Studies on online expression in China have focused on content control and the way in which the state and internet users (hereafter netizens) struggle over the boundaries of online expression. Despite their perceptive insights on censorship mechanisms and social resistance, these studies tend to overlook netizen-to-netizen interactions that shape the landscape of online discourse. Recently, both the party-state and non-state actors have attempted to influence online public opinion using tactics that extend far beyond the usual censorship and counter-censorship dynamics. The state, for instance, has begun recruiting internet commentators who engage in online expression anonymously to produce pro-state commentaries and guide public opinion. As other netizens have wised up to this tactic, they have labelled these state-sponsored commentators the “fifty-cent army” (wumao dang 五毛党), with pejorative reference to the fifty-cent fee they reportedly receive per entry.Footnote 1 Online criticisms of the state for its use of paid commentators have reached a considerable high. Yet, in another twist, a new constituency of netizens, self-termed the “voluntary fifty-cent army” (zidai ganliang de wumao 自带干粮的五毛), has emerged to criticize anti-regime netizens. Their stated cause is to defend the regime on an unpaid basis.
Given the liberal-leaning environment of online expression in China, why and how have netizens spontaneously developed a pro-regime group identity in defence of the regime?Footnote 2 This paper examines internet forums where members of the “voluntary fifty-cent army” struggle discursively with regime challengers. By examining their tactics, I reveal how they define and maintain their group identity, and sustain a grassroots regime-defending discourse. The study reveals a state–society interaction wherein the state is invoked only indirectly as a target and background context. Online struggles are shown to be not binary interactions between state agents and regime challengers but rather multi-actor interactions involving fragmented netizen constituencies championing pluralized political values, ideas and norms. Moreover, the anonymity of discourse competition generates non-coercive power relations that are malleable, performative, and much more than “us versus them” encounters.
Challenging the Regime, Defending the Regime
Scholars of Chinese internet politics have sometimes focused on the struggle between empowered social actors and a repressive state. This framework is largely informed by the vast infrastructural reach of the Chinese state in censoring online expression that includes measures such as filtering unwanted content, suppressing internet dissidents and encouraging self-censorship.Footnote 3 However, some netizens have managed to circumvent state censorship in creative ways, transforming the internet into a relatively free discursive space that has contributed to the development of a public sphere, promoted civil society, and provided opportunities for collective mobilization.Footnote 4 Even online nationalism, often viewed as state-sponsored and pro-regime,Footnote 5 has expanded this public sphere and challenged the regime's claims to nationalist legitimacy.Footnote 6 In Johan Lagerkvist's words, the emergence of online communities represents progress in unlocking the public sphere, as they serve as “bases for public opinion, social organizing, and the occasional stirring of political mobilization.”Footnote 7
Yet, China's authoritarian regime has proved resilient to challenges brought about by the internet. To gain a better understanding of the impact of new technology, recent studies have explored the varieties of online activism.Footnote 8 In particular, as Guobin Yang has insightfully pointed out, “To see politics only in the higher echelons of power as its outright subversion, and consequently to think of political change only as regime change, has its limits.” Such second-generation studies include Yang's account of the rich rituals and genres of digital contention,Footnote 9 Paola Voci's research on “smaller-screen realities,”Footnote 10 and accounts of internet spoofing by scholars like Bingchun Meng and Christopher Rea.Footnote 11 In the words of Herold and Marolt, an online carnival is being created, celebrated and instrumentalized in Chinese cyberspace.Footnote 12
These studies have deepened our understanding of cyber activism, yet they still tend, whether explicitly or implicitly, to assume the regime-challenging character of Chinese online expression. It is hardly deniable that a critical and politicized citizenry has emerged onlineFootnote 13 and that the state has “lost its ideational leadership.”Footnote 14 But, Chinese cyberspace is also a “force field in which different social forces and political interests compete.”Footnote 15 Several recent studies have characterized the Chinese internet as fragmented and Chinese netizens as generally apolitical.Footnote 16 Emerging evidence shows that netizens and online community managers tend to withdraw rather than fight for free speech when encountering state censorship.Footnote 17 Even when taking up explicitly political topics, netizens are divided in terms of identity, political orientation and discourse preferences, as witnessed in debates between leftists and rightists,Footnote 18 as well as in the rise of cyber nationalism that targets minority groupsFootnote 19 and foreign actors.Footnote 20
These studies suggest that online expression in China is pluralized and not always regime-challenging. Yet, other than a few accounts of cyber nationalism and online commentators that suggest pro-regime discourse can be state-sponsored,Footnote 21 few scholars have systematically analysed the dynamics of pro-regime expression in Chinese cyberspace. This article, by examining the activities of the “voluntary fifty-cent army,” focuses on the emergence of regime-defending voices in Chinese cyberspace.
