The foundational premises that underpin Melissa M. Matthes's deeply researched and frequently persuasive book When Sorrow Comes: The Power of Sermons from Pearl Harbor to Black Lives Matter will strike scholars of American religion and politics as familiar observations: that in the wake of modern national tragedies, religious and non-religious Americans alike have often looked to Christian churches for consolation; that these moments of crisis have given Protestant churches in particular unique opportunities to shape popular conceptions of national identity, patriotism, and the tangled relationship between church and state; and finally, that the sermons preached in the aftermath of tragedies tend not only to document, but to define the early contours of historical memory.
Using these familiar touchstones as points of departure, though, Matthes provides a series of novel and insightful core arguments that reconfigure specific dimensions of the complicated linkage between American politics and the pulpit. She argues that religious sermons doubled as profound theopolitical texts; that Protestant ministers were not just sources of pastoral solace but “for many Americans the political theorists of the crises”; that postcrisis sermons revealed whom Americans should mourn in ways that, depending usually on whether the minister was White or Black, either reinforced White racial innocence or criticized racialized state violence, respectively; and most importantly, that while Protestant clergy have not totally lost their power to influence public opinion, they nonetheless have lost a distinct form of clout rooted in “the authority of the Christian moral demand system” that licensed them to voice uncomfortable theopolitical truths (24, 27). In short, Matthes's overarching claim is that the “modern church has ceded much of its former power and now often finds itself dependent on the intercession of the state to make a meaningful impact on American life” (6).
Although When Sorrow Comes features six chapters that seem, at first glance, to cover a great deal of historical ground, stretching from the early 1940s to the early 2020s, the book is constructed like two distinct triptych panels. The first triptych is composed of chapters 1–3 and covers sermons preached over twenty-seven years of American history from 1941 to 1968: the attacks on Pearl Harbor and the subsequent internment of Japanese Americans (chapter 1), the assassination of President John F. Kennedy (chapter 2), and the assassination of Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. (chapter 3). The second triptych, chapters 4–6, covers sermons preached over twenty-eight years of American history from 1992 to 2020: the Los Angeles riots and the Oklahoma City Bombing (chapter 4), the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001 (chapter 5), and the Newtown school shootings in addition to the killings of Trayvon Martin and George Floyd (chapter 6).
Since Matthes makes few sustained, substantive references to major events between the early 1970s and the late 1980s, these two triptychs function like studies in contrast. Matthes frequently notes how these two quarter-century periods of cultural time can be juxtaposed against one another to reveal striking changes in American popular attitudes towards religion and politics. For instance, Matthes shows how, in the wake of the attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt sought the approval of various church leaders for the American war effort, an outreach program demonstrating that these Christian ministers had enough cultural gravitas that “the enlistment of their support was deemed important to the success of a political proposal, particularly one as important as going to war” (27). However, Christian clergy largely balked at this perceived intrusion into their domain, and their sermons in 1941 and 1942 show “Christian suspicion of, if not antagonism toward, the state” (57). The upshot, for Matthes, is that the definition of Christian patriotism in the 1940s hinged on being a faithful witness to Christ in the shadow of a nation-state that was eager to co-opt Christianity for its own worldly ends. In the aftermath of 9/11, Matthes interjects suddenly in chapter 1, the terminology would be reversed, as the “state defined the terms of the [post-9/11] debate, with Christianity merely a welcome addendum.” By 2001, the definition of “Christian patriotism” would be “focused more on what the United States had suffered than what Christian witness required in the face of suffering” (63).
If crisis sermons for predominantly White Christian audiences, about mostly White victims, reveal a shifting declension narrative from serious Christian witness to superficial American narcissism by the end of the twentieth century, then Matthes brilliantly demonstrates that crisis sermons about Black victims have remained lamentably consistent. Surveying sermons given in the wake of Martin Luther King Jr.'s assassination, the police beating of Rodney King, and the killings of Latasha Harlins, Trayvon Martin, and George Floyd, Matthes finds that Black victims have routinely been excluded from larger White mourning networks, which cast Black suffering not as a transcendent national tragedy, but as a parochial tragedy for Black communities. Contrasting sermonic responses to the Kennedy and King assassinations, Matthes cogently argues that when Protestant ministers embraced the fallen Roman Catholic president, King's death a few years later would throw into relief that the “embrace had been of Kennedy's paradigmatic Whiteness, not his Catholicism” (119). King's death would also disclose a rift between how White and Black ministers conceptualized which fallen leaders could be granted the privilege of national mourning: whereas Black ministers experienced existential despair about the entire American political sphere, White ministers “regretted the loss [of King] to the Black community but did not experience it as a loss to their own” (119). Paradoxically for Black ministers in the Obama era, Black victims come to be seen as worthy of mourning precisely as “the Black church lost much of its authority concurrent ironically with the rise of Black electoral power,” as epitomized by Obama's nickname, the “mourner in chief” (281, 278).
While Matthes's method of contrasting various sermons to grasp continuities and changes over time certainly reveals fascinating shifts in both pastoral and popular understandings of Christianity and American politics, materialist-minded readers interested in a methodology that offers a more robust account of historical causality may justifiably criticize this technique. Essentially, Matthes's methodology shares a family resemblance with Foucauldian archeological discourse analysis: she drills down into different historical-cultural moments, takes a series of cultural core samples, compares them, and invites readers to marvel at the changes. On the one hand, the method's lack of causal explanatory power occasionally leads Matthes into metaphorical vagueness and rhetorical overstatement. For example, she claims that by “failing to mourn” either the death of Latasha Harlins or the beating of Rodney King, Americans “sowed the seeds that would mature grotesquely into more videos of even greater police brutality” in the twenty-first century; she then theorizes (implausibly) that if President George H. W. Bush had merely mentioned Harlins or King by name, America may have “begun the intentional process of mourning all of its dead” (197). On the other hand, though, despite rare methodological shortcomings, Matthes offers not only genuine insights, but generative ones, which is to say that her book has the potential to catalyze vital future scholarship.
