This excellent book is a combination of careful scholarship, thoughtful analysis, clear writing, and moral commitment. In the fall of 1965, the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) was the third largest communist party in the world, behind only the state-mandated Soviet and Chinese communist parties, with membership in the party proper and associated organizations in the millions. A conjunction of favourable trends seemed to put the PKI on the threshold of peaceful accession to power. It had the support of the charismatic hero of Indonesian independence and head of government, President Sukarno, of influential members of Sukarno’s circle, and of some elements of the armed forces. By mid 1966, however, half a million members of the PKI and its associated organizations had been slaughtered, another million were imprisoned, leftist organizations had been banned, and the Indonesian Army had imposed the authoritarian New Order that would dominate Indonesian life for subsequent decades.Footnote ¹ While known to specialists in Southeast Asian and Cold War history, the existence, nature, and scale of these crimes are not as well known as the smaller-magnitude killings of leftists in 1970s South America or the more recent Bosnian massacres.Footnote ² Robinson’s accessible narrative and lucid analysis will do much to increase awareness of these tragedies.

In a series of well-written chapters, Robinson describes the domestic and international structural features that set the stage for this break in Indonesian life, the murky history of the coup attempt that precipitated the massacres, the dynamics and nature of mass killing, the enormous detentions that accompanied and followed the massacres, and the lasting effects on Indonesian society. Woven throughout the book are useful comparisons with other mass killings of the twentieth century.

The years prior to the massacres saw increasing political polarization, mass political mobilization, and failure of nascent democratic institutions within Indonesia. Robinson describes Indonesian politics in the early 1960s as competition among powerful blocs, including the PKI and several conservative nationalist and religiously affiliated parties, adjudicated and manipulated by Sukarno. Conflict between leftist and conservative versions of Indonesian nationalism emerged early in the twentieth century, and was a persistent and sometimes violent feature of Indonesian politics. Political polarization tended to follow class divisions, with the PKI drawing followers from among poorer Indonesians. These divisions often coincided with and reinforced other divisions. Poorer Javanese, for example, tended to mix their Islam with traditional folk religious practices, with orthodoxy more prevalent among the affluent.

One of the most powerful actors within this system was the Indonesian armed forces, dominated by the conservative Army. The armed forces, however, were not monolithic, and the PKI had sympathizers within the armed forces, notably the Indonesian Air Force. Robinson emphasizes institutional features that predisposed the Army to domestic repression. Some of the army leadership had entered politics as Japanese clients during the brutal Japanese occupation of Indonesia. This was followed by participation in the vicious struggle against the attempted Dutch reoccupation. Robinson describes the 1965–6 massacres as mimicry of Japanese and Dutch counter-insurgency tactics. As leaders of the struggle against the Dutch, the Army leadership felt that they had unique legitimacy to govern the Indonesian state. Crude self-interest was also a major factor. In the late 1950s, the Indonesian state expropriated numerous foreign investments, with the Army taking over management of many lucrative enterprises. As in several other postcolonial states where the military became deeply enmeshed in national economies, reformist movements were a direct threat to the pocketbooks of army leaders.Footnote ³

Domestic divisions occurred within and were inflamed by the context of the Cold War. The USA and its allies, notably Britain, were alarmed by Sukarno’s leftism and anti-imperialism. In the late 1950s, the Eisenhower administration initiated a characteristic strategy of cultivating the army leadership. In the mid 1960s, the Johnson administration, sinking into the quagmire of Vietnam, was especially alarmed by the growth of the PKI, and intensified interactions with the Army leadership. The international situation worked to the disadvantage of the PKI. While Indonesia had received considerable aid from (and incurred substantial debts to) the Soviet Union, by 1965, Sukarno had tilted towards China, a power without the international diplomatic clout or resources to significantly assist the PKI or the Sukarno regime.

The precipitant for the massacres was an apparent attempted coup on 1 October 1965, in which several Army generals were killed. Much about the coup remains murky. The most plausible explanation is that it was an attempt on the part of leftist military officers to decapitate the more conservative army leadership. The role of the PKI leadership is unclear and there is no evidence that the PKI was preparing a violent takeover of the Indonesian state.

