The word ‘genius’ is often associated with the idea that artistic creativity is entirely a matter of an involuntary sort of inspiration visited upon the individual artist.Footnote 1 My aim in referring to cinematic genius is not, however, to defend that dubious thesis, but to direct attention to the remarkable artistic achievements that some film-makers, working individually or in collaborative teams, have managed to bring about in their intentional and often painstaking creation of cinematic works. Genius, as I understand it, is the exceptional ability to do something difficult, such as the intentional making of an innovative and valuable work of art. My central claim in what follows is that our longstanding and legitimate interest in manifestations of this kind of skill has important implications for a number of interrelated issues in the philosophy of art, and in particular, for some of the questions taken up in the ever-expanding literature on the ontology of works of art.
I begin by evoking some of the central questions in the ontology of art and recommend one approach to their solution. In the second section of the paper I discuss aspects of a particular case in some detail, namely, Mira Nair's (2004) cinematic adaptation of William Makepeace Thackeray's (1848) Vanity Fair. One upshot of this discussion is that when we take into account what it means to appreciate a cinematic adaptation as such, we discover additional support for the recommended approach to the ontological questions. In the final section of the paper, I examine some implications for our understanding of the nature of cinematic works and conclude with remarks on the distinction between multiple and singular art forms.
I
The most basic and central question to which contributions in the ontology of art address themselves concerns what kinds of things works of art are.Footnote 2 It is asked, then, whether all sorts of works are plausibly thought to belong to a single overarching category of entities, and if so, what category that is. Related questions include how particular works are to be individuated, and under what conditions they may be created and destroyed.
With regard to the first question, a central dispute concerns the distinction between multiple and singular works, the thought being that if both of these categories are applicable to the arts, monism about the ontology of art is false. And indeed many philosophers have argued that while some works are ‘multiple’ in the sense of having, at least in principle, more than one instance, another very basic category of works is made up of those that are in some sense singular or non-iterable.Footnote 3
The latter assumption has been contested. For example, in his fairly brief, enigmatic yet highly influential essay of 1936, Walter Benjamin contrasted the cinematic work's mechanical reproducibility to what he called the ‘auratic’ status and function of works such as Leonardo's Mona Lisa.Footnote 4 According to Benjamin, the essential genius of the cinema as a medium and art form is its disruption of the traditional, quasi-religious ideology of the uniqueness or individuality of the work of art. Other philosophers, such as C. I. Lewis in 1946, Andrew Paul Ushenko in 1953, and Peter Strawson in 1958, have reasoned that as a matter of metaphysical if not technological possibility, all of the artefacts associated with works of art, and perhaps the works themselves, could have multiple instantiations.Footnote 5 If they are right, then the ‘auratic’ belief in a work's individuality would be illusory in all art forms, and not just the cinema. The thesis that at least some works are particulars as opposed to types or universals still has its adherents, however. For example, in a paper on the relations between art and technology, Anthony O'Hear defends what he calls the ‘singularity thesis’, which is the idea that works of art, or at least those ‘of distinction’, are necessarily individual and unique.Footnote 6
The debate between the advocates of contrasting ‘monist’ and other views on the work of art continues in the contemporary literature. I return to this topic below, but shall first recommend a very general approach to the more general question of the nature of works of art.Footnote 7
Various philosophers who have commented on the problematic nature of topics in the ontology of art have suggested that at least part of the problem resides in a ‘process/product’ ambiguity inherent in the term ‘work’ (and related terms in other languages, such as Werk, œuvre, opus, etc.).Footnote 8 If this is right, then a first attempt at explicating a concept of works can adopt any one of three basic strategies: eliminate the product and retain the process; eliminate the process and retain the product; and finally, retain both process and product, for example, by understanding the concept of the work as somehow covering their relation.
The first of these options has been attempted by various philosophers. Robin Collingwood is an early example, at least if we take literally those formulations in which he clearly states that the work is the artist's ‘activity’.Footnote 9 This line of thought has the disadvantage of neglecting the evidence that artistic creation is not always a process undertaken with no product in view. In many cases, the artist's activity is clearly intended to eventuate in some finished, perceptible item that can be put on display and attended to, and this sort of practice is central to the worlds of art. To say that the work is the activity alone and in no wise the product of this activity is implausible because it simply denies this fact.