Some Methodological Considerations
My findings are the result of in-depth online ethnography involving over five years of semi-participant observation of forums where “voluntary fifty-cent” netizens (hereafter “voluntary fifty-centers”) are concentrated. During this period, I usually spent at least one hour a day observing selected sites in the early evening when netizens are most active. By semi-participant I mean that I had an online presence but only limited participation. To avoid influencing the discourse in any particular direction, I remained an anonymous viewer of the forum most of the time, following discussion threads, observing forum management and state censorship activities, and tracing linkages to other sites. Only on rare occasions did I engage netizens directly by asking for explanations of memes and idioms or by contacting active participants for interviews. This approach is similar to Guobin Yang's approach of online “guerrilla ethnography,” which emphasizes limited involvement and moving within networks and exploring links.Footnote 22 Yet, unlike Yang, I maintained constant immersion in a small number of selected sites. Yang argues that long-term ethnographic work on a few sites does not capture the internet's real strengths and can lead to tunnel vision. True as this may be, the fluidity of online expression and frequent censorship benefit from an in situ approach involving close observation over time and a cumulative compilation of discussion threads which can be removed at any time. Furthermore, only through immersion in a small number of sites can the ethnographer develop the tacit knowledge and fluid metis (i.e. practical experience and know-how) necessary to read between the lines and accurately interpret texts.Footnote 23
Online interaction allows users to develop closer ties, mutual trust and a shared group identity.Footnote 24 Such netizen groups in turn often promote discourses with “communitarian subject constituted within, and bound by, an ethically integrated community.”Footnote 25 To study the “voluntary fifty-cent army,” I identified the main online platforms where members congregated. The very existence of the “voluntary fifty-cent army” was, in fact, an accidental discovery of my guerrilla ethnography. Whilst monitoring popular online platforms, I frequently observed adversarial comments like, “Go back to the Military Board where you warm each other!” By following these cues, and noting the association between users, expressive behaviours, and certain platforms, I located the home bases of “voluntary fifty-centers,” and these became my primary data collection sites.
These sites include military boards on NEWSMTH (shuimu shequ 水木社区, newsmth.net) and MITBBS (weiming kongjian 未名空间, mitbbs.com), the Worldlook (guoji guancha 国际观察) board of TIANYA (tianya luntan 天涯论坛, tianya.cn; the board of a forum will be expressed hereafter as, for example, Worldlook@TIANYA), CCTHERE (xixihe 西西河, ccthere.com), as well as military forums such as CJDBY (chaoji da benying 超级大本营, it.cjdby.net), and SBANZU (shangbanzu 上班族, sbanzu.net). Besides MITBBS and CCTHERE, all these sites are domestic forums located inside China's Great Firewall. All the selected forums attract stable traffic flows but vary dramatically in popularity. The largest one, TIANYA, boasts over 86 million registered users, with over one million simultaneously online during active periods by late 2013.Footnote 26 Even the smaller ones claim a simultaneous user population of a thousand or more during peak periods.Footnote 27 The particular discussion boards I focus on also attract a significant number of users, especially political ones. For instance, Worldlook@TIANYA constantly ranks in the top five among all boards, and is only second to Free (zatan 杂谈) if non-political boards are excluded. NEWSMTH's several military-related boards together now attract more users than NewExpress (shuimu tekuai 水木特快) – the most popular board for public affairs.Footnote 28 On MITBBS, the military board has been the most popular board since 2008. Although this selection of sites is not representative of political discourse across the entire Chinese cybersphere, it is sufficient to indicate the reach of the “voluntary fifty-cent army.”
