On 27 February 1976, Empress Farah Pahlavi of Iran laid the foundation stone of a new city that was to be constructed 100 kilometers north of Senegal’s capital Dakar on the coast between the Mboro and the fishing village of Kayar. The city was planned to have a population of 200,000 and would include a port, oil refinery and phosphate mine, all constructed with significant Iranian assistance. Iranian tankers would bring crude oil to the city’s refinery and return to Iran laden with phosphates.Footnote 1 The renowned Israeli-Canadian architect Moshe Safdie, who had met the empress at her Second International Congress of Architecture at Persepolis in 1974, had been put in charge of designing the city. It would be named, after the empress, Keur Farah Pahlavi, and would, the Senegalese media reported, “set in stone the Iranian–Senegalese friendship.”Footnote 2 But why was the relationship with Senegal so important to Iran and why was it willing to invest so heavily in the country? In answering these questions, this paper will shine a light on a little-studied aspect of the foreign policy of late Pahlavi Iran; its political, economic and cultural relations with West Africa. Iran’s foreign relations with the United States and the Soviet Union during the Pahlavi period have been studied extensively, but comparatively little attention has been paid to relations with the Global South outside of Iran’s regional geopolitical space.Footnote 3 Aside from Houchang Chehabi’s article “South Africa and Iran in the Apartheid Era,” very little has been published on Iran’s relations with Sub-Saharan Africa.Footnote 4 This begs the question, why has this aspect of the shah’s foreign policy been so neglected?
In an article on Iranian relations with the African continent during the Pahlavi period, published in 2008 in the journal Tārikh-e Ravābet-e Khāreji, Ahmad Bakhshi states that the shah paid little attention to Africa, noting that Iran had a diplomatic presence in only nine African countries and that the number of treaties signed with the Soviet Union alone greatly exceeded the sixty treaties signed with all African nations combined.Footnote 5 While this lack of interest in Africa can certainly be seen in the early decades of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s rule, in the 1970s he actively sought closer cooperation with African states, and they in turn sought closer cooperation with Iran. Among the countries with which Iran established political relations in this period were Kenya and Senegal in 1971, Zaire and Sudan in 1972, Nigeria in 1973, Ghana in 1974, Gabon, Ivory Coast and Madagascar in 1975, and Mauritania in 1976. Unlike Iran’s ties with north African states like Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia, as well as Ethiopia, there was no historical precedent for these relationships. Although Bakhshi is correct in arguing that, compared to other continents, Pahlavi Iran had relatively little impact in Sub-Saharan Africa, there are two caveats that should be noted. First, many of these countries did not achieve independence until 1960, and in the early years of independence maintained close economic alignment with, while seeking political independence from, their former colonial masters.Footnote 6 This limited the opportunities for countries such as Iran to seek rapprochement. And second, until the late 1960s/early 1970s, the shah was not strong enough politically or economically to seek to advance Iran’s political and economic interests beyond his regional sphere of influence.
The withdrawal of the British from the Persian Gulf in 1971 allowed the shah further to exert his power in the Gulf region, while vast increases in oil revenue provided greater opportunities to purchase military hardware and make investments overseas. Furthermore, the imperial celebrations of 1971 firmly established his Iran as one of the rapidly emerging powers of the Global South.Footnote 7 These celebrations at Persepolis are remembered more for who did not attend than for who did and many view the absence of certain invitees as evidence that shah and his celebrations were not taken particularly seriously. According to one article published in Newsweek, for instance, the shah “invited virtually everybody who was anybody—but mostly nobodies showed up.”Footnote 8 The shah was evidently disappointed that figures such as Queen Elizabeth II, President Pompidou and President Nixon declined their invitations, but the presence of representatives from countries in Asia, Africa and South America was as important, if not more so, than the representation of the United States and western European countries, with which Iran already had long-established relationships. Indeed, the shah used the celebrations at Persepolis to court states from around the world and they in turn sought to ingratiate themselves with the Pahlavi regime. Mauritania’s relationship with Iran, established in 1976, for example, was said to have been facilitated by the presence of President Moktar Ould Daddah at Persepolis, which was viewed favorably by the Iranians.Footnote 9 During President Léopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal’s state visit to Iran in 1976, the shah spoke fondly of their meeting during the celebrations: “[at Persepolis] I had the opportunity to get to know more and better your privileged, distinguished and cultural personality.”Footnote 10 The British even speculated that the idea for the Keur Farah Pahlavi project could be dated to meetings between the Senegalese and Iranians at Persepolis in 1971.Footnote 11
In recent works, several scholars, for example Roham Alvandi, have challenged the typical presentation of the shah as a puppet, arguing that in the context of the cold war leaders such as him were not merely bystanders, but “active agents of history who often abetted and manipulated the superpowers in the pursuit of their own local ambitions and interests.”Footnote 12 It was not merely local ambitions that the shah pursued, but global ones too, and he was able to create his own independent global policy, in which neither the United States, nor the Soviet Union, nor France interfered. Francophone Africa was viewed by France as its chasse gardee (private hunting ground) and to preserve this status, it sought to promote the spread of French language and culture in the region and maintain economic influence over its former colonies. The United States was primarily concerned with containing Soviet influence in the region, in the context of the cold war, and relied on the French to fulfill this agenda for them.Footnote 13 However, tensions and conflict did arise in French–American relations at times when the French perceived that the United States overstepped the mark by getting directly involved in African affairs, and some French policymakers saw the US as the main long-term threat to French dominance.Footnote 14 Indeed, in 1976, during his tour of Africa, as a statement of the increasing attention the US intended to pay to the continent, Henry Kissinger declared “that the development of Africa, the progress of Africa is in our interest.”Footnote 15 Amidst this tension, it is a measure of the big powers’ perception of Iran’s cold war credentials that it was able to exert its influence in this part of the world virtually unopposed, without promising to serve either the United States’ or France’s interests. By the time of Kissinger’s tour of Africa, Iran had already identified this part of the world as an area of significant interest, had established relations with several countries, and had pursued a special relationship with Senegal.
