I. Introduction
This paper argues for a theory of the rule of law which explicitly includes non-human animals. It shows that influential contemporary legal theorists have built their rule of law theories on the assumption of a legal subject who is capable of understanding and following legal norms and who can be held responsible for breaches in compliance. Typically, this will be a fully rational and autonomous human adult.Footnote 1 Call this kind of legal subject an active legal subject.Footnote 2 An exclusive focus on active legal subjects may be understandable on the view that the basic idea of the rule of lawFootnote 3 is that the law should be capable of guiding the actions of legal subjects. The law can only guide those who can understand and comply with legal norms (i.e., active legal subjects).
However, this paper will argue against embracing this view. Instead, it will argue that we should view the basic idea of the rule of law as restraining arbitrary power. Doing so, it will be shown, will no longer allow theorists to build conceptions of the rule of law exclusively focused on active legal subjects. Rather, on this alternative view, theorists will need to identify those legal subjects who can be victims of arbitrary power. Of course, active legal subjects can be victims of such power. However, legal subjects, such as human infants, severely mentally disabled humans, and—importantly for the purposes of this paper—non-human animals, can also be victims of arbitrary power. These subjects are not capable of understanding and following legal norms in the same way as active subjects. Call these subjects passive legal subjects. If we accept, as this paper argues, that the basic idea of the rule of law is to restrain arbitrary power, then potential victims of such power, whether they are active or passive subjects, whether they are human or non-human animals, ought to be protected by the rule of law. Theorists of the rule of law need then to provide an account of how the rule of law can protect both active and passive legal subjects.
This paper therefore problematizes those accounts which have exclusively focused on active subjects and provides an inclusive account of the rule of law. Part II of the paper shows how three influential theories of the rule of law have been built on active subjects. It follows the usual but contested classification of theories of the rule of law into formal, procedural, and substantive accounts.Footnote 4 It analyses the accounts of Fuller, Waldron, and TRS Allan as champions of each. The choice of these three theorists is somewhat arbitrary, as several other thinkers have put forward influential rule of law theories. Raz and Bingham, for example, have respectively argued for exceptionally influential formal and substantive accounts.Footnote 5 Nevertheless, it is hoped that this somewhat restricted choice is sufficient to illustrate the wider pattern of constructing rule of law theories exclusively focused on active legal subjects.
The paper shows that, if we take at face value the texts of these theorists, their accounts do not consider passive subjects. We may charitably try to extract something valuable for passive subjects from these rule of law accounts. However, as this paper will argue, any value to passive subjects, and to non-human animals in particular, will be contingent on the existence of specific legal rules which protect passive subjects. Such legal rules may not exist and there is nothing in these accounts that calls for their existence. Consider, for example, animal welfare laws which prohibit causing unnecessary suffering to non-human animals. While these laws are widespread around the world, there are jurisdictions where these laws do not exist at allFootnote 6 or where, such as in the US or China, they apply to an almost insignificant number of non-human animals.Footnote 7 Where these animal welfare laws exist or apply, non-human animals may indirectly benefit from Fuller’s, Waldron’s, and TRS Allan’s theories to the extent that the theorists insist that laws, including animal welfare laws (we may assume), should be properly enforced to protect them. However, where no animal welfare laws exist or where they do not apply, rule of law theories that focus on active legal subjects will have nothing to benefit non-human animals.
However, once we move to inclusive accounts that explicitly recognise that the rule of law should protect both active and passive legal subjects from arbitrary power, non-human animals will always be afforded some degree of protection by the rule of law. The extent of the protection will vary depending on the nature of the inclusive account. As shown in part IV, it will be weakest on an inclusive formal account, stronger on an inclusive procedural account, and strongest on an inclusive substantive account. On any inclusive account, however, the protection will never be dependent on the contingent existence of any specific laws.
This paper remains agnostic as to whether an inclusive theory of the rule of law should be formal, procedural, or substantive. However, it shows that in relation to all three the basic idea of the rule of law remains the curtailment of arbitrary power. The paper then shows how the requirements of the rule of law can apply to protect both passive and active legal subjects from arbitrary power exercisable both by private and public persons. It concludes by showing that this view of the rule of law serves not only the same moral values highlighted by the problematized non-inclusive theories but also signalling that both passive and active legal subjects are valued co-members of the same legal community.
While this paper’s focus is on the rule of law, it is not silent about other existing approaches in the legal literature to protect the well-being of non-human animals. Some argue that the law should recognise fundamental rights similar to human rights for non-human animals.Footnote 8 Others argue that such a step cannot be taken without first abolishing the property status of non-human animals.Footnote 9 Some insist that recognition of legal personhood for non-human animals is instead the first necessary step to provide substantial legal protection to non-human animals.Footnote 10 Some would expansively interpret existing statutory prohibitions of inflicting unnecessary suffering on non-human animals to abolish several human uses of non-human animals.Footnote 11 While this paper cannot, for reason of space, engage directly with all these approaches, it claims that they all rest on the prior claim that a legal system cannot be indifferent to the well-being of non-human animals. This prior claim is indeed the chief concern of this paper. The inclusive accounts of the rule of law outlined in part IV show that legal systems are defective from a rule of law perspective if they do not afford some degree of protection to non-human animals.
The paper will also show that a rule of law perspective strengthens some of the other existing approaches in the literature to protect the well-being of non-human animals. An inclusive procedural account of the rule of law, for example, bolsters the claims of those that champion the legal personhood of non-human animals. This is explored in part IV.B. Similarly, approaches that demand fundamental rights for non-human animals are strengthened by an inclusive substantive theory of the rule of law. This is explored in part IV.C.
This paper is structured as follows. Part II analyses Fuller’s, Waldron’s, and TRS Allan’s theories of the rule of law and shows that they unduly exclude passive legal subjects. Part III of the paper defends the view that the well-being of passive legal subjects, with special emphasis on non-human animals, counts morally and legally due to their sentience. As such their interests cannot be excluded from the protection from arbitrary power which the rule of law affords. Part IV of the paper sets out formal, procedural, and substantive theories of the rule of law which are inclusive of human and non-human animals. To be sure, the theories are inclusive only of sentient animals. It remains unclear which animals are sentient. Our scientific understanding today indicates that most vertebrate animals are sentient. It is still an open question whether all invertebrate animals, such as insects and molluscs, are indeed sentient.Footnote 12 This paper’s several references to non-human animals should therefore be taken as a reference to sentient non-human animals, which is a category that, while remaining somewhat indeterminate given our scientific ignorance of non-human animals, is still meaningful.
II. The Basic Idea, Requirements, and Value of Anthropocentric Theories of the Rule of Law
This part considers the theories of Fuller, Waldron, and TRS Allan to show how their theories of the rule of law exclusively focus on active legal subjects. It shows this in relation to what they take to be the basic idea, the requirements and the moral value of the rule of law. Each of these components are discussed and critiqued in turn for each theorist. As stated in the introduction, the choice of these specific theorists is merely illustrative of the wider pattern in rule of law scholarship of constructing theories which have nothing explicit to say about passive legal subjects, especially of non-human animals.
