos Times [Monday 4 May 1891]Footnote 87
The arrival of about 200 labourers and some Haussas at Ito Iki was at once a signal for one Amodu who is said to be a Lagosian, and a trader, but who seems to live more frequently on Ijebu soil to dispatch a special messenger to Ode the capital, a distance of about 21mls to announce to the Awujale and his chiefs that war was imminent and that the Governor of Lagos was marching out with a large army against Ijebu to take it, that 2400 of his men had been already landed at Ito Iki, that larger members were to arrive with the governor himself in a day or two, and that the proposed friendly visit was simply a pretext for a quiet march against the Ijebu. Some thoughtless remarks from some of the irresponsible labourers of the expedition to the effect that the governor was coming to fight his way through Ijebu on to Ilorin first suggest this thought to many at the lending place who had been expecting a friendly visit from the Governor of Lagos to their king. Besides, Lagos traders at the Ejinrin market had sought to prejudice Ijebu against the visit and sent up someone to Ode and to the king specially to dissuade him from his consent to accept a visit from the Governor, urging that he might deport him from his country and make him a prisoner in the Lagos Goal [sic] as he has done the King of Ado [Ado Odo];Footnote 88 whilst the Lagosians at Epe on the Lagoon added their own message to him of a similar import. Though the king knew differently and protested to his chiefs and others that the visit he expected was an altogether friendly one … the report created a considerable commotion in the town.Footnote 89
Denton [Wednesday, 6 May 1891]Footnote 90
I arrived at Itoikin in the afternoon. To my surprise, I was greeted by a message to the effect that I was not to come to Ijebu-Ode, that I had too many soldiers with me, and that I must return to Lagos. After some consideration, I decided that the best course to pursue was to send Captain Tarbet [Asst. Inspector, Lagos Constabulary], Mr. Jacob Williams, a Lagos merchant and a native of Ijebu, who was one of my party and Mr Hethersett, to Ijebu-Ode.Footnote 91 [The delegation was rebuffed.]
Denton [Saturday, 9 May 1891]Footnote 92
In the morning another message reached me from the Awujale of an indefinite nature and as matters have gone so far, I considered it advisable to convey in strong terms my opinion of the manner in which he had treated her majesty’s representatives. Accordingly, I sent Dr. Rowland with Mr. Hethersett and Mr. Colley Green to Ijebu-Ode. In reply I was informed that the Awujale would give me a friendly reception if I came without soldiers.
Denton [Monday, 11 May 1891]Footnote 93
After some deliberations, I formed the opinion that I was anxious that the people of Ijebu-Ode should understand that my visit was one purely of a friendly nature and it was advisable that I should concede the point of the guard and I, therefore, made arrangements to leave Itoikin for Ijebu-Ode. No sooner had I arrived at this decision than a further message from the Awujale reached me to the effect that he would be glad to welcome me in five days’ time if I would come without soldiers, guns and swords. This last communication seemed to me the last straw and I informed the messengers that if I went to Ijebu-Ode at all it must be at once.
Denton [Tuesday, 12 May 1891]Footnote 94
I prepared to return to Lagos but at night the messengers returned from Ijebu-Ode and informed me that the Awujale wished me to come at once.
Denton [Wednesday, 13 May 1891]Footnote 95
Accordingly, in the morning I started for Ijebu-Ode which place I reached at 5 p.m. I was accompanied by the Queen’s Advocate [George Stallard]; the Honourable Thomas Welsh, Secretary of the Chambers of Commerce; Dr. Rowland, Colonial Surgeon; Captain Tarbet; Mr. Jacob Williams; Mr. W. R. Harding, Pay and Quarter Master of the Constabulary; Mr. Hethersett, chief clerk and interpreter; and Mr. F. Colley Green, Assistant Superintendent of Police.Footnote 96 At Ijebu-Ode we were lodged at the residence of the Oluwo.Footnote 97 Later in the evening, I was informed that the Awujale would receive me on the following day. I then sent the present which I had brought with me for the Awujale, but was asked by him to offer it publicly, as his people were very suspicious. To this, I at once agreed.
Denton [Thursday, 14 May 1891]Footnote 98
I was not received today; a message being sent to me during the day that I must “be tired and want to rest after my journey.”
Denton [Friday, 15 May 1891]Footnote 99
About 10.30 a.m. a very heavy rain came on and it was not until 4 p.m. that it was sufficiently fine to allow for the public reception to take place which the Awujale wished to give me. When I arrived there, I found some 2000 persons assembled to receive me.Footnote 100 From what I had indirectly learnt I knew that many of the people present were opposed to the Awujale, and I speedily gathered that the general feeling of those present was unfriendly to the Lagos government. I therefore at once went to the actual point and spoke of the arrangement of a scheme by which the produce of the interior could pass to Lagos without the intervention of the Ijebu middlemen.Footnote 101 A most decided and unanimous opinion prevailed on this point, and I felt that nothing short of compulsion would ever bring about any change in the view expressed by the Balogun [Onafowokan] which one can hardly be surprised at when the peculiarly advantageous position now held by the Ijebu is remembered. The Balogun stated, “we will take produce to Ejinrin and what comes there we will take to the interior. What goods the Lagos traders bring they sell at Ejinrin, and we buy and sell to the people of the interior and vice versa. That is how it has been done from the past. God who created the world has also made divisions. The white man got the sea and the natives the lagoon and Ijebu. They need not interfere with Lagos nor Lagos with Ijebu. That being said there is nothing left but to play together, to buy and sell at Ejinrin and play together. What my father has not bowed to before I will not bow to now. People have never passed through Ijebu-Ode to trade, it has never been a trade route.” On my offering the present that I brought with me they were neither accepted nor refused an evasive answer being returned to my enquiries on this point.Footnote 102 I at once informed the Awujale that it was impossible for me to continue the interview in a friendly spirit unless he and his people were prepared to receive my presents and I demanded an immediate and definite decision. The Awujale replied in courteous terms that it was his wish to accept the presents, but that his people would not allow him as to do.Footnote 103 This being so it appeared to me that no other course was open but to withdraw from the meeting and having asked the Awujale’s permission to retire I did so with my party. I also returned the presents of four sheep which had earlier been presented to me the previous day.