This paper will examine the relationship between Pahlavi Iran and Senegal, which began in 1971 and deepened throughout the decade right up until the revolution of 1978–79. It will question what drove Iran and Senegal to pursue this relationship, and what the development of the partnership throughout the 1970s can tell us about the shah’s broader foreign policy objectives, and his vision for the future of Iran into the 1980s. As the literature on this subject is exceedingly sparse, the paper draws on a wide range of primary source materials, including Iranian and Senegalese newspapers, Dutch and British Foreign Ministry papers, and most importantly, the archives of Moshe Safdie, thus providing a much-needed study on a hitherto neglected aspect of the shah’s foreign policy.
The Indian Ocean and Beyond
In the late Pahlavi period, the shah spoke about his vision for the Indian Ocean and his plan to establish an economic union for the countries bordering it, stretching from Australia, Singapore and India to Iran and South Africa. “Just imagine what a powerful organization all of them together would constitute,” he said, “Imagine the future of the Indian Ocean remaining a matter of exclusive concern for the maritime or oceanic states.”Footnote 16 The goal of this initiative was not merely to strengthen economic ties with the countries of the Indian Ocean, but also to develop Iran’s military influence. To illustrate this, in 1972 construction commenced on a naval and air base at Chābahār, on the Arabian Sea, close to the border with Pakistan. Furthermore, planned expenditure on Iran’s navy increased over 200-fold from the third to fifth development plans, from $5.5 million in the third plan (1963–68), to $55 million in the fourth plan (1968–73) and $1,200 million in the fifth plan (1973–78).Footnote 17 The US State Department noted in 1975 that “The Shah wants to be a leading—if not the dominant—power in the Indian Ocean … Over the longer term, the Shah will work for the elimination of both Soviet and US military presence in the Indian Ocean.”Footnote 18 It was evident that Iran was not seeking merely to create an economic and security union, but that it intended to become the leader of such a union.
Iran’s economic, military and diplomatic push in the Indian Ocean was not traditionally imperialistic, since the shah did not have any territorial ambitions, but it was imperialistic in a more modern, post-European sense. It resembled modern American and Soviet imperialism, in the sense that, as Cyrus Schayegh writes, it sought to “systematically and permanently influence others, if need be by force.” He continues:
Iran’s global diplomacy and Middle Eastern and Indian Ocean geostrategy in the 1970s, too, was more than simply the actions of a nation-state player writ large. The shah’s wish for Iran to become a world power, and to lead and guide a considerable area of the globe, amounted to an imperial project—though one, to stress this again, of a non-territorial, post European empire nature.Footnote 19
Schayegh further argues that by employing terms such as tamaddon (civilization) and tamaddon-e bozorg (great civilization) the regime presented the shah’s Iran as a civilizational beacon for the world. He explains, “tamaddon was neither Eastern nor Western, but pivotal to both, the bridge between the two: Iran was the world’s centre, its navel, linking a rather tired Euro-American world in the west with a re-born Asian world in the east.”Footnote 20 The countries that were part of Iran’s global push were aware of the importance of these ideas to the Iranians. As President Senghor said during a speech in Tehran, “Iran on the Asian continent represents the civilization of India and Europe, and the important thing about this civilization is what Her Majesty Farah Pahlavi calls ‘Iraniyāt.’”Footnote 21Iraniyāt, rendered into French as Iranité, was used by Empress Farah to stress the essence of Iranianness; of a people who had over thousands of years “welcome[d], liberally, the most diverse ideas,” without ever renouncing their essence.Footnote 22 The fact that Iran developed relationships with states in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1970s supports and indeed adds another dimension to Schayegh’s argument, for it shows that Iran was even looking beyond the Indian Ocean.
Although Iran did not establish relations with most of the newly independent African states until the 1970s, it had earlier recognized the potential opportunities that these could offer. In 1964, the shah’s cultural minister at the imperial court, Shojāʿ al-Din Shafā, wrote a report on behalf of the Imperial Cultural Council (Shurā-ye Farhangi-ye Saltanati), titled “Brief Report on Africa.” In it he noted that in the previous May a conference had been held in Addis Ababa at which thirty African states were represented. According to Shafā, the opportunities this vast continent presented were of interest to all nations, including Iran, and should be pursued as a matter of urgency.
In this situation, to further their own interests, both politically and economically, all non-African governments need to find a position for themselves in this vast continent. In this competition, any country that has on the one hand the necessary conditions and potential to bring investment [to Africa] and on the other [the ability to] do so sooner and better, will naturally get the most privileged position.Footnote 23
The report, which goes into detail on the history, culture and geography of each country in Africa, was to be made available to all the economic, political and cultural organs of the state, so that they might explore the possibilities independent Africa presented. Shafā made several suggestions as to how Iran could assert its influence in Sub-Saharan Africa, including establishing two Iranian offices, one in West and one in East Africa, to serve as points of contact; sending trade missions to study the opportunities for establishing trade and business relations; establishing scholarships for African students to study at Iranian universities; facilitating travel by Iranian technicians and engineers to Africa; and establishing a Centre of Excellence in African Studies at the University of Tehran, to provide the necessary research on aspects of African history, politics, geography, culture, economy and religion.Footnote 24 When Ardeshir Zāhedi became Iran’s foreign minister in 1966, he also recognized that pursuing relations with Africa should be seen as a priority. In addition to the economic benefits this would bring, he would later note in his memoirs, “their envoys voted at the United Nations and other international forums, and their votes could have been needed.”Footnote 25
In the mid-1970s, several foreign ministries, including the Dutch, noted Iran’s “growing interest in Black Africa.”Footnote 26 In an analysis of Iran’s foreign policy, the embassy of the United States in Tehran wrote:
In Africa, Iran has recently offered or concluded economic assistance agreements with Sudan, Senegal, Zaire, Morocco, Tunisia, Lesotho, Kenya, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast and South Africa. In addition to increasing Iran’s political influence in those countries, simultaneously undercutting radical Arab influence in black Africa, and paving the way for African support on international issues, these deals will provide Iran with many needed commodities, access to markets for future industrial output, and constructive use for its surplus oil revenues.Footnote 27
Though Iran had expressed interest in Africa earlier, the urgency with which it pursued relations with African states in the 1970s suggests a change in geostrategy; Iran was no longer thinking only in terms of regional, or even solely Indian Ocean supremacy, but was looking even further afield. The foreign policy chapter of a book-length interview with the shah, published in 1977, is titled “Master-plan for the world,” which perhaps illustrates this fact.
