In the advent season of the year 1300 the Parisian regent master Peter of Auvergne (d. 1304) proposed four theological questions in his Quodlibet V that mentioned the advent of Antichrist.Footnote 1 Three months earlier Peter had belonged to the college of theologians that had condemned the Catalan physician Arnald of Villanova's treatise, De tempore adventus Antichristi.Footnote 2 Consequently scholars have assumed that all four of the advent season's questions were directed against Arnald's propositions. This surely was the case regarding the framing of a cluster of three: “Utrum Antichristus sit venturus in brevi,” “Utrum expediat scire determinatum tempus adventus eius,” and “Utrum Antichristum venturum esse determinato et signato tempore sit error in Scriptura Sacra.”Footnote 3 Peter referred to Arnald's treatise explicitly in the first of these questions and to Arnald's reckonings in the third.Footnote 4 Thus it was appropriate that Josep Perarnau appended editions of these three questions in his recent magisterial edition of De tempore adventus Antichristi. Following an earlier assumption by Franz Pelster, Perarnau maintained as well that a remaining question, “Utrum angelo bono revelanti aliquid bonum de adventu Christi vel Antichristi futuris credendum sit,” was also directed against Arnald. Yet perhaps he had hesitations about this, since he did not provide an edition of this question. Indeed, the fourth question comes earlier in Peter's set and appears in a different context. Although it does concern knowledge of the coming of Antichrist, I will show that it was not directed against Arnald of Villanova.
The question at issue for Peter primarily concerns a hypothetical instance of communication between “good angels” and men. If a good angel reveals something good about the advent of Christ or Antichrist, should he be believed? Peter argues first that if a good angel reveals good things, he should be believed, for otherwise he would be lying. But how can one know whether it is a good angel who is speaking? Indeed, a bad angel can disguise himself as a good one. The answer, according to Aristotle, is that statements can only be credible if they stem from prudence, virtue [virtus], and benevolence. A good angel is benevolent. Furthermore, what is communicated cannot stand against natural reason and faith. Statements of a good angel pass these tests. Nevertheless, even a good angel does not know “the day or hour” of the advent of Christ or Antichrist by natural reason, for Christ says in Mark 13:32 (and also Matthew 24:36): “of that day or hour no one knows, neither the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but only the Father.” To this Peter adds an interesting twist. In Acts, Christ says to the apostles: “It is not for you to know the times or moments that the Father has placed in his own power.” For Peter this means that it is possible to know “the times and moments” by divine revelation, for the Son knows “in divinity,” but he kept the knowledge from the apostles because he did not wish to reveal it at that particular time.
Franz Pelster, who read this question closely, proposed that it left an opening for private revelation about the coming of Antichrist; thereby, it was implicitly favorable to Arnald of Villanova.Footnote 5 But I believe this conclusion is unwarranted because Arnald based his arguments in De tempore adventus Antichristi on a close reading of the Bible rather than private revelation. His methodological insistence was “scrutamini Scripturas” (John 5:39): “Prima est quod incumbit speculatoribus Ecclesie, Dei precepto, scrutari Scripturam Sacram.”Footnote 6 Above all, it should be recognized that Peter's question about “good angels” was not addressed to issues advanced in any way by Arnald. Instead, it asked about hypothetical revelations communicated by good angels. Although Peter at first gave as his example revelation regarding the advent of Christ or Antichrist, he then referred to revelation regarding the advent “of Christ or anyone whatsoever” (de adventu Christi vel quocumque) and then to “Christ or even Antichrist or anyone else” (de adventu Christi vel Antichristi aut de quolibet alio), showing that knowledge of the advent of Antichrist did not primarily concern him. An edition to round out the Perarnau dossier follows.