The “Voluntary Fifty-Cent Army”: Identity, Community and Discourse
While it has largely failed to control online expression through censorship, the Chinese state has adapted by adopting strategies to manipulate online popular opinion. Since 2004, various state agencies have hired internet commentators to participate in online discussions anonymously. These state agents, commonly known as the “fifty-cent army,” have been active in online propaganda campaigns, government image maintenance efforts and crises management efforts.Footnote 29 Although this tactic may be effective in defusing particular crises, recent deployments of the “fifty-cent army” have frequently backfired, as netizens grow increasingly aware of their co-opted character. Today, the “fifty-cent army” has become a strongly pejorative label: it is frequently said that its members traffic in a cheap “sale of their souls” (chumai linghun 出卖灵魂).Footnote 30
“Voluntary fifty-centers,” on the other hand, are not state agents. They are not unthinking tools of the state, most clearly because their opinions diverge from official discourse and are critical of the regime on a wide scope of issues. They debate the merits and faults of current and past leaders, a practice that is discouraged by the state. They frequently disparage the propaganda system as incompetent and corrupt. They adopt the idioms and critiques raised by dissidents, such as referring to former premier Wen Jiabao 温家宝 as China's “best actor.”Footnote 31 Second, “voluntary fifty-centers” tend to be very active on overseas and smaller-scale platforms on the margins of the more popular domestic platforms where the state makes direct efforts to shape public opinion. If “voluntary fifty-centers” were actually state agents, they would appear mainly on popular domestic platforms. Finally, I also personally know several active “voluntary fifty-centers” who, I believe, are not state agents and who, to all appearances, are sincere in their beliefs. All of this together, gives me confidence that at least some regime defenders are not merely the unthinking and paid tools of state propaganda.
From “fifty-cent army” to “voluntary fifty-cent army”
Why would “innocent” netizens associate with the “fifty-cent army”? Largely a reaction to pervasive criticisms and rumours targeting the regime, identification with the “voluntary fifty-cent army” is both externally imposed and actively chosen. When online interactions turn antagonistic, netizens commonly label other netizens they perceive as pro-government as members of the “fifty-cent army.” These accusations are spurred by state censorship and opinion-guiding efforts, and motivated by a desire to delegitimize pro-government netizens by recasting them as paid state agents. In this sense, many netizens become “voluntary fifty-centers” involuntarily: they are externally labelled as members of the “fifty-cent army” (bei wumao 被五毛) by their adversaries in online debates.
External imposition of the “fifty-cent army” label is complemented by the active construction of the group's identify. Once labelled as a member of the “fifty-cent army,” some netizens have subverted the pejorative label and turned it into a badge of honour and superiority: they believe they are demeaned only because they are more patriotic and rational than their opponents. Chinese political scientist, Zhang Shengjun 张胜军, explicitly links the “fifty-cent army” to patriotism by arguing that the label has become a “baton waved at all Chinese patriots.”Footnote 32 It is not a coincidence that “voluntary fifty-centers” often evince nationalistic opinions. Nationalistic netizens view the West sceptically and tend to see the regime as playing a critical role in unifying and industrializing the nation. As a result, they are more likely to support the regime.