Denton [Saturday, 16 May 1891]Footnote 104
I left for Lagos at 6 a.m.
Denton [Sunday, 17 May 1891]Footnote 105
Arrived Lagos at 6 a.m. I am convinced that it is useless to hope to establish an open road through Ijebu by friendly negotiations. But should we assume a hostile attitude the case would be completely altered and the opportunity to obtain a road to the sea would be immediately seized upon by the Ibadan and Oyo.Footnote 106
Carter [Thursday, 5 November 1891]Footnote 107
I am instructed to call upon the king of Ijebu to apologise for the manner in which the Acting Governor was received and to inform him that unless an agreement is concluded whereby all traders or other persons passing between the interior and Lagos are allowed free and unhindered passage through the Ijebu country, I have been instructed to take such steps as may be necessary to enforce compliance with these demands.
Carter [Thursday, 17 December 1891]Footnote 108
I have addressed the letter to the King of Ijebu through Mr. G. B. Haddon-Smith, the Acting Inspector General of Police. The Ijebu have been given a month to reply to the ultimatum.
Carter [Sunday, 20 December 1891]Footnote 109
Mr. Haddon-Smith was treated with proper courtesy and respect, and it was proposed to send a deputation from Ijebu to Lagos consisting of representatives from all the Ijebu towns to discuss the question of the roads.Footnote 110
Carter [Thursday, 31 December 1891]Footnote 111
In view of the statement made by the King of Ijebu that 30 days would elapse before the deputation would be sent to Lagos, I judged it advisable to despatch another message pointing out to his Majesty that it would be necessary for the whole question to be settled within 30 days, and expressing my surprise that he had not taken the opportunity of sending back by Mr. Haddon-Smith, the apology, which had been demanded by her Majesty’s Government. I likewise judged it expedient to return the king’s present of 6 sheep, which he had handed to Mr. Haddon-Smith for conveyance to me. I obtained the services Mr. Isaac Bypass, also an Ijebu and well known in the country, to accompany Mr. Haddon, the Constabulary Pay and Quarter Master.
Carter [Friday, 1 January 1892]Footnote 112
They arrived Ijebu-Ode at 2 p.m. and were treated with all proper courtesy.
Carter [Sunday, 3 January 1892]Footnote 113
The king received them in the presence of the elders. The king replied that it was not his intention to allow the fixed time to pass by without carrying out his promise in regard to the deputation which would express its views clearly as to what the wishes of his people were. On the subject of the apology, His Majesty excused his former conduct to Captain Denton by professing to be alarmed at his appearance at Itoikin with “armed men, gun powder, big guns, drums and bugles,” which have the aspect of an aggressive body.
Carter [Thursday, 14 January 1892]Footnote 114
The first contingent of the Ijebu deputation arrived.
Carter [Saturday, 16 January 1892]Footnote 115
The remaining portion of them arrived. There were twenty-two in all—representing the principal Ijebu officials detailed as follows: 4 Agunrins [Aguren]: 4 Ogbonis [Osugbo];Footnote 116 3 Pampas; 11 Parakoyis [Onisowo Pampa].Footnote 117 The first I understand to be the special and confidential officers of the king, the second, the principal advisers of the king, the third officials who deal with trade questions, and the fourth a subordinate section of the same department.Footnote 118
Carter [Monday,18 January 1892]
I arranged to have a meeting with the deputation at 8.30 a.m. and determined to make it as formal and impressive as possible. I had arranged for a salute to be fired, as I have found from previous experience that the sound of a big gun appeals to the intelligence of a West African nature with far greater effect than the most subtle logic.Footnote 119 I also took care to appear in uniform and requested Captain Denton to do likewise, the legal officers also donned their wigs and gowns, so that there was nothing wanting to render the externals duly impressive and significant. I told the deputation that they were fully acquainted with the correspondence which had taken place between the king (Awujale) and myself and wished to know if they have full power to deal with the matters without further reference to Ijebu. The spokesman replied that they had full authority to treat and had instructions to hear what the governor had to say, and to reply to the same. They replied that they were all in accord in desiring to express their regret for the offence given regarding the implied insult on the occasion of Denton’s visit and that they spoke in the name of the king and of the Ijebu nation. I then proceeded to the question of the roads, briefly alluding to the past history of the question and speaking very plainly on the subject of their backwardness as compared with their neighbouring tribes. I particularly adverted to their folly in refusing to receive missionaries in their country, and though I could not coerce them into adopting such a policy, yet I strongly advised them to follow the example of those who had done so. I bade them to compare the position of Lagos with that of their own country, and told them that the results which they could see with their own eyes had not been achieved by the policy of isolation which they had adopted but by liberal and advanced views, by free trade and by the encouragement of missionaries which established schools and endeavoured to introduce a higher standard of morality and a purer form of religion than at present existed amongst those natives which were ignorant of the Bible. I added that Her Majesty’s government had determined that in future all roads and waterways through their country were to be free and open to all, and while I should be glad to hear anything they had to say on the subject, it must be distinctly understood that a decision such as I had intimated was imperative. The spokesman then replied that the King was ready to agree that all the roads should be open and free. I then enquired if they were prepared to sign an agreement to that effect. The spokesman said that they were ready to agree to what had been proposed but that they did not understand “Book.” The meeting broke up with the understanding that an agreement should be drawn up for signature embodying the terms to which they had assented and arranging for compensation to be made to the king in view of his losses consequent upon the abolition of the tolls.