The country that received the most attention was Senegal. Under French colonial rule, Senegal had had a prominent position due, in part, to its strategic location on the western tip of the African continent—offering the shortest route from Africa to South America, a convenient route from Sub-Saharan Africa to Europe and an ideal stop for ships travelling around the Cape of Good Hope.Footnote 28 Dakar became the capital of French West Africa (Afrique Occidentale Française) in the early twentieth century, when, in the words of Sheldon Gellar, it was “transformed into an imperial city containing the most advanced administrative and social services in French Black Africa.”Footnote 29 As a mark of its importance to the French, Senegal was the only colony in which assimilationist policies were applied. For instance, full citizenship rights were granted to Africans born in the urban communities of Dakar, Gorée, Rufisque and Saint-Louis.Footnote 30 One student to take advantage of this was the future president of independent Senegal, who won a scholarship to attend university in Paris and when filling in his name and nationality on forms wrote “Léopold Sédar Senghor, French.”Footnote 31 Even after Senegal gained independence, first as part of the Mali Federation in June 1960, and then as an independent state two months later, the country remained strongly influenced by French language and culture. Within the community of French-speaking nations Senegal took a prominent position and President Senghor became a leading proponent of the establishment of a formal federation of French-speaking countries, la francophonie.
In the decade following independence, France continued to have a strong hold on the Senegalese economy. Ninety-five percent of all investment in the country, for example, came from French capital.Footnote 32 Furthermore, 80 percent of all trade was with France, all peanut exports were bought by France at subsidized rates, France covered two-thirds of Senegal’s development capital, as well as technical assistance, and the French treasury covered Senegal’s trade deficits.Footnote 33 As Mohamed Mbodji has written, “Senegal’s independence in 1960 did not affect a complete separation from France, but rather gave way to the continuation or even the reinforcement of the 300-year-old political and economic relationship.”Footnote 34 Under the colonial regime, peanut farming and export had been such an important sector for the colony’s economy that by 1966 the peanut sector still accounted for 80 percent of employment.Footnote 35 Through the 1960s, Senegal’s non-agricultural exports became more significant, for example fish products, phosphates, fertilizers and petroleum products (it had established an oil refinery, Société africaine de raffinage, in 1961).Footnote 36 However, peanut products still counted for more than 50 percent of exports, and the knock-on effects of reductions in yields, caused for example by reduced rainfall, meant that economic growth fluctuated, and when France eventually decided to end subsidies on peanuts, and henceforth purchased peanuts at global market prices, the consequences were dire for the already struggling Senegalese farmers.Footnote 37 Not just investment, therefore, but also some diversification of the economy was necessary for Senegal’s economic development, and Iran offered help in both areas.
Of the relationships Iran developed with West African states during the 1970s, the one with Senegal was the most significant, for several reasons. First, Senegal’s former prominent position in the French empire marked it as an appealing prospect symbolically for Iran, and its location, as stated above, as a route from Sub-Saharan Africa to both Europe and the Americas, would be strategically important for extending Iran’s global reach.Footnote 38 The second factor was the compatibility of the political philosophies that both leaders developed. Senghor’s political philosophy was based on two ideas: Négritude, an ideology designed to articulate Senghor’s vision for the place of Black Africans in the modern world, and African socialism, an ideology he argued befitted African countries because of their traditionally communitarian societies.Footnote 39 The shah, meanwhile, adopted a civilizational discourse, built around the idea of Iran as a distinct cultural space, and his future tamaddon-e bozorg, which was described by the shah as a “welfare state where everybody born, until he is dead, will enjoy every kind of social insurances to permit him to go into industry, to other jobs, to work and to die in peace and tranquillity.”Footnote 40
During his speeches concerning Iran, President Senghor commented on the relationship between the ideologies of the two countries. Although economic alignment was an important goal of the relationship, “our cooperation goes further,” he said. “It expresses itself, essentially, in the dialogue between Iranité and Négritude, which must be an essential contribution to the dialogue of cultures, which we have been organising for several years from either side.”Footnote 41 Iranian civilization and culture were the essence of the modern nation, and discussions between the two leaders were framed as relations not just between two nations, but two civilizations. Moreover, one of the main similarities between the ideologies of Senghor and the shah was that in two countries with majority Muslim populations (Iran over 99 percent, Senegal over 95 percent), neither referenced Islam explicitly as a source of national identity. At the same time, for Senghor, as a Catholic, cultivating relationships with Muslim states was important to build legitimacy and, as Peter Schraeder noted, “if one wants to completely understand the formulation and implementation of Senegal’s foreign policy, as well as that of other African countries with sizeable Muslim populations, one must take into account the role of religion.”Footnote 42
A third factor was the personal friendships that developed between the shah, Empress Farah and Amir ʿAbbās Hoveydā, and Senghor and Abdou Diouf, which facilitated the development of political relations between Iran and Senegal. These friendships were enabled in part by the francophone educational backgrounds and self-styled intellectualism of some key members of both Iran’s and Senegal’s political elite. The Senegalese elite, as already touched upon, felt that they belonged to la francophonie—a wider French-speaking community whose cultural heart is France.Footnote 43 Senghor in particular saw himself as much as French as African, and for his attainments in poetry he became the only African to have been inducted into the Académie Française. His prime minister and successor as president, Abdou Diouf, also studied at a French school in St Louis before studying law and political science at the Sorbonne, and going on to the Overseas Civil Service School.Footnote 44 Senior members of the Pahlavi regime shared this educational background with the Senegalese. Prime Minister Hoveydā, for example, had studied at a French school in Beirut and was enamored with French literature and culture. In his diaries, Hoveydā regularly referenced European intellectuals, and, as Milani notes, “an essential component of the identity he envisioned for himself was one of an intellectual.”Footnote 45 According to Chehabi, the shah was appreciative of Hoveydā’s “cosmopolitan Francophilia” and from time to time conversed with him in French.Footnote 46 Hoveydā travelled to Senegal on official visits three times and developed close bonds with both Senghor and his counterpart, Diouf.