Yet, the “voluntary fifty-cent army” is not just a group of cyber nationalists. This is most clearly seen in the emphasis they place on evidence and logic over more emotional, nationalistic claims. The following example is telling. By pointing out the unequal growth rates of Han and non-Han populations (2.03 per cent versus 15.88 per cent, respectively) in China's 2005 One Per Cent Population Survey and its 2000 Census, many nationalistic netizens argue that family planning – which imposes birth control on Han Chinese but not on ethnic minority groups – is tantamount to the “genocide” of the Han. In response to this, one CCTHERE user explained away Han/non-Han disparities in population growth as a result of statistical errors. Before his rebuttal, he added,
I heard about the job of paid internet commentators, which I always wanted. But I don't know who is in charge of recruiting. Since I have been longing for the job, let me try to explain this “genocide policy” by Tugong (土共, Bandit Communist Party).Footnote 33 Take [this] as my effort to clean up the mess for Tugong and count it as my application for the internet commentator position. So please feel free to forward. You may get a referral bonus.Footnote 34
Claiming “scientific rationality” distinguishes “voluntary fifty-centers” from nationalists and conservative left-wing groups who are commonly perceived as anti-West (and sometimes pro-regime).Footnote 35 For them, what one argues for is an issue of standpoint (lichang 立场问题) and how one advances an argument is an issue of intelligence (zhishang wenti 智商问题). The standpoint may be critical, but it must be backed with intelligence. These traits distinguish “voluntary fifty-centers” from other cyber nationalists and leftists who also voice views criticizing Western media, Western governments, dissident groups and pro-liberal intellectuals.
Tactics of the “voluntary fifty-cent army”
Through constant online interaction, “voluntary fifty-centers” acquire and consolidate their identity, build community and sustain a pro-regime discourse. Next, I analyse the interactive tactics that solidify this identity. These tactics share a playful quality, a nationalistic orientation, and most importantly, an emphasis on “rationality.”
Labelling wars. Labelling wars provided the initial momentum for the formation of the “voluntary fifty-center” identity: some netizens become “voluntary fifty-centers” because they are labelled state-sponsored “fifty-centers.” When this happens again and again, it continues to reinforce a group identity. But, a labelling war is never unidirectional. If being labelled a “fifty-center” helps “voluntary fifty-centers” to define passively who they are, labelling opponents actively defines who they are not. “Voluntary fifty-centers” use many labels to describe their opponents, including “US cent party” (meifen dang 美分党, i.e. US-sponsored internet commentators), “dog-food party” (gouliang dang 狗粮党, i.e. those who beg foreign powers for food like dogs), and “road-leading party” (dailu dang 带路党, i.e. those who will lead the way for invaders). These counter-labels usually recast their accusers as aligning with foreign governments or causes. Not all counter-labels are nationalistic. For instance, “elites” (jingying 精英) and “public intellectuals” (gongzhi 公知) are often used by “voluntary fifty-centers” to demean pro-liberal intellectuals and media professionals.Footnote 36 Such labels carry strong negative connotations that imply that these parties are detached from the public, lack common sense and professional knowledge, and most importantly, prioritize “stance” over “logic” and “facts,” whether owing to ignorance or their attempts to manipulate public opinion. These labels further demonstrate that “voluntary fifty-centers” are not run-of-the-mill nationalists.
Face-slapping (dalian 打脸). Face-slapping refers to confrontations where netizens mount an attack ruthlessly and directly, pointing out errors in logic, factual mistakes or discrepancies. Given the symbolic importance of face (mianzi 面子) in Chinese society, “face-slapping” is very antagonistic and operates more effectively than labelling to undermine an opponent's reputation. In many cases, face-slapping serves to defend the regime directly. For example, after the devastating Sichuan earthquake of 2008, many netizens criticized the Chinese government for its failure to predict the disaster. After the Japanese earthquake in March 2011, a CJDBY user defended the regime against these “unfair” accusations by exclaiming: “Those claiming that earthquakes can be forecasted after the Wenchuan earthquake, I am here to slap your face!!!!”Footnote 37 This same logic held when the face of “Southern Clique” (nanfang xi 南方系) – a loose grouping of pro-liberal media outlets and professionals connected to the Southern Media Group (Nanfang baoye chuanmei jituan 南方报业传媒集团)Footnote 38 – was slapped over the same incident. Although it is often praised for its investigative journalism and critical standpoint,Footnote 39 the group is often charged by “voluntary fifty-centers” with “smuggling in its hidden agenda in reports” (jiadai sihuo 夹带私货) in order to brainwash the public. So, when reports by the Southern Clique appeared on forums praising the Japanese for being orderly and lauding its government for transparency, “voluntary fifty-centers” immediately countered this praise with news about looting in earthquake-stricken areas and criticisms of Tokyo Electric Power and the Japanese government.Footnote 40 They argued that media outlets like the Southern Clique held the Japanese and Chinese governments to different standards, and attributed Southern Clique's critical portrayal of the Chinese state's response to the Sichuan earthquake to its malicious, anti-regime intentions.
