Originally published in 2009, and deservedly reissued in paperback in 2012, this masterful study by Henry Farrell develops what he calls a “political economy of trust.” Farrell interrogates an existing literature on trust, with a primary focus on “encapsulated,” or interpersonal, trust before developing his own approach—a form of rational choice institutionalism—which focuses explicitly on informal institutions.
Building on both his own previously published work and his collaborations with Frank Knight, Farrell develops his theory through an investigation of three cases—two machine-producing industrial districts (one in Bologna, Italy, the other in Stuttgart, Germany) and the Sicilian Mafia. He contends that existing understandings of trust—whether based in political culture and values (Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, Ronald Inglehart), social capital and norms of diffuse reciprocity (Robert Putnam), or interpersonal relations and considered interests (Russell Hardin)—are unable to tell us much about where high levels of trust are to be found. The real puzzle is presented by Italy, a country with low levels of general and interpersonal trust, but where industrial districts in the central North thrive on high levels of interfirm cooperation. Solving that puzzle, Farrell argues, requires a new understanding of trust and a new focus on informal institutions.
The essential argument is this: Trust is special. It is not necessarily found in environments rich in formal rules and institutions (as in the Stuttgart industrial district) where context-induced “confidence” underpins interfirm cooperation. Trust is found, instead, in more ambiguous circumstances (as in Bologna) where actors are not provided with the strong routinized signals and guidance from formal institutions but are forced to rely instead on “informal institutions” (norms and rules) that Farrell compares to notions of “corporate culture” (David Kreps) or “moral contracts” (Edward Lorenz). This understanding of trust can be communicated in simple, formulaic terms (pp. 57–60): Formal institutions will be associated with “thinner” forms of trust, or confidence; informal institutions (of the right kind) will be associated with much “thicker” forms of trust, in which informal rules guide actors to behave in a trustworthy fashion. In all of these contexts, individuals are motivated by material self-interest. There is nothing mystical, romantic, or intangible about Farrell's notion of trust. Informal institutions provide information and incentives for actors to behave in one way rather than another.
Whereas the informal institutions found in the machine-producing industrial district of Bologna allow actors to distinguish trustworthy from untrustworthy behavior in “an imperfectly defined set of situations” (p. 175), those found among the Sicilian Mafia have the opposite effect. There, the informal rules regulating interpersonal behavior are as pervasive as in Bologna. But instead of generating virtuous behavior and trust, they generate distrust and untrustworthy behavior by communicating the strong probability that the intentions of others will be malign. Whereas in Bologna enforcement mechanisms take the form of unwritten contracts, in which the penalty for reneging on a deal will be the loss of trust, with pecuniary consequences, for the Sicilian Mafiosi there are no certain, reliable, or predictable sanctions for dishonesty. The closest thing to a formal institution for settling disputes and enforcing rules—the grouping of families in the so-called provincial commissione—is undermined as an enforcement mechanism by struggles for power among the crime families within it, who subject themselves to the distrust-inducing informal institutions that pervade their dysfunctional society.
The strengths of this analysis derive, first, from the fluency with which Farrell communicates contending conceptual perspectives, including his own; second, from his deep engagement with the empirics and interpretations of his cases; and third, from the elegance of his writing. The book is a tour de force of theoretically informed social science. But although I am greatly impressed by Farrell's multiple analytical skills, a series of niggling questions leave me feeling unconvinced by key aspects of the argument. Together, these pose some challenges to his distinction between trust as the property of informal institutions and confidence as inherent in formal institutions.
Although the author engages with an exhaustive range of theoretical and empirical literature, I was concerned that he neglected an important tradition of scholarly work on trust, cooperation and interfirm relations from the 1990s, based on similar cases to his. Thus, the work of Brendan Burchell, Frank Wilkinson, Christel Lane, and Reinhard Bachman on Britain, Germany, and Italy paid considerable attention to the embeddedness of firms in contexts of strong formal and informal institutions, as critical to the development of trust. (See Burchell and Wilkinson, “Trust, Business Relationships and the Contractual Environment,” ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, Working Paper 35 [1996]; and Lane and Bachman, “Co-Operation in Inter-Firm Relations in Britain and Germany: The Role of Social Institutions,” British Journal of Sociology 48 [no. 2, 1997]: 226–54.) Farrell's portrayal of one industrial district based on formal institutions and another on informal institutions looks just a little too neat when compared to the complex interdependence of both types of institution depicted in that older literature.
This point becomes clearer when one looks back at studies of the “Third Italy” of industrial districts that proliferated from the late 1980s. A survey of that literature (see, for example, Shari O. Garmise, “Economic Development Strategies in Emilia-Romagna” in Martin Rhodes, ed., The Regions and the New Europe: Patterns in Core and Periphery Development, 1996, pp. 136–164) reveals the importance for interfirm cooperation of a dense network of formal institutions: political parties, local government agencies, and private-sector associations. All have contributed to a regional productivity coalition in Emilia-Romagna, of which interfirm cooperation in subareas such as the Bologna machine-producing district is just one part. A key component of this omitted variable in Farrell's analysis is the “good governance” created by the formal institutions of the region. As Bo Rothstein has convincingly argued in The Quality of Government: Corruption, Social Trust and Inequality in International Perspective (2011), social trust and the quality of government institutions “hang together” (pp. 151–52). The contrast between Emilia-Romagna and Sicily is precisely in “good governance” versus “bad governance.” And it is the absence of quality formal (government) institutions in the Italian Mezzogiorno, as much as the presence of the mistrust-inducing informal institutions identified and so skillfully explored by Farrell, that explains the perpetuation and character of its criminal organizations.
This argument, then, leads to the question of case selection. To my mind, a more instructive third-case study would have been another industrial district, perhaps one in the Italian South that has failed to perform well. Undoubtedly, the Mafia case was adopted to make this a more general study of trust, and not just of that found in industrial districts. But if Stuttgart is a context in which formal institutions prevail and interfirm relations in Bologna are underpinned by informal institutions, then a district in which neither is powerful would have provided an instructive counterpoint. But that research design would have likely produced a different conclusion—one in which trust emerges from, and is sustained to different degrees by, a combination of formality and informality in institutional contexts.
Regardless of this critique, The Political Economy of Trust makes a profound contribution to the literature on social trust and economic development and is destined to become a classic of comparative politics and comparative political economy. Its lucid and penetrating analysis will repay careful reading and reflection by economic sociologists, political economists and scholars of institutions and institutional change.
