Between 1936 and 1941 the Croatian Peasant Party, headed by Vladko Maček, operated two militias – the Hrvatska seljačka zaštita (HSZ, Croatian Peasant Defence) in the villages and the Hrvatska gradjanska zastita (HGZ, Croatian Civil Defence) in the urban centres. Even though it is well known that these units played an important role in stopping police violence against the Croatian peasantry,Footnote 1 little attention has been paid to them up to now. An examination of the activity of the HSZ in particular can throw light not only on Maček's complicated relations with the Yugoslav government, but also on his relations with Ante Pavelić and the fascist Ustaša movement as well as on the nature of the interwar kingdom. In a word, the mere fact that Maček saw the need to create a peasant self-defence force speaks volumes about the lawlessness prevailing in that country at the time.
The HSZ was a manifestation both of the lawlessness of the interwar kingdom and of persistent Croatian discontent with the system as it existed. In order to understand the HSZ as an expression of that discontent, it is necessary, I believe, to begin the story a few years before its actual establishment, thereby setting the context for what followed.
The nature of the interwar kingdom
The history of the interwar Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1918–41, known until 1929 as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) has sometimes been represented as that of a legitimate system, even of a parliamentary system, in which the rule of law predominated. Nothing could be further from the truth. The kingdom was created through a shotgun marriage, in which delegates representing the Slovene and Croat lands exceeded their mandate; specifically, they were authorised only to negotiate for a federal state but, instead, agreed on their own authority to a centralised system.Footnote 2 Thereafter, the kingdom functioned in its first decade as a non-consensual quasi-parliamentary system and subsequently first as a royal dictatorship (1929–34), then as a police state (1934–9), and eventually as a Serb-Croat condominium (1939–41).
The unification of Yugoslav lands was carried out without regard to legal niceties or the wishes of local inhabitants. Kosovo and Macedonia were annexed by force, the preferences of the respective Albanian and Bulgarian majorities of these regions being ignored, and armed resistance continued in those regions for a few years.Footnote 3 Montenegro was absorbed into the nascent kingdom through the device of conjuring a ‘Grand National Assembly’ into existence. This assembly had no legal basis and was brought into being as a result of the Serbian occupation and for the purpose of bypassing the legitimate government and assembly of Montenegro. Stiff resistance to Serbian annexation continued until 1924.Footnote 4 In Bosnia and Herzegovina, by contrast, there was no resistance as such to union with Serbia, but in the early months of 1919, Bosnian Serbs attacked Muslims throughout the region, setting their homes on fire and confiscating their land. The bloodletting in Bosnia and Herzegovina continued throughout 1924.Footnote 5 In Slovenia the fact that a plebiscite was held in October 1920, allowing Slovenes to choose between incorporation into Austria and incorporation into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and providing the basis for the eventual frontier between the two states, lent some legitimacy to Slovenia's adhesion to the new state, but the majority of Slovenes had hoped for autonomy and the Slovenian People's Party, the dominant political force among Slovenes, campaigned in the first parliamentary elections on a platform of winning administrative autonomy for Slovenia.Footnote 6 Slovenes compared the new state unfavourably with the Habsburg Empire, of which Slovenia had formerly been a part, and in May 1932, students of the University of Ljubljana staged a demonstration to demand independence for Slovenia. When prominent members of the Slovenian People's Party protested against the dictatorship, they were put on trial before the Special Court for the Protection of the State.