Cross-talk (xiangsheng 相声). In addition to labelling wars and face-slapping, which require direct confrontation, netizens also engage in cross-talk, which involves the collective ridicule of enemies. As in popular performances of cross-talk, “voluntary fifty-centers” use exaggeration, irony and parody to highlight the “illogical” arguments of their opponents. For instance, when China's first aircraft carrier started its maiden sea trial in August 2011,Footnote 41 one CCTHERE user commented: “Ah, we don't want a floating coffin. We want a star destroyer instead.”Footnote 42 Fellow community members knew immediately that this comment poked fun at those who condemned the Chinese carrier as a “coffin floating on the sea.”Footnote 43 Similarly, when “voluntary fifty-centers” repeated slogans like “Heaven condemns the CCP” (tianmie zhonggong 天灭中共),Footnote 44 or “It is all because of the Three Gorges dam”Footnote 45 after an earthquake shook New York and Washington, they were not condemning the CCP or blaming the Three Gorges dam, but practising cross-talk.Footnote 46 Their comments ridiculed and parodied the tendency of some netizens (and dissidents) to attribute all disasters to the Chinese Communist Party.
Fishing (diaoyu 钓鱼). “Fishing” is one of the most popular tactics used by “voluntary fifty-centers.” It works by “hooking” netizens with false or fabricated information. The game has four stages: (1) fabricating a message that is factually or logically flawed as bait; (2) posting the fabricated message on targeted forums; (3) hooking, i.e. collecting evidence of opponents believing and spreading the false information; and (4) celebration, i.e. laughing at those gullible enough to fall for the false message. A classic case of fishing started at SBANZU, a site used by many “voluntary fifty-centers.” Mainly to demonstrate the superficiality, ignorance and bad intentions of Kuomintang fans (guofen 果粉) and the “truth-discovery party” (zhenxiang dang 真相党),Footnote 47 the user Muhaogu 穆好古 forged a handwritten receipt by Mao Zedong stating that he had received 350 million gold roubles from the Comintern.Footnote 48 The picture contained historical anachronisms and font bugs that were discernable.Footnote 49 However, when posted on KDNET 凯迪, one of the perceived bases of KMT fans and the “truth-discovery party,” it was taken by many netizens to be a new-found “truth” about the CCP's inglorious history. The climax of the story, according to Muhaogu, was reached when a KDNET user and Party history student cited the picture in her MA thesis and was expelled from her programme as a result.Footnote 50 Catching “fish” so easily further convinces “voluntary fifty-centers” that many of their opponents are ignorant and intellectually incurious.
One particularly effective instance of fishing even made it to the print media. Mimicking a report about Huang Wanli 黄万里, a hydro-engineer known for his opposition to the Three Gorges dam,Footnote 51 a MITBBS user fabricated a story about an imaginary environmental scientist called Zhang Shimai 张拾迈 who proposed a theory that high-speed trains will cause massive geological disasters.Footnote 52 Two of the key concepts that were defined at length in the forged theory, “Charles Chef Force” and “Stephen King Effects,” were actually named after two popular MITBBS users, xiaxie and StephenKing. Widely reproduced online, the article hooked many unsuspecting readers despite efforts by netizens and the Chinese Academy of Science to debunk the story.Footnote 53 More astonishingly, the non-existent Professor Zhang was quoted by China Business News (Diyi caijing ribao 第一财经日报) after a high-speed train accident on 23 July 2011.Footnote 54 The newspaper was forced to issue an apology when netizens slapped its face by commenting on its website.Footnote 55 Such events only serve to feed the deeply held belief among “voluntary fifty-centers” that some media groups harbour ulterior motives that blind them to simple facts.