A. Fuller’s Formal TheoryFootnote 13
Lon Fuller’s theory of the rule of law is one of the best known within the Anglophone world. He famously said that the basic idea of the rule of law is “to subject human conduct to the governance of rules.”Footnote 14 And even more clearly he said that,
[L]egal morality … cannot be neutral in its view of man himself. To embark on the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules involves of necessity a commitment to the view that man is, or can become, a responsible agent, capable of understanding and following rules, and answerable for his defaults. Footnote 15
From the above, it is not just any human subject that Fuller’s basic idea of the rule of law presupposes; it is a human who is an active legal subject. Passive legal subjects are not contemplated within his rule of law account.
So Fuller’s account is doubly exclusionary. First, it is anthropocentric because it assumes that the basic idea of the rule of law is to be theorised by presupposing a human person. But, as part III will argue in more detail, there is no compelling reason why the rule of law should not be theorised also with non-human animals in mind. Indeed, non-human animals should also be considered legal subjects, rather than mere objects of legal regulation. This is because they are entities capable of being invested with legal rights through, for example, animal welfare legislation.Footnote 16 The second problem with Fuller’s account is that it is exclusionary even within its anthropocentricism. Indeed, there might be human persons who are not active subjects because, due to age or disability, they cannot understand or follow legal norms and cannot be held responsible for breaches of legal norms. In essence, Fuller’s basic idea of the rule of law does not contemplate any passive legal subjects.
Can we not identify the basic idea of the rule of law without already presupposing that it should be focused on active legal subjects? This paper suggests that a more inclusive basic idea of the rule of law, one which puts both active and passive subjects centre stage, is that the law should restrain arbitrary power. In fact both passive and active legal subjects, human and non-humans alike, may be victims of arbitrary power. Part IV.A sets out more fully what this paper means by arbitrary power. Here it suffices to say that it is power which is unconstrained by standards external to the power-holder and/or power which is not accountable to those standards. On this view, humans and non-humans alike may be arbitrarily harmed, exploited, or killed without the constraints set by legal standards and/or the accountability mechanisms of law enforcement. This seems to be a more ecumenical premise which opens up the space to include passive legal subjects within rule of law theories.
Ultimately, however, it is admitted that what a theorist considers to be the basic idea of the rule of law depends on differing intuitions. So this paper can only offer an invitation for a more inclusive basic idea of the rule of law. A theorist may choose to disregard this invitation and to insist that the basic idea of the rule of law is the guidance of human conduct. In this case, we will have to ultimately judge the validity of rule of law theories that are built on different premises on the persuasiveness of their overall accounts. Only at the end of this paper, once an account that puts centre-stage both active and passive legal subjects has been defended, will the reader be able to accept or reject the more inclusive premise.
Fuller’s exclusion of passive legal subjects also permeates his conception of the requirements and moral value of the rule of law. Let us start with Fuller’s ideas of the requirements of the rule of law. In Chapter II of The Morality of Law, he argues that, given that the rule of law is to be understood as the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules, there are eight ways in which a system can fail to live up to its demands. To identify and illustrate the eight failures to live up to these demands, he famously employs the fable of an imaginary King Rex who wished to set up a new legal system but failed at several attempts. That well known fable will not be rehearsed here. Its lesson can be summarised as follows: The rule of law demands that law be: [1] general; [2] publicly promulgated; [3] clear; [4] non-contradictory; [5] possible to comply with; [6] relatively constant through time; [7] non-retroactive; and [8] that there be congruence between official action and the declared rule.Footnote 17
Fuller’s requirements of the rule of law may not withstand a legal theory that incorporates, as it should, passive legal subjects. For example, it is not clear how Fuller’s second demand (i.e., laws should be publicly promulgated) serves the well-being of passive legal subjects. Because non-human animals and some humans cannot comprehend legal norms, whether a particular law is publicly promulgated or is instead kept secret makes no difference to them. Of course it makes a big difference to those humans who can comprehend legal norms and can plan their lives on this basis. And of course, if such laws happen to protect the interests of passive subjects, public knowledge of these laws is essential to protecting their interests. However, as explained in the introduction, any benefits on this account to passive legal subjects are contingent on the existence of specific laws protecting the interests of passive subjects. Such laws may in fact not exist and their existence is not required by Fuller’s account. By contrast, Fuller’s account always affords some degree of benefit to active legal subjects: public promulgation of the law, for example, serves their interest in planning their lives independently of whether or not such laws confer any more specific benefits. This illustrates how Fuller’s theory is formulated to always provide some measure of benefit to active subjects. By contrast, passive legal subjects can only benefit from Fuller’s account on the contingent basis of whether any particular laws protect their interests. A theory of the rule of law that takes the well-being of non-human animals seriously, as will be shown in part IV below, will always provide some degree of protection from arbitrary power to both active and passive legal subjects.
Fuller’s narrow focus is reiterated in what he takes to be the moral value of the rule of law. That value is the exercise of political power in a way which demonstrates respect for human agency and responsibility, understood to be the basis of human dignity. Indeed, Fuller’s requirements of the rule of law set an ethos of political governance which limits the forms through which political power may be justifiably exercised over his active legal subjects. Political power which ignores the rule of law may take the form of secret, retroactive, unclear, etc., norms. Such exercise of political power ignores the status of the legal subject as a responsible and autonomous agent who may be guided by norms and who may be answerable for breaches. That status, in Fuller’s theory, is so highly valued that it sets the benchmark of legitimacy of the legal order. Only if political power is exercised by complying with the rule of law’s demands, and thereby respecting human agency and responsibility, can those who hold political power legitimately demand allegiance to legal norms that are compatible with the rule of law. In sum, according to Fuller, only if those who hold political power sufficiently comply with the rule of law is there a duty for the legal subject of fidelity to law.Footnote 18
It is not clear, however, why legal legitimacy on Fuller’s account depends only on law’s respect for the agency and responsibility of active legal subjects. It is doubtful that there exists a compelling theory of legal legitimacy that allows the mistreatment of passive legal subjects. The Nazi regime, for example, persecuted both fully able-bodied and disabled individuals, including the severely mentally disabled.Footnote 19 On Fuller’s account, the legitimacy of the regime was undermined because of the persecution of fully able-bodied individuals (i.e. active legal subjects) but was not undermined because of the persecution of severely mentally disabled (i.e. passive legal subjects). However, it should be uncontroversial to state that had the regime only persecuted the severely mentally disabled, it would have had no legitimacy at all and that, consequently, all legal subjects would have been under a moral duty to oppose the regime.Footnote 20 Fuller’s account is not able to accommodate this relatively uncontroversial position because he argues that legal legitimacy depends only on respect for individuals capable of understanding and being guided by law. In sum, Fuller’s exclusive focus on active legal subjects undermines his account of the moral value of the rule of law by making the conditions of legal legitimacy unduly narrow. This narrowness is the result of his problematic premise that the basic idea of the rule of law is to enable the governance of human conduct.
B. Waldron’s Procedural Theory
This section shows that the same exclusionary presupposition of Fuller’s formal theory equally affects Jeremy Waldron’s procedural theory of the rule of law.Footnote 21 Waldron does not repudiate Fuller’s formal version of the rule of law. However, he thinks that formal accounts need additional emphasis on the principles of natural justice. These principles require fair trials run by independent judges who are responsive to parties’ legal arguments. Waldron thinks that there is a close conceptual link between the idea of a legal system and a fully functional judicial system which respects the principles of natural justice. He thinks that most people would not consider a system without hearings and impartial proceedings a legal system at all.Footnote 22 So far, Waldron’s view does not seem to explicitly exclude non-human animals and other passive legal subjects. This is because non-human animals can benefit under this account if these judicial institutions impartially administer laws, such as animal welfare laws, that benefit them. As stated, however, this benefit is only contingent on the existence of such laws. Such laws may not exist or may only apply to a very narrow class of non-human animals. Furthermore, there is nothing in Waldron’s account that calls for their existence.