LWR [Monday, 18 January 1892]Footnote 120
The meeting took place on the grounds of Government House at 8.30 a.m. in the presence of a large gathering of every section of the community. His Excellency who was in full uniform occupied a seat on a dais decorated with flags and was supported on his right by the Hon. G. C. Denton, Colonial Secretary, who was also in uniform, and on his left by His Honour E. H. Richards, Acting Chief Justice and the Hon. H. W. de Sausmares, acting Queens Advocate in their robes. Officials, Heads of Departments, and members of the legislative council also occupied seats upon the dais. On the right and left of the dais were seats appropriated to the use of the elite portion of the community, the Ijebu representatives being accommodated with mats in front of the dais, Messrs J. A. Otonba Payne and Jacob Williams being seated with them.Footnote 121 As His Excellency and suite entered the grounds the Hausa force which was drawn up in full array in the street fronting Government House saluted him by presenting arms, the band playing the national anthem, and the whole company rising to greet His Excellency; which was followed by a salute of 17 guns fired from the battery in front of Government House. In the interview with the deputation His Excellency said he would like to know the names and official rank of the persons forming the deputation and which were enumerated and explained as follows: The Agunrins (king’s officers); Ogbonis Odi (privy councillors);Footnote 122 Osugbos (legislature);Footnote 123 Pampas (trade); Parakoyis (directors of commerce).Footnote 124 After this explanation had been given, His Excellency said that he deserved particularly to know if the deputation represented the whole Ijebu tribe; whether there was any Ijebu interest unrepresented, and if they represented the whole Ijebu nation. His Excellency said that the first primary question then was the insults recently offered by the Ijebu to Her Majesty the Queen, that when Capt. Denton, who was now sitting, on his right, went as representing Her Majesty to visit Ijebu recently, he reported that he was received with the most marked discourtesy, although he went there on a friendly errand, and that the presents offered by him in Her Majesty’s name were refused. That he could only consider such treatment as grievous insult and that it was regarded as such in Lagos. He therefore demanded an apology for the insult and that apology he must have and if the deputation were not prepared to give that apology the interview must terminate as no other matter could be disposed of before this apology. His Excellency expressed the hope that the deputation would comply with his demand, assuring them if they did not that they would bring trouble upon themselves. The chief Agunrin spoke. He said that before the acting governor’s arrival at Ijebu, the people of the country had accused the Awujale of having sold the country to the English government for £15,400. That on the Acting Governor’s arrival at Ito-Iki, that there was a great commotion, the people saying that the man to whom the country had been sold had come. That it was on this account that the people refused to receive the present from the Acting Governor, and that the Awujale deemed it prudent on his part under these circumstances not to accept the presents made to him also. The Agunrin said that they are prepared to make an apology and that they would beg His Excellency’s pardon for what had happened. His Excellency said that he was very glad to accept the apology from them, that they should take a lesson from the present, as another case of the kind might involve serious consequences. His Excellency then observed that the next question of importance was the one dealing with the roads. That the Ijebu authorities knew that the government had for a long time demanded the opening of the roads, and that it was very foolish on their part to persist in keeping them closed; for whilst it enabled a few to profit by it, it also kept back the bulk of prosperity. That he had never visited Ijebu country, but he had heard and read about it, and that all travellers through it agreed in stating that the position of the people was far behind other tribes in intelligence and advancement, etc., and that the cause of it was because they would not allow missionaries to go into their country to teach them. His Excellency said that though he could not coerce them into admitting missionaries into their country, he would advise them to do so. That they should see the difference between Lagos and Ijebu, that if they had been as conservative and prejudiced as the Ijebu, Lagos would not be what it is today; and that he should like to see the Ijebu country under the developing influence of Christianity and civilisation. That her Majesty’s government was determined that trade should not be restricted. His Excellency then inquired of them if they were prepared to make an agreement stating that the roads were to be opened. The Agurin in reply said that they agreed the roads should be opened, but that they did not understand “book.” His Excellency said he would present an agreement to them and if they said that they could not sign it then he would open the roads in his own way. That he had written to inform the Awujale that he would put certain things before him in writing which he would ask him to agree to and promise to abide by. That they have friends and relatives in Lagos who will understand and explain the agreement to them. After enquiring of the deputation if they had anything more to say, and receiving a reply in the negative, His Excellency dismissed the deputation and the interview terminated.
Carter [Thursday, 21 January 1892]Footnote 125
The Ijebu again assembled, where I brought forward an agreement which had been drawn up. I found that they had an invincible objection to sign the document, and moreover to my surprise again raised the question of the tolls which they still wished to retain.Footnote 126 I, however, expressed my mind very frankly very freely upon the subject and told them frankly that unless this concession was made the government would take immediate steps to free the roads in its own fashion in which case the king would get nothing. The Ijebu then gave way and definitely promised that all the roads and waterways should be open for produce and goods passing through both ways, and that all tolls should be abolished. I then read the agreement which was carefully explained to them, and they unanimously agreed to all its provisions, but every argument failed to induce them to affix their signatures—they said they understood nothing about the “Book” and that the promise they had given was quite as binding as if they touched the pen as I wished them to do.Footnote 127 Seeing that it was hopeless to get any further, I called upon Mr. Payne and Mr. Jacob Williams, the two Ijebus they had expressly asked to be present to sign the document on their behalf as witnessing the solemn promise their compatriots had made. Both these gentlemen then addressed the deputation and obtained from them a unanimous declaration of agreement to the terms of compact, and further at Mr. Payne’s request they took the oath of their country on kola nuts and water—this was regarded as satisfactory by all parties present and Mr. Payne and Mr. Williams then affixed their names to the document. There can be no doubt that the Lagos government has acquired the rights laid down in the document at a very reasonable figure, and I feel sure that the freedom of the Ijebu roads and waterways will ultimately mean a large increase to the trade of this port.
LWR [Thursday, 4 February 1892]Footnote 128
Revd. T. Harding of the C.M.S. passed by the Sagamu route of Jebu Remo. The latest news from Jebu reports that free transit is afforded through the country to all travellers, both by the Jebu Ode and Jebu Remo routes.
LWR [Tuesday, 9 February 1892]Footnote 129
We were 58 carriers in all who left Ibadan for Itoikin having been dispatched by the Rev. T. Harding to fetch some loads which he had at the latter place. But of our number only 33 were to return to Ibadan with the loads, the remainder being men who had been employed from Lagos and who were to return home from Ito-Iki. We left Ibadan early in the morning.