In Croatia, as is well known, the locals responded to the proclamation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes by staging anti-monarchy protests on Zagreb's Jelačić Square. A Serbian military mission arrived two weeks later and began disbanding the Croatian regiments of the Austro-Hungarian army. Violence and chaos swept across Croatia and continued well into 1919.Footnote 7
Soon after the establishment of the kingdom, authorities in Belgrade suppressed the Croatian Sabor (Assembly), a traditional institution valued by Croats, while the 1921 constitution was passed without the assent of deputies of Croats’ largest political party, the Croatian Republican Peasant Party (later known as the Croatian Peasant Party – Hrvatska Seljačka Stranka (HSS)). Opposition politicians were repeatedly arrested during election campaigns, police caused lists of signatures confirming support for the candidacies of opposition politicians to disappear and held up the confirmation of opposition deputies to the parliament, supporters of opposition parties were beaten by police or by paramilitaries, election results were falsified, leading critics of the regime were variously assassinated, imprisoned, or forced into exile and, until 1929, Slovenes and Croats were required to pay a higher rate of tax than Serbs or Montenegrins. Corruption penetrated to the highest levels of state,Footnote 8 and the educational system was harnessed to foster a Yugoslav consciousness in which Serbian culture and the Serbian language would provide the core, while the Orthodox Church displayed a contempt for Catholicism which suggested to at least some Croats, as Ante Cilaga would put it in 1951, that a ‘war was being waged against the Catholic Church and in favour of the Serb Orthodox Church’.Footnote 9 As Ivo Banac has noted, ‘the Catholic church was acutely aware that in the eyes of the latitudinarian Yugoslavist unitarists it stood condemned. . . [and] whereas Catholicism was condemned as anti-Slavic, the unitarists and Great Serbs viewed Orthodoxy as native and national’.Footnote 10 The result was that some Croatian Catholics reportedly decided to convert to the Serbian Orthodox Church.Footnote 11
Throughout the interwar years, paramilitary formations inspired by nationalist ideas terrorised sectors of the population. Among the first such formations were the Chetniks (who split into two major formations in 1924) and the Organisation of Yugoslav Nationalists (ORJUNAFootnote 12), established in Split in 1921 and operating under the umbrella of Svetozar Pribićević's wing of the Democratic Party. Later, other paramilitary formations were set up – specifically, the Serbian National Youth (SRNAOFootnote 13), which was inspired by the notion that ORJUNA was not ‘Serbian’ enough, and the Croatian National Youth (HANAOFootnote 14), which was formed as a response to ORJUNA. To these one may add the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO), which sought to annex Macedonia to a Greater Bulgaria, and the Ustaša Movement (later Ustaša Party), set up by Ante Pavelić after he had fled the country, following the proclamation of the royal dictatorship on 6 January 1929.
Various accounts have been given concerning the year in which the Ustaša organisation came into being. Sekula Drljević provides the earliest date, suggesting that the Ustaša movement was founded as early as 7 January 1929, while Pavelić was still in Zagreb.Footnote 15 An unsigned article for the online Wikipedija likewise claims that the Ustaša movement was founded in 1929, but asserts that it was founded in Italy; the encyclopedia entry includes a note indicating that some of the points made in its article are disputed.Footnote 16 James Sadkovich also dates the founding of the Ustaša in 1929, but suggests that the establishment of the movement came only late in the year.Footnote 17 In fact, the first organisation called into being by Pavelić, accomplished in conjunction with Gustav Perčec and Dr Stanišev, president of the Macedonian National Committee, was the Croatian-Macedonian Committee, a body dedicated to the establishment of an independent Croatia and an independent Macedonia.Footnote 18 And while Pavelić was certainly in contact with like-minded persons even before he left Croatia (on 17 January 1929), it was only in 1931, as Fikreta Jelić-Butić notes, that the Ustaša organisation formally announced its birth,Footnote 19 under the name Ustaša – hrvatska revolucionarna organizacija (Insurgent – Croatian Revolutionary Organisation) and it was under this name that a band of Pavelić's followers staged an attack on a police station in the village of Brušani in the Lika region in autumn 1932. As Ivo Goldstein notes, Ustaša members came to regard this attack, which was later known as the Velebit uprising, as ‘the formal birth of their organisation’.Footnote 20 Finally, it was only in 1933 that the Ustaša, committed to the establishment of an independent Croatian state and fiercely anti-Serb, issued a set of principles ‘recognizing the rights of no other peoples in Croatia except the Croats’.Footnote 21 That same year, the Ustaša organisation changed its name to Ustaški pokret, or Ustaša Movement.
