Sebastian Rosato and Anthony King have each written an important book that makes a significant contribution to our understanding of European integration. Rosato systematizes and extends realist thinking about cooperation under anarchy in order to create an innovative geopolitical theory of integration and unification. King offers an innovative sociological analysis of the transformation of Europe's armed forces. Rosato evaluates the explanatory power of his theory by applying it to three key episodes of Western European integration in the 1950s: the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, the failed attempt to establish a European Defense Community, and the creation of the European Economic Community. King presents ethnographically informed accounts of recent innovations and the convergence of the institutional structures, cultures, and practices of the rapid-reaction corps, intervention brigades, and special forces of Britain, France, and Germany. The two books, both of which are written in crystal-clear prose, are, in their empirical focus and epistemologically, very different. However, there are some common themes running through them.
In Europe United, Rosato's “basic argument is that states cooperate in a centralized or decentralized fashion depending on the power of their common adversary, and that if they opt for centralization, they unify or integrate depending on the distribution of capabilities among them” (p. 13). As interstate balancing by means of loose coalitions has long been a staple of realist international relations theory, Rosato focuses on centralized coalitions. His balance-of-power theory of minor-power cooperation hinges on the distinction between superior and overwhelming competitors. Second-rank states facing an overwhelming competitor in their region stand little chance of surviving a military confrontation. Their only chance of survival is to band together in a centralized coalition aimed at pooling capabilities and at increasing the organizational effectiveness with which they can be developed, mobilized and deployed. Centralized cooperation can take one of two forms. States either integrate into a supranational community in which they share policymaking powers or delegate them to an international institution, or they merge into a union in which one state makes policy for all. Which form cooperation takes depends on the intracoalition balance of power. If there are no significant power inequalities among coalition members, then integration “is attractive … because it promises to maintain the existing relatively even distribution of power within the coalition” (p. 32). If one coalition member is considerably more powerful than the others, then it is likely to create a unified counterweight to the overwhelming competitor. The strategy of trading away sovereignty for security can only succeed if potential balancers have the collective means to stand up to the overwhelming competitor and the opportunity to do so without being first destroyed by it.
Rosato identifies a number of reasons why an overwhelming competitor may look on while second-rank states form a coalition against it. One of them is that an extraregional great power—an offshore balancer—protects the minor powers. His theory also accounts for nonintegrationist policies or buck passing. Minor powers “that are further away from their adversary, or separated from it by other states, mountain ranges, or large bodies of water, are not as fearful of being conquered and are therefore more likely to pass the buck” (p. 35).
In recent years, innovation in realist IR has centered on the development of neoclassical realism, which takes into account ideas and the domestic-policy process as secondary but directly causal factors that shape state behavior. Rosato demonstrates that considerable explanatory mileage can be gained through a fairly simple extension of structural realism. His book is thus an impressive achievement, though it is not without limitations. To begin with, his historical account is that of a political scientist who treats history as a testing ground for theory. The result of this instrumental approach is a history shorn of nuances and contingency. In a number of instances throughout the book, Rosato's interpretation of the historical record seems contestable or incomplete. For instance, while he marshals persuasive evidence that French decision makers saw European integration as a means to contain a resurgent West Germany, what remains unclear, even though it is crucial for assessing the causal logic of his theory, is whether they saw integration as a means for “domesticating” the balance-of-power system in Western Europe—integration as a vehicle originating in realist calculations but designed for travel to a postrealist world—or whether they saw integration as a means for preserving the existing balance between France and Germany in a system that would continue to operate under the shadow of war.
As to theoretical limitations, Rosato makes a strong case that the balance-of-power configuration in postwar Europe was a necessary condition for integration, but he is much less convincing when he claims that it was also the sufficient condition. He briefly refers to such domestic politics and ideas as Germany's desire to rehabilitate itself in the eyes of the world as a normal country or the constraints imposed on successive postwar French governments by the powerful pro-Soviet French Communist Party, but he does not explore the relative explanatory power of these factors in accounting for European integration. Waltzian neorealism has to be supplemented by nonsystemic variables to account for specific foreign policies. In a similar vein, it would seem that the explanatory power of Rosato's theory could be enhanced by “complexifying” it, making it a more contingent, realist, midrange theory of centralized cooperation under anarchy.