In Senegal the constitution granted the president control over foreign affairs, national defense, and the armed forces, essentially giving him sole prerogative to define foreign policy.Footnote 47 In Iran, too, the shah had supreme control over foreign policy, so if one wanted to pursue good relations with either country, it was advantageous to develop a personal bond with the leader. The personal friendship between Senghor and the shah, therefore, was a particularly important factor in advancing relations between Senegal and Iran. Indeed, according to Gholam Reza Afkhami, Senghor was one of only a small number of leaders with whom the shah was on first-name terms.Footnote 48 The shah enjoyed the company of intellectuals and frequently referred to Senghor as a figure of cultural as well as political significance. During Senghor’s first state visit, in a speech in his honor, the shah spoke of him as important “not only as head of a friendly country, but also at the same time one of the most outstanding cultural personalities” and of his “voice that resonates as the best contemporary African poetry.”Footnote 49 In this respect, Senghor was considered not only to speak for Senegal, but for all Africans: “Today you are not only the leader of an important African nation that under your leadership is heading towards comprehensive social, political and societal progress, but you are the spiritual spokesperson for the whole of Africa.”Footnote 50
Such flattery was the norm during these events, and privately the shah’s court minister, Asadollāh ʿAlam, was a little less impressed by Senghor’s intellect. During a lunch in his honor, ʿAlam writes:
He [Senghor] is a wise man, but he himself thinks he is very wise and talks a lot, he was almost a conversation hoarder. He talks about everything from race and religion and politics and Asia and Africa and Europe and everything else. The king looked at me and smiled.Footnote 51
Senghor also spoke passionately about the shah and, according to an article in the Senegalese newspaper Le Soleil, he “never misses a chance to refer to the friendship that ties him to the Shah and the admiration he feels, as a scholar, for the fabulous history of Persia.”Footnote 52 As further evidence of the importance of personal relationships in international politics at this time, Senghor’s relationship with the shah was said to have been reinforced by the shah’s friendship with President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, who was also close to Senghor.Footnote 53
Another relationship which undoubtedly helped matters was that between Empress Farah and President Senghor. Indeed, she later referred to Senghor as her “old and dear friend” and her affection for him was certainly reciprocated.Footnote 54 Speaking about how well she was received in his country during her visit in 1976, Senghor said, “None of the foreign figures who visited our country, even the late Georges Pompidou, president of France, who was my best friend, received such a reception.”Footnote 55 During a speech in her honor, Senghor called Empress Farah “one of the most distinguished personalities in the world and a model for Senegalese girls to follow.”Footnote 56 He frequently referred to her as l’Impératrice au sourire de soie, the empress with the silken smile, while she called him l’artisan impeccable du verb, the impeccable craftsman of the verb.Footnote 57 While Senghor’s reputation as a figure of cultural significance endeared him to the Pahlavi elite, so too did Empress Farah’s sophistication and elegance endear her to Senghor.
Senghor’s approach to culture as a driver of development also appealed to the Pahlavi perception of the importance of Iran’s own culture. In April 1966, Senghor held a huge cultural festival in Dakar, titled Le Premier Festival mondial des arts nègres (the First World Festival of Black Arts), in which thousands of writers, musicians, performers and artists from 30 African countries took part, in addition to delegations from elsewhere. The delegation from the United States included the poet Langston Hughes and the jazz musician Duke Ellington.Footnote 58 The festival featured an impressive line-up of music, dance and theatrical performances, film screenings, exhibitions, including L’Art nègre, and a nine-day colloquium in which the idea of Négritude was debated. The festival was not, however, as David Murphy has noted, a generic celebration of African “culture,” but a celebration of the “high arts.” It would, he argued, “celebrate Africa’s cultural renaissance by primarily celebrating the continent’s ‘Classical’ tradition.’”Footnote 59 Facing criticism over the cost of the event—it made a loss of over $500,000—Senghor argued, “We ought not to regret the financial sacrifices the festival has cost us, because it is a matter of culture and, to repeat once again, culture is at the beginning and end of development.”Footnote 60 Empress Farah, whose own annual Shiraz Festival of Arts commenced one year later in 1967, would undoubtedly have agreed with this statement, as well as, perhaps, with the focus on “high arts.” Moreover, in the final report of the Keur Farah Pahlavi project, submitted in October 1978, plans were announced to hold an annual festival in the new city in conjunction with the Shiraz Festival of Arts.Footnote 61
The personal friendships between the two sets of leaders facilitated a close bilateral relationship which ultimately served both countries’ economic and strategic interests. For Iran, close relations with Senegal provided a foothold in West Africa in a strategic position on the Atlantic, expanding the shah’s imperialist project beyond the Indian Ocean in the process, and providing opportunities to import phosphates from Senegal. For Senegal, Iran offered significant investment, opportunities further to diversify the economy away from the peanut sector through industrialization and increases in trade, and a relationship with both a moderate Islamic country and an emerging global power. The relationship should also be seen in the context of the cold war in Africa. As Senegal’s foreign minister Doudou Thiam wrote in 1963 on the dangers of superpower competition in Africa:
The African states are anxious to co-operate with the other countries of the world. They want to derive advantages from this co-operation; they hope to secure economic, technical and cultural assistance. They do not refuse assistance just because there are conditions attached to it, but those conditions must in no case affect their sovereignty.Footnote 62
While the Soviet Union and the United States would give aid with the expectation of achieving political leverage in the politics of the cold war, Iran offered access to a powerful but non-aligned benefactor, one that would protect its partners economically from being dragged into the superpower rivalry. The Keur Farah Pahlavi project was the culmination of this relationship that began in 1971 and developed rapidly as the decade progressed.