The emergence of the Croatian Peasant Defence
One of the last such formations to be established was the HSZ, set in motion in 1936 on instructions of Vladko Maček (1879–1964), president of the HSS. The formation of the Croatian Peasant Defence was symptomatic, thus, of the general failure of the authorities in Belgrade to establish order and to build a legitimate state based on the rule of law.Footnote 22
The proclamation of the royal dictatorship by King Aleksandar in 1929 had resulted in the suppression, at least nominally, of the pre-existing political parties. The king claimed that his intention was to establish civil and political order, but neither the dictatorship nor the royal constitution issued by the king unilaterally in 1931 (a constitution which, in Tomasevich's words, ‘safeguarded all royal dictatorial prerogatives’Footnote 23) succeeded (or could have been expected to succeed) in this task, and there continued to be reports of plans on the part of IMRO and the Ustaša Movement to carry out terrorist actions or, on the part of Hungarian authorities, to prepare militarily to recapture lands lost to Belgrade after 1918.Footnote 24 The ministry of internal affairs (MUP) reported that it was also keeping an eye on a group of Bulgarian terrorists said to be based in Zadar, as well as on several terrorist groups based in Albania,Footnote 25 although it is likely that these groups existed largely in the imagination of rumour-mongers. Ludbreg county was the scene of particular unrest in April and May 1932, when local peasants hoisted a Croatian flag and vowed to fight the government. Authorities feared that the unrest reflected not so latent separatist tendencies among Croats.Footnote 26 It was about this time that the aforementioned attack by members of the Ustaša organisation in Brušani took place; police correctly suspected a lawyer, Andrija Artuković (later to serve as minister of internal affairs in the Independent State of Croatia), of being one of the organisers of this band.Footnote 27 It was at this point that a secret organisation with ties to Vladko Maček was established in Sisak county. The Sisak organisation was headed by Ivan Pernar, a Zagreb lawyer. The organisation, which may be seen as a forerunner to the HSZ, was reported (by local police authorities) to be planning to attack police stations and seize control of other government facilities. The long-term objective of the organisation was said to be the secession of Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Slovenia.Footnote 28 For that matter, the communist party was also agitating in Sisak, playing on Croats’ bitterness over their general situation as well as over the assassination in 1928 of Stjepan Radić, Maček's predecessor as head of the HSS.Footnote 29 Indeed, opponents of the regime repeatedly created incidents at public events, such as performances of various kinds, in order to register their opposition to the regime and to raise the consciousness of Croats.Footnote 30
Later that same year, Djuro Padačić, a pharmacist in Ivanec county, was agitating for the formation of a society which he planned to call ‘Hrvatski Zagorac’ (literally, Croatian inhabitant of the Zagorje region), setting 16 October as the date on which interested persons should assemble. Five days before, the county prefect issued a decree, banning the organisation in advance.Footnote 31 At about the same time there were reports of movements on the part of armed bands in the virgin forests of Kalnik, and an attack by young peasants on a police station in the village of Bojan in Čazma county.Footnote 32 While the latter attack was apparently spontaneous, with no organisation behind it, Ustaša operatives were also active, setting off explosives at the customs office in Šibenik and at the gendarme barracks at Sukošane and Gorica, near Biograd.Footnote 33
By that time Croatian young people were involved in a number of organisations – most prominently the Križari (Crusaders) and the Hrvatski Skauti (Croatian Scouts), both of them opposed to the ideology of Yugoslavism, by which the regime hoped to erase Croatian and other non-Serb national identities.Footnote 34 The police worried that opposition activities reflected separatist aspirations and, in 1932, duly reported that Croatian separatists remained active in the middle schools of Zagreb, organised in Crveni krst and similar associations. That same year saw the establishment of the Central Representative Student Organisation at the University of Zagreb; inspired by Frankist (i.e., Croatian nationalist) ideology, the organisation took shape on the initiative of the former rector, Josip Belobrk. By then an armed Ustaša group, uniformed and equipped with the latest weaponry, had been established in Velebit; the émigré publication Grič reported that these UstašeFootnote 35 were moving around in the woods and studying the terrain, in anticipation of future military operations.Footnote 36
During 1929–34 Maček remained in contact with Pavelić, at one point relaying a request to the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini to receive Pavelić and August Košutić. In November 1930, which is to say before the establishment of the Ustaša, when Maček travelled to Vienna for a meeting with Košutić and Juraj Krnjević, another Croatian émigré active in the opposition to the Belgrade regime, Pavelić was invited to join them. But Maček tried to keep his contacts with Pavelić secret and, after a Ustaša raid into Lika in September 1932, he became increasingly explicit about endorsing a federalist (which is to say, also peaceful) solution; there were now reports of friction among Croatian leaders, between those favouring armed insurrection (such as Pavelić) and those open to negotiation (such as Maček).Footnote 37 By the time that the Ustaše were interned, Maček's organisation was clearly reaching a parting of the ways with Pavelić, who, as Sadkovich notes, ‘wanted a racially pure state [in which]. . . only the Poglavnik [the leader, Pavelić himself] was to enjoy any real individuality’.Footnote 38 By this time it was already clear that there were fundamental differences of national ideology between Maček and Pavelić. Specifically, Maček and the HSS were open to compromise and were prepared to work towards a solution within the Yugoslav framework; for them, the problem was Serb hegemonism, not Serbs as such. Separatism was an option for the HSS, but not the only one. By contrast, Pavelić and the Ustaša wanted to destroy Yugoslavia, rejected any form of compromise and viewed the presence of Serbs in Croatia as a problem to be ‘solved’.
