In his book, Martin Sweet moves beyond traditional approaches to the study of judicial effectiveness. In the spirit of a growing body of research in judicial politics, he sets out to consider how the elected branches' powers and prerogatives shape or curtail the consequences and implementation of judicial decisions. Marshaling a detailed case study of affirmative action policies in three cities, as well as briefer analyses of hate speech, school prayer, and legislative vetoes, he seeks to demonstrate that those charged with implementing a court decision often have, and use, resources to evade or undermine the Court's pronouncements. Indeed, it is well known that there exist compliance problems with Court decisions in these areas. Sweet's goal, though, is to highlight a more general mechanism by which compliance suffers. I think there are important lessons and implications that can be drawn from his investigation.
Sweet opens Merely Judgment by reviewing ways in which the various branches of government interact. He looks to situate his argument in the language of “constitutional dialogue.” In doing so, he draws on literatures concerned with constitutional interpretation, judicial efficacy, and compliance with judicial decisions. The key point is that elected officials charged with enforcing judicial orders often have options that allow them to evade judicial decisions. Indeed, this much is clear from the title of the book, which draws on Alexander Hamilton's famous assertion in Federalist 78 that the Court has “neither force nor will, but merely judgment.”
Sweet argues that Court decisions can potentially affect three types of changes in society—institutional, attitudinal, and behavioral. By attitudes, he means public opinion; by behavior, he means the decisions people make and the actions they undertake. What Sweet means by institutions, however, is a bit more vague. He claims that when examining the consequences of Supreme Court decisions, “some researchers evaluate the institutional relationship between the Court and the elected branches. These studies explain how governments either ignore, repeal, or modify policies in response to Court decisions” (p. 15). However, Sweet leaves it to the reader to infer what is meant by the distinction between that dynamic and behavior. In my view, institutions are rules or structures that create incentives to take certain actions (behaviors) in pursuit of those preferences. As a consequence, I am not sure whether I accept the author's claim that court decisions affect institutions themselves.
To make his point that The Court's ability to affect societal changes is limited, Sweet argues that elected actors have been able not only to evade the Court's decision but to illegitimately undermine the Court's ability to participate in “constitutional dialogue.” Sweet is particularly concerned with strategic moves by the elected branches to avoid being dragged into court, a process he labels “checkmate.” Checkmate involves executive refusal to enforce parts of a policy, de facto weakening of the policy, or a weak version of logrolling with those who might otherwise challenge the practice in court. Checkmate may also include legislative “tinkering” with policies. The evidence he brings to bear on this subject is the real subject of the book.
Sweet has amassed an impressive knowledge of affirmative action law and how it has played out in particular in the three cities he studies. The analysis begins with a discussion of Supreme Court doctrine concerning affirmative action in government contracting, focusing on City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co. In that case, the Supreme Court invalidated an affirmative action program, declaring that affirmative action programs concerning government contracting would be subject to “strict scrutiny”—the highest level of scrutiny applied by the Court to alleged discriminatory practices. Sweet reviews the Court's doctrine and concludes that essentially all affirmative action programs in government contracting would fail the strict scrutiny test.
The author then reviews affirmative actin plans in the wake of Croson in Philadelphia, Portland, and Miami. These cities have followed different policy paths since that case. In Philadelphia, the city was successfully sued for its program, which was alleged to violate the standard announced in the Supreme Court's decision in Croson. Philadelphia stopped enforcing its affirmative action program. In Portland, by contrast, the city responded proactively to the decision, eliminating its program and then later reenacting a program crafted in order to comply with the Supreme Court's standards. At the same time, the Portland program was designed so as not to instigate litigation, by limiting its application to smaller contracts. In Miami, the government has essentially gutted the program, by refusing to enforce any of its controversial components. Sweet argues that in Philadelphia “the view from the judiciary would, appropriately, come to rule the day” (p. 60; emphasis added). In contrast, the courses followed in Portland and Miami represent, in his view, inappropriate and illegitimate violations of the order of constitutional dialogue.
Critically, though, Sweet wants to make an even stronger argument. His argument is not just that it is problematic that the Court has made a decision and that jurisdictions not subject to the case have decided to respond in any one of a variety of ways. The real problem, from his view, is that the jurisdictions have adjusted their programs and policies to undermine potential litigants' cases. In Portland, the program was modified such that potential litigants were not sufficiently aggrieved to bring suit. In Miami, the program was brought to a practical halt, essentially eliminating any actions that could be litigated. While the programs have been operated de facto such that everyone who is affected by the program is at peace, they remain in one form or another “on the books.” Thus, the elected branches have, in Sweet's view, exercised checkmate and illegitimately undermined judicial supremacy.
One potential problem here is in Sweet's interpretation of what is going on in these cities. In one case, a program is being operated in such a way that no one subject to the program—neither the white contractors nor their minority or female counterparts—is sufficiently aggrieved to bring suit in court. In the other case, a program has been abandoned, though never formally repealed from the city ordinances. The author, however, has determined that if they were to be challenged in court, then application of strict scrutiny would require that they be declared unconstitutional. Thus, because the cities have decided to modify application of their programs in anticipation of such a decision, they are violating the Constitution and frustrating constitutional dialogue by blocking the courts from engaging the programs. The cities he studies employed “techniques for elected branch monopolization of the constitutional dialogue” (p. 124). More critically, by adjusting their actions so as to alleviate any potential litigants' concerns, the cities have illegitimately derailed constitutional dialogue. To the contrary, the elected branches seem to have demonstrated techniques for engaging the courts, rather than simply deferring to them.
The book is more of an argument for judicial supremacy—perhaps, juristocracy—than an analysis concerned with understanding the process by which constitutional dialogue takes place. Sweet's argument is that judicial determinations of constitutionality should have reverberating implications throughout society, with every jurisdiction reviewing all of its own statutes—whether challenged or not—and acceding to imputed judicial evaluations.
Seen in this light, it is a bit surprising Sweet does not focus on examples that make his point more effectively. There are many instances in which the “elected branches” (his term) openly defy or subvert judicial decisions, and scholars have written extensively on political evasion of judicial decisions from various perspectives (e.g., Stephen L. Wasby, The Impact of the United States Supreme Court: Some Perspectives, 1970; James F. Spriggs, II, “The Supreme Court and Federal Administrative Agencies: A Resource-Based Theory and Analysis of Judicial Impact,” American Journal of Political Science 40 [1996]: 1122–51). However, by contrast, Sweet presents evidence not of political evasion of Court decisions; instead, he shows political reaction to, and accommodation of, judicial pronouncements.
Further, it remains an open question how the author would respond to or engage the larger body of literature that relates to his subject. There is a contemporary literature from the field, which he does not cite, that contemplates the implications of the types of constitutional evasions with which he is concerned. For example, recent research considers the implications of evasion or noncompliance by elected officials for decision making by the Court (e.g., Georg Vanberg, The Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany, 2005; Jeffrey K. Staton, Judicial Power and Strategic Communication in Mexico, 2010). Do such opportunities create incentives for the Court to exercise self-restraint and avoid constitutional conflicts? Indeed, Sweet has not considered the possibility that the Court is aware of evasion by other branches and the implications that might have for Court decision making. This oversight is unfortunate because we cannot learn from his study how the dynamic he highlights affects the balance of power and functioning of our government.
In the end, Merely Judgment is concerned with a topic of great importance and provides some provocative ideas about interbranch relations. The ideas are, I expect, intriguing to the field broadly and likely to spur considerable additional research and attention.