Crucially, however, it is not clear on Waldron’s view whether passive legal subjects can be part of the legal process and so whether this procedural account is at all applicable to them. We have to analyse his views of the requirements of the rule of law to discover that passive legal subjects do not have the necessary attributes to be co-participants in the legal process. Waldron’s list of the requirements of the rule of law is as follows:
No one should have any penalty, stigma, or serious loss imposed upon him by government except as the upshot of procedures that involve:
A. A hearing by an impartial tribunal that is required to act on the basis of evidence and argument presented formally before it in relation to legal norms that govern the imposition of penalty, stigma, loss, and so forth;
B. A legally trained judicial officer, whose independence of other agencies of government is ensured;
C. A right to representation by counsel and to the time and opportunity required to prepare a case;
D. A right to be present at all critical stages of the proceeding;
E. A right to confront witnesses against the detainee;
F. A right to an assurance that the evidence presented by the government has been gathered in a properly supervised way;
G. A right to present evidence in one’s own behalf;
H. A right to make legal argument about the bearing of the evidence and about the bearing of the various legal norms relevant to the case;
I. A right to hear reasons from the tribunal when it reaches its decision that are responsive to the evidence and arguments presented before it; and
J. Some right of appeal to a higher tribunal of a similar character.Footnote 23
Are passive legal subjects counted among those who, according to Waldron, “should [not] have any penalty, stigma, or serious loss imposed upon [them] by government except as the upshot of procedures that involve [Waldron’s list]?”Footnote 24 It is doubtful that they are. Look at requirements E-I. Those are premised on legal subjects that can judge the propriety of the process, that have a view as to how their case ought to be argued, and that have an interest in understanding the reasons for the outcome. Non-human animals and several humans do not straightforwardly have these capacities. To be sure, legal representatives could be appointed on their behalf to represent their interests. In the UK, for example, children in family courts can be independently represented by the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service.Footnote 25 Waldron’s account, however, does not explicitly consider this issue because, presumably, he is presupposing only active legal subjects who can independently engage in the legal process. A theory that puts centre-stage both active and passive subjects will, as will be shown in part IV, explain how non-human animals can be empowered to participate in the legal processes.
Waldron’s anthropocentricism is however most evident when he conceptualises the moral value of the rule of law. He explicitly follows Fuller when he connects the rule of law with respect for human dignity. He says: “I think what Fuller said about the connection between his formal principles and dignity can be said even more about the connection between procedure and dignity.”Footnote 26 Such respect is shown by the institutions taking seriously the evidence and legal arguments provided by the parties and then by attending to those views by issuing a judgment that responds to the evidence and arguments. In sum, “law is a mode of governing people that treats them with respect, as though they had a view or perspective of their own to present on the application of the norm to their conduct and situation.”Footnote 27
Crucially, Waldron is clear that non-human animals are excluded from this. He says: “Applying a norm to a human individual is not like deciding what to do about a rabid animal or a dilapidated house. It involves paying attention to a point of view and respecting the personality of the entity one is dealing with.”Footnote 28 The implication then is that the procedural rule of law cannot serve the interests of non-human animals because they are not capable of applying legal norms to their conduct. It is granted that non-human animals are not capable of self-application of legal norms. However, non-human animals, unlike dilapidated houses, have a point of view (at least in the sense that they have preferences) and also have personalities. Why should the legal process not pay regard to their point of view and respect their personalities? Again, on Waldron’s account this cannot even figure as a problem because he presupposes that the legal process should treat non-human animals just like dilapidated houses. As will be made clearer in part III, this cannot be the case because non-human animals, unlike dilapidated houses, are sentient. Part IV.B will propose modifications to Waldron’s account which dispense with these troubling assumptions.
C. TRS Allan’s Substantive Theory
This paper concludes this part by analysing TRS Allan’s substantive account of the rule of law. Allan’s premise is his Dworkinian interpretivism, which sees law as a means to resolve disputes in accordance with standards of justice and fairness.Footnote 29 On this view, the basic idea of the rule of law is that “the law should embody a coherent and consistent scheme of justice, treating all alike according to the standards of that scheme.”Footnote 30 In essence, the rule of law ensures adjudication according to pre-existing moral rights which ought to be posited in light of existing social and political contexts. Accordingly, the requirements of the rule of law include giving effect to those moral rights, in addition to giving effect to the formal and procedural demands already encountered in other accounts. Allan says:
The law must preserve a sphere of independent decision and action, securing as far as possible an equal freedom for all. Such familiar constitutional freedoms as those of conscience, speech, association, and personal liberty supplement the protections for person and property in the ordinary civil law …Footnote 31
It is important to note that the moral rights to which the law must give effect are not only familiar constitutional rights. In light of Allan’s insistence that the rule of law requires determination of moral entitlements from the state and private persons, these moral rights include those protected by ordinary criminal law and private law. Furthermore, this account has deep implications for other principles of constitutionalism such as the separation of powers, legislative supremacy, judicial review, and a general theory of adjudication.Footnote 32 However persuasive and comprehensive this account is, it is nevertheless clear that it is indebted to Fuller and suffers from unduly focusing on active legal subjects.
This becomes apparent when Allan clarifies the moral value of the rule of law. He does not reject the Fullerian view that a formal account of the rule of law serves the value of freedom and autonomy. Allan, influenced by his Cambridge colleague, Simmonds, accordingly concedes that a formal account of the rule of law serves the republican idea of freedom as independence from the will of another.Footnote 33 However, he insists that his substantive conception also serves the value of protecting freedom as independence. He accordingly says:
There can be no restriction of the central freedoms of thought, speech, conscience, and association that would curtail a person’s ability to form and pursue her own ethical ideals … It is an affront to people’s dignity to deny them liberty to conduct their own lives in accordance with their convictions, assuming that they do not impede an equal liberty enjoyed by others.Footnote 34
It follows that the moral value of Allan’s substantive rule of law is not different from that of Fuller: it is to preserve human autonomy (now understood as ‘freedom as independence’) and human dignity. That value, however, necessarily presupposes a legal subject which has the necessary cognitive abilities to form and pursue a life in accordance with their ethical convictions. This excludes humans that are not autonomous and are not fully rational and, of course, it excludes non-human animals. However, if the rule of law and justice, according to Allan’s conception, are intrinsically linked, there is no compelling reason why the rule of law should not incorporate the justice-based claims that non-human animals have. Because non-human animals are subjects of morality and justice, as will be argued in the next part, a substantive rule of law needs to cater for their rights too and needs to protect them from arbitrary power which may be exercised against them. Once Allan’s presuppositions are laid bare, it becomes clear that his theory of the rule of law excludes passive legal subjects. Those that wish to advocate for a substantive theory of the rule of law without committing to this exclusionary focus on active legal subjects therefore need to look elsewhere. They may find an alternative framework in part IV.C.