The regime was hostile to both the HSS and the Ustaša movement. An article was published in early autumn 1932 asking why Croats had not staged an armed uprising against Serb hegemonism, and arguing that Yugoslavia as a state was so sick politically that it would die of its own accord, without the necessity of organizing an insurrection;Footnote 39 it predictably inflamed tempers in Belgrade. Then, in November 1932, leading figures in the HSS and the SDS – Maček among them – signed the famous Zagreb Points (Zagrebačke punktacije), which had been drafted by Ante Trumbić. The Points charged that the state was the instrument for sustaining Serb hegemony in the country and that Croatian values and institutions were being destroyed in the kingdom.Footnote 40 In the wake of the issuance of this written protest, Maček was arrested on 31 January 1933, convicted of having violated the law on the security of the state and, on 30 April 1933, sentenced to three years in prison. The Croatian party leader served just under twenty months of his sentence, being amnestied and released in mid-December 1934 by the incoming prime minister, Bogoljub Jevtić.Footnote 41
The Ustaše, loyal to Ante Pavelić, continued to make their presence felt as the 1930s wore on, conducting terrorist operations in 1932–3, attempting regicide in December 1933, and finally succeeding, in collaboration with IMRO, in assassinating the king on 9 October 1934.Footnote 42 While ORJUNA, SRNAO and the Chetniks operated from bases within the country, Ustaša groups operated from bases in Hungary and Italy. Fascist Italy's support of the Ustaša reflected Mussolini's aspiration to build a Mediterranean empire consisting of fascist understudies and outright colonies; Belgrade's support of terrorists and revolutionaries in Venezia/Giulia, Istria, and Albania may have figured as a response to the threat of Italian imperialism. By the end of 1933 the governor of Savska banovina (the administrative unit which included Zagreb) was complaining of ‘frequent’ incursions into the territory by terrorist groups based in neighbouring countries.Footnote 43 In February 1934 the authorities in Savska banovina reported to Belgrade that they had confiscated 2,093 leaflets of a political character, mostly of a separatist inspiration; they had apparently been prepared by Croatian émigrés (Ustaše) based in Hungary and Italy. ‘Former Radićevites’ – as the authorities called members of Maček's suppressed HSS – condemned the terrorism being waged by émigré Ustaše, however, arguing that it should be possible ‘to set the position of Croats right without [recourse to] terror and force’.Footnote 44
But as the rivalry between Pavelić and Maček for leadership among the Croats intensified, Maček was forced to respond in kind, which meant forming his own armed militias. This came in part as a response to the assassination of Croatian intellectual Milan Šufflay in 1931Footnote 45 and the attempted assassination of Mile Budak in 1932. As early as 1932–3, Maček loyalists formed illegal ‘combat organisations’ in several municipalities; these organisations were the forerunners of the HSZ. Subsequently, in spring 1935, the leadership of ‘the former HSS’ set up certain illegal organisations in Zagreb; about this time, students at the agricultural faculty of the University of Zagreb set up a Croatian National Revolutionary Movement (Hrvatski Nacionalni Revolucionarni Pokret) for the purpose of promoting a peasant uprising.Footnote 46 Although the HSZ would not be formally established until 1936, self-defence units loyal to Maček were established in the larger towns of Croatia during 1934–5.Footnote 47 These self-defence units were simultaneously a security measure to defend Croats from Chetniks and other hostile paramilitary forces, and an effort on the part of the HSS loyalists to compete with the Ustaše for Croatian support.