Political and Economic Cooperation: 1971–75
According to the memoirs of Ardeshir Zāhedi, when he became minister of foreign affairs in 1966, the shah had promised the Ivory Coast that Iran would establish an embassy there, however Zāhedi argued that Senegal would be a better prospect in West Africa, for some of the economic and geostrategic reasons cited above. “Irrespective of his friendship with Sédar Senghor,” Zāhedi writes, “my arguments for His Majesty were convincing.”Footnote 63 Iran and Senegal thus established political relations on 13 May 1971 and shortly afterwards an ambassador was sent to Dakar.Footnote 64 On 1 June that year, Minister of Foreign Affairs Zāhedi travelled to Dakar for talks with his counterpart Amadou Karim Gaye, President Senghor and Prime Minister Diouf, during which, as well as discussing cooperation on security in the Middle East, preliminary discussions were held on the potential for establishing comprehensive economic ties.Footnote 65 The semi-official daily Ettelāʿāt reported that “Iran has identified Dakar as its first base for large-scale efforts and constructive cooperation in Sub-Saharan Africa.”Footnote 66 Zāhedi referred to Senghor in his memoir as an “exceptional character,” with whom he developed a “very friendly and trusting relationship,” and recalled that this trip in 1971 “marked the beginning of a lasting friendship between the two countries, as well as between the President and His Majesty.”Footnote 67 Later that year, as mentioned in the introduction, President Senghor visited Iran to represent his country at the shah’s imperial celebrations.
On 18 July 1973, Iran signed an agreement to provide Senegal with loans of over $2.4 million for two development projects—to provide drinking water in rural areas and develop an audio-visual educational program—with an interest rate of 5 percent per year, repayable in sixteen years.Footnote 68 Shortly after, from 8 to 11 February 1974, Prime Minister Hoveydā visited Senegal. This visit was said by Ettelāʿāt to come at a time of “Iran’s increasing economic power, and its ability to support the economic development of African countries has increased, [therefore] Iran’s assistance can be provided through joint agricultural and cultural projects.”Footnote 69 As a mark of Iran’s importance to Senegal, Hoveydā was awarded Senegal’s highest honor in a meeting with President Senghor. During the visit, a photography exhibition was organized in Dakar by the Iranian Ministry of Information, intended as an introduction to Iran for the people of Senegal.Footnote 70 On the last day, an agreement of cultural, scientific and technical cooperation was signed by Hoveydā and his counterpart Diouf, which established a general framework for cooperation in these fields.Footnote 71 During this visit, a total of eleven projects were discussed, including the construction of an oil refinery, and in the months that followed, ʿAbdolmajid Majidi, head of the Plan Organization, travelled to Senegal as head of an Iranian delegation of technicians to look into this project.Footnote 72
Following this trip, Prime Minister Diouf, travelled to Iran from 6 to 12 July 1974, as the head of a delegation which included the minister of higher education, the minister of industry and development, and a team of ten Senegalese technicians. Reciprocating the award received by Hoveydā, Court Minister ʿAlam presented Diouf with a medal.Footnote 73 During this visit Iran and Senegal signed several deals. Iran pledged a further $8.5 million for projects in Senegal, including $4 million towards the delta dam, $1.5 million towards irrigation and $3 million towards the creation of a free industrial zone (Zone Franche Industrielle) in Dakar.Footnote 74 A protocol agreement was signed concerning the creation of an industrial complex comprising an oil refinery and petrochemical facilities, as well as the exploitation and development of Senegal’s phosphate reserves.Footnote 75 Finally, an agreement on tourism cooperation was signed by the Iranian minister for information and tourism, Gholāmrezā Kiyānpur, and Senegal’s ambassador in Tehran, Massamba Sarre. The deal stated that, “considering the importance of tourism for their two countries both in terms of the economy and as a factor in the understanding between the peoples,” they would cooperate on the development of the industry and seek to ensure the most “effective exploitation of its potential.”Footnote 76
On the final day of this July 1974 visit, Hoveydā and Diouf issued a joint communique, in which, in addition to stressing their desire to strengthen economic and cultural relations, they made some comments on regional security. Iran pledged its support for the liberation of African countries, while Senegal agreed that the security of the Persian Gulf should be managed solely by Gulf countries. They also jointly stressed the importance of maintaining peace and stability in the Indian Ocean and, given its importance for global trade, avoiding big power competition there.Footnote 77 Signaling his understanding of the importance of Iran’s desire to expand its influence internationally, Diouf said “Not only will I be the goodwill ambassador of Iran in my country, but I will also be the goodwill ambassador of the Shāhanshāh Āryāmehr everywhere I am.”Footnote 78 On 6 March 1975, several months after this visit, a treaty of friendship and cooperation was signed by Hoveydā and Diouf, in which “the two friends declare[d] their firm desire to establish between them sincere ties of friendship, cooperation, and durable peace.”Footnote 79
An agreement was also signed on 30 April 1975 for the establishment of an Iranian–Senegalese company called Irasenco: Société Irano Sénégalaise des Pétroles et des Mines. The company was capitalized with $80 million, 50 percent of which was provided by Iran and 50 percent by Senegal.Footnote 80 Iran granted a $40 million loan to Senegal to cover its half of the capital.Footnote 81 The remaining funds required to complete the proposed projects would be borrowed by Irasenco on the international money markets and from development institutions, with guarantees provided by the governments of Iran and Senegal.Footnote 82 Iranian minister ʿAbdolmajid Majidi and Senegalese minister in charge of financial and economic affairs, Babacar Ba, agreed that the main purpose of the company would be to execute the following projects:
1. An oil refinery with an initial capacity of 1.5 million tons per year, which could be increased later to 2.5 million.
2. A majority shareholding of at least 61 percent in the operating facilities of the phosphate mine of Tobène, for a capacity of around 2 million tons of enriched phosphate per year.
