This important study brings to bear on the philosophical works of Seneca a scholarly approach which, while not yet ubiquitous, is happily ascendant. Liz Gloyn combines ‘philosophical analysis with social, cultural and historical factors’ (1), a multi-faceted method that is critical for understanding our author. Over the course of a long public career, Seneca engaged in writing original philosophy to develop Stoicism further, taking seriously his sect's imperative that adherents use their talents and labour for the benefit of others — a project that is outwardly directed almost by necessity. Simultaneously, he pursued an increasingly serious project of inwardly directed self-improvement, seeking to depend neither on any external institutions, customs or events, nor to be invested in participation in the same, except insofar as doing so might benefit his progress in virtue. His authorial persona gives vanishingly little away that we can be confident of assessing accurately, whether in biographical detail or the workings of the inner man. We are still tightly constrained by what Miriam Griffin called ‘the Seneca problem’. G.'s resourceful, ambitious and diligent approach works to mitigate this constraint.
The book consists of an introduction, six chapters and an epilogue, as well as a welcome appendix which provides the text and translation of the remnants of Seneca's De matrimonio. Each chapter takes as its main focus one or two works of Seneca that G. has found most germane to her central topic. The first chapter, which seeks to show how mothers ought to model virtue, focuses on the consolations to Marcia and Helvia. Ch. 2 contends that the consolation to Polybius appeals to the Stoic cosmopolis to demonstrate that the duty of a brother is owed to each citizen of the world-city, and thus Polybius is bound equally to Seneca as to his brother who has died. Similarly, ch. 3 treats marriage, which when good can be ‘an important site of ethical stability’ (11), through the De matrimonio, and ch. 4 handles fathers and sons via the De beneficiis. G. considers the anti-exemplary status of the imperial family in ch. 5, and in ch. 6, on the Epistulae morales, proposes the initial dismissal and gradual reintroduction of the family over the course of that collection as a deliberate manoeuvre, since the family is an entity only reliably beneficial for a relatively advanced Stoic proficiens.
Occasionally G.'s analysis is flawed by a misplaced confidence that, in Seneca's corpus, works are what they say they are. Her categorical declaration that ‘the ad Marciam and the ad Helviam are, after all, functional pieces of therapeutic writing whose primary goal is to comfort’ (18) is insufficiently appreciative of Seneca's penchant for generic experimentation and his capacity for pragmatic multi-tasking. This author is more than capable of epistemological and ethical speculation commingled with stylistic showmanship and political self-promotion; but each aspect of the text has effects on the others, and mixed purposes must needs be sifted. Similarly, G. does not always succeed in correctly weighing historical particularity against the portable quality of exemplary discourse, which depends for its power on being detachable from its original context. G.'s detailed attention to specific historical circumstances at court and her reconstruction of ambitious jostling within the imperial household sometimes seem at odds with the power which members of the imperial family might exert as exemplary figures. Most problematic, however, is the fact that Seneca's corpus, with the partial exception, perhaps, of the fragmentary De matrimonio, does not demonstrate a special interest in writing an ethics of the family, whereas G.'s study is premised on the idea that Seneca constantly prioritises a unified Stoic project, and that an exposition of philosophically correct family roles and family life were central to it. On this view, whatever other literary play or political gamesmanship Seneca may be engaged in, his other goals are consistently subordinated to the prime objective of theorising and proselytising for Stoicism. The reader who begins this book sceptical of G.'s premise is unlikely to emerge as a convert to it.
Over his extensive œuvre, Seneca exploits ideas of family (including roles, membership, boundaries and duties) when it suits him to do so, whether his aims are squarely philosophical or largely rhetorical. His recourse to the family as both a conceptual and a real-life experience intimately accessible to virtually every reader is deeply pragmatic and not particularly surprising. The prominence of oikeiosis within systematic exposition of Stoicism is relevant to but not necessarily determinative of Seneca's use of the family. It is, rather, the thoroughgoing familiarity of both the concept and the lived reality that gives the family its greatest power. To harness and exploit this power to expose the arbitrary nature of orthodox understanding and conventional behaviour is thoroughly Senecan. However, making ad hoc use of the family in order to support, advance and illustrate various philosophical points is quite different from explicitly writing out or even implicitly working through a systematic ethics of the family. Every scholar brings her own preoccupations to her texts, and the interaction of what we might be looking for and what we actually find gives rise to many a valuable project. G.'s fine study contains much that is of use to Senecan scholars of various stripes, and it merits a place on everyone's shelf.