Thus in the lead-up to the 1935 elections the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, riddled with corruption, was also the scene of terrorist violence emanating from several quarters. The elections themselves saw Maček working together with Serbs in opposition to the government list headed by Bogoljub Jevtić, the incumbent prime minister. There were reports at the time that Croats were being terrorised into supporting Maček's list – for example, in Kuterevo, where a terrorist campaign was waged against opponents, so that supporters of Jevtić's list allegedly feared for their lives and property.Footnote 48 This seems rather improbable given Maček's huge popularity among Croats, but may be read as an effort by the police to provide an excuse of sorts for Maček's success among Croatian voters. Rumours also spread that, after the elections, Maček would establish a free and independent Croatia (‘slobodnu i nezavisnu Hrvatsku’) within the framework of Yugoslavia, but with its own military and state apparatus.Footnote 49 Other rumours held that, after the elections, the Third Reich and the British (!) would come to Maček's assistance so that he might set up an independent Croatia, while others held out hope that ‘the Serbs’ would recognise Maček's ‘right’ to set up an independent Croatia.Footnote 50 Yet more rumours, which circulated in some villages on the eve of the elections, held that Hitler's army was already in Zagreb, with four regiments of the Italian army standing by on the border, and that the Germans and Italians were ready to help Croats obtain their independence.Footnote 51 Indeed, there were widespread expectations among Croats of imminent independence for Croatia. There is a hyperbolic character to some of the rumours and expectations which circulated in Croatia at the time, but they are important insofar as they figure as measures of Croatian discontent or worries about the regime. By the same token, some of the police reports at the time exaggerated the threat posed by Croatian self-defence organisations. However, these very exaggerations may be taken as a measure of nervousness and uncertainty on the part of the police, or even as an indication of a tendency to want to discredit the opposition, most especially the HSS.
In fact, Maček, who had been amnestied and released from prison on 22 December 1934, after 691 days of incarceration, told the UK Daily Mail on the day following his release that he hoped to bring about the federalisation of the Yugoslav state and that his vision of Croatian independence was a qualified one: Croatia would, he indicated at that time, remain within the Yugoslav kingdom. At the same time, he explicitly rejected any recourse to armed insurgency or rebellion.Footnote 52
Although Maček was Croatia's senior political leader, he was able to establish credibility among at least some Serbs in a way in which Radić had never been able to do, based on a common opposition to the lack of democracy and the widespread corruption. This credibility was even shared by Serbian Orthodox clergy – probably a reflection of the co-operation between the SDS and the HSS. Thus, for example, in Podravska Slatina, three local Orthodox priests supported Maček's list; indeed, one of them – Fr Rajko Kokanović – was a candidate on the list. Other Serbian Orthodox priests, for example, in Kostajnica and Otočac, also supported Maček.Footnote 53
The elections were held on 5 May 1935; some 3,914,945 voters, or 73.6 per cent of those eligible to vote, took part. According to official reports, Jevtić's list was placed first, but, also according to official figures, Maček's list was a strong second.Footnote 54 Given widespread fraud and other irregularities which served to boost Jevtić's result, the vote was widely interpreted as a setback for the government list and, accordingly, Prince Paul, serving as regent since the assassination of King Aleksandar in October the previous year, turned to Milan Stojadinović, the erstwhile minister of finance, to form the new government.
The growth and activities of the HSZ
The elections blew wind into the sails of the HSS, which now revived its cultural organisation, Seljačka sloga (Peasant Unity, originally founded in 1925 but suppressed by royal decree in 1929), and set up two others – Seljačka Gospodarska Sloga (SGS, or Peasant Economic Unity) to assist peasants in economic affairs and Sud dobrih ljudi (literally, Court of good people) to resolve disputes arising among Croatian peasants.Footnote 55 But immediately after the parliamentary elections of May 1935, the newly installed regime of Milan Stojadinović launched a new wave of attacks on Croatian peasants.Footnote 56 In spring 1936 the HSS circulated an instruction to its leading members, warning that the government was using illegal Chetnik organisations to harass Croats, albeit under the rubric of the government party, Yugoslav Radical