III. Why Passive Legal Subjects Ought to Be Included in the Rule of Law
This part defends the need to include non-human animals in conceptions of the rule of law. It does not develop the claim in relation to passive legal subjects who are human. This is because other scholars and practitioners have already been doing important work on this.Footnote 35 The paper shows in sub-part A, albeit briefly, that injustice can be done to non-human animals by breaching the rights entailed by their moral status. On Allan’s view of the relationship between the rule of law and justice, it should follow that the rule of law ought to give effect to the justice-based claims of non-human animals. Sub-part B casts further doubts on Fuller’s and Waldron’s view that the basic idea of the rule of law is to enable the guidance of human conduct. That sub-part shows that non-human animals are capable of possessing and, in fact often possess, legal rights. So, in contrast to dilapidated houses, non-human animals are not mere objects of legal regulation but are subjects with legal rights. As such, we should be sceptical of accounts of the rule of law which exclude them. We should embrace a more inclusive basic idea of the rule of law which is capable of explaining non-human animals’ status as genuine bearers of legal rights.
A. Non-Human Animals as Subjects of Morality and Justice
The animal ethics literature is imposing. This paper cannot adequately summarise it, nor will it attempt to do so. Nevertheless, it does not seem unfair to state that there is a consensus within different animal ethics traditions, from the consequentialist, to the deontological, to the neo-Aristotelian, to the more recent political turn,Footnote 36 that the moral status of non-human animals depends at least on the fact that they are sentient. By ‘sentience’ this paper means the capacity to subjectively experience reality and, consequently, the capacity to experience things as beneficial or harmful. In essence, non-human animals, unlike dilapidated houses or plants, can experience their own well-being. Because human action, including political action, can benefit or harm non-human animals (e.g., humans can inflict pain on them or kill them), and because humans can generally choose whether or not to do so, they are to be held responsible for their acts. It follows that human action, whether individual or political, that affects the well-being of non-human animals is subject to both morality and justice.
Two caveats are in order to this view of why animals are subjects of morality and justice. The first, already mentioned in the Introduction, is that it is not clear that all animals are sentient. So the arguments in this paper only apply to sentient animals. The second caveat to this view is that it only holds that non-human animals matter in questions of morality and justice but it does not say how much they matter. There are different views on what the moral status of non-human animals entails for the specific moral duties owed to them. Some think that non-human animals have fundamental rights similar to humans’ rights. This would entail that the common practices of using non-human animals for food, entertainment, or labour almost always violate these rights.Footnote 37 On the other hand, some think that non-human animals, although of moral significance, can be used and killed for various purposes as long as they are not made to suffer unnecessarily. The latter view is the one which can be found in all legal systems which provide for some form of animal protection. While this paper endorses the former view, providing a justification for this stronger view is not necessary here. The aim here is simply to argue that the well-being of non-human animals matters in questions of morality and justice. If this is accepted, it entails that substantive conceptions of the rule of law, such as Allan’s, cannot remain silent in relation to non-human animals. If the rule of law requires determination of moral entitlements from the state and private persons, and if non-human animals are subjects of morality and justice, the rule of law cannot be silent as to their entitlements. Part IV.C therefore sets out a substantive conception of the rule of law which also speaks of non-human animals.
B. Non-Human Animals as Subjects of the Law
Sentience in Law
Part II has shown that Fuller and Waldron encourage us to view the basic idea of the rule of law as the law being capable of guiding human conduct. The paper has already suggested that a more inclusive basic idea should instead be adopted. This paper has suggested that we should view the basic idea of the rule of law as restraining arbitrary power. Because both active and passive legal subjects can be harmed by this form of power, we can construct theories of the rule of law that speak to both kinds of subjects. However, this option is open only if non-human animals are indeed genuine legal subjects. This paper argues that they are in fact legal subjects because non-human animals are capable of, and in fact often possess, legal rights. It may be objected to this view that the law regulates non-human animals, just as it regulates dilapidated houses, rivers, or trees, but does not grant them legal rights. Hence they are not legal subjects.
It is granted that the law treats non-human animals in an ambivalent way. It treats them similarly to dilapidated houses, rivers, or trees by treating them as items of property: a vast array of non-human animals (or parts of their bodies) may be sold and bought with legal approval. There is almost universal agreement on this.Footnote 38 However, and importantly, the law sometimes treats non-humans similarly to how it treats active legal subjects when it recognises that non-human animals are sentient beings. Sometimes the law explicitly says that non-human animals are sentient. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, for example, says that “the Union and the Member States shall, since animals are sentient beings, pay full regard to the welfare requirements of animals.”Footnote 39 The same explicit recognition of animal sentience is found, among other places, in Quebec,Footnote 40 Colombia,Footnote 41 Chile,Footnote 42 New Zealand,Footnote 43 and in the Australian Capital Territory.Footnote 44 While only a few jurisdictions have explicitly recognised non-human animals as sentient beings, several more recognise animal sentience implicitly. This is because at least a pocket of the law of a vast majority of countries, but not all,Footnote 45 recognises that non-human animals are beings that can suffer and who need protection through civil or criminal anti-cruelty laws or animal welfare laws.
To be sure, the law of some countries implicitly recognises animal sentience only in relation to an almost insignificant proportion of non-human animals. China, for example, despite being the world’s biggest producer of farmed land and marine animals for human consumption, does not have legislation protecting the welfare of these animals.Footnote 46 Similarly in the US, the US Humane Methods of Slaughter Act, which requires the humane killing of specified non-human animals, does not mention chickens.Footnote 47 However, these constitute the vast majority of land animals annually killed for food in the US. Nevertheless, it is clear that the law of the vast majority of countries recognises that at least some non-human animals are sentient and that their well-being deserves some legal protection.
Non-Human Animals as Holders of Legal Rights
Does the fact that the law recognises, implicitly or explicitly, the sentience of non-human animals entail that they are holders of legal rights with the consequence that they are legal subjects? The following sceptical argument, call it the Only Duties Argument, suggests a negative answer. It says that animal welfare legislation only imposes legal duties on humans, rather than granting legal rights to non-human animals. This argument is bolstered by reference to the will theory of legal rights. This theory considers a legal right to essentially be a “legally respected choice,” and the right-holder a “small scale sovereign” whose exercise of choice is facilitated by giving them discretionary “legal powers of control” over others’ duties.Footnote 48 Consequently, given that non-human animals cannot enforce or waive the duties in these statutes, they should not be considered right-holders.