In The Transformation of Europe's Armed Forces, King investigates European integration from a very different angle, analyzing “how Europe's forces currently conceptualize, plan, command and train for military operations, especially in Afghanistan” (p. 6). Whereas Rosato focuses on grand diplomacy, King studies sociological microprocesses. While for Rosato international security policy is driven by an identifiable logic, King is skeptical of the notion of systemic logic, instead zeroing in on the cumulative institutional changes engendered by contingent adaptions of military organizations to new strategic challenges. Whereas Rosato develops a monocausal theory of integration, King's theoretical ambition is limited to highlighting, in a series of brief digressions, how Europe's military transformation can be situated within broader social dynamics, such as globalization and the rise of network forms of organization. Both books emphasize the role of national interests and cross-national emulation of successful institutions and practices in shaping European integration. For Rosato, national interest is a function of the international balance of power and emulation is fueled by interstate competition. For King, national interest is a function of security interdependence and emulation is fueled by transnational relations.
King argues that the reduction in manpower and funding available to Europe's armed forces in the post–Cold War era has been accompanied by the concentration of national military power in elite expeditionary forces, which “have expanded in size, capability and strategic significance” (p. 10). These national military cores in which resources and professional expertise are concentrated have evolved close transnational ties under the aegis of NATO, which provides a framework within which European officers circulate and new professional expertise and best practices are developed and diffused. While King emphasizes the transnational convergence of the institutional forms, doctrines, expertise, and practices of Europe's militaries, he does point out that the process is both shaped and limited by distinct national military institutions and cultures. He explores transnational changes at the operational level (the headquarters of Europe's new rapid-reaction corps) and tactical level (Europe's new intervention brigades and special forces) in considerable and often fascinating detail. Among other things, he maps and analyzes changes in military planning, detailing how new standards of operational planning have been elaborated in a bottom-up and contingent fashion in response to pressing needs on the battlefield; explores the role of collective-memory constructions and special military insignia in explaining the rise of elite forces; and examines the increasing role of drills and rituals of battle preparation in enhancing combat effectiveness.
The author contextualizes his sociological explorations in terms of a liberal IR argument about security interdependence. For King, Europe's military transformation is ultimately aimed at ensuring that Washington continues to provide crucial collective-security goods for a world characterized by nontraditional security threats, such as ethnic and religious conflicts, terrorism, and failed states. In this view, Europe needs to transform its armed forces in order to make them interoperable with those of America because the ability and willingness to contribute to America's wars of choice are the political price Europeans have to pay for sustaining their crucial alliance with Washington.
In many ways, the strengths and weaknesses of these two books mirror each other. Rosato's main achievement is the stunningly simple theoretical extension of structural realism to account for centralized interstate cooperation. His main weaknesses are that he downplays the ambiguity of the historical record and overplays the explanatory power of his theory. Kings' main achievement is the thick description of European military integration below the level of governments. His bottom-up perspective captures aspects of integration that escape Rosato's structural theory. For instance, Rosato's claim that “there has been no meaningful … military integration [in Europe] since 1991” (Europe United, p. 10) has to be qualified in light of King's findings. Yet King's focus on close-up portrayals of military life-worlds has downsides, notably too much reliance on what Clifford Geertz called experience-near concepts, that is, concepts that express the lived experience of those immersed in a particular social milieu, soldiers in King's case, and insufficient contextualization (empirical and theoretical). For instance, King's account of the ability of the British-run Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) to innovate operational planning when it was deployed in Afghanistan in 2006 seems largely based on sources from within the ARRC. The account, which sidesteps intraorganizational power struggles, which are emphasized by one of King's theoretical inspirations—actor-network theory—would have benefited from better empirical contextualization, including a discussion of the constraints imposed on the ARRC by the fact that America has dominated the campaign in Afghanistan, and from more interviews with non-ARRC personnel familiar with the ARRC's tour of duty.
In addition, King's mobilization of liberal IR to frame his sociological study seems based more on hunches than on rigorous theoretical arguments and evidence. On a more basic note, his book would have benefited from more careful editing to avoid factual mistakes, such as referring to the German Bundeswehr as Bundesheer (Transformation, p. 158 and others) or the claim that the shift toward an all-volunteer force in Germany was at least a decade away (p. 37), when it was actually predecided in 2010 and ratified in 2011.
In conclusion, both books, in their own distinct fashion, add considerable value to the existing literature. Rosato expands the frontiers of structural realism and makes a powerful case that it has something important to say about the causes and limits of European integration. Seen in light of structural realism's somewhat precarious standing within contemporary IR research, and the fact that the field of European integration studies is dominated by postrealist theories, this is no minor achievement. King's book is an important extension of the sociology of European integration pioneered by Karl Deutsch and masterly elaborated more recently by Neil Fligstein. King applies the sociological perspective to the military field, from which it has largely been absent, and he does so in a manner which, in terms of empirical scope and depth and ethnographic sensitivities, is unmatched by any of the studies, few in number, that have looked at this issue form the vantage point of transnational interaction.