Community (Jugoslavenska radikalna zajednica), and that it was therefore necessary to establish a paramilitary self-defence force. The result was the creation of the HSZ, to which able-bodied Croats aged 25 to 40 were now recruited.Footnote 57 Soon there were HSZ units operating in several villages across Croatia, conducting military exercises on a daily basis. At the time the government did not intervene in any way in the activities of the HSZ or seek to prevent them from taking place. Then, in September 1936, there was a misleading report that the HSZ had been shut down. In fact, the HSZ was just getting organised and in October 1936, Maček signed his name to an HSZ 42-page manual on organisational questions.Footnote 58 Moreover, although the HSZ ceased all activities in the district of Zagreb in autumn that year, in December there were reports of the renewed registration of peasants of 20 and older in Lasinja county, evidence that the organisation was still very much alive.Footnote 59
The organisation had an overtly military character, and its purpose, according to the county prefect in Donji Miholjac, was to obstruct the authorities in their work, at the same time providing a potential core for an army to liberate Croatia from rule by Belgrade; indeed, this was the general consensus among the authorities. HSS activists, however, insisted that the purpose of the HSZ was purely defensive, directed against Chetniks and communists, although it did not escape the notice of the authorities that some HSZ units were clashing with gendarmes.Footnote 60 This was not as contradictory as first appeared, since the gendarmes were often found to be offering support to local Chetnik organisations, so that conflict with Chetniks automatically brought the HSZ into conflict with the gendarmes.Footnote 61 Both the HSZ and the SGS, like the Hrvatski Radnički Savez (Croatian Workers’ League) – an industrial counterpart to the SGS – remained illegal. In fact, however, Maček was playing a double game, declaring publicly in July 1936 that the Croats might give up on a negotiated solution and turn to revolution. That same month Košutić arrived in Rome for a meeting with Mussolini, telling the Duce that although the HSS and the Ustaša were distinct organisations, they would ‘reunite’ for the ‘final battle’ with the Serbs.Footnote 62 The following month, Ante Trumbić went to Palermo to see Pavelić, in the hope of reconciling Maček and Pavelić. His efforts were unavailing.
During summer 1936, branches of the Croatian Peasant Defence were established in villages in the districts of Farkaševac, Ivanjska, Ciglena, Trojstvo and Severin. But as of late 1936 the situation as regards the HSZ differed from county to county. In Gjurgjevac and Kalinovac, for example, local authorities assured their superiors that there was no sign of the HSZ, while in the district of Jelačićevo the HSZ had established a branch in only one village, Lepa Greda, which had thirteen members as of October 1936.Footnote 63 Or again, information supplied by the county prefect in Koprivnica county showed that HSZ organisations in that county were either stagnating or in decline, with no new chapters being formed.Footnote 64 On the other hand, the HSZ branch in Brodski Drenovac enjoyed particularly strong growth. By the end of January 1937 the overall strength of the HSZ was officially estimated by the authorities at 13,915 members, the largest figures being given for Donja Stubica (1,445), Koprivnica (1,200) and Ludbreg (1,200).Footnote 65
At first, as already noted, the authorities adopted a passive attitude towards the HSZ, expecting that the peasants would not be able to sustain paramilitary activity. But by the end of 1936, the steady burgeoning of both HSZ branches and Croatian paramilitary organisations operating under other names, though possibly part of the HSZ network, began to alarm the authorities. Among these other organisations were the so-called Hrvatska vojska (Croatian army) set up in the village of Bistričko Podgorje (in Marija Bistrica county) in June 1936, the Hrvatska omladina (Croatian Youth) established in the village of Viškovci (county of Djakovo) in July 1936, the Hrvatska narodna odbrana (Croatian People's Defence) which appeared in the villages of Vrbanovac and Sesveta, both in Ludbreg county, in September–October 1936, and the Seljačka sloga – narodna zaštita (Peasant Unity – People's Defence), established in the village of Dubrovčanin in Klanjec county. These organisations conducted unarmed exercises. Authorities were also troubled by reports that weaponry was being smuggled to the HSZ from abroad (Italy and Austria) and that Croats who had served in the Austro-Hungarian army were helping to set up and train the HSZ units.Footnote 66 Moreover, the authorities quickly obtained a copy of a six-page typed memo, signed by Maček and Jakov Jelašić, describing the successful launching of the HSZ as ‘only a small step on the road to our final goal’ and promising that efforts would be intensified in 1937.Footnote 67 Reviewing these developments, the authorities decided, by early 1937, that their erstwhile policy of, let us say, malignant neglect had failed, and on 1 March 1937 orders were issued for a clampdown on HSZ activities. In particular, the Section for the Protection of the State (Zagreb office) now demanded the immediate arrest of local HSZ leaders in the event of efforts to hold either training exercises or meetings.Footnote 68