The second option amounts to thinking of works as finished products only. St Thomas Aquinas can be interpreted as espousing this option when he contends that art ‘does not require the artist to proceed well, but to make a good work’ because ‘the good of art is considered not in the artist himself, but in the product [opus]’.Footnote 10 This position is sometimes promoted as the ordinary or common sense view. Proposals that diverge from it are labeled ‘revisionist’ and attacked as inconsistent with ordinary usage. And indeed we are apt to say that the Mona Lisa is to be glimpsed inside the thick glass case in which it is housed at the Louvre. Do not such utterances refer to the work of art as a discrete material object having a determinate spatio-temporal location, which is certainly not the case with the process of Da Vinci's making of the picture, which apparently took place over twelve years? The second type of explication of ‘work’, then, has the apparent advantage of setting aside the intangible and fleeting thoughts and actions of the artist so as to seize upon the final product, which remains to be identified as the work of art itself.
A first problem with this position, however, is that if some works are happenings or performances (which arguably belong to the category of events), then not all works of art are reducible to, or are even partly constituted by a product, if by this is meant a particular physical or abstract artifact. It would indeed be a stretch to classify the action undertaken by a performance artist, such as Chris Burden's having himself shot in the arm, as a ‘product’. A second problem with this general approach to the ontology of works is that it is hard to square with our demonstrable and justifiable interest in the artistic artefact, taken not as a detachable product, but as the manifestation and upshot of the artist's purposeful activities and abilities, reference to which is necessary to the correct classification of the item. The latter point is made by Kant in the Kritik der Urteilskraft when he distinguishes between works and natural items such as honeycombs. Kant claims that the former, unlike the latter, involve the exercise of freedom, and he adds immediately that by this he means that a work, unlike the honeycomb, arises ‘durch eine Willkür’: ‘through a capacity for choice that grounds its actions in reason’.Footnote 11 It should be noted, however, that Kant did not explicitly square off against the above-cited thesis advanced by Aquinas, and in the same paragraph §43 he contrasts Werk (opus) to Wirkung (effectus), aligning the artist's Produkt with the former terms, and the honeycomb with the latter.
Against the thesis that the work is simply the artist's product or effect, it can be argued that some of the identifying or essential features of the work involve the artist's activities, and more specifically, aspects of the process whereby the artefact or event was generated. It will not do to try to explain this by saying that reference to the artefact's relations to the agent's actions is purely epistemic, or in other words, merely our (optional) way of experiencing or thinking about the product. A work, we say, is skillful or inept to some degree, and a judgement of this sort does not refer uniquely to the intrinsic properties of a physical object or artefact, but instead bears upon a relation obtaining between the content and quality of the artist's intention and the actual results of the actions the artist undertakes in an effort to realize those intentions. A skill is a capacity to succeed in attempts at doing something difficult; to say that a product is skillful is to imply that the action whereby it was made was the activation of such an ability. An inept yet lucky attempt is contrasted, then, to a skillful action in which the agent realizes the aim as intended.
What, then, is the link between skill and artistic value? Here we must be very careful, since the bold and straightforward theses on this topic are false. The successful realization of some artistic intention cannot alone suffice to endow a work with a corresponding artistic merit, since the intended feature can be artistically worthless. And if there can be valuable, but unintended artistic properties, as I think we should recognize, intention is not necessary to artistic value either. So we have to look for more subtle correlations.
One possibility is that the intentional realization of an intended goal could contribute to artistic value in a context where other conditions (including conditions on the quality of the intention) are satisfied. As I have already implied, we should acknowledge the existence of artistic serendipity, which is what happens when the artist goes looking for one sort of good thing, does not find it, but luckily comes up with some other kind of good thing. Even if we grant the existence of artistic serendipity, perhaps the successful realization of at least some artistic intentions is necessary to the creation of any work of art having significant artistic value. This weaker necessity thesis can be tested by asking whether there is or could be a highly valuable work of art, all of the significant artistic merits of which were the unintended consequences of the artist's inept attempts to endow the work with artistic qualities vastly different from those it actually possesses. I do not know of any such cases and think that such a thing is highly unlikely, but perhaps this is merely the product of my inability to imagine the glories of a totally serendipitous work, that is, one in which all of the mediocre features conceived of and attempted by the inept artist were luckily supplanted by marvelous artistic qualities.