3. The acquisition of 50 percent of the distribution channels for oil products belonging to the Shell Company in Senegal.
4. Equity participation in the project to produce ammonia and urea belonging to Fertisen.Footnote 83
The company also formally put into place plans for the construction of a town, built to house those employed at the refinery, which would be called Keur Farah Pahlavi, along with a port called Port Sédar.Footnote 84 From this period onwards, the execution of the Keur Farah Pahlavi project would be the primary concern of political contacts between the two countries, but it was far more than merely an industrial complex and adjoining town. It would be a cultural and tourism center too, and, in the words of Senghor, “the city seals for eternity the deep friendship which binds the Senegalese and Iranian people.”Footnote 85
The Keur Farah Pahlavi Project: 1976–79
Rapid urbanization resulted in a significant increase in the population of Dakar in the years after independence. The number of people living in the capital grew by 53 percent from 374,400 in 1961 to 534,857 in 1970. By 1976, the population had grown to 798,792, a further 49 percent increase in just six years. Other cities were affected by the general trend of urbanization, too, though to a lesser extent. Senegal’s second (Thiès) and third (Kaolack) most populous cities saw population increases of 29 and 11 percent respectively between 1970 and 1976.Footnote 86 The construction of a new city in Senegal thus had four basic objectives:
1. To reduce the high population density in the capital, Dakar.
2. To diversify and strengthen the economic and industrial bases of the country.
3. To create an Iranian–Senegalese joint venture that would provide opportunities for expansion in bilateral trade and political relations.
4. To successfully realize an original enterprise, making use of the full potential of the Senegalese administration.Footnote 87
When completed, Keur Farah Pahlavi would accommodate over 200,000 inhabitants, making it the second most populous city in the country by some margin, thus alleviating the strain on the capital.Footnote 88 Moreover, such huge programs, or grands projets, several of which were incorporated into Senegal’s fourth plan (1973–77), and which required significant foreign investment, were designed to help achieve the desired diversification of the economy.Footnote 89 By the year 2000, Senghor aimed to “achieve the status of an industrial society and all our efforts will be aimed at this objective.”Footnote 90 The Keur Farah Pahlavi project was intended to accelerate the realization of the type of industrial society Senghor envisioned.
The Israeli-Canadian architect Moshe Safdie was hired by the Senegalese government towards the end of 1975, almost certainly on the recommendation of Empress Farah, to design the architectural program of the new city.Footnote 91 Safdie’s firm was also hired to provide architectural and engineering services for the headquarters of Irasenco, which would be constructed in Keur Farah Pahlavi. At this early stage in the planning, work was geared towards identifying a suitable location and developing a schematic design in time for the visit of Empress Farah in February 1976, when she would take part in a ceremony at the site of the new city.Footnote 92 Over the following three years, Safdie worked with a group of Iranian and Senegalese experts, which included several Senegalese ministers and the following Iranian members: Hushang Nahāvandi, chief of the Special Bureau of the Shahbanou; Professor Mehdi Kowsar, architect and dean of the University of Tehran’s Faculty of Fine Arts; the sculptor Parviz Tanāvoli; Jamshid Behnām, chancellor of Fārābi University; and the deputy chairman of the Iranian National Oil Company, Rezā Fallāh, who was also the director of Irasenco and thus closely involved with the construction of the oil refinery.
Iran granted substantial long-term loans for petroleum-related projects to other countries besides Senegal. Fernando Camacho Padilla shows, for instance, that in 1975 Iran pledged to loan the government of Peru $100 million for the construction of the Norperuano pipeline, and there are many other examples around the world.Footnote 93 What was exceptional about Iran’s relationship with Senegal was the scale of the project envisioned by Irasenco and the vast sums of money pledged by Iran. The refinery alone, which would be funded by Iran and would give priority to the Senegalese market, would require nearly $120 million of investment between 1976 and 1980, and the planned improvements to the phosphate mine at Tobène would require $250 million of investment, at least 51 percent of which the Iranian government had pledged to provide.Footnote 94 In response to a request from Senegal for a $57 million loan to cover the cost of the port infrastructure at Keur Farah Pahlavi, Iran agreed to cover half, on the condition that Senegal obtain the balance from the World Bank and Iran’s portion exceed no more than $30 million. The Iranian government also agreed to fund a World Bank feasibility study for the port, not exceeding $290,000.Footnote 95 These were substantial amounts of money, which serve to illustrate Iran’s commitment to pursuing greater economic influence in Sub-Saharan Africa during this period. Indeed, according to Le Monde, Keur Farah Pahlavi was “undoubtedly the largest project ever undertaken in Senegal.”Footnote 96
In addition to the money the Iranians pledged to industrial projects associated with the new city, they also offered to fund the city’s public buildings and a cultural center “in honour of Her Majesty,” and Nahāvandi even suggested that the Grand Mosque of the city be designed by an Iranian architect.Footnote 97 The extent of Iran’s influence on the town not just in terms of finance, but also architectural style, was a frequent subject of discussion among the joint Iranian–Senegalese committee. Early on, Senghor stated that he expected Keur Farah Pahlavi to be a “city which will complement our respective culture … a Senegalese city in which the tectonic severity of Sudano-Sahelian art will respond to the warmth of Iranian art.”Footnote 98 How this desired architectural style, both Iranian and Senegalese, was to be realized became a pressing concern.