Peter of Auvergne: Quodlibet V, questio 4
The following edition employs Paris, BnF, Latin 14562, fols. 64rb–65ra, as its base manuscript (P1).Footnote 7 The manuscript is from Paris, St. Victor, and contains Peter's quodlibets as copied in the first quarter of the fourteenth century — thus, the copy is very close to Peter's composition in terms of both place and time. The manuscripts Paris, BnF, Latin 15851 (Sorbonne, early fourteenth century), fol. 60rb–60vb, and Troyes 269 (Clairvaux, early fourteenth century), fols. 176vb–177rb, used as controls, show only trivial variants that need not be recorded. My edition supplies modernized punctuation and capitalization.
Deinde ponuntur questiones pertinentes ad entia creata in particulari. Et primo ponitur questio pertinens ad substantias intransmutabiles et immateriales. Secundo ponuntur questiones pertinentes ad transmutabiles. Circa primum querebatur unum tantum, utrum scilicet angelo bono revelanti aliquid bonum de adventu Christi vel Antichristi futuris credendum sit.
Et argutum fuit quod sic, quoniam cuilibet bono et scienti et bona nuntianti credendum est. Bonus autem et sciens non mentitur de quibus novit. Opus enim sapientis est non mentiri de quibus [fol. 64va] novit. Angelus autem bonus et sciens est et bonus. Igitur ei bona nuntianti de adventu Christi vel Antichristi futuris credendum est.
Contra: illi qui nihil scit de die adventus Christi vel Antichristi credendum non est. Sed angeli nichil sciunt de die vel hora huiusmodi adventus. Dicitur enim Marci XIII: De die autem illa et hora nemo scit, neque angelus in celo neque Filius, nisi Pater. Igitur angelo bono aliquid bonum revelanti de huiusmodi adventu non est credendum.
Ad huius solutionem primo considerandum est que et quot sunt que faciunt aliquem credibilem. Secundo quod non omni angelo bono revelanti bona credendum est. Tertio quod angelo bono revelanti bona de adventu Christi vel quocumque alio credendum est.
De primo est intelligendum quod secundum Philosophum, secundo Rhetoricae,Footnote 8 tres sunt cause que faciunt dicentes credibiles, tot enim sunt propter que credimus exceptis mentionibus. Sunt autem hec prudentia, virtus, et benivolentia. Mentiuntur enim de hiis que dicunt aut consulunt aut propter omnia hec aut propter aliquod horum. Aut enim propter imprudentiam non recte hec sentiunt, aut sentientes recte propter nequitiam non que sentiunt dicunt, aut prudentes quidem et epytiquesFootnote 9 sunt, sed non benivolentia, id est propter quod convenit non optima consulere hec cognoscentes. Necesse est ergo qui estimatur omnia hec habere esse credibilem auditoribus. Et per oppositum qui estimatur aut nullum aut aliquod istorum non habere non esse credibilem. Et in hoc apparet primum.
De secundo dicendum quod non omni angelo revelanti aliquid de adventu Christi vel etiam Antichristi aut de quolibet alio non est credendum per se. Sunt enim quidam angeli boni, quidam vero mali. Mali quidam qui secundum naturam boni existentes propria voluntate a Deo aversi sunt magis diligentes propriam excellentiam quam ipsum. Et quia in ipsis naturalia manent integra, cognitionem quidem habent eorum que naturaliter cognoscere possunt.