There is another way to support a thesis to the effect that whether an artistically valenced property has been intentionally realized can make a difference to some of the work's artistic values, and hence ought to be recognized as potentially contributing, in more or less direct ways, to the overall artistic merit (or demerit) of the work. Such a thesis can be supported by reference to a sub-category of valuable artistic properties which can only be realized when the artist's intentions match the subsequent output. An example of properties falling into such a category is a stylistic feature the value of which necessarily pertains to the manner in which the artist designs and executes that feature in the making of the work.Footnote 12 An artistic feature referred to as ‘semi-archaic’ is an example of an artistic property belonging to that category, as it is a property that is only valuable when intentionally realized (as when an artist, such as Sassetta, chooses to combine rival or seemingly incompatible options or features in a particular historical situation). If features of a work are semi-archaic by design, then these features carry one artistic valence, but if they are merely the result of ineptitude or happenstance, they carry another, negative valence.
Such considerations concerning one aspect of artistic value and its appreciation support the idea that the process/product ambiguity at the heart of the concept of a work should be maintained. A work, then, should be conceived of as comprised of a result as well as an intentional activity converging on that result. With this in mind, the work of art as a whole should be distinguished from the product alone, or what can be called the artistic vehicle, such as a painted surface, a string of linguistic symbols, a sequence of sounds, bodily movements, or whatever other perceptible or cognizable arrangement may be put on display for some audience to contemplate.
In employing the term artistic ‘vehicle’ here, I follow a usage adopted, for example, by H. S. Goodhart-Rendel in 1934, as well as by such philosophers as Stephen C. Pepper and C. I. Lewis, and a few contemporary figures, including David Davies.Footnote 13 In old-fashioned medicinal parlance, the vehicle is the sugar that makes the medicine go down; those who dislike the medical and other connotations of the word may prefer to follow Jerrold Levinson, Gregory Currie and others in speaking of artistic ‘structures’.Footnote 14 With regard to the cinema, it is appropriate to use the term ‘audio-visual display’ to refer to the vehicle or structure of a cinematic work, though it may be worth noting that many film scholars think there are cinematic ‘texts’, probably because they have in mind the Barthesian idea of un texte (or even du texte) as anything it can be amusing to interpret. Or perhaps what leads film scholars to refer to moving images as texts is some more general (and in my view dubious) ‘semiotic’ notion that anything that is meaningful or has content is a text.
One key reason for insisting on a work/vehicle distinction (which is different from the distinction between a work and its multiple instances) is this: a work of art is more than the perceptible item (or type of item) an artist may intentionally put on display, since the work includes relations between that item and relevant aspects of the artist's activity and attitudes, including intentions, decisions, and a way of devising, making, classifying, and displaying the vehicle or structure. In those happy cases where the intended properties of a work have been realized as intended, this is not an intrinsic feature of the vehicle, but it is a feature of the work. The overall explication of the concept named ‘work of art’ that best accommodates these points is our third, ‘skill-inclusive’ option, which identifies the work as a process/product relation.
Is this a revisionary proposal? If ‘revisionary’ means anything that deviates from a literal acceptance of all ordinary usage, the answer is ‘yes’, since one of the proposal's entailments is that what is located in the box at the Louvre is the artistic vehicle (the poplar board), not the work of art. But is revisionism necessarily a bad thing? It is common sense, and not at all revisionist, to observe that revisionism would only be a mistake if we knew that the status quo could not be improved. That is usually quite hard to establish, however, especially when it comes to the vagaries of ordinary usage. Philosophers of art would do well, I think, to look beyond the revisionary/non-revisionary dichotomy (and what may or may not be a Strawson-inspired appeal to a ‘descriptive’ metaphysics).