Positive mobilization. Like other online activists, “voluntary fifty-centers” sometimes also mobilize shared beliefs, values and emotions directly. For instance, a serial entitled “The Little White Bunny's Glorious Past” – a playful narrative praising the Party for unifying and building the nation – is very popular among “voluntary fifty-centers.” On CJDBY alone, this meme has attracted over 4.5 million views and 14 thousand replies.Footnote 56 The following translation of alternative lyrics to the Ode to the Motherland, the song sung at the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics, provides another example of positive mobilization. These lyrics were created by a CJDBY user:Footnote 57
Ode to the Motherland (author's notes in parenthesis) The Flag of Five Stars is fluttering in the wind (the Flag of Five Stars is China's national flag. It is clearly a symbol of nationalism),
The Song of CNMD is so sound (CMND is a pun; it means “fuck your mother” or Chinese National Missile Defence),
We are singing for our “black-belle” TG (“black-belle” TG means “evil Communist Party,” which is an affectionate nickname some “voluntary fifty centers” use to refer to the regime),
And Fucking Two Holes is even more shameless and rogue (“Fucking Two Holes” is an obscene pun referring to China's first stealth fighter, the J-20).
We are clean and honest,
We are nice and kind-hearted,
The White Bunny and the Panda are the role models of our kind (these lines project an innocent and adorable image of China and the regime by using the image of the White Bunny and Panda),
How many times we've being looked down upon we cannot count,
And today we finally can be proud and unbridled (these lines evoke nationalism through memories of national humiliation).
We love river crabs (river crabs symbolize internet censorship),Footnote 58
We love keeping accounts (jizhang 记账, “voluntary fifty-centers” claim they are keeping accounts so that all will be paid back later),
Whoever owes us money and refuses to pay back will be eliminated!
Long live our motherland, our mighty and powerful motherland! (Although not an alternative lyric, this shows clear nationalistic sentiment.
These alternative lyrics demonstrate the “voluntary fifty-cent army” nationalism and support for the regime. The mixture of national symbols, combined with a particular military forum subculture (including profanity), appealed to fellow community members, and made the post very popular.Footnote 59 Posted right after China's stealth fighter J-20 made its first public flight in January 2011, the lyrics attracted over 1,000 replies within two weeks, most echoing and lauding the original post.
The above list is not exhaustive. Other popular games among “voluntary fifty-centers” include “on-looking” (weiguan 围观), “playing undercover” (wujiandao 无间道), and “keeping accounts” (jizhang 记账). “On-looking” refers to large crowds surrounding and watching spectacles. Although often deployed by regime challengers to demonstrate public opinion and question the regime,Footnote 60 this tactic is also used by “voluntary fifty-centers” to bully their opponents. “Voluntary fifty-centers” bombard a target with repeated replies saying “on-looking,” “on-looking, too,” and so forth. This signals to other netizens that the target is voicing an unpopular or even absurd opinion.Footnote 61 In “playing undercover,” “voluntary fifty-centers” hide their true opinions and support the opposite side in an exaggerated and parodied fashion, recasting opponents as unpersuasive and untrustworthy. “Keeping accounts” refers to keeping a record of what the perceived enemies have said or done as evidence of their inconsistency. For instance, a CCTHERE user has compiled a collection of BBC reports about the Chinese internet over the past eight years in which one photo was repeatedly used but interpreted differently. In its earliest appearance in 2000, the picture was an illustration of “authorities wary of the web.” But, in 2008, the picture was interpreted as “China enhances its surveillance over Olympic guests.”Footnote 62
Not all of these tactics are exclusively deployed by “voluntary fifty-centers.” Some of them, like labelling wars, on-looking, and positive mobilization, are common among netizens generally; others, like face-slapping, fishing and keeping accounts, are more specific to “voluntary fifty-centers.” However, they all help to define the group identity and share certain features. In particular, they vary along two key dimensions: the degree of confrontation and the type of persuasive power (see Table 1). Along the first dimension, some games mainly rely on facts and reasoning to persuade others or to mock opponents, while others resort to emotional and normative appeals. The distinctive rhetorical tactics “voluntary fifty-centers” deploy – face-slapping, fishing, keeping accounts – are used to demonstrate that they prioritize logic and factual evidence in debates, in contrast to some other cyber-nationalists. Along the second dimension, some of these games involve direct attacks on opposing opinions, while others are more like playful ripostes between community members, and still others fall in between these categories. Through antagonistic interaction, “voluntary fifty-centers” shape and define their group identity and are unified in their opposition to a perceived set of regime-challenging or foreign-agent “enemies.” Mutual cooperation and other amicable interactions among “voluntary fifty-centers” further strengthen the group identity by reinforcing shared values and behavioural codes.
