Social Histories of Iran centers the experiences of subaltern social groups in the history and historiography of modernity in and beyond Iran. This is the history of people in revolt, the hungry, the poor, sex workers, bandits, slaves, and women who have been subjected to crises born in the wake of changing socioeconomic, political, and religious paradigms on the one hand, and to modernism's politics of representation on the other. In masterfully telling this story, Stephanie Cronin provincializes the history of the elite and their ideologies of state and society. In what is the book's second and decisively methodological intervention, the history of Iran is situated alongside that of the modern Middle East and the world more generally, pushing against a tendency that the Introduction identifies as “methodological nationalism.” This is “the assumption that the geographical territory defined by the state and the population within its borders is the primary, and sometimes only, organizing principle for research and analysis” (1).
The book enacts what it identifies as a “global, transnational and comparative approach,” rejecting “any singularity or uniqueness to the experience of individual countries but seeing it as fundamentally shaped by inescapable transnational and global developments” (1–2). This methodology, although foregrounded, is not spelled out systematically. Instead, Social Histories of Iran exemplifies this method both in the organization and the analysis of archival material. It is structured in two parts, each equally divided into three chapters. In the first part, “Iran,” Cronin draws on regional and transnational comparison to elaborate on the histories of the 1979 revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic (Chapter 1), famine and bread protests in the late Qajar and early Pahlavi periods (Chapter 2), and Iran's modernist discourses and practices of criminality (Chapter 3). In the second part, “The Wider Middle East,” the histories of banditry (Chapter 4), slavery and abolition (Chapter 5), and veiling and anti-veiling campaigns (Chapter 6) are analyzed within regional and transregional frames and with reference to Islam as a transnational tradition.
In a Hegelian mode, even if in a Marxian sociological key, the chapters subsume historical examples from within a national or regional context into the global space. The landmark works of British historians E. P. Thompson and Eric Hobsbawm, as well as Michel Foucault (although more loosely), provide the frames of the “global” world from which Iranian and Middle Eastern histories unfold from. These are primarily historical studies of modern Europe, but in the book they provide the meta-historical paradigms of comparison that allow the text to establish equivalences between the experiences of Iran, the Middle East, and other contexts.
Comparison in the book, however, does not always establish equivalences across different countries and regions. At times, it brings forth distinct social practices or discursive formations and thereby suggests a tension between the book's stated and enacted methodology. In what is arguably the most compelling example, in Chapter 5, the analysis questions the possibility of a singular narrative of slavery and abolition. Instead, Cronin provincializes the dominant racialized understanding of slavery and abolition in contemporary global discourse as the modern experience of plantation slavery in the Americas. She highlights regional specificities of slavery across the Middle East and North Africa, and between the region and European settler-colonial orders in the Americas, in relation to specificities of religion and race. Although here, as elsewhere, Cronin reiterates her rejection of singularity to any context and establishes a parallel between the premodern Middle East and medieval Europe, she nonetheless emphasizes that it would be a historiographic error to imagine that slaves everywhere have experienced a similar condition of racialization and bondage and, in turn, to adopt universally applicable ideas of revolt and abolition. The book does not explicitly theorize this error in relation to secular and liberal epistemology and ideology of modern history and historiography. But it is nonetheless explicit that secular and liberal conceptions of agency, equality, and liberty were absent, or not yet present, as part of existing social relationships in the early modern Middle East.
Methodological nationalism has been debated in anglophone Iranian studies for at least two decades.Footnote 1 But not all critics of nationalist historiography have argued that comparative, transnational, and global approaches are the remedy to the shortcomings of methodological nationalism. This is because nationalist epistemologies are part of the more intractable secular episteme that also provides terms of comparison such as “country,” “elite,” “subaltern,” and indeed “the social,” as well as concepts such as “the transnational” and “the global.” Moreover, within this episteme, Europe occupies a singular position of power that is evident in the very ability of global scholars such as Cronin to write the history of Iran and “the Middle East.” In the global discourse of history, there is no Iranian history of Britain, especially one that has been translated into English and debated by British publics in the way Cronin's many contributions are translated and debated in Iran today.
Although Cronin observes “a persistent Eurocentrism in global, transnational, and comparative history” (2–3), she does not reflect on the constitutive one-sidedness of her discourse. The impositions of her sources, including the nationally organized British, Russian, and Iranian archives, as well as the methods and analytic categories that emerge within them, remain outside her methodological considerations. The lack of theoretical engagement with critical debates in postcolonial, transregional, and global history on Eurocentrism renders Cronin's history accessible to metropolitan readers who are themselves asymmetrically situated in the global terrain.Footnote 2 Yet it also contributes to the book's shortcomings in elaborating the historical predicaments that are global and yet particular to colonial and postcolonial societies of Iran and the Middle East in two interrelated ways.
First, the book occludes, and thereby reproduces, the global condition of differential power and sovereignty that animates transnational and global social processes. By settling on various social contexts while comparatively moving between them, global asymmetries of power and geopolitics that produce modern social contexts through colonial and imperial domination and violence, such as those of Britain, Europe, Iran, and the Middle East, remain outside the positivist epistemology of social history. This limitation speaks to the book's central framing of modernism and marginality. In addition to their dialectical relationship with subaltern groups, national elites in Iran and the Middle East—the modernists of yesterday and Islamists of today in Cronin's narrative—have been caught in a unique and non-dialectical relation of subjugation to European powers. In addition to its social history, the region's marginalization and indeed devastation are also global.
Second, a version of methodological nationalism continues to animate the book. Although Cronin shifts the historiographic angle away from “the nation,” she does not challenge, and indeed reproduces, the representations of society, class, politics, culture, and religion that are shared across methodological nationalism and comparative and global methodologies. Consequently, discontinuities and dynamics of Persianate and Islamic discursive traditions that defy secular representations and yet are central to modern histories of Iran and the Middle East remain outside the historiographic frame. This limitation is perhaps most evident in the analysis of the 1979 revolution and the rise of Islamic politics of the state. Cronin theorizes the revolution as part of the global processes and trends that centrally include the “education revolution” after World War II and the rise of leftist intelligentsia and student movements in “the red ’70s.” The politics of the Islamic Republic, which is framed as a surprise by appealing to the liberal expectations of the reader, is in turn addressed as the Iranian variety of the conservative and neoliberal politics that Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher respectively championed in the United States and Britain.
Cronin's account leaves out the continuities between “revolutionary” anti-imperialist, anti-Western, and redistributive impulses that continue to animate the “conservative” politics of the postrevolutionary state. But more importantly for my purpose, the book does not account for (a) the discontinuities between the institutions and discourses of modern Iranian society and those of the Iranian court and Shiʿi Islam; and (b) the gradual politicization of this gap in the politics of Islamic revolution and reform. The nationally organized Iranian intelligentsia (or more accurately rūshanfikrān, or “enlightened thinkers”), students, and the universities were revolutionary not simply because of their particular leftist ideologies, as Cronin suggests, but because they fought for “the social” by emulating Europe's “global” models and announcing the limits of inherited traditions in enacting a modern society. The movement from Islamic scholasticism, centered in the seminaries, to Islamic politics of revolution and reform, centered in the streets, similarly can be situated in modernity's reification of the social. A social history that does not account for its own location within the epistemological apparatus of global society falls short of elaborating on Iran's ongoing revolutionary struggles for tradition and tajadud (modernity).