In any case, the broad approach to the conception of works that I have just sketched does not lack distinguished historical antecedents as well as the sophisticated 20th-century proponents mentioned above. For example, when Leon Battista Alberti attempted to generalize about excellence in architecture, or what he called ‘concinnitas’, one of his concerns was to characterize ‘lineamentis’, which can be translated, at least if we follow Bastoli, who was responsible for bringing Alberti's Latin into the vernacular, as ‘disegno’ or ‘design’.Footnote 15 Design in turn is understood as ‘a product of human ingenuity’ (ingenio), but also as a project [une preordinazione] ‘executed with learned ingenuity, intelligence, and talent [‘animo ingenio et erudito’ for which Bastoli wrote ‘condotto da anima e da ingegnio buono’]. Such was Alberti's general characterization of one of the privileged objects of appreciation. More generally, skill and intention-related properties, such as design, figure amongst the objects of artistic appreciation, and we should only accept an account of works that is consistent with this assumption.
In order to make this point and some of its implications more tangible, in the next section of this paper I discuss a particular example. This discussion will set the stage for a return to the theoretical issues in the final section of the paper.
II
My example belongs to an important category of cinematic works in which the relation to a literary or other anterior work invites and guides specific comparisons that are meant to inform both the experience and appreciation of the work. I have in mind the category of cinematic adaptations, for to appreciate an adaptation as such is to weigh the qualitative differences and similarities between the adaptation and the work that served as its source or model.Footnote 16 Cinematic adaptations belong, I propose, to the larger category of overtly imitative works, that is, works explicitly or conspicuously modelled on anterior works, and where the target audience is meant to be aware of this modeling relation. In some cases, such as in a pastiche or a parody, the source is not a particular, identifiable work, but a category or style of works, such as westerns or science fiction or the distinctive life-work of a famous author. In other cases, an overtly imitative work is conspicuously based on a particular model, and the audience of the adaptation is expected to entertain comparisons between the adaptation and its model so as to grasp various aspects of the adaptation's intentional design. Whereas some imitative works of this sort are designed to remain highly faithful to the model, others are not, and instead exhibit creative differences from that model while also remaining overtly imitative in other respects. In some cases it is a matter of a transgressive manifestation of the distance from the anterior model, but in other cases there is a more or less harmonious combination of imitative and innovative traits.
Consider now the 2004 cinematic adaptation of Thackeray's Vanity Fair. This is a very fine instance of the hybrid category referred to above. For those who know something about the filmmakers and the novel, it is easy to observe that this is not an adaptation the makers of which slavishly sought a high degree of fidelity to the source, yet as it is an adaptation, the work was of course meant to carry over a number of key features (or more accurately, types of features) of that source. In both the film and the novel, the central character is a parvenue or social climber named ‘Rebecca Sharp’. In the novel Becky is a deeply villainous figure, a mother who intentionally and systematically mistreats her child. Yet in the film, the homonymous character is a rather more sympathetic figure, not simply one portrait figuring alongside the others in a very long gallery of vaniteux.
Plenty of evidence supports this broad contrast. In interviews in which she discusses the approach adopted in the making of the film, the director and co-author of the script, Mira Nair, admits that her Becky is a ‘rascal’, but repeatedly praises the character's intelligence, artistic talent, and selfless acts of friendship. One finds little or no evidence of any such selfless acts in the novel. The subtitle of Thackery's work is ‘a novel without a hero’, but Nair and her multiple collaborators have not made a film without a heroine. Money, and those who have it, such as Lord Steyne, are the real problem in the film's story, not the efforts and schemes of those who, like Rebecca and her artist father, are born with talent but without money.
To develop these points in a bit more detail, let us consider how the movie-makers have rather cleverly adapted the episode in which Becky has managed to get herself invited to the home of the lecherous Lord Steyne. This is already something of an achievement for the social climber, but Rebecca still faces the problem of getting the aristocratic women to stop ‘cutting’ her. Taking pity on her, and perhaps in an effort to placate her husband, Lady Steyne finally asks Rebecca whether she will sing. Here is what Thackeray's narrator tells us about what happens next:
‘I will do anything that may give pleasure to my Lord Steyne or to you’, said Rebecca, sincerely grateful, and seating herself at the piano, began to sing.