LWR [Wednesday, 10 February 1892]Footnote 130
We arrived at Ijebu-Ode about 1 p.m. without any molestation. We proceeded to the house of Agunrin Olowu to salute him on Mr. Harding’s behalf and as we had been directed to do by Mr. Harding, the Agunrin Olowu being the chief with whom Mr. Harding usually lodged in passing through Ijebu.Footnote 131 We did not meet the chief at home, so we all sat down in the open space in front of his house. In a little while a man from inside the house came to the door and inquired if we had all arrived, and we replied that we had. A few minutes after we were surrounded by a large crowd who began to abuse, and “swear upon” us; and said that their roads did not belong to either the white man or the Yorubas, and that they were determined that not one of us should escape, and that when they had done with us the whole Yoruba nation would be convinced that they were owners of their country and roads.Footnote 132 Immediately after one of their number came amongst us and ordered us to stand up and began to slap our faces. The crowd then set upon us and began to beat us with clubs and to slash us with machetes, and we all endeavoured to escape for our lives. When the women and old men saw what was going on, they cried, and that if they did not wish us to pass through the country, they should allow us to return from whence we came. It was in this circumstance that we were not all murdered on the spot, and that we owed our lives and managed to escape; but nearly all of us with more or less serious wounds inflicted with iron pegged clubs and machetes. We were stripped of everything we had. I the leader was clubbed and fell senseless on the ground near Olowu’s house. My arm was as I believed broken, and I had a fearful club wound at the back of the head from which I bled profusely. It was this blow which felled me and rendered me insensible. I remained unconscious until nearly dark, and at night someone came and lifted me to Olowu’s veranda where I remained.Footnote 133
LWR [Thursday, 11 February 1892]Footnote 134
In the morning Olowu gave me six strings of cowries and sent two men to lead me to the gate to prevent my being again attacked. My companions fled in every direction, and I did not come up with any of them until I reached Odo [River] Omi beyond Oru.
Ayantuga [Monday, 15 February 1892]Footnote 135
Bishop Tugwell was offended by what he conceived to be the Ijebu attitude to the missionary carriers.Footnote 136 A highly bellicose missionary, he immediately hurried from Lagos to Ijebu-Ode to express his resentment against the Ijebu. Contrary to what usually obtained, he refused to be announced to the king by the responsible Ijebu official. Instead, he burst through and demanded immediate interview with the Awujale. He was refused permission by the chiefs who lodged him for the night and gave him the present of a sheep from the king.
Ayantuga [Tuesday, 16 February 1892]Footnote 137
Tugwell left his lodging and went into the streets to preach the gospel. The young men were furious. Tugwell’s behaviour seemed to them to substantiate the rumour that their king had sold Ijebu to the white man. They sought to molest him, but the chiefs prevented the hotheads and instead took the pastor to the palace where he questioned the propriety of the Ijebu attitude to the Ibadan carriers. The hotheads wanted to manhandle the missionary, but the chiefs sheltered him and safely led him out of the town.
Denton [Saturday, 20 February 1892]Footnote 138
I have letters from Revd. T. Harding and Revd. H. Tugwell complaining of the treatment which they have received from the Awujale and people of Ijebu-Ode. In the absence of any explanation from the Ijebu authorities, it would appear that the Agreement of 21 January has been broken, but before any action is taken to enforce compliance with it, it seems to me but just that the Awujale should be invited to give his side of the story. I, therefore, propose to send the Inspector General of Constabulary, Major Stanley, to Ijebu-Ode. In this way, I hope to have matters ripe for the governor [Carter] on his return from Ondo and Ilesa.
LWR [Tuesday, 23 February 1892]Footnote 139
Major Edward Stanley, Inspector General of Constabulary, accompanied by Mr. A. Hethersett, government interpreter, and Mr. I. A. Bypass proceeded to Ijebu-Ode to inquire into the cause of the recent interruption of intercourse with the interior through that country in violation of the treaty lately entered into with this government.
LWR [Thursday, 25 February 1892]Footnote 140
Major Stanley was not allowed to proceed beyond Itoikin before he was turned back to Lagos. [The Ijebu closed their roads thereafter.]
Ayantuga [Friday, 18 March 1892]Footnote 141
The British government approved military action against Ijebu.
Carter [Wednesday, 30 March 1892]Footnote 142
Colonel F. C. Scott, head of the Gold Coast Constabulary, and commander of the proposed Ijebu Expedition arrived in Lagos.
Carter [Wednesday, 13 April 1892]Footnote 143
I received a deputation headed by the Revd. James Johnson, who waited upon me, practically to suggest that the government should use further forbearance with the Jebus, and wait until a native deputation which it was proposed to send to Ijebu-Ode, had made further remonstrances with this misguided race and endeavoured to settle matters peacefully. I said the Jebus had left me no alternative, and that whatever happened now, it had been finally decided that a military force should march to Jebu and insist on the treaty being carried out.Footnote 144
Smith [Monday, 2 May 1892] Composition of the ForceFootnote 145
The force immediately available to the Lagos Government consisted only of the local Constabulary. The Colonial Office agreed with the Governor that reinforcements were needed. These were to consist of constables from the Gold Coast – the “Gold Coast Hausas,” a company from the West Indian Regiment stationed in Sierra Leone, the Colonial Office having thought it “safer that some regular forces should be engaged.” Permission was then obtained to add a number of Ibadan “war boys” who had volunteered their help and who were to be used as either troops or carriers. The commander, Colonel F. C. Scott, C.B., was a veteran who had fought against the Ashanti eighteen years before and was a senior to Major Stanley, the Inspector-General in Lagos. In addition, seven Special Service officers from England were seconded to the expedition [Capt. A. S. Hardinge, Capt. E. R. Owen, Capt. A. V. Ussher, Capt. R. L. Bower, Capt. J. R. V. Gordon, Lieut. C. E. Lawrie, and Lieut. J. F. Davis]. The Gold Coast constables were equipped with Martini-Henry rifles whereas their Lagos counterparts had Sniders. The West Indians [had] Martini-Henry’s. The Ibadan auxiliaries [had] flint-lock muskets known as “Dane guns,” a few had Sniders. The expedition was also allotted three seven-pounder guns, one Maxim machine-gun, two Nordenfelt machine-guns, and three rocket troughs.
Smith [Tuesday, 10 May 1892]Footnote 146
Carter held an inspection of the combined force on the racecourse, at which he professed himself particularly impressed by the Ibadan fighting contingent. On the same day he issued his instructions to Colonel Scott. In these he wrote that: “The main object of the Expedition is to compel the Jebus to permit a free passage through their country to all persons whether native or European from the interior to Lagoon and vice versa and in fact to open all roads and waterways passing through their country, to legitimate Commerce.” To attain this, Scott was “to proceed to Ijebu Ode, and occupy the place, by peaceable means if practicable but if not by force.” The instructions stipulated that the expedition should proceed by water to Epe whence there was believed to be a reasonably good road to the Ijebu capital.
