The collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 was a boon for scholars interested in democratization and socioeconomic change. One of the most illuminating strands in the huge and still-growing literature on this topic has been the work inspired by historical institutionalism, an approach that highlights the path-dependent nature of political, economic, and social institutions and practices. Anna Seleny's book fits solidly within that school, as she carefully attempts to show that the post-1989 economic and political transformations of Hungary and Poland were shaped, at least in part, by changes that occurred in those countries during the communist era. Some of the literature on path dependence gives only a vague sense of how the process actually works, but Seleny, to her credit, seeks to elucidate the concrete historical circumstances that influenced subsequent choices and outcomes in both Hungary and Poland.
In a brief introduction and an opening chapter, Seleny lays out the main points she aims to develop in the book. The discussion here at times is convoluted, and some of her definitions of key terms (and even the terms themselves) are puzzling, but she succeeds in presenting a framework for the remaining chapters. Her analysis picks up steam in the three chapters that explore the evolution of economic and political arrangements in communist-era Hungary. The author gives particular emphasis to the emergence of the second economy in Hungary, tracing how it gradually became a genuine “private sector” (albeit one still greatly overshadowed by the inefficient state sector). She discusses how the relationship between state and society in Hungary was altered by the series of economic reforms carried out in three main phases over 35 years: the New Course of 1953–55, the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) adopted in 1968, and the spate of decrees, regulations, and laws enacted from 1982 on, paving the way in 1988 for the passage of the Law on Corporations, which codified important changes in property rights.
Seleny offers a similar but more cursory overview of attempts at economic reform in communist-era Poland, beginning with the bold measures implemented in 1956 that were soon eviscerated by the same leaders who had initially championed them. She recounts the abortive economic reform efforts in Poland in the 1970s and the more significant laws and regulations enacted in the early 1980s after the Polish regime had imposed martial law and crushed Solidarity. She also notes the economic measures adopted in Poland shortly before the August 1989 transition to a noncommunist government headed by Tadeusz Mazowiecki.
Much of the material in the book is interesting and rich, and Seleny's analysis of how the emergence of small-scale private ventures in Hungary in the 1980s gradually reconfigured the links among government officials, state-owned enterprise managers, and private entrepreneurs is especially intriguing. She shows that certain options available to bureaucrats and political leaders in the past (e.g., onerous taxes and other discriminatory measures intended to deter and stifle private economic activity) were no longer as appealing at a time when nearly all of Hungary's economic growth was coming from the private sector. Seleny also perceptively describes how, at each stage, reform-minded Communist Party officials and professional economists in Hungary “crafted political-discursive strategies that stretched the boundaries of the ideologically permissible” (p. 8). Her meticulous account of these rhetorical tactics will be of great interest to proponents of ideational and discourse theories of political affairs.
Despite the many strengths of the book, some weaknesses are worth noting. One obvious shortcoming is case selection. Seleny limits her discussion to the two countries that, as she rightly says, “led Eastern Europe out of communism” (p. 4). She justifies the case selection by claiming that Hungary and Poland followed “radically different routes … out of communism” (p. 4), but this characterization is dubious. Although the two countries' routes out of communism were by no means identical, they were not “radically different.” Indeed, Hungary and Poland were much more similar to each other than to any of the other Soviet-bloc countries. If she had truly wanted to examine “radically different routes out of communism,” she would have been better off comparing Hungary with, say, Czechoslovakia or one of the three Baltic countries or—even more—with Romania or Bulgaria. Economic reform in Poland prior to the late 1980s was not as far-reaching as in Hungary, but the reforms in Poland surely were more impressive than anything adopted in the East-bloc countries other than Hungary (and Czechoslovakia in 1968).
On some other points, too, Seleny has a propensity for overstatement. She repeatedly describes as “radical” certain measures in Hungary that were actually more modest. Neither cumulatively nor individually did the reforms in Hungary before the late 1980s produce a “radical” transformation of the communist economic system. Her attempt to contrast the experiences of Hungary and Poland in the postcommunist era—a contrast that will supposedly bear out her argument about path dependency—is also problematic. She markedly overstates the degree of contentiousness in Poland (which overall has enjoyed a relatively tranquil postcommunist period, especially compared to countries like Albania, Romania, Slovakia, and eastern Germany) and suggests that Hungary has been notable for its “more quiescent politics” (p. 8). Seleny completed her book shortly before violent antigovernment unrest erupted on a large scale in Hungary in September–October 2006, followed by further violent clashes in Budapest and several other cities in 2007 and 2008. Nothing remotely comparable has happened in postcommunist Poland. Presumably, those events have forced the author to rethink her argument about the supposedly lasting impact of pre-1989 changes on postcommunist arrangements in both Hungary and Poland.
Seleny draws on a wide range of secondary sources, supplementing them with interviews conducted during 1988–96 with former officials, entrepreneurs, and scholars in the two countries. But unfortunately, she did not make use of formerly closed archives in Hungary and Poland, which opened nearly 20 years ago and contain a vast amount of declassified Communist Party and government files relevant to this topic. Having worked extensively in the archives of both of these countries, I found myself thinking, as I was reading the book, of specific collections that could have shed further valuable light on the issues covered. (To cite but one example, documents in the Hungarian archives make clear that the anti-reformist economic retrenchment in 1972–74 was spurred in large part by Soviet pressure.) On numerous occasions Seleny cites a few internal Hungarian Ministry of Finance documents, and on page 220 she quotes an internal Hungarian Communist Party memorandum (though in each case without indicating the provenance of the document). The information she derives from these items is so interesting that one regrets all the more that she did not rely on any other archival materials.
Despite these shortcomings, this book is thought-provoking and enjoyable to read. Seleny's effort to pinpoint the historical circumstances that had a long-term impact on postcommunist changes in Hungary and Poland is admirable, albeit not always convincing. Anyone interested in comparative democratization, historical institutionalism, or the politics of former communist countries will find the book stimulating and rewarding.