She sang religious songs of Mozart, which had been early favourites of Lady Steyne, and with such sweetness and tenderness that the lady lingering round the piano, sate down by its side, and listened until the tears rolled down her eyes.Footnote 17
The treatment given to this material in the film is quite novel and nothing short of marvelous. Film-making is often a richly collaborative endeavor, and the scene in question is a good case where cinematic genius is a matter of the harmonious contributions made by a group of creative people. Nair deserves authorial credit for having skillfully solicited and orchestrated contributions from a variety of talented people, including Julian Fellowes, who co-authored the script with Nair; Beatrix Aruna Pasztor, who was responsible for the costume design; Allyson Johnson, the editor, and Declan Quinn, cinematographer.
With regard to the artistic brilliance of the scene in question, special mention should be made of the Canadian composer Mychael Danna, who provided an inventive and lovely musical setting to Tennyson's poem, gorgeously sung by Custer Larue. In this regard, the adaptation explicitly diverges not only from the novelistic source but from the historical record. When Lady Steyne asks Becky what song to play, she names Tennyson's poem, as though the music that follows were some well-known composition. This is clearly a deliberate anachronism, yet in my view it has a cogent artistic motivation in the context of a hybrid adaptation aimed at a deliberate refashioning of the parvenue. Nair and her collaborators did well in deliberately swerving away from having the movie's Rebecca hypocritically lend her voice to a rendition of ‘O Gottes Lamm’, or one of the other relatively obscure religious songs by Mozart. Instead, Nair's Rebecca honestly wins her audience, just as Nair courts hers, with the beauty and power of a song of erotic mystery and intimacy. In Thackeray, Becky manages to charm Lady Steyne largely because she stirs up the Lady's childhood associations; Becky fails, however, to charm the other women. In the film, Becky seduces everyone who witnesses her performance. In Thackeray, Rebecca's oft-mentioned musical talent is adduced as another illustration of a moralist's contrast between an all-too-scarce moral virtue, on the one hand, and beauty, talent, and the other worldly vanities on the other. In the film there is instead a harmonious celebration of artistic virtuosity exemplified by Becky's adept performance of a fascinating song.
While the cinematic medium has its own specific artistic techniques, films can also nest or embed the expressive devices of many other art forms, such as, most obviously, music, dance, and costume, but also, interior design and the statues and pictures that are depicted within a set. A film can also nest within itself another work of art. Very briefly, a work nests another work when at least part of the vehicle of that work is observable in the vehicle of the nesting or matrix work.Footnote 18 For example, the words of Tennyson's poem are audible in Becky's song. In a sense, the specifically cinematic genius of this scene is its very combination of an array of nested artistic vehicles.
A systematic analysis of the scene, and of its relation to the work as a whole, would take quite some time, and in what follows I single out only a few aspects. At the beginning of the scene, Becky enters a roomful of enemies. Her social exclusion is visually highlighted by the contrast between her black dress and the white and red gowns worn by the others. An overhead crane shot shows how Becky quite literally attempts to break into the closed circle of the women gathered about a round table, looking at drawings. When Becky approaches, the others flee in a kind of choreography of social exclusion. As Becky begins to sing, Nair and her team draw masterfully upon two of the most powerful cinematic devices: close-ups and reaction shots. The fictional performance of Becky is a composite of the actresses' expressive mimicry and the singer's dubbed-in voice. Shots of the actress pretending to sing are intercut with shots that depict the responses of the onlookers, whose faces progressively shift from cool disdain to a reluctant acknowledgement of talent, and finally to complicity and genuine aesthetic delight. Whatever else they make think of her, the audience must acknowledge and admire Becky's talent.
