The relationship between democratic theory and the empirical study of democratization might seem pretty obvious. Democratic theory’s role is surely to specify the normative endpoint of democratization—to say what ideal democracy is. And students of democratization, for their part (the argument would go), should uncover the mechanisms and means by which democratic ideals can (or perhaps cannot) be attained. Of course, according to this division of labor, practitioners of one of these forms of inquiry would not likely take much interest in how the other arrives at its results. They would simply accept the other’s fully formed conclusions. And so a true democratic theorist, for example, might find little to engage with in a work like Emily Beaulieu’s Electoral Protest and Democracy in the Developing World. But there is good reason for theorists to delve into this conceptually inventive and methodologically painstaking new work, and to think alongside this author about the vital problems she explores.

Beaulieu sets out to explain why what she calls “electoral protests” take place in less-developed countries. She also seeks to determine when such protests lead to real democratic reform. “Electoral protests,” for Beaulieu, signify both election boycotts and postelection demonstrations, instances in which opposition groups who have the right to participate in elections nevertheless choose more contentious extrainstitutional methods. A couple of fruitful conceptual choices direct Beaulieu’s attention toward these questions. First, in asking about the selection and timing of these tactics, she brings the spirit and approach of social movement theory to the study of democratization. And second, with a nod to Charles Tilly (Social Movements, 2004), the distinguished late scholar of movements and democratic development, she treats democratization not as a singular (if lengthy) transition from one distinct regime type to another but as an incremental, precarious, and sometimes reversible process. With this framing, what might seem like incidental skirmishes become an important object of study. This twofold reconceptualization has even wider implications. It points to new avenues for both democratic theorists and political scientists, calling their attention to the fact that genuinely democratic dramas often play out against significantly undemocratic backdrops, and placing the narrower repertoire of obviously democratic practices, such as voting, within a broader repertoire of democracy-advancing activities, including ones usually associated with contentious politics.

Beaulieu derives her specific hypotheses about electoral protests from what she depicts as the logic of strategic interaction between opposition and incumbent. Like others who have gone before her, she understands democratic change as resulting from elite bargaining. Her explanation of the driving considerations and hazards of such negotiation, though, is derived less from this literature than from a rationalist theory of war. She argues that electoral protests (like wars) are generally risky and nonoptimal for both sides. So both sides, she assumes, would prefer to reach an understanding—an understanding about just how much manipulation is acceptable—according to which elections could proceed. From this point of view, when electoral protests occur, they represent a failure of bargaining. And this points Beaulieu to the ideas that shape the main hypotheses she tests, namely, that bargaining failures like these are generally due to misrepresentation and poor information, on the one hand, and to problems of credible commitment, on the other.

The author puts these ideas to the test by assembling a data set encompassing 765 elections in the developing world over about 30 years, and constructing a series of statistical models that seek to explain either the causes or the consequences of electoral protests. She finds support for the hypothesis that poor political information leads to a higher likelihood of boycotts, as incumbents underestimate the strength of the opposition or overestimate the amount of manipulation the opposition will accept, and as opposition groups think incumbent governments are engaging in more election tampering than really they are. Similarly, she concludes that the inability of incumbents to demonstrate their credibility also increases the chance that oppositions will boycott. After voting takes place, Beaulieu finds, the chances of demonstrations protesting the process or outcome are driven mainly by the opposition’s strength—although not quite in the way her initial model might predict. She defines opposition strength as the product of cohesiveness and voter support. Oppositions with relatively low electoral support, she finds, are twice as likely to protest if they are cohesive. But even though stronger oppositions should demand less electoral manipulation, in fact it appears that those with greater voter support are more likely to accept (and not protest) election results, regardless of whether they are cohesive or fragmented.

As for whether any of these opposition tactics lead to electoral reforms, Beaulieu finds that incumbent regimes are inclined to enact “authoritarian” pseudoreforms, rather than real democratic ones, when they believe that the opposition is strong enough to benefit from real reforms in the next election. This can be the case when opposition strength is proven either by election results or by postelection demonstrations. Meanwhile, the combination of an election boycott and a watchful international community is conducive, according to Beaulieu, to genuine democratic reforms. All this is, of course, only a short summary of nuanced, thorough, and carefully constructed empirical study.

Returning to the issues with which I began, it seems to me that democratic theory can do more than just produce or purify democratic ideals—that it should be concerned with conceptualizing and reflecting critically on the whole process of democratic change, as it plays out in time and against resistance. (Such a critical, pragmatic democratic theory perspective would have much in common with the outlook of pro-democratic actors in the developed and developing worlds—though not necessarily with any particular actors.) How would Beaulieu’s project and its structuring assumptions appear from this perspective? Much of the answer, it seems to me, concerns forms of abstraction—the particular ways in which Beaulieu’s research, by design, selects certain institutions, mechanisms, and processes for attention while setting others aside.

We can begin with the author’s portrayal of the logic of decision making by an opposition. Beaulieu does not think it necessary to assume that oppositions are sincerely pro-democracy, only that they seek to gain power through fair elections (pp. 34–35). Now it is wise, probably, not to be too credulous about the motives of actual opposition parties around the world. But just as Beaulieu asks what strategy a party seeking to gain power electorally would follow, others can ask how the problem of electoral protests would look from the standpoint of a group or actor more fundamentally committed to democratic change. And it seems plausible to think that democratizing groups often have a wider set of interests than just electoral reforms that may help them to gain vote share in the future. Most significantly, they may be interested in trying to build and broaden a durable pro-democracy movement and, relatedly, to foster a democratic political culture. For such groups, even the decision of whether and how to sponsor electoral protests likely involves the thought of advancing these interests as well. Beaulieu assumes, remember, that oppositions generally would prefer to avoid protesting altogether. And she argues as well that an opposition always has in mind some level of electoral manipulation it will find “acceptable” in light of its plans to compete in elections. But one might think that pro-democracy activists, with an eye on movement building, recruitment, and the encouragement of ideological change, might find electoral protests to be part of a long-term strategy to grow in strength and capability, and might want to call critical attention to almost any level of manipulation.

By design, the incumbent and opposition actors in Beaulieu’s rationalist account are quite similar, indeed almost interchangeable, except for the fact that the former control the state. Her approach reaches conclusions about bargaining strategy that are not particularly sensitive, that is, to the ideologies, social ties, and structural positions that likely differentiate actual incumbents and oppositions in the developing world (and elsewhere). But the critical, pragmatic, democratic-theory perspective I am positing would be quite interested in such issues—in understanding and responding critically, that is, to the varying nature of what resists democratization. In the developing world, the obstacles might include a number of vestiges of colonialism and postcolonialism, such as weak states (on the one hand) and strong rival power structures (on the other); clientilist or corporatist traditions and practices that bypass genuine democratic participation; military dictatorships or the threat of their return; simmering ethnic conflict or ethnically based oppression; and the subordinate position of developing countries vis-à-vis the forces and governing structures of the world economy. Ceteris paribus, the typical opposition party might just want a bigger share of the vote in the next election. But those seeking longer-term and more meaningful democratic change might seek to craft strategies—even in the context of elections—that confront such challenges directly. They might link electoral protest to the challenge of building stronger civic institutions, or new participatory institutions in local government, or to that of resisting neoliberal policies.

Now, raising these issues could sound a lot like asking why Beaulieu did not write a different book than the one she did. But the question I pose concerns projecting from, not supplanting, the meticulous work she has done: Would a group seeking democratic change, with these sorts of developing-world issues and obstacles in mind, look any differently at electoral protests than the sort of opposition parties Beaulieu posits in her model? That is an important practical and principled question for both empiricists and theorists.