The Only Duties Argument can be paired with two other arguments. The first, call it the No Responsibilities Argument, was explicitly endorsed by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery—a case where the Non-Human Rights Project sought a writ of habeas corpus for a chimpanzee. It says that non-human animals cannot be the holders of rights because they cannot be held responsible for legal duties.Footnote 49 The second, call it the Human Dignity Argument, is an immediate response to the critique of the No Responsibilities Argument. When one points to the fact that passive legal subjects who are human are equally unable to be held responsible for legal duties, the Human Dignity Argument offers an alternative explanation of the basis of the rights of human children and of severely mentally disabled humans: they are endowed with human dignity. Because non-humans are not endowed with human dignity, the argument goes, non-humans cannot hold rights. Animal welfare legislation is therefore best understood as a way to impose certain duties on humans concerning non-human animals, not a way to grant legal rights to non-human animals.Footnote 50
The Only Duties, No Responsibilities, and Human Dignity Arguments should all be rejected. First, there is an alternative and respectable theory of legal rights—the interest theory—which is capable of explaining why welfare legislation does in fact confer legal rights on non-human animals. Under this theory,
[T]he ultimate purpose of rights is the protection and advancement of some aspect(s) of an individual’s well-being and interests. Legal rights are essentially ‘legally-protected interests’ that are of special importance and concern. With its emphasis on well-being rather than on agency, the interest theory seems more open to the possibility of animal [legal] rights from the outset.Footnote 51
This should be supplemented with the Razian view that only sufficiently important interests of an individual ground a duty in others together with a corresponding right in the interest-holder.Footnote 52
There is no need here to resolve which of the two competing theories of rights (or any alternative)Footnote 53 is the most persuasive. Here we need only note that there is an alternative to the will theory which is capable of explaining why non-human animals do in fact have legal rights under welfare legislation. Indeed, because such legislation regards as sufficiently important the interests of non-human animals not to suffer unnecessarily and confers on certain human beings a corresponding duty to protect this interest, then it can be said that non-human animals truly have legal rights. Furthermore, another eminent legal theory can explain the implausibility of the insistence that welfare legislation only creates duties on humans rather than legal rights for non-human animals. Under a Hohfeldian taxonomy of legal rights,Footnote 54 every legal duty corresponds to a legal (claim) right and vice-versa. So to the extent that the argument admits that welfare legislation imposes duties on humans and that the beneficiaries of those duties are non-human animals, it follows under Hohfeld’s taxomony that non-human animals are (claim) rights holders.
The above references to the interest theory and to Hohfeld’s taxonomy, while not demonstrating the incorrectness of the Only Duties Argument, at least show that the view that non-human animals can and in fact often have legal rights is well grounded in respectable legal theory. Hohfeld’s taxonomy is also helpful to dismiss the No Responsibilities Argument. In fact under that taxonomy, it is clear that the beneficiary of a claim right need not be a duty-bearer to have a valid claim right. Kramer explains this well:
When X holds a legal right, he is thereby entitled to someone else’s performance of an act or a set of acts, or to someone else’s abstention from an act or a set of acts. The other person is thus under a legal duty to adopt a specified mode of behavior. Whether X himself bears any legal duties, however, is an altogether separate matter.Footnote 55
This point can be reinforced by showing that very young human children and the severely mentally disabled are also usually not held responsible for legal duties. Nevertheless, it would go against widespread legal practice to consider them right-less. For example, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child declares that the interests it protects are ‘rights.’ Similarly, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities speaks in terms of rights. These legal instruments cover, among others, very young human children and the severely mentally disabled.
The Human Dignity Argument attempts to counter this practice-focused response. It suggests that there is an alternative basis for the rights of very young human children and severely mentally disabled humans. It says that the basis of their rights is the fact that they possess human dignity.Footnote 56 However, the Human Dignity Argument turns out to be circular once we investigate the basis of human dignity. Richard Cupp, who endorses the Human Dignity Argument, has been able to only provide a self-justifying reply: “The pervasive societal view that all humans have distinctive and intrinsic human dignity regardless of their capabilities may have cultural, religious, or even instinctual foundations.”Footnote 57 This is a self-justifying reply because it essentially reduces to a societal assumption without strong foundations.
Cupp’s approach in approvingly noting the assumption of the intrinsic worth of humans belongs to a well-established tradition that has been labelled ‘dignitarianism.’Footnote 58 As Fasel puts it,
dignitarians found humanity. The verb ‘to found’ here refers to the act of establishing or creating something new … the process of founding does not base principles on empirical facts … it instead creates its own foundations by drawing on existing (‘internal’) assumptions and normative principles.Footnote 59
While this process of ‘founding’ human dignity can make it impervious to requests for the justification of the intrinsic worth of humanity—dignitarians in fact assume rather than justify it—ultimately by “erecting normative principles [e.g. human dignity] on other normative assumptions, dignitarianism becomes circular and thereby deprives itself of an external means of conferring plausibility on its normative principles.”Footnote 60
Ultimately then, dignitarians cannot really successfully escape the request for the ground of the intrinsic worth of humanity. This paper suggests that such a foundation is available and it is the same one that explains why non-human animals are subjects of morality and justice: sentience. Human animals, just like non-human animals, possess a subjective experience of reality and, consequently, things can be done to them that make their lives better or worse. Put simply, they experience their own well-being. This applies equally to fully autonomous and rational human adults as it does to human children and to severely mentally disabled humans. Of course, there may be categories of humans to whom it does not apply, for example very early stage foetuses and humans in a permanent vegetative state. But the fact that these humans may not be sentient does not entail that anything can be done to them. For example, the interests and desires of pregnant women (in the case of foetuses) and of family members (in the case of humans in a permanent vegetative state) would circumscribe permissible action. Nevertheless, it is clear that Cupp’s dignity-based attempt to provide an alternative basis for the legal rights of human children and severely mentally disabled humans, once properly investigated, actually ends up showing that the reason why humans matter in morality, justice, and law is also a reason for why non-human animals so matter.
It should be noted that the fact that humans and non-human animals are both sentient does not entail that they should be treated equally. As already indicated in part III.A, sentience provides a reason why animals (whether human or not) are subjects of morality and justice. Other considerations, such as their interests and prudential and institutional factors, will ultimately also need to be taken into account when deciding how they ought to be treated in particular circumstances. To put this another way, sentience is the basis of equal consideration and not of equal treatment.
The various arguments against the view that non-human animals are genuine holders of legal rights have been shown to be misguided. Because non-human animals can and often hold legal rights, they should be considered legal subjects. It follows that we should be sceptical of theories of the rule of law which exclude or are silent about them. We should more readily embrace an ecumenical view of the basic point of the rule of law which is inclusive of non-human animals, as well as other passive and active legal subjects. As the next part shows, doing so enables the conceptualisation of a theory of the rule of law which is more inclusive.
IV. The Rule of Law for Sentient Animals
We need an inclusive theory of the rule of law. This does not mean that we need to discard altogether those theories which have been shown to be chiefly focused on active legal subjects. We need only discard their narrow focus. This part does so by developing three theories of the rule of law—tracking the formal, procedural, and substantive preoccupations of the theorists investigated in part II. We need not decide here whether any of these three accounts is superior to the other. The main aim is to show that, whichever account is chosen, a more inclusive theory of the rule of law is attractive.
A. A Formal Theory of the Rule of Law for Sentient Animals
This paper has been suggesting that there is already within our tradition an inclusive basic idea of the rule of law: the law should curtail arbitrary power. By arbitrary power this paper means power which is not constrained by any standard external to the power-holder and, importantly, which is not subject to accountability external to the power-holder (i.e. the person wielding the power does not have to justify to another that the power has been exercised according to the applicable standards). It is important for this account that any person in a polity could potentially exercise arbitrary power. Theorists of the rule of law usually require that only state officials be subject to the rule of lawFootnote 61 and so they worry about arbitrary state power. This is understandable especially if the rule of law is understood only as a principle of constitutionalism, given that one main preoccupation of constitutions is to set up and regulate public institutions. However, if the rule of law is understood to also be a principle of how a polity should be governed (i.e., a political and not just a constitutional principle), then there is no good reason to limit its application to public entities. Private persons, such as corporations, NGOs, or wealthy individuals, may have a considerable amount of power over their fellow citizens and exercise it in arbitrary ways.Footnote 62
An account of when the rule of law should constrain arbitrary private power is likely to be complex and contestable. However, widespread legal practice already provides ample illustration of straightforward instances of when the law should regulate interactions between private persons. Ordinary criminal law, tort law, contract law, and private law more generally fulfil the rule of law’s basic idea of constraining arbitrary power between private persons. To be sure, all of these areas of law do more than that. For example, they create new powers, such as legal marriage, which, without law, private actors would not have. Also, this is not a blanket defence of any particular legal doctrine which limits the power of individuals over each other. Without a doubt, there are existing legal doctrines which should be repealed in favour of individual discretion. Nevertheless, existing legal practice shows that there are many instances in which the law appropriately governs the exercise of power between private persons.
