This volume was published after the death of its author and laboriously edited by Roig Lanzillotta. In front of such an editorial achievement, one has to be grateful both to the author and to her faithful colleagues who undertook the difficult task to make the book publishable in Brill's Plutarch Studies.
The book comprises 20 papers previously published elsewhere. According to F. no text is presented in the form it was originally published. Not only the introductions, but also the core texts are modified in order to be fitted to the conception and the architecture of the book. In some cases not explicitly indicated, F. confesses that she has modified her opinions.
Most of the papers deal with Plutarch's Erotikos. In Erotikos a certain theology of reality is present. Eros, as a god, is supposed to be an indisputable reality represented by a myth. If that was not the case, then all the values deriving from Eros would have been totally empty of meaning. In Plutarch's theology of Eros, the mythology of Eros is simultaneously the philosophy of Eros. The three together, theology, mythology and philosophy of Eros, constitute Plutarch's Erotikos.
F. follows a solid methodological and interpretative principle in dealing with the texts she is studying. She claims that the traditional hermeneutical enterprise of interpreting texts on the basis of the original inspiration of their writers and the relevant reception on the part of their contemporaries is limited nowadays because of the priority given to ancient (and contemporary, I should say) commentaries (p. 325). I certainly agree with her, and I definitely support F.'s decisive turn to honour the originals.
F. knew the texts under discussion extremely well. A simple look at the index locorum shows the depth of F.'s knowledge of her material. Her bibliography contains representative books and papers in the field of Plutarchean studies. I should add, though, C. Hubert's De Plutarchi amatorio (Diss. Berlin, 1903) as well as A. Billault's ‘Le dialogue sur l'amour de Plutarque et les dialogues de Platon sur l'amour’, in A. Pérez Jiménez et al. (edd.), Plutarco, Platón y Aristóteles (1999). F. is in dialogue with the most competent scholars of Plutarch, such as D. Babut, P. Donini, J. Sirinelli and others, as she deploys her thought both on philological and philosophical matters.
Her critical philological observations are mixed with philosophical remarks, and both lead to solid hermeneutical conclusions. I think that the serious task fοr a reviewer of F.'s last, and inevitably most mature, work is to extract and put to the fore the main ideas she wanted to leave behind, after so many years of serious interpretative effort.
According to F.'s view, the philosophical discourse operates as an ‘eikon’, opposed to ‘eidola’, which are the deceptive products of the sophistic spirit (p. 316). Regarding the philosophical discourse in its traditional form, F. emphasises its strong linguistic dimension, which is to be found in literature as well. Philosophy and literature are supposed to be combined by Plutarch, in order for the philosophical dialogue to be constructed (p. 40).
I think, though, that things are a little more complicated. The linguistic freedom of philosophy is determined by a certain self-control of the philosophical thought. The philosophical autonomy is unavoidably conditioned by the cohesion of philosophical syllogism. In addition, the linguistic productions in ancient Greece, whether in literature or in philosophy, do not only cause a certain kind of intellectual pleasure. In classical philosophy, in particular, both writers and readers are traced from life to thought and from thought to life. Literature could be seen as an interval in the play of life. Philosophy is constantly situated in the central scene.
Most probably, this is what F. had in mind when stressing the inciting value not only of the Platonic dialogues, but of every piece of philosophy that is supposed to express the philosopher's need to approach the public (p. 152). According to F. Plato's influence on Plutarch has been a kind of impregnation (p. 116).
Nevertheless, Plutarch's inspiration does not seem to derive from Plato's influence only. F. states that Plutarch seems to be distancing himself from the typical Platonic philosophical reflection, at the same time approaching the genre of laudation (p. 30). The Platonic remote world, though, is supposed to be a constant object of recall for Plutarch (p. 43), who is inclined to adopt metaphysical considerations and the construction of ideals, always caring about the practical realisations of them in everyday life, where the philosophical ends are supposed to be applied. The philosopher, as an ex-captive in the Platonic cave, is finally supposed to return back to the cave (p. 62).
F. emphasises that Plutarch believed in a Platonic evaluation of human experiences, which could be valuable for the majority of people (p. 23). At the same time, though, she probably contradicts herself when referring to a certain conviction of Plutarch about the non-philosophical spirit of the crowd (p. 187).
After all, F. puts forward the idea that, in the context of Plutarch's philosophical discipline, life and classical philosophy are mutually nourished (p. 23, see also p. 262). Thus, in F.'s mind, Plutarch conceives philosophical discourse as a vivid reflection that prevails in human life (pp. 45–6). She is well aware, though, that Plutarch's critical reason is not the typical philosophical reason of classical philosophers (p. 109).
F. confesses that she feels more comfortable to analyse the religious experience in Plutarch's texts (p. 424). She definitely stresses the fact that Plutarch was a priest as well. She believes that Plutarch lived simultaneously as a religious servant and as a competent philosopher without having the slightest reservation that, between religion and philosophy, there might occur a potential disruption of continuity.
F.'s remark, that there is no new conception of religious faith in Plutarch, is right (p. 425). It is a fact, also, that no religious faith is present in Plutarch (see pp. 443 and 468). According to F. Plutarch's faith is a philosophical one (p. 422). Nevertheless, there is a problem, I think, with F.'s conviction that Plutarch has succeeded in harmoniously expressing both his views as a philosopher and as a priest of Delphi (p. 272), unless one is ready to agree with her that the communication between humans and gods is at the centre of a philosopher's thought (p. 220). Personally, I believe that this is definitely a fact about poets like Homer.
Besides, according to F., Plutarch emphasises the psychological dimension of faith, which is an integral part of our alleged relation to the deity (p. 440). From this point of view, religious faith is rightly considered to belong to a somewhat inferior level of the human world (p. 441).
F.'s last book should be seen as a big challenge for her, to say her last words about issues such as the ones I have commented on. The limited space of such a review does not allow me to say more. The rest is to be discovered by those interested in Plutarch's Platonic philosophical theology. Undoubtedly, a collection of F.'s Plutarch-related papers has been long awaited, mostly by her peers who know and value her work. Such an edition will be highly appreciated by many other scholars as well, who will benefit from F.'s erudition in ancient Greek philosophical literature, particularly in Plato's and Plutarch's dialogues.