Smith [Thursday, 12 May 1892] Embarkation and Departure of the Expeditionary ForceFootnote 147
At daybreak, in heavy rain, the expedition began to embark. It consisted of the commander, Colonel Scott, thirteen European officers (including police officers), four local police officers (two being Lagosian and two Gold Coast “Hausas”), 458 rank and file, and 100 Ibadan warriors under Chief Toyan. This fighting force was accompanied by the Acting Colonial Surgeon as Chief Medical Officer; a Surgeon-Captain from the West India Regiment; 350 carriers, increased by later recruitment at Epe and Lekki [14–15 May] to 536; twenty-seven guides and interpreters; and finally, the proprietor and editor of the Lagos Weekly Record, John Payne Jackson, as Special Correspondent. The total expedition numbering some 1,042. Their transport consisted of the government steam yacht Margaret with six large canoes and six covered lighters towed by steam launches. Embarkation was completed at about 10.30 a.m. and an hour later the expedition was under way. Progress up the lagoon was slow, but during the night the flotilla arrived off Epe.
Smith [Friday, 13 May 1892] Disembarkation of the Expeditionary Force in EpeFootnote 148
Disembarkation began at daybreak.Footnote 149 The northern, or Ijebu, half of the town was found to have been deserted, but the inhabitants of the lagoon side, of Lagos descent and mostly Moslems, proved as friendly as had been expected and under the leadership of Braimo Edu co-operated with the expedition.Footnote 150
Smith [Monday, 16 May 1892] The Encounter at Pobo/PokaFootnote 151
At 7.30 a.m. the force of 463 Officers and men and 566 non-combatants set out on its march to Ijebu Ode, leaving a rearguard at Epe of one officer and twelve men of the West India Regiment. They were able to cover only some one and a half miles in the hour. In the van as scouts were the Ibadan, accompanied by Captain the Honourable A. S. Hardinge with whom as interpreter and aide was Abraham Claude Willoughby an Assistant Superintendent in the Lagos Constabulary. The advance guard was provided by thirty men of this constabulary under Captain Bower, with two of the three machine-guns and one rocket trough under Lieutenant Lawrie. Colonel Scott and his staff came next, accompanied by an escort of thirty Gold Coast constables under the command of Lieutenant Davies. Then came the main body with the rest of the guns and the reserve ammunition, and stretcher parties, driving thirty-three head of cattle as part of provisions for the troops. The carriers presumably marched next, with the rearguard following with one machine-gun allotted to them. After a march of three to four hours, during which they noticed a number of deserted hamlets on their route, the expedition reached the village of Pobo. Here the first action of the campaign was fought. An advanced detachment of Ijebu had taken up positions in the surrounding bush and now received the invaders with a volley of fire. The Ibadan and the constables at the head of the column, reinforced by one seven-pounder gun, returned the fire and must at the same time have deployed into the bush in accordance with tactics laid down for such engagements and practised at Lagos. But having inflicted casualties, the Ijebu soon withdrew, falling back towards the hamlet of Naforija, about three-quarters of a mile to the north. They were followed by the Lagos force and another exchange of fire took place here before the Ijebu again broke off the engagement. Eight of the Lagos force had been wounded in this short but sharp battle, and although it was still only early afternoon the commander decided to halt his advance and camp for the night in the empty houses of Pobo. Of the casualties, seven were Ibadan warriors and the other a carrier. Their wounds had all been inflicted by slugs or buckshot, and only in one case were serious; this was an Ibadan who died a few days later in Ijebu Ode.Footnote 152
Smith [Tuesday, 17 May 1892] Encounters at Pasida (Odo Ragusin) and MojodaFootnote 153
The expedition made an early start, first burning the houses of Pobo where they had spent the night and then moving off along the track northwards. On their right was Naforija whence they had driven off the Ijebu the previous day. A few hundred yards further north they crossed the great earthwork known as the Eredo.Footnote 154 A village to the right of the path, also known as Eredo, was shelled but proved to be already deserted. Then, shortly before 8 a.m., as the column wound its way between hills covered by dense forest, it came under heavy fire from the defenders [at Pasida]. The Ijebu position here just before the village of Odo Ragusen, was a strong one, well covered and commanding the leading ranks of the invaders. The latter were led, as on the previous day, by the Ibadan under Hardinge and their own chief and the two companies of constables under Captains Gordon and Bower. Despite the Ijebu fire they continued to press slowly forward on the line of advance, while the rest of the column were led by Captain Owen on a flanking movement and Lawrie manoeuvred his guns into position. The whole weight of the Lagos fire was then brought to bear on the Ijebu, who had made no countermove to outflank the expedition, and after a short time the defenders were forced to withdraw from the cover of the forest across neighbouring farmland where they provided a target for artillery as well as rifle fire. The Lagos force was now able “to make full use of the superior range of their weapons.” After enduring an hour of this fire in their new positions, the Ijebu again began to retreat. The Ibadan and the constables joined in pursuit [extending operations further afield to Mojoda]. At about 4 p.m. a few Ijebu, led by a chief in a red cap, made a sortie from the bush but were driven back by “a few rounds from the maxim gun and a seven-pounder shell,” leaving the chief and several others dead. The Lagos troops spent the rest of the day and that night in the deserted compounds of the village [of Mojoda].
Smith [Wednesday, 18 May 1892] Encampment at Odo LagayeFootnote 155
Scott again got his men on the march at first light. Throughout the morning nothing was seen of the enemy, but reports were brought in that the Ijebu army was preparing to stand not far away, and the villages on the route had all been abandoned.Footnote 156 A little to the north of Mojoda the column passed through Odo Agboju. At about 10.30 a.m. they crossed a river and soon after midday occupied Odo Lagaye where they encamped.