A few comments on the use of lip-synching in this scene may be in order. In a purely musical context, the use of this device is hardly an artistic virtue, yet the valence somehow shifts in the context of Nair's film, where no deception is involved. We can admire Reece Witherspoon's skill, not at singing, but at pretending to sing, just as we can admire the director's selection of a superior voice for the part; Witherspoon is a performer in the work as opposed to one of the work's authors, so there is no reason to conclude that she ought to have sung the part herself, or that her failure to sing is a flaw in her performance. Finally, we may note that in her commentary on the film, the director has generously identified a cinematic source that provided some inspiration for the scene, Bollywood director Guru Dutt's 1957 film, Pyaasa. It is true that both films include lip-synched song sequences in which a singing figure interacts dynamically with a crowd of onlookers, but the one in Dutt's film lacks the restraint, precision, and elegance of Nair's scene.Footnote 19
Some readers may wonder what my points about adaptations have to do with the distinction between the work and its vehicle and with the considerations introduced above about works as product and process. An answer to that question can be formulated by turning our backs on the messiness of actual artistic examples and referring to a schematic, imaginary example devised in the manner of Jorge Luis Borges' oft-mined 1939 story of Pierre Menard.Footnote 20
Imagine, then, that two film-makers (or teams thereof), A1 and A2, work independently. Rather surprisingly, they somehow end up making cinematic displays (or ‘texts’ if you insist) that are indistinguishable.Footnote 21 Call these Vehicle 1 and Vehicle 2 of Work 1 and Work 2, made by A1 and A2, respectively. Both vehicles bear a number of striking resemblances to a particular novel, N, published prior to their making. The author of Work 1 intentionally based his film on N, conceiving of the film rather standardly as a cinematic adaptation of this particular, anterior work. Yet the author of Work 2 was blithely unaware of N, and so in creating his film was in no way intent upon making an adaptation of it. Nor was A2 basing his work on other works that were modeled on, or direct sources for N. One might conclude, on the basis of the resemblances between N and Work 2, that the latter lacks historical if not psychological creativity: even though A2 was innocent of copying N, ‘somebody else got there first’, and the film therefore lacks one kind of novelty. In such a context, it would, however, be a blunder to classify Work 2 as an adaptation. So as we scrutinize the qualities of Vehicle 2, it would be an error to think in terms of the ways in which the maker(s) intentionally copied or diverged from N, whereas the tracking of these very same sorts of qualities would be wholly appropriate in an assessment of Work 1, which cries out to be understood in relation to its source as well as to its maker's particular manner of understanding (or misunderstanding) that source. It follows, then, that while the vehicles are type-identical, the works are not, and from this fact, given some relatively uncontroversial assumptions about identity, it follows that the works are not identical to their vehicles. Instead, the work is the relation between a vehicle and the episode of its making, or the product as well as the process. To appreciate a work, as opposed to the vehicle alone, one must know certain things about the artist's intentions and decisions, as well as about the features of the historical context within which the artist was acting.Footnote 22
It follows from these remarks that the successful appreciation of an adaptation requires a lot of knowledge, not only about the features of the source, but about how that source has been understood by the makers of the adaptation. The appreciator also needs to know which of the source's features the adaptors do and do not intend to carry over into the adaptation. Appreciation is a fallible enterprise: of course the appreciator may lack some of this knowledge, and the available evidence may require careful sifting.
Here, for example, is a tangle related to the Thackeray example. One of my central claims above about the relation between Nair's and Thackeray's works is that Becky in the novel is a far more villainous character than the Becky in the film. Yet Nair's co-author of the script, Julian Fellowes, has denied that in the novel Becky is really a villainess. Thackeray, he claims, ‘had to pretend’ that Becky was not the heroine.Footnote 23 I confess that I do not find it cogent to conjecture that when Thackeray wrote in a way that coherently invites us to imagine a character who does a lot of obviously evil things, he was only pretending to do so, and ‘thus’ the character does not really do these evil things in the story. The list of Becky's misdeeds in the story is quite long, and the only way to delete or shorten that list would be to argue that the narrator is lying or otherwise unreliable. The author, then, would only be pretending to endorse everything the narrator says about what happens in the story, but the discerning reader would detect the irony and suspend the make-believe. Yet I see no evidence to support the postulation in Thackeray's Vanity Fair of an authorial irony with regard to the descriptions of the story events that are proffered by the seemingly omniscient narrator. Thackeray very obviously uses the device of the unreliable narrator in the case of the first-person account in Barry Lyndon (Barry is more villainous than he presents himself as being) but there is no such first-person narration at work in Vanity Fair. Even if Nair et al. genuinely intended to be faithful to Thackeray's intentions by making Rebecca a positive heroine, and even were we to grant the accuracy of Fellowes' claim about the conjectured unreliable narration or authorial pretense in the novel, the film could not have been genuinely faithful to the novel in realizing such an intention because Thackeray's putative ironic or indirect strategy of characterization would have been left behind. It is far from apparent, in any case, that the film as a whole was actually designed with this sort of fidelity in mind, and thus I am reluctant to ascribe to its makers a failure in attempting to achieve any such thing. Instead, the more straightforward conclusion is that while Thackeray's book has no heroine, Nair's film does. Nair's Becky is a talented parvenue whose tough circumstances explain the liberties she takes with what is presented as a conventional and largely hypocritical set of imperial mores.
