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Institutionalizing Investor-State Dispute Prevention in China

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 November 2024

Zhenyu Xiao*
Affiliation:
School of Law, Sun Yat-Sen University, China.
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Extract

China's 2019 Foreign Investment Law establishes a formal mechanism to handle complaints by foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs)—i.e., Chinese enterprises that are wholly or partly foreign-owned. Its “complaint agencies” are empowered to prevent disputes by facilitating settlements; they do not have adjudicatory authority. Beyond the immediate objective of dispute prevention, this essay argues that the FIE complaint mechanism was intended to strengthen central oversight and control over subnational governments. However, the mechanism may be hindering its intended objectives in practice. In particular, the flexibility and informality of its processes encourage ad hoc settlements between FIEs and errant subnational governments in ways that may undermine the exercise of central administrative powers.

Information

Type
Essay
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press for The American Society of International Law