Categorization of Rhetorical Tools
This categorization offers a rough-and-ready framework to understand the value orientations along which opposing groups of netizens align themselves. On the one hand, the factual/rational and normative/emotional divide exists but is far from clear-cut. For instance, in both of the positive mobilization cases, readers' attention was directed towards a series of historical events that are imbued with nationalist sentiments. In fact, nationalism and rationality are the primary values of “voluntary fifty-centers.” Nationalism provides a moral imperative: to defend the nation against online sabotage by enemies from within and without.Footnote 63 Rationality inspires the belief of “voluntary fifty-centers” that they are enlightening netizens who are otherwise deceived by the ill-informed and unreflective opposition of some posters.Footnote 64 Thus, both factual/rational and normative/emotional persuasion provides “voluntary fifty-centers” with a sense of fulfilment and superiority.
On the other hand, the antagonism inherent in these tactics largely depends on who is using them and where they are used. For instance, when deployed in the presence of other “voluntary fifty-centers” and supportive netizens, tactics like cross-talk that involve soft satire are often echoed and appreciated. When deployed in the presence of opposing netizens, they frequently escalate into direct confrontation. Similarly, the degree of antagonism can vary at each stage in a multi-stage battle depending on changes in context or participants. Take fishing as an example. While bait preparation and celebration are generally amicable interactions among “voluntary fifty-centers,” hooking often involves direct confrontation to humiliate the hooked (often at perceived enemy sites, which are viewed by “voluntary fifty-centers” as “fish ponds”). In fact, many “voluntary fifty-centers” refer to this step as face-slapping.
Despite the variation in degree of antagonism and pattern of persuasive power (nationalism or rationality), these rhetorical responses all build up the collective online experiences of the “voluntary fifty-cent army” by consolidating their group identity, strengthening their community ties and contributing to the production of a pro-regime discourse. Fishing, which involves multiple community members at different stages, is a perfect example. Although it takes only one creative member to devise the bait, others may contribute by offering comments and suggestions, and by producing adaptations of the message or even derivative stories. Community members also play a larger role in spreading the bait, especially initially. Setting a hook involves collective confrontation with those hooked, thus promoting group identity through solidarity against a common enemy. Celebration enhances the image of the enemy, and against a “they,” “voluntary fifty-centers” actively project an image of “us.” By employing shared behaviour codes and championing similar values and beliefs, “voluntary fifty-centers” effectively establish independent online colonies with a fairly stable regime-defending discourse.
The reach of the “voluntary fifty-cent army”
Owing to the subjectivity of their identity and the fluidity of cyberspace, it is impossible to estimate the size of the “voluntary fifty-cent army.” However, there are indicators of the reach of the group which suggest that the “voluntary fifty-cent army” has become a significant force in online expression.
Although representing a small portion of netizens, the “voluntary fifty-cent army” has firmly established itself in cyberspace. As discussed above in the methodological section, “voluntary fifty-centers” have occupied not only small-scale forums that attract nationalistic netizens or military enthusiasts but also popular boards on major forums like TIANYA, MITBBS and NEWSMTH. TIANYA is the largest internet forum in China and attracts millions of visitors daily, whilst the latter two are the most popular student forums with 30,000 plus simultaneous users each. Not all users identify with the “voluntary fifty-cent army” but the group has gained traction on these platforms, demonstrating its capacity to reach a wide audience, as netizens “vote” with their attention and visit platforms where they are prominent.Footnote 65 Recently, the military board replaced ChinaNews as the most popular board on MITBBS. Before 2008, this board attracted only military enthusiasts; most netizens frequented ChinaNews to discuss Chinese politics. However, a series of events in 2008 – namely, the Tibet riots, the Sichuan earthquake, and the Beijing Olympics – triggered a mass exodus from ChinaNews as users became dissatisfied with the anti-regime orientations that dominated the board. They turned to the military board, where many “voluntary fifty-centers” are based, for relatively “neutral” and more positive discussion of China. Since then, this forum has often attracted ten times the traffic of ChinaNews.Footnote 66 This shift reveals the growing influence of “voluntary fifty-centers” in online expression.