III
With the discussion of the example in mind we can identify some of the kinds of artistic properties that are the object of one important species of artistic appreciation; for shorthand, I refer to these properties as pertaining to artistry, understood, following Alberti, as talented and intelligent choice and skilful purposeful activity in the realization of an artistic design. The appreciation of artistry, I have suggested, requires attunement to the artist's actions and choices in a context.
To return to the ontological issues broached earlier, the questions to which we must address ourselves are these: what kind of item is it that can be the bearer of the properties involved in artistry? What kinds of entities are they, and are they multiple or singular?
To begin with the distinction between the work of art and the artistic vehicle, it is generally allowed that in the case of film, the artistic vehicle is not a unique object, but a type of text or display. Two people can experience two distinct tokens of the same type of audio-visual display at the same time but in different places. This is the case because various technologies can be used to encode a type of display that is then instantiated in particular screenings or projections effectuated by the relevant machines. As Noël Carroll has observed, such a screening is not like the performance of a musical or theatrical work, as normally no artistry is involved in such mechanical operations as using a projector to screen a film.Footnote 24 Or in other words, the projectionist's performance, while valuable and important, is not one of the objects of artistic appreciation. Mention should, however, be made, in passing, of hybrid traditions in which musical and other performances enhanced screenings of films. For example, in Japan, kowairo setsumei (translated literally as ‘voice colouring’) was provided by a group of performers who, seated out of sight, improvised dialogue during the screening of a ‘silent’ film.
Setting aside various hard questions about the nature of cinematic vehicles, I turn now to the question of the relation between the vehicle and the work. What, finally, is a work if it is not the discrete and detachable product of the artist's creative activity? The crux is to say something sufficiently accurate and informative about the nature of the complex, relational entity which is a work of art, and there remains significant disagreement amongst philosophers on this score, including those who agree that the work is a relation between a structure or vehicle and an artist's (or artists') attitudes and creative activities in a context.
A good part of this disagreement hinges on the right way to provide a highly general characterization of the action artists undertake in relation to the vehicle of a work.Footnote 25 The traditional inclination is to invoke some concept of creation or making, understood broadly as being instrumental in and responsible for intentionally bringing something into existence for the first time. Yet objections to this traditional idea have been raised. If the vehicle is an abstract type or a universal, it is reasoned, this item cannot have been literally created as a result of the activities of a spatio-temporally located agent. This assumption, which may not be well-founded, is what motivates some philosophers to say that the artist discovers or indicates an artistic structure, but does not genuinely create one. My view is that it is preferable for a variety of reasons to say that the artist intentionally creates, makes, or chooses a primary instance or token of the vehicle; the artist makes various choices regarding the primary token's features and this vehicle's possible and appropriate reproductions. As appreciators of works, we are interested in the difference made by the artist's purposeful and potentially skillful manipulation of artistic media, and talk of a rather cerebral ‘discovery’ of pre-existing abstracta does not correspond to the object of this sort of well-entrenched interest. Also, if we remember that in some art forms, such as dance and mime, the vehicle is itself a matter of physical actions and gestures (as opposed, say, to the making of some artefact or arrangement of objects), it is especially awkward to have to say, as some philosophers would have us say, that the artist's role in the production of a work of art is to discover or select a type of movement or action that is the artistic structure. Instead, it is preferable to say that the artist creates a work by performing intentional actions, where some of these actions generate or constitute or otherwise give rise to a first, and in some cases, the only instance of the perceptible vehicle of the work.