The rivalry between Maček and Pavelić
By this point the rift between Maček and Pavelić was almost complete. During 1936, for example, Ustaša newspapers openly attacked some of Maček's closest collaborators, thereby implicitly attacking also Maček himself, even while doing their best to infiltrate the HSS apparatus.Footnote 69 In addition, Pavelić's followers were attending meetings and other events organised by Maček's adherents, causing disruption with their shouts of ‘Živio Ante Pavelić!’ (long live Ante Pavelić!).Footnote 70 In North America, the Croatian émigré organisation Domobran turned its back on Maček at about this time, after Maček had criticised the organisation for fascistic tendencies, and by early 1937 was celebrating Pavelić as the only leader of the Croats.Footnote 71 County prefects seemed inclined to exaggerate the threat posed by Pavelić's organisation. Compared with the HSZ's roughly 14,000 members, police claimed that Pavelić had about 70,000 recruits in Spain at the time, fighting for Franco and preparing for a future attack on Yugoslavia from bases in Hungary and Italy.Footnote 72 But, in fact, as of April 1937, Pavelić could count on just over 500 followers in Italy, where he made his base – all of them confined to detention camps.Footnote 73 There were additional numbers of Ustaše in Hungary and South America, but, even so, it is inconceivable that Pavelić could have been represented by more than a few hundred volunteers in Spain – if that.Footnote 74
In the 11 December 1938 Yugoslav elections, Maček's list won 1,364,524 votes as against 1,643,738 for the government list.Footnote 75 Maček's opposition on the right railed against his apparent willingness to play by the regime's rules, and in the lead-up to the election Stjepan Buć's newspaper, Nezavisnost (Independence), published in Zagreb, ‘accused Macek of having betrayed the struggle for an independent Croatian state’.Footnote 76 On 5 February 1939 Dragiša Cvetković took office as prime minister, charged with reaching an agreement with the Croats. Soon afterwards, he and Maček began talks concerning a historic agreement. Maček, however, was playing a double game. At the same time that he was negotiating with Cvetković, he was also carrying on discussions with the Italian government, through intermediaries.Footnote 77 An apparent envoy from Maček turned up in Rome about this time and suggested to Galeazzo Ciano, Italy's foreign minister, that Maček and his associates could be receptive to separating Croatia from Belgrade and linking it to Italy through a personal (dynastic) union. Subsequently (on 20 March 1939), Amadeo Carnelutti, an Italian from Croatia and member of the HSS, arrived in Rome and contacted Ciano. Carnelutti alluded to the possibility of an uprising by Croats within six months, indicating that they would, in that case, look to Italy for assistance. It was understood that this would mean a ‘personal union’ joining Croatia and Italy.Footnote 78
The Ustaša wanted a complete break with Belgrade and therefore took umbrage at Maček's apparent flexibility. On 16 April 1939 the Ustaša organisation Hrvatski Domobran (Croatian Home Guard) held a conference in Buenos Aires; at this conference, Ante Valenta, Pavelić's deputy, upbraided Maček for having ‘sold out to the Serbs’.Footnote 79 Branimir Jelić, who had assumed the leadership of the Ustaša organisation in the United States by this point, told the same conference that only Hitler would liberate Croatia.
Maček and Cvetković reached an agreement on 27 April 1939. The prince would in fact veto this agreement, forcing the two men to resume negotiations. But in the meantime, the May 1939 issue of Nezavisna hrvatska država (Independent State of Croatia), reacting to the initial announcement of the agreement, attacked Maček for his ‘capitulation’.Footnote 80 As the Maček–Cvetković negotiations resumed, Nezavisna hrvatska država opined that nothing good could come of the talks.Footnote 81 By mid-August, the two men were reaching the successful conclusion of their talks, and the text of their eventual agreement was accepted by the regent on 24 August 1939. Under the terms of the Cvetković--Maček Sporazum (agreement), an autonomous Croatia was created within expanded borders; Maček now became deputy prime minister, Ivan Šubašić became ban (governor) of the Banovina of Croatia.