Smith [Thursday, 19 May 1892] Battle of Yemoji River, ImagbonFootnote 157
Battle Site: The small river Yemoji flows south-west to the river Owa which in turn enters the lagoon about half a mile to the east of Ejinrin and was crossed by the track from Epe at a point some five miles in a direct line from Ijebu Ode. Here the river running through a “steep and narrow ravine,” broadened out into a “little lake” about forty yards in width with marshy banks; a ford led through the western side to connect the two ends of the track while on the east was “grassy island.” Although it was still early in the wet season there had been a heavy fall of rain on the previous afternoon and even at the ford the water was waist-deep. From the Epe direction “a hollow and rugged path” dropped down the side of the heavily wooded slope, crossed a small tributary stream, and then reached the ford some 300 to 400 yards beyond. On either side of the lake the river narrowed and ran through dense bush. The main body of the Ijebu army was concealed in good firing positions on the steep and wooded slopes of the further side of the river, while a large detachment, estimated at about 700 men, was posted forward of the river to cover the enemy’s approach. The ford itself had been deepened and obstructed by the Ijebu who threw “snags” (presumably boulders) into the water as well as adding charms or “medicine,” while the thick bush both screened the movements of the defenders and made it impossible for the Lagos to deploy as soon as they came under fire and so bring their superior firepower to bear.
The Battle 7.15 a.m.–10.15 a.m.: Soon after beginning their march [from Odo Lagaye about 6 a.m.] the Lagos encountered scattered firing from the hills on their left, probably meant as a signal to the main Ijebu army to the north. About an hour after leaving their camp, they reached the crest of the hill above the Yemoji valley (a point from which today an extensive view stretching beyond Ijebu Ode is obtained, but which in 1892 must have been buried within high forest). The Gold Coast constables were in the van with the Ibadan, and the column still extended, by Scott’s estimation, to nearly two miles. As they descended the slope, on a path which must have been slippery with mud, the Ibadan suddenly checked, averring that they could “smell” the enemy ahead, and began to sound their drums and look to their war charms. A few minutes later, as the column rounded a bend in the path, the Ijebu opened fire. It was now 7.15 a.m., and a hard battle lasting nearly three hours lay ahead. Continuing their slow advance down the “hollow path,” the Lagos force crossed the tributary stream flowing to the Yemoji. At this point the Ijebu fire, from positions commanding (it seemed) the whole length of the column, became intense, and a number of Lagos men were hit. This hindered movement on the path and pinned down the invaders for about thirty minutes as they tried to make an effective return of fire against an invisible foe. At last, the leading members of the column emerged on a patch of level and more open ground bordering the river, where they were able to spread out into open formation to minimise the effect of the heavy fire coming from the main body of the defenders on the opposite side of the valley. The battle of the Yemoji was now at its crisis. If the Ijebu could hold the invaders on the further bank of the river for that morning and continue to inflict casualties, they would save their kingdom, while for the Lagos expedition, greatly outnumbered and exposed to a galling fire, there was no way left for any flanking movement and no choice but to force a passage of the river. The Lagos were now deployed into three columns, with the two companies of constables on the flanks and the West Indians in the centre and (apparently) to the rear. As they came up to the river, Lawrie – who had accompanied the leading rifles – succeeded in bringing his Maxim to bear on the enemy ahead, sweeping the opposite bank with fire. Under this cover Owen and Gordon led the Hausa into the water, but immediately Owen was hit, and the troops wavered and held back. At this crucial point, the fifty-eight-year-old Colonel Scott sprang into the waist-deep water and thundered out to the West Indian company to advance. The West Indians, under Major Madden, responded and entered the river, steadily wading towards the opposite bank, under fire and “stumbling on the snags” but still going at the enemy.Footnote 158 Meanwhile, the seven-pounders and rockets had been positioned, and as the rest of the force followed on through the ford, they fired over their heads so that to the defenders the trees seemed to burst into flame and the Ibadan acclaimed Scott as adana sun igbo, “he who sets the forest ablaze.” By 8.30 a.m. the main body of the Lagos force had crossed the river, “every man and every gun being engaged” and now their superior firepower began to tell against the superior numbers of the defence. The Maxim had played a big part in the river crossing, and though Lawrie had been slightly wounded in the action, the machine-guns accompanied the troops across the river, followed by the seven-pounders (one of which was shouldered over by Colley-Green, a Lagosian Assistant Superintendent of Police). The Ijebu continued to dispute every turn of the path which they lined on either side, but the bush here, though still dense, was comparatively low so that the Lagos guns and rocket troughs could be brought into effective action from the path. In the rear heavy firing caused some concern for the safety of the long line of carriers and their loads, but the rearguard held its own. Then, as the main body fought its way up the slope on the further side of the river, the Ijebu fire began to slacken. By about 9.45 the defence was breaking and the Ijebu began to withdraw. But their withdrawal was no rout, and it was about 11 a.m. before the main Lagos force, after shelling the village of Imagbon half a mile ahead, completed the ascent of the further side of the valley and occupied the deserted village and the adjacent camp of the Ijebu army.Footnote 159
Ijebu Losses/Casualties: The losses among the Ijebu had been severe, amounting to seventeen chiefs and some 1,000 warriors killed and many more wounded.
Lagos Losses/Casualties: Total number of fifty-six killed, with thirty wounded including three officers.Footnote 160
Capitulation: Late in the afternoon a white flag was seen planted beside the path to Ijebu Ode, but Scott feared a trap, and this only increased his vigilance. The rest of the day, therefore, the expedition rested at Imagbon and prepared for whatever lay ahead.
Smith [Friday, 20 May 1892] The March to Ijebu-OdeFootnote 161
[In the] morning, as the Lagos force, after burning the camp at Imagbon, resumed their advance along a path strewn with the debris of the defeated army and churned into deep mud, six emissaries from the Awujale met them, bearing a flag of truce and asking for peace. As they passed down the column to see Colonel Scott, Davies noted that “No one could help being struck with the fine bearing and apparent indifference of these men.” Scott sent back two of the emissaries with his demand for the surrender of the capital and retained the rest as hostages. The advance continued, and at 11.30 a.m. the troops entered Ijebu Ode … the town seemed deserted.
LWR [Friday, 20 May 1892] The Occupation of Ijebu-OdeFootnote 162
Two of the king’s messengers were then despatched to invite the king and chiefs to an audience with the Colonel, after some delay Captain Gordon and Mr. F. C. Green were despatched and returned with the king and chiefs following in the rear. After some preliminary observations respecting the delay of the king and chiefs, Colonel Scott informed the king that he had come up to open the roads, and was determined to have them opened and kept open. To which the king replied that he was glad the Colonel had come and thanked him for doing so. The Colonel asked, “If you are glad, then why did you send your army to fight with me?”