With regard to cinematic works, while it may appeal to some philosophers to imagine that all possible types of audio-visual displays ‘always already’ exist along with all other abstract items, it seems unhelpful and irrelevant at best, and ludicrous at worst, to think that what the film-makers are doing in their painstaking labours in those ‘fields of technology’ that are the film set and film studio is to ‘indicate’ or ‘discover’ a pre-existent audio-visual display. Did Nair and her collaborators merely discover the audio-visual images of the heavily costumed Reece Witherspoon et al. as they prepared and then filmed the ‘Crimson Petal’ scene, or did they not substantially create this part of the multiply instantiable artistic vehicle of the work they were inventing? And is this skillful act of creation not one of the key bearers of the kind of value that is necessary to what we recognize as the artistic merit of the work?
As I have just implied and do not tire of repeating, the vehicle is not equivalent to the work. Nor is it accurate to say that the vehicle is an instance of the work, though the temptation to employ such a confusing locution persists. The vehicle of a work does not fully manifest or constitute that work; the vehicle conveys some of the work's features, but it does not carry all of them, as some of the work's features pertain to attitudes and actions that are not, strictly speaking, intrinsic properties of an artistic vehicle.
As has often been observed in the literature, this approach to the nature of works does some violence to ordinary language, since we regularly say we see and hear the film, by which we mean the cinematic work, whereas we cannot literally see and hear the work if it is not only an audio-visual display, but the determination of that display as the vehicle of a particular finished work by this (individual or collective) author. But I do not see why this kind of linguistic consideration should be decisive if we are doing philosophy, which should not be a matter of always speaking roughly and efficiently, but of trying, within the limits appropriate to the subject matter, of saying something reasonably precise, sometimes at the cost of elegance and discursive economy (the current sentence being a very good example). And the proposed approach to art's ontology and appreciation is, I maintain, firmly anchored in well-entrenched artistic practices that have a solid motivation in our perennial interest in certain forms of agent-related artistic value.
I shall conclude with a few remarks about the bedeviled topic of the multiple or singular nature of the work of art and/or artistic vehicle. This topic is not, I believe, reducible to a single question. One can, for example, ask, of any given artistic vehicle, whether it admits of an artistically perfect reproduction; it is another question to ask whether the work of art, of which this item is the vehicle, is a unique entity or something admitting multiple instances or occurrences. So one sort of question is about vehicles, as in: can the vehicle of the Mona Lisa be adequately reproduced? Or could there be two distinct yet artistically equivalent performances of the Hammerklavier sonata? Another sort of question, which is not a matter of questions about artistic vehicles, is about works, as in: could there be two Hammerklavier sonatas? Not two performances of that work, but two compositions referred to by that name? If we follow Currie in thinking that the work that bears this title is in fact an action type, it follows that there could be two or more tokens or instances of this type.
A good part of the disagreement on such difficult questions arises from philosophers' divergence with regard to the nature of the modality that is deemed decisive in saying whether a given artistic entity is multiple or singular. For example, since he reasons in terms of logical possibility, C. I. Lewis deems all artistic vehicles to be multiple, even if the current techniques of reproduction are highly imperfect. Similarly, Currie reasons that a work of art is an action type because it is metaphysically possible for more than one artistically equivalent event to take place in contexts where all artistically relevant factors are equivalent. For Currie the event is a certain type of discovering of something in a certain type of context, and since the event and its components are not numerical individuals, but schematic types, the work logically admits of multiple instances. Yet someone who is interested in the value of specific artistic accomplishments could agree with these observations as a matter of logic and metaphysics, yet argue that this is not the sort of possibility that is most relevant to our appreciation of the artistic value and status of a work. If we think in terms, not of what is logically or metaphysically possible, but in terms of what is probable given the history of the arts in our world, the singular nature of the artist's achievement in a particular context comes to the fore. It is logically possible, of course, that a twin Nair created a twin Vanity Fair based on a twin Thackeray novel on a planet that is a perfect image of our own. Perhaps such a strange event is also nomologically possible, since given what we think we know about the laws of physics, no law of nature would have to be violated for this to take place. Yet even if this much is allowed, it may be rejoined that this is an extremely unlikely event that in no way figures within the scope of our artistic appreciation. Nair's work is to be appreciated only in relation to the context and tradition in which her relation to Thackeray emerged, for it is in this context that she and her collaborators have found an interesting response to the challenge of adaptation, a response involving both the following and breaking of the rules of fidelity to a prized literary source.Footnote 26