The pro-Sporazum newspaper, Istra (Istria), published in Zagreb in spite of its name, hailed the Maček–Cvetković agreement and quoted with approval from a newspaper published in Graz to claim that Yugoslavia had achieved ‘a reconciliation of Serbs and Croats. In spite of many gloomy prophecies and pessimistic assessments, so much calm, so much considered objectivity, and so much goodwill has been shown on both sides that a way has finally been found which has been received with satisfaction in Belgrade and Zagreb’.Footnote 82 The Ustaša press, by contrast, rejected the Sporazum lock, stock, and barrel. Commenting on the agreement a few months later, Nezavisnost asked rhetorically,
What exactly has Dr Maček obtained for Croatianhood and Croatian with his agreement? Instead of creating and acknowledging Croatian sovereignty, which. . . he promised the people so many times, he has obtained for a people a miniscule bit of administrative autonomy with no real or formal guarantee that it will be maintained and for how long it will be sustained.Footnote 83
In spite of the agreement and the creation of the autonomous Banovina of Croatia, the HSZ continued to operate for another two years, occupying the same grey zone as ORJUNA, SRNAO and the Chetniks. After the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia and the subsequent proclamation of the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, NDH) on 10 April 1941, the right wing of the Croatian Peasant Party immediately went over to the Ustaše. As for the Croatian Peasant Defence, at first it placed itself at the service of the new authorities and played a role in guarding public facilities and disarming units of the Yugoslav Army.Footnote 84 Given the presence of German occupation forces which were supporting the Ustaše and the NDH's rather transparent subservience to the Third Reich,Footnote 85 this result is perhaps not surprising. The Catholic, ultra-conservative Hrvatska straža (Croatian Sentinel) would later give this account of the HSZ's role in the first months of the NDH:
The Croatian Peasant and Civil Defence, ready and armed, were especially active and dedicated in helping [the Ustaša movement]: they disarmed Serbian soldiers and captured Chetniks; they guarded public buildings, roads, and bridges, as well as military and other warehouses, private property, and the lives of Croats in danger from Serbian retribution; and they made a supreme effort to ensure that the friendly and allied armies [would experience] minimal troubles and casualties in their noble work in helping to set up the Independent State of Croatia.Footnote 86
In early June 1941, however, the Croatian Peasant Defence was disarmed and dissolved, apparently because the Ustaša leadership was not certain of the loyalty of these units. In spite of its formal dissolution, however, local units continued to exist in some villages, maintaining their connection with local HSS functionaries.Footnote 87
Conclusion
In formal terms, the Croatian Peasant Defence existed for barely five years, 1936–41, although earlier incarnations can be dated at least as far back as 1932. Although some of its organisers thought in terms of using the HSZ to serve as the nucleus for a future Croatian army which would play a role in establishing Croatian independence, there are several factors which point to the (primarily) defensive purpose of the organisation. First, there is the fact that the HSZ was formed only after nearly two decades of lawlessness and corruption, after the suppression of political parties by the king, and after Maček's own incarceration for nearly two years on trumped-up charges. Second, the HSZ was established as a response to the activities of paramilitary formations supported by the regime, such as Mlada Jugoslavija and the Chetnik organisations, which had operated within the kingdom since its establishment (having been set up even earlier), and of ORJUNA and SRNAO. And third, the HSZ was established only after the Ustaša raid on Lika in 1932 and after Pavelić began to rival Maček for leadership among the Croats. The HSZ was thus intended to protect Croatian peasants from Serb paramilitary units, to assure some measure of civil order locally, in a system in which disorder was widespread, and to enable Maček to compete with Pavelić for the loyalty of Croats. In all these respects the HSZ served to demonstrate that the HSS was not a pacifist organisation which would fail to offer resistance to persecution. Although not intended to serve as the nucleus of a future Croatian army, there were those in the HSZ who would have been happy to try to use it for that purpose.Footnote 88 It is thus by no means irrelevant that some HSS members were reported to be asserting, as of late 1937, that they had amassed sufficient weaponry and munitions to provide adequate military defence for an eventual Croatian state.Footnote 89 Nor is it without interest that, on 4 November 1937, Maks Čavlek, addressing new recruits to the HSZ in the village of Desinić-Turnišić (Pregrada county), advised them that, in future, military exercises of the HSZ would be under German(!) command. Čavlek also told those present that November day,
It is only necessary to wait for a night when an independent Croatian state will arise, because there will be no more Yugoslavia. . . Whoever does not come along must be killed. Whoever cannot come aboard must have his house burned, together with all of his property.Footnote 90
Nor, again, is it by any means irrelevant that HSZ forces were clashing with police in Novi Gradec as of early 1938.Footnote 91
The existence of the HSZ was simultaneously a reflection of the general lawlessness of a system in which the HSS and other political parties felt that they needed their own armed reserves, and a symptom of the vast discontent among Croats who, while prepared to consider a federal solution, ultimately hoped to establish a state in which they could feel free.