This conclusion helps us understand how the basic idea of the rule of law will always provide a degree of protection to non-human animals. Remember that Fuller’s account saw the basic idea of the rule of law as enabling guidance of conduct so as to serve human autonomy and human dignity. Non-human animals could only benefit under this account by requiring enforcement of legal norms that served the interests of non-human animals (e.g., welfare laws), if they happen to exist. We have seen that there are jurisdictions where they do not exist or where they apply to only a small minority of non-human animals. By contrast, the account put forward here will always provide a degree of protection to non-human animals by requiring that every exercise of power over them be non-arbitrary. Indeed, non-human animals (and other legal subjects) can be victims of the arbitrary power of public and private persons. They may be harmed, captured, put in captivity, killed for food, and used for entertainment and research. And all this may be done absolutely arbitrarily. For example, in those jurisdictions with animal welfare provisions that only apply to some non-human animals (e.g., in the US and China), there are no legal standards applying to the treatment of the non-human animals not covered by animal welfare provisions. Such non-constrained and non-accountable power is inimical to the rule of law under the basic idea endorsed here.
Re-orientating the basic idea of the rule of law as curtailing arbitrary public and private power therefore opens up the possibility that formal accounts of the rule of law will always provide a degree of protection to non-human animals. Importantly, however, because formal accounts do not require the protection of fundamental rights, it is consistent with such accounts that public and private power may be constrained in a way which nevertheless permits non-human animals’ exploitation and killing. However, what seems inconsistent with the basic idea in a formal account is that power exercised over non-human animals remains totally uncontrolled by law as happens in certain jurisdictions where welfare provisions do not exist at all or, where they do, they do not apply to certain categories of non-human animals. While formal accounts of the rule of law cannot commit to the full protection of non-human animals’ well-being, they certainly can commit to the view that the law ought to regulate how they are treated, however wickedly or maliciously.
We can now say what the requirements of a formal theory of the rule of law are in a conception that takes non-human animals seriously. In line with the scholarly tradition of having lists of the demands of the rule of law, this paper suggests the following criteria before explaining them:
1. The law should monopolise the use of force;
2. The law should regulate interactions between private and public persons in those areas where persons can cause significant harm to each other;
3. Legal norms should possess the following qualities as much as is feasible:
a. Be general
b. Public
c. Clear
d. Prospective
e. Non-contradictory
f. Stable
g. Possible to comply with;
4. Enforcement officers should faithfully enforce the law as interpreted by judicial bodies;
5. Judicial bodies should be independent and impartial and should interpret the law according to their conscience without fear or favour;
6. There should be a well-functioning legal profession;
7. The exercise of discretion by public bodies (in particular of bodies charged with investigating and prosecuting breaches of the law) should be set within clear parameters and be reviewable by independent judicial bodies;
8. The law should control instances of its suspension (e.g. during situations of public emergencies).
The spirit behind this list (which could be further refined) is that a political system should be ruled by law and not by personal whim. Importantly, the ability of public and private persons to cause each other significant harm should be regulated by law. Inter-personal use of force should be monopolised by the law because of its propensity to cause harm. This should not be strictly understood as a requirement that the law should protect individuals from harm that other persons (both public and private) may commit. That would move us towards a more substantive understanding of the rule of law. All that is required under this formal conception is that the use of force and other ways in which persons can cause harm to each other should be subjected to legal regulation so that their actions are not arbitrary. On this account, the law may permit persons to harm each other (e.g., by permitting the exploitation and killing of non-human animals). However, such harm cannot be committed arbitrarily and persons can be held accountable if they exceed the terms of the law.
The requirement for legal regulation of inter-personal harm is left somewhat abstract to acknowledge that there are instances where persons harm each other, yet legal intervention may be inappropriate. Falling out with friends can cause considerable emotional and psychological harm. Nevertheless, it seems uncontroversial to state that the law should not overreach by regulating who should be friends. Nevertheless, as the discussion above on the need for the rule of law to apply between private persons disclosed, our ordinary criminal law, tort law, contract law, and private law more generally suggest appropriate instances where legal regulation is warranted.
The third requirement essentially reproduces Fuller’s list of the internal morality of law, bar his last requirement which is reproduced in the fourth requirement. The rationale behind incorporating Fuller’s requirements is in line with the curtailment of arbitrary power. If the law is to curtail power by setting standards external to public and private persons, then those standards should be such that they can be reasonably known, understood, and complied with. Of course, not all persons will be able to align their actions with legal standards. Non-human animals and other passive legal subjects will not be able to. But remember that the account put forward here constrains arbitrary power of active subjects to benefit all legal subjects. So it is no reason against this account that certain of its requirements are specifically directed to constrain active subjects.
The fourth to seventh requirements are proposed to enable legal accountability. They assume that a functioning legal system will have a doctrine of separation of powers and that judicial review of executive powers is available. Even though the requirements do not mention judicial review of legislatures, the account assumes that such review will be available in accordance with each jurisdiction’s constitutional traditions. Indeed, arbitrary power is exercisable by lawmakers as much as by ordinary persons. Much emphasis is therefore placed on the judicial branch to ensure legal accountability, especially over other branches of government. However, this should not be understood as a call for judicial supremacy. In a constitutional order dedicated to the rule of law, no one branch of government is supreme.Footnote 63 Rather, the law itself is the highest authority and judges exercise their interpretive powers within the limits set by law and legal tradition. Accordingly, each branch of government should be understood to be collaborating to bring about the supremacy of law in a polity in which arbitrary public and private power is appropriately curtailed.
The last requirement of this account builds on the notion that government by law is of great value (on which more in the next paragraphs); however, it comes at least with the cost of inexpediency. It may be far more expedient to act according to one’s own volition rather than to conform to an externally imposed standard and give an account of one’s actions in line of those standards. There may well be some situations where inexpediency caused by legality is too high a price to pay. Public emergencies (e.g., war or natural disasters) may necessitate expedient reaction to protect the public good. Acting outside the fetters of legality may therefore directly serve the common good. Nevertheless, given the dangers that arbitrary power may be exercised in ways which undermine the common good, the law itself should regulate when, how long, and to what extent it should be suspended. Much more will need to be said about this. However, this would go beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, the idea of a permanent state of emergency which requires the broadest suspension of the law seems irremediably incompatible with the rule of law.Footnote 64
What is the moral value of this formal account of legality? Given that the account incorporates all of Fuller’s requirements, it is clear that it also incorporates all of the moral values which that account serves. Accordingly, it serves human autonomy, human dignity, and a republican conception of freedom.Footnote 65 However, the account does hold more than Fuller’s requirements and these additions make it non-contingently valuable to non-human animals and to humans who are passive subjects. In particular, the insistence that the law should monopolise the use of force and should regulate instances of inter-personal harm entails that there is always a degree of legal protection for non-human animals: they can no longer be arbitrarily harmed by other private or public persons. The law has to be clear when it permits such harm and it may well be that the law only permits certain kinds of harms or prohibits such harms altogether. Whenever protections are in place, the rule of law also dictates that they be properly enforced (something which many legal systems with welfare laws fail to live up to).Footnote 66
This account of the moral value of the rule of law for non-human animals may leave a bitter taste. It is clear that the moral value is only a limited one. The account frees passive subjects from arbitrary power but it puts them into the vagaries of whether legal power will protect their fundamental interests. Indeed, under this account mass exploitation and mass killings of non-human animals are perfectly acceptable as long as they are explicitly legally authorised. This is true. However, it is a limitation that affects several formal accounts of legality. For instance, under Raz’s popular theory,
[a] non-democratic legal system, based on the denial of human rights, on extensive poverty, on racial segregation, sexual inequalities, and religious persecution may, in principle, conform to the requirements of the rule of law better than any of the legal systems of the more enlightened Western democracies.Footnote 67
Similarly, even under a formal account of the rule of law that takes non-human animals seriously, a polity that lives up to the requirements of this account may continue to systematically exploit and kill non-human animals. Of course, such exploitation and killing would need to be legally authorised. However, non-human animal’s fate would not be substantively improved.