King – I opposed my people fighting you, but they would not listen to me.
Colonel – What has become of the army?
King – I cannot say what has become of it. It has been defeated and dispersed, the people composing it have fled in all directions, but I would not permit any of them to enter the town.
Colonel – All the roads are to be open from north to south, and I will stay here to see that it is done, and you will have to subsist myself and soldiers.
King – I agree to all the Colonel says, and have agreed to it all before.
Colonel – Where are the arms of your people?
King – I cannot account for them. I do not know where they are.
Colonel – All arms and ammunition are to be delivered up.
LWR [Monday, 23 May 1892]Footnote 163
A flying column under the command of Captain E. R. Owen, Chief of Staff, and consisting of 100 Hausa, 100 armed Ibadan,Footnote 164 and 12 West Indian troops, with artillery left Ijebu-Ode in the morning for Oru. Immediately on arrival at about 11 a.m. the chiefs and elders of the town were summoned by the commanding officers and were informed to the effect that an English force occupied Ijebu-Ode and that the English government was determined to maintain a free and uninterrupted intercourse between the interior and the coast through the Ijebu territory. An Ibadan who accompanied the column informed the commanding officer that a toll gate existed in the adjacent village of Awa, a squad of men under Captain Gordon was despatched to the village and the toll gate broken down.
Carter [Tuesday, 24 May 1892]Footnote 165
I left Lagos and arrived at Epe the same evening to await the escort [under Captain Gordon] which I expected to convey me to Ijebu-Ode.Footnote 166
Carter [Wednesday, 25 May 1892]Footnote 167
In the morning I received a letter from Colonel Scott saying that owing to the foulness of the road from dead bodies he had considered it desirable to send the escort to Itoikin, and accordingly I proceeded up the creek arriving at Itoikin in the evening, where I anchored for the night arranging for an early start the next morning.
Carter [Thursday, 26 May 1892]Footnote 168
At 7.30 a.m. I started for Ijebu-Ode arriving there at 4.45 p.m. The town was practically empty; the king and a few of his followers alone remaining.
LWR [Friday, 27 May 1892]Footnote 169
His Excellency, the Governor addressing the Awujale said: I am sorry to meet you under the present distressing circumstances, but you will admit that the fault is not mine. I shall be glad to hear any explanation you have to make, for though your position is unfortunate, the responsibility falls on you.
Awujale – I thank you for what you have said. All that has happened comes from God. I was here in Jebu when the late king ran away to Epe and I was then elected king. I thought I was loved; and I placed confidence in the people, but latterly the chiefs and young men became opposed to me. Things wore on until Governor Denton’s arrival in Jebu, when it was said by the people that I had sold the country to the British Government. On your arrival, the Lagos Government wanted free roads, but the whole people were opposed to it. I had no power. Mr. Payne and others sent to warn us against any opposition to opening the roads, and of the coming of the expedition. Everything is now in your hands and I will only ask you to point out what will be best for me to do.
The Governor – You sent the deputation down and I told them plainly and clearly what the Government wanted and what it was necessary to do, and that if your people were not prepared to fall in with the wishes of the Government they must take the consequences. As the deputation professed not to understand “book,” two well-known natives of Lagos signed the Treaty for the deputation, after the customary oath had been taken on kolanuts and water which I was assured was the most binding form of promise which Jebus could make. I afterwards took the deputation aside and spoke to them in a friendly manner warning them that serious trouble would arise if the Treaty was broken.
Awujale – I heard of the Expedition and told the people to beg the Governor, but they refused; and when the Expedition got to Epe, I again told the people to yield. But now their eyes are down and they have been made afraid. The people have found the worse and look to me to beg the Governor. I hope the governor will have mercy, and beg him to help to re-arranged matters.
The Governor – I have heard your story and believe it. But it all points to one thing, and that is that you are not master of your people. It is impossible under the circumstances that I should leave you here, I have therefore decided to take you to Lagos. I propose to leave a force here to command the country. I have not taken all this trouble to leave the Jebu people to their own vices. It would be foolish on my part to do so. I am very sorry, but the people have brought the trouble on themselves. They have played their game and lost. The Government told them over and over again that it did not want their country, but only repaired the roads to be kept open. They refused, and now the Government has been obliged to do it in its own way, and has the whole matter in its own hands. It would be folly to leave you here as you have no authority, I shall therefore take you to Lagos.
The Balogun here interposing said:
If matters are spoilt they can be made good by someone. The devil always desires that matters should continue wrong.
Awujale – I shall be suffering doubly if any steps be taken with me and I beg that the Governor will have pity on me.
The Governor – I do not regard it as any trouble or suffering on you, and if I were in your place I should be delighted.
Awujale – My people would think and say it is the result of my lies. And I would only ask the Governor to support me in my authority.
The Governor – What your people may think will be of course no consequence, and that shall not deter me from doing what is best under the circumstances. I suppose you would want me to remove the soldiers as well?
Awujale – Yes.
The Governor – You must think me very simple. It is impossible that they should be removed, that you should be allowed to remain.
Awujale – That will be like death to me … If the Governor will leave an officer and Houssas, I can see that everything goes on right.
The Governor – I will consider the question of your removal, and will give you a definite answer tomorrow, but it is absolutely necessary that troops should be left here, whether you are willing or not.
LWR [Monday, 30 May 1892]Footnote 170
Another interview took place this morning between His Excellency the Governor and the Awujale, when His Excellency informed the King that he had considered the matter and that he would be allowed to remain in his country.Footnote 171 He informed him also that his safety and welfare would depend upon the loyalty and faithfulness manifested by him to the officer left in charge of the troops, and expected the hope that the King would understand his position and adapt himself of it.
Carter [Monday, 30 May 1892]Footnote 172
At about 7 a.m., acting under my instructions, Colonel Scott despatched a flying column consisting of forty-three men of the West India Regiment, fifty-seven constables and the Ibadan warriors under the command of Major Madden to Sagamu and Ikorodu, information having reached me that the latter town [Ikorodu] was inclined to be disaffected.Footnote 173 Later in the day, the first party of the Ibadan arrived at Ijebu-Ode consisting of four men who had been dispatched to ascertain if it were indeed true that the town was occupied by the English. I told them that the road had been opened principally on their account and that I should rely upon their using it for commercial and peaceful purposes.