During one meeting held in June 1978 at the Senegalese embassy in Paris, when debating the prospective style of the bazaar, “a rather intense discussion” took place “on the nature, character and needs of the Iranian bazaar as compared between Africa and Iran.”Footnote 99 At the same meeting, Mehdi Kowsar gave a talk about the ways in which certain elements in urban texture can be selected “to symbolize the link of friendship between Senegal and Iran.” He suggested that a neighborhood park “could be structured like an Iranian garden, or a water pond could be shaped in the quiet and elegant way of Iran,” while the utilization of African plants in these features could help to synthesize the two cultures.Footnote 100 Kowsar proposed that Iran’s influence could also be imparted on the city by utilizing Iranian ceramics, particularly blue tiles, in the making of street furniture, such as street signs and other minor components; by using water and landscaping; and by using geometric-type paving for walkways in the Iranian tradition.Footnote 101 During a meeting of the committee in Dakar, President Senghor spoke of public buildings as an area in which “harmony between Iranian and Senegalese cultures could be realized.”Footnote 102 It was even suggested that a Senegalese architect travel to Isfahan to visit its Armenian churches and draw inspiration for the designs of churches in Keur Farah Pahlavi.Footnote 103
Moshe Safdie displayed some concern that the architects of the city would focus too heavily on amalgamating architectural styles, which would lead to a lack of unity. In volume 6 of his report, he addressed this issue, arguing:
When we identify some elements of Iranian architecture in the Iranian style, such as domes, arcades, and ceramic tiles, we must not forget the origin of these forms: the use of small brick structures to cover large spaces, the protection against the desert climate, the design of structures to promote natural ventilation … The style thus becomes the formal expression of the environment both physically and psychologically … I am of the opinion that the frivolous and arbitrary aspects of fashion are uninteresting and should be completely removed from all that concerns the architecture of Keur Farah Pahlavi. In the same way, taking the style out of context can easily become ridiculous.Footnote 104
He speaks elsewhere about the necessity “to avoid making a catalog of the architectural modes or to group together a variety of buildings which have no relation with each other in a chaotic way and for a single purpose,”Footnote 105 and during meetings with the joint Iranian–Senegalese committee, he frequently stressed the need for stylistic unity.Footnote 106 Responding to a question directly from Empress Farah, who attended some meetings of the committee, about Senghor’s idea that the city should be a “marriage between Iranian and Senegalese architectures,” Safdie said that instead of copying architectural styles from Iran and transplanting them to Senegal, some of the basic principles of Iranian architecture, “which are very applicable and relevant in Senegal,” could be applied.Footnote 107
Iranian–Senegalese cultural relations would therefore be articulated aesthetically through the design of the city and its buildings, but this was not the only way in which they would be expressed. As already stated, Iran would fund the city’s cultural center, which would include indoor and outdoor theatres, an art gallery, a library and a lecture hall.Footnote 108 An annual festival would be held there in conjunction with the Shiraz Festival of Arts, to serve as a truly global projection of Pahlavi Iran. Furthermore, at this time the northern part of the Senegalese coast was underdeveloped, though its potential as a tourist destination had been recognized. Keur Farah Pahlavi would offer opportunities to create attractive beaches, construct hotels and ultimately bring tourists to the region.Footnote 109 Of course, the establishment of the cultural center would also have a positive impact on any future tourism prospects.
The high point of the Keur Farah Pahlavi project from a public relations perspective, and indeed in the context of political relations between Iran and Senegal, was the visit of Empress Farah to Senegal in February 1976. This trip was preceded by a four-day trip to Senegal by Princess Ashraf in January. In December 1973, the shah himself was in the process of planning a tour of Africa, to visit Senegal, Kenya and Sudan, but this trip was abandoned due to security concerns.Footnote 110 The empress was the next best thing, and, according to British records, the reception accorded the Shahbanou was “on the lines that are normal here for Heads of State and included all the characteristics of a full state visit.”Footnote 111 Local newspapers note the adoring crowds that gathered to welcome the empress on her arrival and how she “conquer[ed] the Senegalese by her grace, and her simplicity, [and] through her affectionate hand gestures to the crowd.”Footnote 112 The report continues that there can be no doubting that “Senegal, as a whole, with a gesture of love and sympathy, will offer her heart and her friendship to the gracious Empress Farah.”Footnote 113 During the visit, Empress Farah became the first woman to be granted an honorary doctorate by the University of Dakar, and in addition she visited the island of Gorée and travelled to Keur Farah Pahlavi to lay the foundation stone of the new city.
The ceremony took place on 27 February and was covered by the local media with apparently genuine enthusiasm. In the village beside which the new city would be constructed, the delegation was said by Le Soleil to have encountered “a festive atmosphere.” The article continues:
The ladies in their most beautiful boubous, the children of the schools waving small flags in the colors of the two countries. The men, in this region of cattle breeding, had abandoned their flocks for a while. No one would have wanted to miss this event about which people will later, in the evening around the fire, be able to tell their grandchildren.Footnote 114
The stone itself, which was revealed at the ceremony had the following words inscribed on its base: “Pour remémorer l’alliance de Xerxès avec les Ethiopiens orientaux et occidentaux, en présence de S. M. I. Farah Pahlavi S. E. Léopold Sédar Senghor, président de la République du Sénégal (to commemorate the alliance between Xerxes and the oriental and occidental Ethiopians, in the presence of H. I. M. Farah Pahlavi H. E. Léopold Sédar Senghor, President of the Republic of Senegal).”Footnote 115 The inscription on the foundation stone fed into the narrative of Iranian historical, cultural and civilizational exceptionalism, but it also, perhaps unintentionally, reveals something of Iran’s imperialist motivation or at the very least the blatant imbalance in this relationship, because the Ethiopians were not allied to Xerxes in any true sense; instead they were subjects in his empire.
The visit of Empress Farah to Senegal was reciprocated by President Senghor, who visited Iran from 25 to 30 April the same year. He was met at Tehran’s Mehrābād airport by the shah and Empress Farah, along with Hoveydā, the heads of the senate and majles, the minister of foreign affairs, ʿAbbas ʿAli Khalʿatbari, and chief of the armed forces, Gholāmrezā Azhāri, among others.Footnote 116 He was honored with a twenty-one-gun salute and the eight imperial aircraft that had met the Senegalese at the border flew overhead. He was awarded an honorary doctorate from the University of Tehran and he and his wife received first class honors from the shah.Footnote 117 To mark the visit, Ettelāʿāt dedicated a full-page spread to Senegal, in which Senghor was praised as “a great poet, scholar and philosopher.”Footnote 118 As previously mentioned, the shah also repeatedly expressed his admiration for Senghor during this visit.