B. A Procedural Theory of the Rule of Law for Sentient Animals
Remember from the discussion in part II.B that procedural theories of the rule of law share the same basic idea as formal theories, while emphasising the importance of independent courts and judicial procedures. So the basic idea of the rule of law in an inclusive procedural theory can also remain the curtailment of arbitrary power. We need, however, to emphasise the need for external accountability of power through a system of independent courts and fair legal procedures. These are already somewhat implicit within the fifth, sixth, and seventh requirements set out above. However, to emphasise the need for fair procedures, this paper wholly incorporates Waldron’s requirements of his procedural rule of law while making some modifications and adding two additional requirements which remedy Waldron’s anthropocentricism:
No one, including non-human animals, should have any legal penalty, stigma, or serious loss imposed upon them by a public or private person except as the upshot of procedures that involve:
A. A hearing by an impartial tribunal that is required to act on the basis of evidence and argument presented formally before it in relation to legal norms that govern the imposition of penalty, stigma, loss, and so forth;
B. A legally trained judicial officer, whose independence of other agencies of government is ensured;
C. A right to representation by counsel and to the time and opportunity required to prepare a case;
D. A right to be present at all critical stages of the proceeding;
E. A right to confront witnesses against the detainee;
F. A right to an assurance that the evidence presented by the government has been gathered in a properly supervised way;
G. A right to present evidence in one’s own behalf;
H. A right to make legal argument about the bearing of the evidence and about the bearing of the various legal norms relevant to the case;
I. A right to hear reasons from the tribunal when it reaches its decision that are responsive to the evidence and arguments presented before it; and
J. Some right of appeal to a higher tribunal of a similar character;Footnote 68
For the sake of clarity:
K. Non-human animals enjoy legal standing;
L. The legal rights of non-human animals can be enforced by a legal representative that acts in their best interests.
The above account expunges Waldron’s anthropocentricism by explicitly incorporating non-human animals within the procedural theory of the rule of law. Indeed, as already argued, non-human animals are potential victims of arbitrary power so they, too, ought to be non-contingently protected by the requirements of the rule of law. Incorporating non-human animals within this theory ensures that no harm may be done to them without the legal accountability mechanisms which humans already benefit from. While it may sound odd to have the justice system be used to defend the legal entitlements of cows, pigs, and chickens, this is not unknown to our legal traditions.
Contemporary practice provides some precedent. Part III made reference to some habeas corpus cases, such as Lavery, where animal advocates have sought, albeit almost always unsuccessfully, to free non-human animals from captivity by having courts recognise their legal personhood.Footnote 69 There is no suggestion that these cases, albeit involving the fundamental interests of non-human animals, have been conducted in procedurally irregular ways. In fact, it is clear that the opposite is the case. In the Colombian case of the Andean bear Chucho, for example, several courts heard arguments for and against his release from a zoo to a natural reserve. The Constitutional Court even heard, but was not persuaded, from non-Colombian lawyers who argued in favour of granting the writ to the bear.Footnote 70 So there is precedent for the view that fair legal procedures should be applied before non-human animals can be harmed.
Requirements K and L have been added to Waldron’s account as an explicit response to the rationale underlying some of the habeas corpus cases for non-human animals. The cases have been litigated under the writ because it does not generally necessitate proving the legal standing of the humans invoking it. Standing requirements usually demand that the legal interests of the person seeking judicial redress have been injured in some particular way. So a person seeking to enforce a statute protecting non-human animals has to show that it has some legal interests in enforcing that statute. The fact that a non-human animal has been unlawfully interfered with in breach of the statute is not sufficient to grant standing to any general member of the public. So, for example, in a US case, an animal protection association sought to prevent the destruction of a colony of wild goats living on a military enclave that was not publicly accessible. However, the plaintiff was unable to establish standing because no individual member of the organisation could prove that the death of the goats would result in “direct sensory impact” to the members’ physical environment, given that they had no right to access the military enclave.Footnote 71 Hence, some standing requirements entail that only a limited class of persons can enforce laws that protect non-human animals. The consequence is that breaches of the law will often be left unaddressed. On the other hand, if non-human animals enjoyed legal standing, they could bring legal suit themselves with the aid of a willing and qualified member of the public as a representative.Footnote 72
Non-human animals should enjoy legal standing because, as argued in Part III, they genuinely hold legal rights and are thus genuine legal subjects. However, their well-being cannot be adequately protected if they cannot enforce the rights that the law has granted them. While many jurisdictions have particular bodies (e.g., the RSPCA) whose main objective is to enforce anti-cruelty law and animal welfare laws, these bodies are consistently under-resourced and hence they cannot ensure a sufficient level of enforcement of these laws.Footnote 73 On the other hand, should non-human animals enjoy legal standing, many more willing and qualified humans would be able to enforce their rights. Furthermore, and importantly, recognising standing for non-human animals serves the symbolic view that the legal interests of non-human animals matter as much as that of humans. In fact, humans generally have standing to enforce their own rights. If it is accepted that humans and non-human animals are both entitled to legal protection, it should follow that both have an equal entitlement to enforce the rights which the law has conferred upon them. Importantly, this view does not entail that they both have equal substantive rights. Rather, in line with the emphasis of the procedural rule of law, it entails that they both have the right to access fair courts to enforce whatever rights they may have been afforded.
What is the moral value of this procedural account? Because it incorporates all of Waldron’s requirements, it serves the same anthropocentric value identified by Waldron (i.e., respect for human dignity). However, the non-anthropocentric components of this account extend its moral value to non-human animals and equally serve their dignity, in the limited sense that non-human animals are equal members of the legal community who have a right to address and to be addressed by the law (i.e., they are equal before the law). This notion of equality before the law offers another layer of protection which an inclusive procedural account of the rule of law will always afford to non-human animals. However, this procedural account does not require the protection of any substantive rights. A legal system that permits the mass exploitation and mass killing of non-human animals is therefore consistent with it. However, such permission would have to be conducted in a way which respects the procedural rights of non-human animals and, in particular, would demand that the representatives of non-human animals be able to test the legality of such permission in an independent and fair court.