Carter [Tuesday, 31 May 1892]Footnote 174
As there appeared to be no prospect of further disturbances, I decided to leave Ijebu-Ode with Colonel Scott via Itoikin at 8.30 a.m. Arrived Itoikin at 3 p.m. and embarked at 5 p.m. for Lagos. It was arranged to retain a garrison of 140 men in command of Capt. Tarbet, supported by Capts. Bower and Campbell [Asst. Inspector, Lagos Constabulary] at Ijebu-Ode and to station men at Itoikin.
Acknowledgements
The authors thank the journal’s reviewers, whose insightful comments on the original manuscript inspired new perspectives in the final version.
Appendix 1: A note on Ijebu State institutions
The Ijebu society was organized into age groups based on those born within a specific three-year period (e.g., 1889–1892, 1893–1896). The king assigned names to these groups, establishing them as institutional units. Known collectively as Regberegbe (literally, the cluster of age groups), they formed the foundation of governance through the town assembly called the Igbara, usually convened to discuss issues of common concern.
Political participation was through membership in one or both of the two societies of Osugbo and Pampa. These two societies were established under the king’s warrant with distinct jurisdictions over a designated group of neighboring communities. The Osugbo society was a judicial institution. The Pampa society directed civic, commercial, and military affairs. It mobilized able-bodied males within its territorial coverage for military service under war chieftains called Olorogun. Except for a national mobilization, the army in a campaign was usually drawn principally from the constituent towns of the Pampa units or groups that lay in the direction of warfare, and when necessary, in conjunction with the army from the capital.
Officials at the capital conducted state administration in a council called Ajo Owa. Its members comprised four groups of senior titled officials. Members of the first group included the Olisa, Ogbeni Oja, Egbo, and Olotufore from an aristocratic order of chiefs called Ilamuren. Members of the second group were the Oluwo and Apena of the Osugbo society. The third group consisted of Pampa officials, the Agbon, Kakanfo, and Lapekun, representing the three wards of the city, namely, Iwade, Porogun, and Ijasi. The fourth group, protecting crown interest, comprised the Ogbeni Odi, Ekeji Odi, and Eketa Odi, respectively, the head palace official, the second in command, and the third in command. A delegation of state plenipotentiaries was known as Agbade Iko, usually at least seven members comprising two Aguren (subordinate palace officials), two Osugbo representatives, and three others representing the capital’s tripodal Pampa society. The delegation was headed by one of the Agunren, signifying the force of royal authority.Footnote 175
Appendix 2: The Anglo-Ijebu Agreement of 1892Footnote 176
Agreement made at Lagos this 21st day of January in the year 1892 between Gilbert Thomas Carter Esquire Companion of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George Governor and. Commander-in-Chief of the Colony of Lagos for and on behalf of Her Majesty, the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland Empress of India &c &c Her Heirs and Successors on the one part and the Awujalẹ Chiefs Elders and People of Jebu for themselves their heirs and Successors on the other part.
Whereas the Awujalẹ Chiefs Elders and People of Jebu, by their authorised and accredited Messengers, have assented to the demand of Her Majesty’s Government for open roads and free traffic for all people whether Native or European, though the territory of Jebu, now therefore we the said authorised Messengers and Representatives of the Awujalẹ and people of Jebu, do as testified. by our signatures affixed hereto, agree in the name of the said Awujalẹ and people of Jebu and on their behalf to the following articles:
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1. From henceforth we will keep open and free to traffic all roads and rivers passing through Jebu territory.
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2. The said roads and rivers shall be free to all persons whatever, Native or European who desire to pass through Jebu either from the Interior to Lagos, or from Lagos to the Interior, and. to all produce and property.
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3. No tolls, fees or imposts of any kind whatsoever shall be levied upon any person or property passing through Jebu either by land or by water, either from Lagos to the Interior, or from the Interior to Lagos.
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4. The Awujalẹ Authorities and People of Jebu shall use their best endeavour to maintain the peaceable use of the said roads and rivers to all people wishing to use them.
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5. All disputes that may arise upon, or in reference to the use of the said roads and rivers shall be adjusted by Arbitrators appointed by the two parties to this Agreement and in any case where the Arbitrators so appointed shall not agree the matter in dispute shall be referred to the Governor of Lagos whose decision shall be final. The Governor of Lagos reserves the right of stationing an Officer or Officers in Jebu to secure the faithful observance of the provisions of this Agreement and to guard the interests both of the Jebus, and of the strangers making use of the said roads and rivers.
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6. The Awujalẹ and Authorities bind themselves to endeavour in every legitimate and peaceful way to promote trade and commerce, and to abstain from dissensions and acts likely to promote strife with neighbouring kingdoms and Tribes.
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7. In consideration of the faithful observance of all the foregoing Articles of this Agreement, the Governor of Lagos will make from the date hereof, unto the Awujalẹ of Jebu a yearly present to the value of £500. 0. 0 Five hundred Pounds sterling, but such present may upon breach or neglect of all, or any one or more of the provisions of this Agreement and at the discretion of the Governor of the Colony of Lagos for the time being, be altogether withdrawn or suspended.
Done at Lagos this 21st day of January One thousand eight hundred and ninety-two.
(Sgd.) G. T. Carter.
Witness to the above signature made in our presence
(Sgd.) George C. Denton
(Sgd.) Alfred Reed Elliot
(Sgd.) Andrew L. Hethersett
We the undersigned declare that we were present when the above agreement was interpreted, to the above named messengers and representatives at Government House Lagos on the 21st day of January 1892 and that in our presence and in public meeting the said messengers and. representatives declared that it was contrary to the custom of their country to make their marks or touch paper but that they in the name of the awujale and people of Jebu and on their behalf agreed to all the terms of the agreement and undertook to carry them out and declared that they were authorised to do so. The said representatives further signified their acceptance of the terms by taking the country oath on Kolas and Water.
(Sgd.) John Otonba Payne
(Sgd.) Jacob Williams
Witnesses to the signatures of the above named J. A. O. Payne and Jacob Williams made in our presence this 21 day of January 1892
(Sgd.) George Stallard
(Sgd.) C. J. GeorgeFootnote 178