Although the high-level visits between Iran and Senegal increased in frequency in the final years before the revolution—Senghor visited Iran again in 1977 and 1978, and Empress Farah was planning her second visit to Senegal in January 1979—the Keur Farah Pahlavi project was proceeding more slowly than expected. In an interview with the publication Afrique Industrie Infrastructures in January 1978, when asked about the reasons for the delay, Senghor responded:
When a project is delayed, it is usually for one of the following reasons: preliminary studies that take longer or are more difficult than anticipated, the sourcing of funding, or a lack of will of the promoters. On this last point, we have no doubts whatsoever: the joint will of Iran and Senegal to realize this project has been reaffirmed recently, and with great force.Footnote 119
In fact, the delay, which was, Senghor argued, “not a very important delay,” was caused by “the complexity of the studies and the care taken to obtain suitable financing conditions.”Footnote 120 It is true that the project was vast and expensive; and although Iran had agreed to cover a substantial amount of the costs, it still required further investment and loans.
Even the Iranian economic crisis in 1977 failed to dampen Iran’s commitment to the project; the joint Iranian-Senegalese commission was meeting as late as July 1978, the final reports were submitted in March 1979, and, as mentioned already, Empress Farah was planning another visit to Senegal in January 1979. Even during the unfolding crisis that would lead to the revolution there were no indications that Iran was pulling back from the project. This indicates that the project was more than a mere economic partnership through which Iranian crude oil would be traded for phosphates; it was also a symbol of a cultural and political relationship, and a reflection of the close personal friendships between the leaders. The shah expressed this sentiment clearly in 1976 during Senghor’s visit, when he said: “Thankfully, the relations between our two countries are based on increasing cooperation in all fields of economics, trade, science and culture. The existence of a new city now being created in the name of the Shahbanou of Iran in Senegal is a symbol of the extent of this friendship and the closeness of our two nations.”Footnote 121
Conclusion
Notwithstanding Iran’s clear and demonstrable geostrategic push into West Africa, in some respects the relationship with Senegal itself was an unlikely one that flourished because of a particular set of circumstances. One of the major factors was the personal relationships that developed between the leaders of the two countries, which allowed for dialogue to take place and concessions to be made in negotiations. Another was the receptiveness of Senegal to Iranian financial and political support. Eager to avoid the politics of the cold war, Iran represented a powerful patron that apparently reduced Senegalese interest in American support. For instance, in contrast to the festival atmosphere that greeted the visits of Princess Ashraf, Empress Farah and Prime Minister Hoveydā, when asked in 1976 to comment on Kissinger’s imminent tour of Africa, Senegal’s minister of foreign affairs replied dismissively, “We do not pay attention to such trips.”Footnote 122 Of course, the minister’s statement probably served merely to flatter the Iranians and there is no doubting American influence in Africa at the time. However, while other African states might have relied on American financial support, Senegal already had a rich and powerful benefactor in the shah’s Iran, a country that offered them financial incentives without dragging them into the politics of the cold war.
Iranian–Senegalese relations in the 1970s perfectly illustrate how Pahlavi Iran used its relatively recently acquired financial clout to expand its political influence. When negotiating potential loans with the World Bank for the Keur Farah Pahlavi Project, Jahāngir Āmuzegār, who had served as ambassador at large and chief of the Iranian Economic Mission in Washington DC since 1963, proposed that for each sum required, a portion be loaned first to Iran. For example, if $20 million was needed, Āmuzegār suggested that $10 million be loaned directly to Senegal and $10 million to Iran to pass on to Senegal. When asked by the World Bank representative how this would provide additional benefit to Senegal, Āmuzegār responded that it would not; “it would however provide certain political benefits for Iran vis-à-vis Senegal.”Footnote 123 To Iran, therefore, the relationship was more than merely economic investment, it was about expanding its political reach in West Africa, using financial incentives to achieve this goal.
It is hard properly to envisage how the Keur Farah Pahlavi project would have materialized. Was it too ambitious ever to be implemented on the scale envisioned by the governments of Iran and Senegal? And would Iran have been able to provide the funding that it pledged? On the first point, it should be noted that even on the Senegalese side there were some doubts about the scale of the project. During one visit to the site in January 1977, one of the Senegalese representatives told Safdie that he thought a projected population of 200,000 was unrealistic, “though he acknowledged that with the President’s position, he is unlikely to challenge it.”Footnote 124 If in private conversation these opinions were expressed, they did not affect the direction of the project and in January 1978 Senghor said that he expected the city to become the country’s second most populous by the year 2001.Footnote 125 These figures are also reflected in the reports published by Moshe Safdie, which suggests that although some considered the project to be overly ambitious, there was a determination to fulfill the mandate set by the leadership.
Whatever the eventual size of the city would be, the venture to construct such a joint Iranian–Senegalese city was unprecedented. It was to be an industrial city, but it also reflected Iranian–Senegalese cultural and political relations. As Empress Farah said during her visit to Senegal:
The laying of the first stone of an Iranian–Senegalese oil refinery is more than an economic gesture: it transcends the alliance of phosphate and petroleum and constitutes much more than a vow. This act of industrial infrastructure is the very symbol of our determination to build a world of brotherhood and hope.Footnote 126
The relationship between Iran and Senegal in the 1970s provides a perfect example of Iran’s global foreign policy objectives at a time when the shah’s international prestige was at its peak. He saw opportunities to expand Iran’s influence all over the world, not merely in the Middle East, the countries of the Indian Ocean, Europe and North America, but Sub-Saharan Africa too. As this paper has shown, bilateral relations such as the one with Senegal were key to Iran’s global political strategy and as the shah’s economic and political strength grew, so too did the attention he paid to the Global South.