Item, eorum que supra facultatem nature sunt, puta futurorum contingentium que ex sola voluntate Dei dependent, possunt habere cognitionem et habent cum revelantur eis a Deo immediate vel per medium. Voluntatem autem perversam habent et inordinatam, quia appetentes propriam excellentiam super omnia, posuerunt finem inordinatum, quem maxime et primo intendentes omnia alia et potentias et operationes referre finaliter, non illis. Propter quod mali et nequisiosi sunt voluntate. Quia vero homines, quamvis peccant, per gratiam possunt converti et uniri Deo, a quo ipse aversus est et in hoc excellentior eo, invidet ei, et nititur per peccatum avertere ipsum, et ideo malivolus est ad eum. Si igitur ei qui ignorans est vel, si sciens, tamen voluntatem habet perversam et in se et in comparatione ad nos malivolus existens nobis, credendum non est, ut apparet ex primo, manifestum est quod angelo malo non est credendum. Et sic non omni angelo revelanti aliquid de adventu Christi vel Antichristi vel aliquo alio [fol. 64vb] non est credendum per se. Et ideo dicit Beatus Johannes 1, cap. 4: Nolite credere omni spiritu sed probate spiritus si ex Deo sunt. Et rationem tangit Apostolus II Cor. 11, dicens: Ipse Sathanas transfigurat se in angelum lucis, id est ostendit se quasi angelum Dei, scilicet Christum vel aliquem celestem spiritum ut decipiat. Et sic patet secundum.
Ad tertium dicendum est quod angelo bono et bona nuntianti de quocumque credendum est, quam illi qui scientiam habet eorum que revelat et rectitudinem voluntatis et secundum se ad nos benivolus nobis existens credendum est, sicut ex primo. Angelus autem bonus cognitionem habet eorum que revelat, sive naturalem, sicut eorum que cognoscit ex cognitione primi obiecti intellectus sui, quodcumque sit illud, sive supernaturalem, qua novit ea que sunt supra facultatem nature ipsius, Deo sibi revelante immediate vel per medium. Si enim non haberet notitiam eius quod revelat, vellet decipere et per consequens peccaret et bonus non esset. Habet etiam voluntatem rectam et ordinatam simpliciter in Deum et ad se et ad nos. Aliter enim non esset bonus. Igitur angelo bono nuntianti aliquid bonum de adventu Christi vel Antichristi vel aliquo alio credendum est, si estimetur probabiliter talis esse.
Si forte quereret aliquis “ex quibus et qualibet scietur vel estimetur angelus bonus esse qui revelat?” Dicendum quod non potest scire simpliciter ex eis que revelat et modo revelationis, puta quia revelat vera et bona et sepe et tali modo, scilicet cum suavitate, quia hoc potest facere malus transfigurans se in similitudinem boni. Per ea vero que sunt communia angelo bono et malo non potest simpliciter discrevi hic ab illo et ideo simpliciter sciri per hoc non potest. Coniecturari tamen probabiliter si ea que revelat non sunt contra rationem naturalem, sed ei consonant. Quicquid enim est contra rationem rectam falsum est, et angelus bonus falsum non revelat. Si enim non est contrarium fidei sed consonum — fidei enim non subest falsum — sique non sunt aversa Sacre Scripture, cui non subest aliquid falsum, et si hec frequenter revelat et modo convenenti qui sic videtur bonus.
Item, potest inspirari ei cui revelatur in cognitione aliqua verbi per modum transeuntis vel alio modo quod angelus revelans sit bonus. Et sic credendum est pie patriarchis et prophetis et beate Virgini et sanctis aliis quibus revelationes sunt per angelos facte quod erant angeli boni et eis credendum esse. Per hoc apparet solutio ad questionem. Et concedatur ratio que probat quod est ei credendum.
Ad rationem in oppositum dicendum, cum dicitur “ei qui nihil scit de adventu Christi vel Antichristi non est credendum,” dico quod verum est. Et cum assumitur quod “angelus bonus nihil sit de illis,” dico quod immo. Et quod dicitur ad hoc probandum, De die autem illa et hora nemo scit, neque angelus in celo, neque filius, nisi Pater, Marci 13, dicendum quod [f. 65ra] angelus celestis nescit de hora et die cognitione naturali quia pendent ex sola Dei voluntate. Propter quod dicendum est Actuum 1: Non est vestrum nosse tempora vel momenta qui Pater posuit in sua potestate. Potest tamen scire de illo Deo revelante. Filius autem in divinis scit quidem sed dicitur nescire quia nesciebat ad docendum discipulos pro tempore illo.