“Voluntary fifty-centers” are not limited to the platforms they occupy. They confront opponents both on forums they dominate and on forums where they represent a distinct minority. Such forums include other discussion boards/forums, blogs and micro-blogs. For instance, although “voluntary fifty-centers” on TIANYA tend to concentrate on Worldlook, it does not prevent some of them from entering debates on Free. Through labelling wars, face-slapping or fishing tactics, they exert influence beyond the locations they dominate.
“Voluntary fifty-centers” have also built deeper and broader ties that transcend their base platforms. Many of them have established close contact with QQ and WeChat groups and have even developed real-life friendships with people from other communities.Footnote 67 These ties expand their reach and also link members of the “voluntary fifty-cent army” together. Just as like-minded websites crosslink more than different-minded websites, cross-site based “voluntary fifty-centers” weave connections among different sites.Footnote 68 The latest posts from Military@MITBBS or CCTHERE often appear on NEWSMTH's military boards. Fishing initiatives from MITBBS may inspire similar ones on NEWSMTH. In fact, some netizens even consciously advocate an alliance of communities that share similar inclinations and face a common enemy. A CCTHERE user explicitly argued that they should support WYZX 乌有之乡 (wyzxsx.com, an ultra-left website) against the common enemy of universalists (pushi pai 普世派).Footnote 69 Forums such as April Media (siyue chuanmei 四月传媒, formerly Anti-CNN.com) likewise show that the “voluntary fifty-cent army” community, which has generally been reactive, may be growing into a more self-conscious group with a clearly defined mission to provoke.Footnote 70 Through such a leap, some “voluntary fifty-centers” are turning themselves into political activists who strive to disseminate their political belief online.
Conclusion
Cyberspace is not a monolithic medium. Instead, it contains fragmented fields that either serve as frontlines where opponents meet, or colonies occupied by certain online communities. The analysis of the “voluntary fifty-cent army” in this paper details how group identity has been shaped through repeated rhetorical interactions with both opposing netizens and fellow community members. Such interactions turn some online platforms into “voluntary fifty-cent army” bases in which a particular pro-regime discourse is produced and reproduced.
Although they represent just a small portion of the total netizenry in Chinese cyberspace, “voluntary fifty-centers” can influence public opinion in significant ways. An experimental study with Facebook users, for example, shows evidence of massive-scale emotion contagion, i.e. emotions expressed by others influence our own emotions.Footnote 71 Other researchers have found that social consensus can be effectively influenced or even reversed by a minority of committed agents who “consistently proselytize the opposing opinion and are immune to influence.”Footnote 72 Here, “voluntary fifty-centers” compose the “committed minority” in Chinese cyberspace. With their relatively neutral stance vis-à-vis state propaganda, their calls for popular nationalism, their emphasis on facts and “rationality,” and their playful strategies, they are often more effective at influencing netizens than state agents.
Rather than denying the efforts of researchers, observers and activists to “push China's limits on Web,” this article aims to highlight the plurality of opinions on the internet and its implications.Footnote 73 Such a perspective, I believe, helps to take our understanding of online expression in China beyond models that focus on empowered social actors versus a repressive state to one that embraces conflicts among social actors themselves.Footnote 74 This perspective helps to explain resilient authoritarianism: besides regime adaptability,Footnote 75 groups like the “voluntary fifty-cent army” help to stabilize the regime, not so much by legitimizing it, but by undermining the moral and factual grounds of regime challengers. Future studies might examine how effective such online groups are at defending the Chinese government and thus shed light on mechanisms that promote the resilience of an authoritarian regime.
