The worst thing about this book is its misleading title. The references to Victoria's skull and the mid-Victorian mind may suggest an account of psychology or mental philosophy in the 1850s and 1860s. In fact the book is a biography of George Combe, the chief publicist for phrenology, who began writing on his subject in 1818, well before Victoria came to the throne. What is more, Combe's best-known book, The Constitution of Man, appeared in 1828 – too early to count as Victorian. The choice of title is still less appropriate when one considers the absence from David Stack's analysis of real mid-Victorian philosophers of mind such as Alexander Bain. Bain produced a series of influential works on mental and moral philosophy, originally embedded in phrenology. However, together with virtually everyone else who was then keen on the relationship of brain to mind, Bain abandoned phrenology well before Combe died in 1858. That Stack chose not to write about figures such as Bain is not due to ignorance; he is remarkably well informed about mid-nineteenth-century intellectual history. Rather, he seems simply to have had no desire to write about mid-Victorian philosophy of mind.
Quibbles about the title aside, Stack's biography of Combe has great merit. It provides an archival basis for many of its judgements, and provides an intelligent picture of a Scot who was, by the standards of the time, a publishing sensation, in addition to being a popular lecturer and an effective educational reformer. However, while it records Combe's life well, the book is not a neutral account. Stack has adopted the genre of biography in order to mount a sustained critique of historians of science. These, he believes, have misconstrued Combe's life and ideas for the last four decades. Stack is particularly critical of Steven Shapin, Geoffrey Cantor, Roger Cooter and John van Wyhe, all of whom, he charges, have used Combe as a shuttlecock in interpretive games played within the history of science. To follow Stack's criticisms in detail would require a lengthy review article, but the gist of them is that much Combe scholarship has been concerned not with offering plausible interpretations of its subject's actual life and texts, but with crude applications of later philosophical or sociological theory.
Accordingly, Stack's Combe is a thoroughly unfamiliar figure. Far from being a popular exponent of then-current medical and scientific knowledge after the Napoleonic wars, he emerges here as someone engaged principally in an exposition of the works of eighteenth-century philosophers including Thomas Reid, Lord Kames and Joseph Butler. If we accept Stack's characterization, then we can largely dispense with, for example, the writings on Combe of Robert M. Young, which underpin the belief that the historical purpose of Combe, Gall and phrenology was to prepare the world for the scientific understanding of the brain. Stack suggests, to the contrary, that Combe was significant because he put a modern face on some of the moral and religious philosophical work of the eighteenth century. For myself, I think that Stack proves his case, showing that Combe has not been adequately represented by historians of science. But this in turn creates a quandary, because a reasonable and consequential interpretation of Stack's book is that Combe's phrenology should not be categorized as a science at all, and, therefore, should not be part of the history of science. Yet if this is the case, how should we categorize Combe's conviction – so fascinating to contemporaries – that the shape of a person's skull could reveal the hidden organs of his or her character? Possibly this variety of phrenology belongs to a history of quack psychology and secular substitutes for religion.
Even if Combe does not belong to the domain of natural science as conventionally construed, there remains a question about where we should place him politically. While Stack brushes aside comments on radicals by Greg Claeys and Boyd Hilton, he does not follow these up with the kind of historiographical scrutiny that he gives to historians of science. As a result, one is left feeling that perhaps Combe was not a radical at all. His political stance is not clarified by Stack's observation that Combe's writings upheld a philosophy of order – a doctrine that stretched back to the sixteenth century, and was seldom progressive. In what looks like an attempt to shore up a notion of radicalism, Stack also refers to Combe's political theory, as well as to some other aspect of his thought, as ‘neo-classical’. But this is unfortunate, since, for historians of the early nineteenth century, the term ‘neo-classical’ has an accepted meaning which does not remotely apply to Combe. If one describes a French painting or an Edinburgh building as ‘neo-classical’, it signifies that it was imitative of a Graeco-Roman model, but, as Stack is at pains to point out, Combe disliked Roman culture, and applauded the barbarian invasions of the Roman Empire. Far from adulating the classical past, he wanted to stamp it out.
Behind Stack's curious use of ‘neo-classical’ is his suggestion that Combe, as the inheritor of the Scottish Enlightenment, was endowed with a grasp of civic humanism. The argument would have worked better if Stack had not established that Combe was excessively dependent upon the ideas of Joseph Butler, who was neither humanist nor Scot.