C. A Substantive Theory of the Rule of Law for Sentient Animals
A substantive theory of the rule of law requires re-interpreting the basic idea of the rule of law which this paper has been defending. The basic idea remains the curtailment of arbitrary power. However, in addition to requiring accountability to standards set by law, a substantive theory requires accountability to standards which themselves are non-arbitrary. This means that standards set by a polity to curtail arbitrary power have to be themselves accountable to the non-arbitrary standards of justice. So the basic idea of a substantive theory of the rule of law is to curtail arbitrariness in all possible ways, both in relation to power exercisable by public and private persons and in relation to legal standards themselves. So the chain of accountability runs all the way up: persons are accountable to legal standards and legal standards are accountable to justice.
Because the point of this substantive conception is not divorced from the other accounts (it remains curtailing arbitrariness), it is permissible for its requirements to incorporate all of the requirements of the formal and procedural accounts defended above. However, it adds the following requirements:
I. The law should regulate interactions between private persons in those areas where persons can cause significant harm to each other in a way consistent with the demands of justice;
II. The law should regulate the way public persons may exercise their powers over private persons by ensuring they respect private persons’ fundamental rights.
These requirements are fewer than those of the formal or procedural accounts but are framed in much more general terms. Their essence may be reduced to the necessity that the law should comply with the requirements of justice. This is not to reduce the rule of law to the rule of justice. There are aspects of justice that do not apply to the rule of law and aspects of the rule of law that are not directly dictated by justice. For example, who should act as one’s best man at a wedding is responsive to the demands of justice: it would be unfair to choose a distant relative over a close friend who has provided constant help and support and who wishes to act as best man. However, it would seem inappropriate if the law regulated this aspect of personal life (out of respect for personal autonomy). Conversely, justice may constrain the road traffic law (e.g., people should not be prohibited from driving based on their race) but it does not dictate many aspects which it would be expected that the law would regulate (e.g., what side of the road should people drive on). These basic examples show that requiring that the law comply with justice does not entail that justice and legality become the same ideal.
The first requirement of this substantive conception builds on the notion, already developed above, that the rule of law requires the setting in place of the ordinary criminal law, tort law, contract law, and private law more generally. However, the setting in place of these rules is not by itself sufficient on a substantive account. These rules must also be compatible with justice. No doubt plenty of theoretical work, well beyond the scope of this paper, would need to be undertaken to specify more detailed guidance on rule of law requirements in these areas of law. However, given this paper’s focus, it is clear that no account would be complete if it did not include non-human animals within its scope. In particular, no account would be compatible with substantive legality if it allowed non-human animals to be exploited and killed by other private persons for human food, entertainment, or research, at least in the circumstances where this is unnecessary.
Much discussion could be had on whether the exploitation and killing of non-human animals by humans is ever necessary. It may be plausible that humans may be justified in killing non-human animals in situation of dire need, such as during famines. However, it is clear that the killing of non-human animals for food is often an unnecessary act given the wide availability of plant-based foods and cheap supplements which can meet humans’ dietary needs.Footnote 74 Similarly, the killing of non-human animals for entertainment, such as recreational hunting or bull-fights, is completely unnecessary given the many alternatives for entertainment at humans’ disposal. Finally, there is some scope to argue that there is justification for deadly medical research on non-human animals if this would bring some important benefit to human life. Such reasoning may be permissible on some utilitarian moral theories.Footnote 75 We need not resolve, for the purposes of this paper, which moral theory ought to be embraced. Whichever of these theories we choose, it is clear that they condemn the vast majority of the current ways in which humans unnecessarily exploit and kill non-human animals.Footnote 76 It follows that a substantive theory of the rule of law requires that such practices of exploitation and killing of non-human animals be prohibited by the law which regulates inter-personal harm (i.e. criminal, tort, etc.).
The second requirement follows from the first. The substantive conception does not only require that the basic interests of human and non-human animals be protected from the arbitrary power of private persons. Bolstering accounts of fundamental rights for non-human animals which exist in the literature,Footnote 77 an inclusive substantive conception of the rule of law also requires the protection of non-human animals’ interests through the institution of fundamental rights which bind the state and its organs. Constitutional practice has long revealed which sets of fundamental rights, such as conscience, speech, association, and personal liberty, humans are entitled to.Footnote 78 Part II already criticised these sets of rights for being not only anthropocentric but also for being unduly exclusionary of humans who are passive legal subjects. Much will need to be said about how this anthropocentrism should be remedied. This account of fundamental rights would need to be supplemented by a compelling list of rights for non-human animals and for humans who are passive subjects. Some obvious contenders for entry in such a compendium of rights would be those that do not presuppose that the beneficiary is a fully autonomous and rational agent who can fully participate in social and political life. The right to life, to physical and mental integrity, to be free from unjustified physical restraint, and to be free from exploitative labour would accordingly be included in such a catalogue of fundamental rights. Excluded rights may be the right to freedom of conscience and religion, the right to vote in elections, or the right to marry. Such rights in fact require complex cognitive capacities and effective abilities to participate in human-centric institutions which, as far as we know, non-human animals do not possess.
Much more would need to be said about the catalogue of fundamental rights which a substantive theory of the rule of law demands. That challenging task is left for another venue.Footnote 79 Here we need to reflect on the moral value served by a substantive account of legality. Given that the account incorporates formal and procedural requirements, it equally serves the moral values of those theories. However, the substantive account additionally gives full realisation to the view that human and non-human animals are part of our moral and legal community. Fully securing their well-being is the ultimate aim of the substantive rule of law and this is realised by the insistence that the law be responsive to the standards of justice.
V. Conclusion
This paper has argued that we ought to reconceptualise the rule of law. Prevailing theories of that concept have assumed that it ought to chiefly serve the well-being of active legal subjects. Passive legal subjects do not figure in these theories and, if at all, only contingently benefit from these accounts. Once this undue focus on active legal subjects is swept to a side, existing theories of the rule of law need to be re-elaborated to become more inclusive. The basic idea of the rule of law, whether on a formal, procedural, or substantive conception, should be thought of as being the curtailment of arbitrary power which private or public persons may exercise. This opens up the possibility that non-human animals, because they are possible victims of arbitrary power, are protected by the rule of law.
The scope of the protection offered by the rule of law will vary depending on which account we endorse. It will be thinnest on a formal account, stronger on a procedural account, and thickest on a substantive account. Indeed, only a substantive account can give full realisation to the view that the rule of law should protect the fundamental interests of human and non-human animals alike. This is not to downplay the contribution that formal or procedural accounts can make to the well-being of non-human animals. Those accounts recognise the well-being of non-human animals by insisting that they, too, are afforded some degree of legal protections. Accordingly, they recognise that non-human animals are members of our legal communities.
This paper has not sought to provide a strong case for adopting a thicker conception over a thinner conception of the rule of law. Its main aim has been a re-orientation of our conceptions of the rule of law to make them more inclusive. It has shown why the rule of law should serve the well-being of all sentient animals. If this claim is accepted then many other basic legal concepts, such as constitutionalism, fundamental rights, and democratic citizenship, ought to be re-analysed to ensure that they also serve the well-being of all sentient animals.
Acknowledgments
For their written comments, thanks to Saskia Stucki, Raffael Fasel, Yalan Chang, Eric Heinz, Timothy Macklem, and Kate Malleson. Special thanks to the anonymous reviewer for very insightful comments which substantially improved the paper.