Robinson argues convincingly that the Army leadership used the attempted coup as a pretext for a purge of leftist organizations. He carefully examines and disposes of alternative explanations, such as the racist notion that the mass killing was a spontaneous manifestation of atavistic features of Malay culture (‘running amok’), or that the killings were motivated by religious or ethnic divisions. As he states, ‘Javanese Muslims killed Javanese Muslims, Balinese Hindus killed Balinese Hindus, Protestant Bataks killed Protestant Bataks, Florenese Catholics killed Florenese Catholics’ (p. 132). In a grotesque way, the mass killing indicates the success of Indonesian nationalism, as the primary division between the killed and their murderers was not any of the multiple ethnic, religious, linguistic, or regional differences in Indonesian society but rather individual political commitments. The magnitude, timings, and geographic extent of the killings clearly indicates central organization. In a pair of detailed and graphic chapters, Robinson lays out the mechanics. Army direction was critical, with much actual killing being accomplished by paramilitaries and youth groups associated with conservative and religious political parties. As was common during the Cold War, the mass killings were encouraged and abetted by the USA and its allies.Footnote ⁴ Robinson shows how the Johnson administration and allied governments provided diplomatic support and critical material aid to the Indonesian Army.

The mass killings accompanied mass extra-legal detentions, some lasting for years to decades. Robinson describes both the devastating direct effects of the detentions, and the persistent legal disabilities and social stigma faced by former detainees and their families. The detentions were only one aspect of the oppressive New Order regime established by the Army leadership. Restriction of civil liberties, imposition of ideological conformity through control of the media and education, and economic exploitation on the part of the army leadership were major features of Indonesian life under the New Order. The 1965–6 killings were later followed by brutal repressions in north Sumatra (Aceh), western New Guinea (Papua), and the genocidal invasion of East Timor.

Robinson brings up interesting comparisons with other mass killings of the twentieth century, noting distinctive features of the Indonesian events. Unlike the Shoah, the Rwandan massacres, or the killings of Bosnians, the 1965–6 Indonesian mass killings were not genocides. The essentially political definition of victims more closely resembles the actions of the Khmer Rouge or Franco’s regime in Spain. The latter, with its extensive network of prison camps after the Spanish Civil War, is the closest analogue in European history.Footnote ⁵ Unlike Cambodia or Spain, however, and perhaps more similar to the Argentine Dirty War, the Indonesian mass killings did not occur during wartime, sometimes suggested as a critical element of mass killings. Nor were they inspired by a utopian ideology, another frequently suggested critical factor.

Based on the observation that these actions require some form of systematic, central coordination, Robinson offers a thoughtful approach to identifying a defining feature of twentieth-century mass killings. Leadership by a state-level organization committed to and capable of systematic political violence is a hallmark of mass killings. Robinson suggests that the critical feature is ‘militarism’, a structural feature not defined by specific ideology but rather by identification of domestic foes as existential threats to society, who can only be dealt with by systematic murder. Institutions built around an ethos of violence and viewing themselves as possessing distinctive political legitimacy, such as some professional militaries (in the cases of Indonesia, interwar Spain, and Argentina) or insurgent revolutionaries (such as the Khmer Rouge), are predisposed towards mass killings. However, while Robinson’s militarism concept works well for the relatively temporally focused mass killings of the twentieth century, it is less useful for related but important phenomena such as genocidal treatment of the indigenous peoples of the western hemisphere or Australia. State-sponsored violence was both important and common in the destruction of indigenous peoples, but so too was chronic, uncoordinated (though often state-sanctioned) violence occurring over longer periods.Footnote ⁶

Robinson presents a thoughtful discussion of the role and importance of New Order control of the historical record. Through control of the educational system, pervasive censorship, and creation of a repressive society that encouraged self-censorship, the Army leadership was able to establish a grossly false and highly favourable version of the events of 1965–6. New Order perversion of the historical record was successful not only within Indonesia but to a considerable extent internationally. Robinson shows that control of the past was a critical support of the legitimacy of the New Order. Despite a number of courageous Indonesian efforts to expose the truth, the New Order version of 1965–6 mass killings is still widely accepted and is a bulwark of illiberal forces in Indonesian society. This fact underscores the importance of Robinson’s work. His honest and unsparing scholarship is important not only for retrospective justice for the many innocent victims, but also for expanding human rights.